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Para Mirna y Camilo 
 With minute and amateurish interest, I found atop a scoop in the base of a 
big, drifted, scorched tree trunk five little piles of fox dung, a big owl’s 
puke ball full of hair and rat skulls, and three fresher piles of what had to be 
coon droppings, brown and small, shaped like a dog’s or a human’s. 
 
Why intrigued ignorance asked, did wild things so often choose to stool on 
rocks, stumps, and other elevations? 
 
Common sense replied:  Maybe for the view. . . .  
 
The trouble was, I was ignorant.  Even in that country where I belonged, my 
ken of natural things didn’t include a little bird that went heap-heap. . . . Or 
a million other matters worth the kenning. . . . 
 
With a box gushing refrigerated air (or warmed, seasonally depending) into 
a sealed house and another box flashing loud bright images into our jaded 
heads, . . . why should we sweat ourselves where the Eskimo curlew went? 
 
--John Graves (1960) 
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This is an ecological history of a development project planned and managed 
by technical experts: the origin, decline, spectacular revival, and tragic fate of the 
Peruvian guano industry.  In another sense, this is a social history of an elite type--
the environmental technocrat--and those they served.   
During the nineteenth century, scientific travelers appropriated Andean 
knowledge of vast, ancient deposits of nitrogen fertilizer for use by farmers in the 
Northern Hemisphere.  During the early twentieth century, environmental scientists 
reoriented the guano industry for Peruvian use.  They oversaw the development of 
perhaps “the greatest of all industries based upon the conservation of wild 
animals.” 
 This project had both global and local repercussions.  The two-way 
exchange of personnel, ideas, and technologies between Peru and the rest of the 
world revolutionized scientific understanding of the Peru Current ecosystem.  This 
knowledge led directly to international recognition of the global importance of the 
vii 
El Niño phenomenon.  Through the issue of human population control, Peru’s 
experiment inspired the emergence of an environmental movement that spanned the 
Americas after World War II.  In Peru, technical experts fundamentally influenced 
the political process, input-intensive agriculture, artisanal and industrial fishing, the 
organization of “big science” institutions, as well as the guano birds and their 
ecological community.  Ultimately, technocrats enriched and empowered a new 
ruling class for Peru.  
Beginning in the 1940s, the specter of an impending catastrophe in the 
global food supply gave impetus to the exploitation of the world’s fish stocks.  To 
serve this demand, scientists helped engineer for Peru the largest industrial fishery 
on Earth.  Their studies legitimated the decision to let the guano birds pass into 
oblivion so their food, the anchoveta, could be processed into animal feed.  As a 
reflection of persistent global trends of food distribution, rather than feed the 
world’s undernourished, this fishmeal enabled affluent northerners to consume 
more meat.  This fishery was carefully supervised by experts, but they proved 
unable to prevent its collapse during the El Niño of 1972-1973.  This ecological 
disaster reveals how fleeting “sustainable growth” can be, even for the best-
managed development projects. 
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Introduction 
The Ecology of Expertise 
 
Laws . . . are eternal principles founded in the nature of things: principles that 
cannot be perceived with clarity except by experts accustomed to overcoming the 
difficulties of mental work and trained in scientific inquiry. . . . The right to decree 
laws pertains to the most intelligent--to the aristocracy of knowledge,  
created by nature. 
--Bartolomé Herrera (1846) 
In October 1944, Enrique Ávila was in trouble.  This budding young 
Peruvian scientist had used up the entire four-semester grant that the U.S. Institute 
of International Education had provided him so he could study wildlife 
management at the University of Wisconsin with the legendary conservationist 
Aldo Leopold.  He had good biological training by Peruvian standards: he had 
completed everything but his thesis for a bachiller degree from the Universidad de 
San Agustín de Arequipa, and he had done a year of intensive fieldwork studying 
Peruvian marine birds with U.S. ornithologist William Vogt during the intense El 
Niño event of 1941.  But his mediocre English-language skills slowed him down at 
first.  Now he had neither a degree nor money to continue and faced the prospect of 
deportation.  To make matters even more complicated, his fiancée, a former math 
student of his, was patiently waiting for him in Arequipa and longing for his return.  
His mentor Vogt had warned him this might happen; he thought Ávila (1917-1972) 
needed a few more years of experience and maturity before initiating studies in the 
United States.  Likewise, Leopold thought Ávila should return to Peru and pick up 
his graduate work later.   
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But Ávila would have none of this.  He was the intensely ambitious son of a 
successful peasant farmer and estate foreman from the high altiplano near Lake 
Titicaca.  He identified himself as “mostly Indian,” and he was acutely aware of his 
inferior social status as a cholo (a derogatory term for a Hispanicized indio or dark-
skinned mestizo) from Puno among the white sons of the coastal elite who 
dominated political, economic, and scientific life in Peru.  He could not bear to 
leave the United States without a Master of Science degree: “It would mean the 
opening of new opportunities . . . . In a country like mine, a degree of any kind has 
the magic power of a pass word.”  Ávila coveted “the advantage” such an 
accomplishment “would give to me in dealing with some petty politics of my 
country.”  To wait or fail “would have meant a direct and severe blow to my ego.”1 
Vogt used his connections as a prominent international conservationist to 
help get a student loan for his protégé, helped, no doubt, by the special 
circumstances of wartime which opened many opportunities for Latin Americans in 
the United States.  Aldo and Estella Leopold invited Ávila into their home--and 
presumably to the “shack” made famous in the environmental classic A Sand 
County Almanac--to help him through his final classwork.2  In 1945, Enrique Ávila 
returned triumphantly to Peru with a prestigious foreign degree and a five-year 
contract to work as his homeland’s first native-born professional ornithologist 
(illus. 1).  As one of the scientists entrusted with managing Peru’s famed guano 
                                                 
1. This section is based on the following sources: Aldo Leopold to William Vogt, 11 Oct. 
1944, 18 Oct. 1944, Vogt papers, box 1:2; Enrique Ávila to Vogt, 16 Oct. 1944, 26 Apr. 1948, Vogt 
papers, box 1:1; interview with Basilia Díaz Viuda de Ávila and Ingrid Ávila Díaz, Lima, Peru, 13 
June 2001; MCAG 34 (1943), viii-ix; MCAG 35 (1944), 48. 
2. Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1949). 
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birds, Ávila set up his homeland’s first permanent marine laboratory next to the 
nesting colony on Isla Don Martín.  Yet against his hopes, his technical expertise 
and accomplishments did not give him immunity from racial discrimination in 
Lima’s scientific circles, and his work was generally discounted or ignored by 
those in power.  “No prophet is accepted in his own country,” Ávila’s wife later 
remembered. 
Ávila used his foreign links to further his scientific education at the Scripps 
Institution of Oceanography in California and to obtain a temporary research 
position at the nuclear facility in Mayagüez, Puerto Rico--two of the leading 
centers for environmental research in the Americas.  In a brief reversal of fortune, 
Ávila was named Director of Investigations at the Instituto del Mar del Perú (the 
Peruvian Institute of the Sea, IMARPE), Peru’s premier scientific research 
institution, in the late 1960s just before his life was cut short by cancer.  If only for 
a moment, Ávila was in charge of research crucial to the management of Peru’s 
vast fishing industry. 
These achievements did not provide material security for his family, at least 
not in the short term.  Several times they had to move in with their extended family 
back in the highlands to survive the ups and downs of Ávila’s career and the 
Peruvian economy.  After Ávila’s death, his wife ended up in a poorly built hovel 
in Comas, a barriada (shantytown) on Lima’s rapidly expanding northern 
periphery.  A torrential downpour during the 1982-1983 El Niño event destroyed 
many of her belongings, including practically all of Ávila’s carefully preserved 
private papers and photographs. 
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But Ávila’s persistence finally paid off for his children.  Ávila’s son Yuri 
was able to use his own English-language skills and connections derived from his 
father’s foreign experience to obtain an education and permanent livelihood as an 
engineer in the United States.  Like so many immigrants, he eventually used his 
financial means to help support his mother and sister remaining behind in Peru and 
enable them to escape from the barriadas to a comfortable suburban home in Lima. 
In its general features, the biography of Enrique Ávila and his family is 
representative of millions of aspiring professionals worldwide who have sought to 
use education and technical accomplishment to escape from disadvantaged 
backgrounds and the dilemmas of “underdevelopment.”  Ávila hoped his expertise 
would grant him some measure of the status and influence that for centuries has 
been the birthright of upper-class Creole and foreign-born whites in Peru.  
Specialized training has long provided an avenue for social advance in Peru, 
at least for an already privileged few.  Peru’s ruling class did not start looking to 
the technically trained for guidance only yesterday.  Despite what the black legend 
of Iberian obscurantism may say, we do not have to turn to France and Britain, the 
homelands of the Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution, to locate the deep roots 
of this tendency.  Iberian monarchs tried to use science, technology, and expert 
advice to bring order to their empires at least as far back as the sixteenth century.  
In the best-known case, a group of expert theologians and humanists, western 
5 
Europe’s first comparative ethnographers, profoundly influenced Iberian royal 
policy toward the indigenous peoples of the New World.3 
Spanish colonial officials in Peru also looked to experts for help, especially 
during major crises.  On the night of 28 October 1746, one of the most destructive 
earthquakes of modern times struck Peru’s central coast.  In Lima, then the 
preeminent city in South America, it toppled the king’s statue over the main city 
bridge, collapsed the towers of the cathedral, and damaged over 99 percent of 
Lima’s dwellings, leaving tens of thousands homeless.  A tsunami virtually wiped 
the port city of Callao off the face of the earth, killing all but 200 of its 4,000 
inhabitants and leaving Lima open to piracy or military invasion by sea (map 1).  
Epidemics and massive looting followed in the wake of these seismic events.  For 
the viceroy of Peru and his subordinates, this was an unprecedented administrative 
challenge.  For the upper class, it threatened to wipe out the prestige and power 
entailed by their damaged property.  For everyone else, it was a dire threat to 
survival, long after the shaking had stopped.  This cataclysm captured the attention 
                                                 
3. On these points, see Enrique Martínez Ruis and José María López Piñero, eds., Felipe II, 
la ciencia y la técnica (Madrid: Actas Editorial, 1999); David C. Goodman, “The Scientific 
Revolution in Spain and Portugal,” in The Scientific Revolution in National Context, ed. Roy Porter 
and Mikuláš Teich (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 158-177; idem, Power 
and Penury: Government, Technology and Science in Philip II’s Spain (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988); Antonio Lafuente and José Sala Catalá, eds., Ciencia colonial en América 
(Madrid: Alianza, 1992); Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the 
Origins of Comparative Ethnography (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Juan J. 
Linz, “Intellectual Roles in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Spain,” Daedalus 101:3 (Summer 
1972), 59-108; R. Hooykaas, Humanism and the Voyages of Discovery in Sixteenth-Century 
Portuguese Science and Letters (Amsterdam, 1979); Edmundo O’Gorman, La invención de 
América: Investigación acerca de la estructura histórica del nuevo mundo y del sentido de su 
devenir, 2d ed. (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1977); Lewis Hanke, The Spanish 
Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1949).  
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of natural philosophers in Mexico, Europe, and North America and set the stage for 
reactions to the earthquake and tsunami that leveled Lisbon a decade later.4 
The viceroy responded to this crisis by appointing the French 
mathematician Louis Godin, a former member of the geodesic expedition that 
measured the earth at the equator and future head of the Spanish naval academy, to 
chair a commission to plan the rebuilding of Lima.  Over 1,100 kilometers away, at 
his remote missionary post in the Moxos region of the Amazon Basin, the Jesuit 
mathematician Juan Rehr (1691-1756) received a similar order instructing him to 
travel across the Andes to oversee the repair and reconstruction of Jesuit properties 
in the capital.  After two decades in the wilderness, this Prague native was 
welcomed in Lima as civilization’s savior.  The viceroy soon appointed him to fill 
Godin’s old positions as professor of mathematics and royal cosmographer, and 
more importantly, to take command of the cathedral’s reconstruction.5 
                                                 
4. Alberto Giesecke and Enrique Silgado, Terremotos en el Perú (Lima: Ediciones Rikchay 
Perú, 1981), 23-27; Charles Walker, “Shaking the Unstable Empire: The Lima, Quito, and Arequipa 
Earthquakes, 1746, 1783, and 1797,” in Dreadful Visitations: Confronting Natural Catastrophe in 
the Age of Enlightenment, ed. Alessa Johns (New York: Routledge, 1999), 115-122, 135-138.  See 
also T. D. Kendrick, The Lisbon Earthquake (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1957); and Histoire des 
tremblemens de terre arrive’s a Lima, capitale du Perou, et autres lieux; avec la description du 
Perou, et des recherches sur les Causes physiques des Tremblemens de Terre, par M. Hales de la 
Société Royale de Londres, & autres Phisiciens (Paris: La Haye, 1752), the French translation of a 
report to the Viceroy of Peru, also published in Mexico City, London, Lisbon, Philadelphia (by 
Benjamin Franklin), and Boston (in the French case with an appended translation of Stephen Hales’s 
1750 dissertatation on the climatic causes of earthquakes).  
5.  The Llanos de Mojos is a tropical savanna in what is now lowland Bolivia.  El 
conocimiento de los tiempos. Ephemeride del año de 1750 . . . . Por el P. Juan Rer [sic] de la 
Compañia de Jesus, Cathedratico de Prima, de Matematicas, en la Real Universidad de San 
Marcos de la misma Ciudad. Con Licencia (Lima, 1749), 3, 21; Walker, “Shaking the Unstable 
Empire,” 123-127, 142 n. 30; Diccionario histórico y biográfico del Perú: siglos XV-XX, ed. Carlos 
Milla Batres, (Lima: Editorial Milla Batres, 1986), s.v. “Rehr, Juan”; Diccionario histórico y 
biográfico del Perú, ed. Manuel de Mendiburu, 2d ed. (Lima: Librería e Imprenta Gil, 1934), s.v. 
“Rher, Juan” [sic]; David Block, Native Tradition, Jesuit Enterprise, and Secular Policy in Moxos, 
1660-1880 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 40, 114. 
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Besides changing the face of Lima’s urban landscape, this Jesuit savant 
transformed the cosmographer’s office and forever altered the course of Peruvian 
science.  Rehr firmly believed that “everyone can see clearly in the theater of 
nature,” and he publicly declared that Galileo had proved “our movement.”  Rehr 
continued the astronomical observations, astrological prognostications, and 
calendrical tasks that had long been required of kingly advisors in his position, 
since these were “necessary for government” and navigation in the region.  But he 
was dissatisfied with the idea that the movements of the heavenly bodies provided a 
good instrument for predicting the meteorological shifts that affected local 
agriculture and medical practice.  So he initiated empirical “rustic astrology,” 
quantitative instrumental observations, and published the first systematic 
atmospheric measurements in Peru.  This friar’s simple act of setting up a 
barometer was a sure sign that the Enlightenment had arrived in Peru.6 
What a contrast to events in Portugal, where the great earthquake of 1755 
also led to the appointment of an expert commission to rebuild Lisbon, but 
contributed in short order to the expulsion of the Jesuits from the entire Portuguese 
empire by the enlightened despot, the Marquês de Pombal.7  Despite the 
                                                 
6. El conocimiento de los tiempos. Ephemeride del año de 1750, 3, 5-6, 16, 18-22; El 
conocimiento de los tiempos. Ephemeride del año de 1754 (Lima, 1753), 6; El conocimiento de los 
tiempos. Ephemeride del año de 1755 (Lima, 1754), 12-13; El conocimiento de los tiempos. 
Ephemeride del año de 1756 (Lima, 1755), 4-5; Jan Golinski, “Barometers of Change: 
Meteorological Instruments as Machines of Enlightenment,”  in The Sciences in Enlightened 
Europe, ed. William Clark, Jan Golinski, and Simon Schaffer (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999), 69-93.  Cf. Lizardo Seiner Lizárraga, “Los inicios de la meteorología en el Perú y la 
labor del Cosmografiato, 1753-1856,” in Science and Cultural Diversity (in press). 
7. David K. Chester, “The 1755 Lisbon Earthquake,” Progress in Physical Geography 25:3 
(2001), 363-383; J. R. Mullin, “The Reconstruction of Lisbon Following the Earthquake of 1755: A 
Study in Despotic Planning,” Planning Perspectives 7 (1992), 157-179; Luis Gonzaga Jaeger, 
“Many Were the Pretexts,” in The Expulsion of the Jesuits from Latin America, ed. Magnus Mörner 
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contributions of men like Rehr, the Spanish empire followed suit in 1767.  Though 
designed to centralize and strengthen Iberian governance--and many say to knock 
down a major barrier to the modern philosophy--the Jesuits’ unpopular expulsion 
mainly served to eliminate an entire group vital to science, education, and 
economic life in Latin America.8 
Enlightened members of the urban Creole elite in Spanish America worked 
to fill this vacuum: by founding local economic and scientific societies, by 
traveling overseas for advanced education, by reforming technical training back 
home, by participating as correspondents and collectors in international scientific 
networks, and by engaging in the trans-Atlantic dispute over the supposed natural 
                                                                                                                                        
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 122-123. Cf. Kenneth R. Maxwell, Pombal: Paradox of the 
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University Press, 1991), 32-46, echoing Salvador de Madariaga’s evaluation of Spanish America, 
“The Fall of the Jesuits--The Triumph of the Philosophers,” in Expulsion of the Jesuits, 33-40.  
Contrast this to Rehr’s Jesuit colleague Juan de Hospital who is often credited with introducing 
modern natural philosophy to Quito about 1760; Juan José Saldaña, “Ilustración, ciencia y técnica 
en América,” in La Ilustración en América colonial: Bibliografía crítica, ed. Diana Soto Arango, 
Miguel Ángel Puig-Samper, and Luis Carlos Arboleda (Madrid: Ediciones Doce Calles, 1995), 40-
41; cf. Constancio Eguía Ruiz, “A Staggering Blow for Education,” in Expulsion of the Jesuits, 175-
180.  Rehr’s case also argues against the “cultural decadence of the Peruvian province of the order,” 
suggested by Antonello Gerbi (who otherwise highlights Jesuit scientific contributions) in The 
Dispute of the New World: The History of a Polemic, 1750-1900, trans. Jeremy Moyle (Pittsburgh, 
PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973), originally published as La disputa del Nuovo Mondo: 
Storia di una polemica, 1750-1900 (Milan: Riccardo Ricciardi Editore, 1955), esp. 233; cf. Luis 
Martín, The Intellectual Conquest of Peru: The Jesuit College of San Pablo: 1568-1767 (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1968). 
Some recent work has given attention to the impact of the Jesuits’ expulsion; see Jorge 
Cañizares Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World: Histories, Epistemologies, and 
Identities in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2001), 165-166, 182-190, 199-204, 234-261; D. A. Brading, The First America: The Spanish 
Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the Liberal State, 1492-1867 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 166-183, 447-464, 467-468, 497-507. 
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inferiority of the Americas.  Though they were mostly forbidden from holding 
prominent political positions and received help from foreign visitors like 
Alessandro Malaspina and Alexander von Humboldt, these Creoles engineered 
their own “cultural revolution” in the colonies.9 
Rehr’s initiatives continued to bear fruit in this context.  His successors 
perpetuated Rehr’s meteorological observations.  This climate record allowed the 
Peruvian-born physician Hipólito Unanue (1755-1833) to recognize immediately 
that the hot Lima summer of 1791 was extremely anomalous.  A few years later, he 
tied those observations to similar anomalies in 1701, 1720, and 1728.  This was a 
major discovery for environmental science, as we now know this periodic 
recurrence as the El Niño phenomenon.10   
                                                 
9. The study of this revolution and its ties to Spain has exploded in recent years.  Besides 
ref. in previous note, see Joaquín F. Quintanilla, Naturalistas para una corte ilustrada (Madrid: 
Ediciones Doce Calles, 1999); Juan Pimentel, La física de la Monarquía: Ciencia y política en el 
pensamiento colonial de Alejandro Malaspina (1754-1810) (Madrid: Ediciones Doce Calles, 1998); 
Virginia González Claverán, La expedición científica de Malaspina en Nueva España, 1789-1794 
(Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1988).  Older studies of note include: John Tate Lanning, The 
Royal Protomedicato: The Regulation of the Medical Professions in the Spanish Empire, ed. John 
Jay TePaske (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985); idem, The Eighteenth-Century 
Enlightenment in the University of San Carlos de Guatemala (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1956); Rose Marie Buechler, “The Mining Society of Potosí, 1776-1810” (Ph.D. diss., Syracuse 
University, 1981); idem, “Technical Aid to Upper Peru: The Nordenflicht Expedition,” JLAS 5 
(1973), 37-77; Arthur Robert Steele, Flowers for the King: The Expedition of Ruiz and Pavon and 
the Flora of Peru (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1964); Richard Herr, The Eighteenth-
Century Revolution in Spain (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958). 
10. Hipólito Unanue, [Aristio,  pseud.], “Precauciones para conservar la salud en el 
presente Otoño,” Mercurio Peruano 14 Apr. 1791, 275-280, in Mercurio Peruano: Edición 
facsimilar, vol. 1 (Lima: Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, 1964); idem, Observaciones sobre el clima 
de Lima, y sus influencias en los seres organizados, en especial el hombre (1806; reprint, in 
Hipólito Unanue, ed. Jorge Árias-Schreiber Pezet (Lima: Comisión Nacional del Sesquicentenario 
de la Independencia de Perú, 1974), 1:67; Richard Grove, “Global Impact of the 1789-93 El Niño,” 
Nature 28 May 1998, 318-319.  Cf. Gregory T. Cushman, “Enclave Vision: Foreign Networks in 
Peru and the Internationalization of El Niño Research during the 1920s,” in Science and Cultural 
Diversity: Proceedings of 21st International Congress of History of Science (Mexico City: 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, in press).  
10 
This was but one, minor example of Unanue’s contributions to science, 
medicine, and “scientific administration” in late-colonial Peru.  He was later 
rewarded for these accomplishments by José de San Martín and Simón Bolívar, the 
“liberators of South America,” who appointed him to major positions in the 
government of independent Peru during the 1820s, including two stints as Minister 
of Finance.  Unanue was one of several scientists to achieve prominence as 
founding fathers of post-colonial Latin America, before he retired with his large 
scientific library to the life of a patrician on a rural hacienda in the Cañete Valley.11 
Even if, despite the best attempts of their fathers, the sons of this nascent 
technical elite tended to drift away to other careers or jumped directly into politics 
during the first decades after independence, Latin America maintained its long 
tradition uniting science and expertise to governance.  The highly exceptional 
biography of a more recent Peruvian shows the immense power, wealth, and 
prestige that it has occasionally become possible for the underprivileged to obtain 
                                                 
11. On Unanue and his Peruvian compatriots, see Jean-Pierre Clément, El Mercurio 
Peruano, 1790–1795: vol. I: Estudio (Frankfurt: Vervuert, 1997); Jorge Cañizares, “La Utopía de 
Hipólito Unanue: Comercio, naturaleza, y religión en el Perú,” in Saberes andinos: Ciencia y 
tecnología en Bolivia, Ecuador y Perú, ed. Marcos Cueto (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 
1995), 91-108; Diccionario histórico y biográfico del Perú, s.v. “Unanue, Hipólito”; John E. 
Woodham, “Hipólito Unanue and the Enlightenment in Peru” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1964); 
William Pratt Dale, II, “The Cultural Revolution in Peru” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1941). 
On the importance of science and engineering during the era of Latin American 
independence, see Thomas F. Glick, “Science and Independence in Latin America, with Special 
Reference to New Granada,” HAHR 71:2 (1991), 307-334; Frank Safford, The Ideal of the 
Practical: Colombia’s Struggle to Form a Technical Elite (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1976), pt. 3, esp. 96-98; Emilia Viotti da Costa, “José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva: A Brazilian 
Founding Father,” in The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1985), 24-52; Tristan Platt, “The Alchemy of Modernity. Alonso Barba’s Copper Cauldrons 
and the Independence of Bolivian Metallurgy (1790-1890),” JLAS 32 (2000), 1-54.  
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in the name of meritocracy, as well as the promises and pitfalls of technocratic 
governance for contemporary society. 
Far more than Enrique Ávila, the Peruvian-born nisei Alberto Fujimori 
(1938-) started life as a reviled minority.  His family easily could have ended up in 
a U.S. concentration camp like tens of thousands of other Japanese descendants 
living in the Americas during World War II.12  
Once this initial danger passed, like Ávila, Fujimori pursued a career path 
premised on meritocratic advancement.  Like so many of his generation, Fujimori 
adhered to the mantra “Quién estudia, triunfa” (He who studies, triumphs)--the title 
of a popular Peruvian television show in the early 1950s.  He ended up attending 
the Escuela Nacional de Agricultura at La Molina, Peru’s national training school 
for agronomists.  University reforms had only recently allowed the large-scale 
admission of students of color.  “Fujimono,” as he was derogatorily known, 
tirelessly stuck to his studies and rose to first in his class.  Much like Ávila, 
Fujimori became a math teacher at his alma mater and eventually completed a 
master’s degree in mathematics at the University of Wisconsin.  Unlike Ávila, he 
was never much of a técnico, and he made his fortune as a land developer on 
Lima’s suburban periphery.  Fujimori gave up scientific pursuits altogether after he 
returned from abroad with a prestigious degree and became involved in the tumult 
of university politics.  Posing as an outsider, he was improbably elected rector of 
                                                 
12. Luis Jochamowitz, Ciudadano Fujimori: La construcción de un político (Lima: Peisa, 
1993), ch. 2; Michi Weglyn, Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America’s Concentration Camps 
(New York: Morrow Quill, 1976), 59-66.   
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the renamed Universidad Nacional Agraria in 1984, and then used this as a 
springboard to national prominence.13 
In 1990, Fujimori did something Enrique Ávila never dreamed of 
accomplishing: he jumped into the national presidential race.  During his campaign, 
he cultivated the dual image as an anti-political técnico and agrarian populist.  
Building on the small, rural notoriety he had gained as the television host of a 
farming program, Fujimori portrayed himself as an expert on Andean cultivars.  He 
claimed to have learned that “every problem has a scientific and rational solution” 
during his graduate training in the United States, and he adopted the campaign 
slogan “Technology, Honesty, and Work.”  He eschewed traditional political 
parties and established the habit of arriving at political rallies aboard a tractor--the 
“Fujimóvil.”  It is said that, behind the scenes, Fujimori turned to the writings of 
U.S. management guru W. Edwards Deming for guidance.  Deming was recognized 
in U.S. business circles as “the American who taught the Japanese about quality,” 
the self-proclaimed architect of Japan’s postwar industrial miracle.  This was a 
potent association, since it put a positive light on Fujimori’s ethnicity and ties to 
“scientific management.”  It made him look like the right man to lead Peru down 
the “pathway from the periphery” blazed by the “Asian tigers,” the newly 
industrializing countries on the other side of the Pacific Rim.14 
                                                 
13. Jochamowitz, Ciudadano Fujimori, 162, 166-169, 174, 181, 183-185, 215, 221, 234-
237.   
14. Ibid., 185, 256-257, 264-267, 276-280; Kenneth M. Roberts, “Neoliberalism and the 
Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case,” World Poltics 48:1 (Oct. 1995), 
92-96.  On the Deming legend, see William M. Tsutsui, Manufacturing Ideology: Scientific 
Management in Twentieth-Century Japan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 197-
201.  Cf. Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly 
Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
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As it turned out, Fujimori could not have chosen a more brilliant campaign 
strategy.  Even more than its other South American neighbors at the time, Peru was 
caught in a downspiral of debt, hyperinflation, unemployment, and immiseration.  
Leftist revolutionary movements in alliance with drug traffickers threatened to rip 
the Peruvian state apart, starting with its electrical infrastructure.  Middle-class 
workers (especially those with technical training like Yuri Ávila) were leaving Peru 
in droves.  Others survived by participating in Peru’s rapidly growing “informal 
economy.”  The main presidential candidate of the political right, the international 
literary star Mario Vargas Llosa, promised to impose a severe “neoliberal 
adjustment” after his election to resolve this crisis.  Coming from an exemplar of 
the aloof, white, cosmopolitian intellectual, such a presecription was all but 
impossible to sell to Peru’s besieged mestizo majority.15 
In these historical circumstances, a son of Japanese immigrants who had 
seemingly conquered racism and poverty through scientific training and hard work 
suddenly became the most powerful man in Peru.  To gain further confidence at 
home and abroad, Fujimori placed a respected representative of the center-left with 
advanced degrees in agronomic engineering, agricultural economics, and public 
administration at the helm of his new government.  Then, following the vogue set 
by the “Chicago Boys” in Chile during the 1970s, Harvard’s Wunderkind 
economist Jeffrey Sachs in Bolivia and Poland during the 1980s, and International 
                                                 
15. Roberts, “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism,” 92-96; Carlos Contreras 
and Marcos Cueto, Historia del Perú contemporáneo: Desde las luchas por la Independencia hasta 
el presente, 2d ed. (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos/Red para el Desarrollo de las Ciencias 
Sociales en el Perú, 2000), 331-341.  
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Monetary Fund officials all over the world after the fall of the Soviet bloc, Fujimori 
installed a a true neoliberal technocrat as his prime minister in February 1991.  
Oxford-educated economist Carlos Boloña (1950-) designed a radical “change of 
course” for the Peruvian economy that went much farther than Vargas Llosa’s 
reviled free-market proposals.  Contradicting the so-called Washington consensus 
of the 1990s positing a natural connection between economic and political freedom, 
Fujimori dissolved most of Peru’s democratic institutions in order to eliminate 
barriers to these programs and oppose “terrorism” effectively.  True to his word, 
the “Fujishock” and “Fujigolpe” crushed left-wing insurgency and produced a 
short-lived economic bonanza through a spate of privatizations.  Fujimori later used 
his power quite successfully to mitigate damage caused by the El Niño event of 
1997-1998, the strongest of the twentieth century.  But this “open” authoritarian 
environment created enormous potential for graft.  Thanks to the paranoid 
fascination Fujimori’s ironically named spy-chief Vladimiro Lenin Montesinos had 
with hidden camaras, the world knows something of the extent of this corruption 
from thousands of “vladivideos.”  Fujimori’s promise of competent, expert 
administration was betrayed by the very doggedness with which he sought a 
pathway from the periphery of power in Peru.16 
                                                 
16. Roberts, “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism,” 96-102; Contreras and 
Cueto, Historia del Perú contemporáneo, 342-361; The Peru Report’s Guide to Top People in Peru: 
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Juan Carlos,” “Boloña Behr, Carlos”; Antonio Zapata Velasco and Juan Carlos Sueiro, Naturaleza y 
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Peruanos/CooperAcción, 1999); El Comercio: Anuario 2000-2001 (Lima: Apoyo Comunicaciones, 
2001), 39-44, 51-56; Carmen Rosa Balbi and David Scott Palmer, “Political Earthquake: The 70 
Days That Shook Peru,” LASA Forum 31:4 (Winter 2001), 7-11. 
On the connection between the Washington consensus and Peru’s political economy of the 
1990s, see Carlos Boloña, Cambio de rumbo: El programa económico para los 90 (Lima: Instituto 
15 
The denoument of these events had an added twist that further illustrates a 
major theme of these biographical vignettes, as well as this study as a whole: the 
ubiquitous rise of experts to political and economic power in Peru and around the 
globe.17 
                                                                                                                                        
de Economía de Libre Mercado, 1993); Carlos E. Paredes and Jeffrey D. Sachs, eds., Peru’s Path to 
Recovery: A Plan for Economic Stabilization and Growth (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 
1991).  On the role of technocrats in 1990s Peru, see Catherine M. Conaghan, “Stars of the Crisis: 
The Ascent of Economists in Peruvian Public Life,” in The Politics of Expertise in Latin America, 
ed. Miguel A. Centeno and Patricio Silva (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 142-164; Conaghan 
and James M. Malloy, Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the Central Andes 
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994).   
17. The rise of experts to power has attracted extensive attention from social scientists, 
especially those concerned with links between Latin America and the rest of the globe:  For an 
introduction, see John Markoff and Verónica Montecinos, “The Ubiquitous Rise of Economists,” 
Journal of Public Policy 13:1 (1993), 37-68; Miguel A. Centeno and Patricio Silva, eds., The 
Politics of Expertise in Latin America (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), esp. Michiel Baud, 
“The Quest for Modernity: Latin American Technocratic Ideas in Historical Perspective,” 13-35; 
Benno Galjart and Silva, eds., Designers of Development: Intellectuals and Technocrats in the Third 
World (Leiden: Leiden University Centre of Non-Western Studies, 1995); Centeno, “The New 
Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy,” Theory and Society 22:3 (June 1993), 307-
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Older studies that continue to influence discussion include Guillermo A. O’Donnell, 
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University of California Institute of International Studies, 1979); Carlos Estevam Martins, 
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58.  Tsutsui’s study of scientific management in Japan, Manufacturing Ideology, is a useful 
comparison.  Studies narrowly focused on Europe, the United States, and Soviet Union are too 
numerous to mention here.  
Book-length studies examining the relation between science, technology, expertise, and 
governance in Latin America since the late-nineteenth century include: Verónica Montecinos, 
Economists, Politics, and the State: Chile 1958-1994 (Amsterdam: CEDLA, 1998); Pamela S. 
Murray, Dreams of Development: Colombia’s National School of Mines and Its Engineers 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997); Mauricio Tenorio-Trillo, Mexico at the World’s 
Fairs: Crafting a Modern Nation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996); 
Barbara Weinstein, For Social Peace in Brazil: Industrialists and the Remaking of the Working 
Class in São Paulo, 1920-1964 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Juan 
Gabriel Valdés, Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995); Simon Schwartzman, A Space for Science: The Development of a Scientific 
Community in Brazil, rev. ed. (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991); Paul W. 
Drake, The Money Doctor in the Andes: The Kemmerer Missions, 1923-1933 (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1989); Mario Mariscotti, El secreto atómico de Huemul (Buenos Aires: 
Sudamericana/Planeta, 1985); Peter Smith, Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in 
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During the 2000 presidential election, Fujimori boldly manipulated Peru’s 
Supreme Court and used electoral fraud to stay in power.  His main opponent, 
economist and think-tank director Alejandro Toledo (1946-), used a tried-and-true 
populist tactic to oppose this action: he and his supporters took to the streets in 
protest.  The unexpected appearance of the vladivideos eventually forced Fujimori 
into exile in Japan.  Toledo won the election to replace Fujimori, partly because 
Peruvians trusted this technocrat and his proposed economic team to manage the 
Peruvian economy.  In July 2001, he was inaugurated president of the Republic of 
Peru.  Thus, this introduction comes full circle: the Peruvian majority voted for a 
man with roots in both the rural highlands and coastal shantytowns, the son of a 
poor sheepherder and fishing industry worker, a self-proclaimed cholo who once 
got by as a shoeshine boy in Chimbote.  Toledo worked his way to a Ph.D. in 
international development from the Stanford University Department of 
Economics.18  Fifty years after Enrique Ávila left his homeland to study in the 
United States, and for the first time since the Spaniards conquered the Inca Empire 
almost 500 years before, a man of indigenous descent held the highest position in 
the land. 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the earth’s inhabitants on both sides 
of the North-South divide live in an age of experts.  For many of us, in rich and 
poor countries alike, physicians mark the moment when our lives begin and when 
                                                                                                                                        
Twentieth-Century Mexico (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univeristy Press, 1979); José Murilo de 
Carvalho, A Escola de Minas de Ouro Preto: O peso da glória (Rio de Janeiro: FINEP/Companhia 
Editora Nacional, 1978). 
18. Peru Report’s Guide to Top People in Peru: 1992, s.v. “Toledo Manrique, Alejandro”; 
Current Biography Yearbook (New York: H. W. Wilson, 2001), s.v. “Toledo, Alejandro.”   
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they end, if only by signing a certificate.  The food we eat, the water we drink, the 
shelters we live in--including many of the ramshackle dwellings and concrete-
floored “sanitary markets” of the world’s poorest neighborhoods--are watched over 
by engineers and health officials (if only with a blind eye). 
In perhaps the best-known case of the ascent of experts to power, the party 
hierarchy that ruled the Mexican state tabbed Carlos Salinas de Gotari (Ph.D., 
Harvard, 1978) as heir-apparent to the presidency.  His fraudulent 1988 election 
swept a team of technocrats into key positions of power, including economist María 
de los Ángeles Moreno Uriegas (M.A., 1972), a rare woman technocrat, as 
Secretary of Fisheries.19  This clique quickly accomplished a revolutionary 
transformation of the relationship between the state, civil society, and the global 
marketplace that has been compared to the changes that followed the Mexican 
Revolution of the 1910s.  After the assassination of Salinas’s initial choice, he 
fingered his Secretary of Programming and Budget, economist Ernesto Zedillo 
Ponce de León (Ph.D., Yale, 1978) to succeed him as president.  As in Fujimori’s 
case, the lofty scientific credentials of Salinas and his cronies hardly made them 
immune to political corruption and violence.20 
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included Pedro Aspe Armella (Secretary of Finance--Ph.D., MIT, 1978), Jaime José Serra Puche 
(Secretary of Commerce--Ph.D., Yale, 1979), Jerminio Blanco Mendoza (chief NAFTA negotiator--
Ph.D., Chicago, 1978).  A close economic advisor, José Córdoba Montoya (who had training at the 
Sorbonne) scandalously lied about possessing a Ph.D. from Stanford.  Other environmental 
technocrats included economist Patricio Chirinos Calero (Secretary of Urban Development and 
Ecology, Licenciatura, UNAM, 1964).   
20. Miguel Ángel Centeno, Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico 
(University Park: Pennsylvannia State University Press, 1994), passim; Sarah Babb, Managing 
Mexico: Economists from Nationalism to Neoliberalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2001), ch. 6-7; Stephane R. Golob, “‘Making Possible What Is Necessary’: Pedro Aspe, the Salinas 
Team, and the Next Mexican ‘Miracle,’” in Technopols: Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin 
18 
In the extreme case of one 1990s Taiwanese government, the president and 
14 of 15 cabinet ministers had Ph.D.s, ten acquired from U.S. graduate schools.  
Beginning in 1992, a group of top economists, the “Seven Wise Men,” were given 
charge of economic policy in the United Kingdom, despite the fact that their 
economic models seldom agreed and their quantitative predictions were almost 
always wrong.  By 2002, even the President of the United States possessed a Ph.D. 
from the London School of Economics, had taught for years at the Ivy League’s 
Dartmouth College, and won the Nobel Prize in Economics--at least in the fantasy 
world of U.S. network television.  Though their actions are sometimes obscured by 
worshipful praise of the invisible hand of the market, experts have become the 
priests, even designers, of a transnational political order.21 
A favorite explanation for this triumphal ascent of experts has been that 
they serve an indispensable function or role in modern society.  The increasing 
complexity, scale, speed, specialization, and interdependence of industrialized life 
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major credit to scientists, engineers, and business managers for the prowess of U.S. capitalism.  
Perhaps some such conclusions can be generalized more broadly; David F. Noble, America by 
Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1977); Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977); for an update, see Patrick J. 
McGrath, Scientists, Business, and the State, 1890-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
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requires individuals with special skills.  The constancy of change demands the 
ability to solve new problems.  Modern regimes need experts to ensure their 
stability and smooth function, to set goals and formulate performance criteria that 
establish their legitimacy.  Modern business needs experts to fulfill various 
“management needs,” especially to ensure profitability (or at least maintain stock 
values and inflow of investment during the 1990s’ market bubble).  Both need 
experts to resolve crises of administration and production, even to define the 
meaning of “success.”  Experts are closely identified with many modern political 
ideals: efficiency, organization, objectivity, impartiality, rationality, practicality, 
probity, incorruptibility, devotion to the common good instead of private interest, 
the power of personal merit and competence over money and privilege, and the 
value of peaceful, international collaboration.22 
                                                 
22. Such functional explanations are closely associated with Max Weber’s classic 
sociological theory that the inexorable drive for administrative efficiency and infrastructural power 
demands the proliferation of “bureaucratic” systems of administration.  Centeno, “The New 
Leviathan,” 317-320, 323-324, 328; Markoff and Montecinos, “The Ubiquitous Rise of 
Economists,” 41-43, 46; O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, 30-31, 51-
53, 70, 73, 77-80; Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-Out-of-Control as a Theme 
in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977), 256-263, 395; Jean Meynaud, 
Technocracy, trans. Paul Barnes (New York: Free Press, 1968), originally published as La 
technocratie: Mythe ou réalité (Paris: Payot, 1964), 19-20, 22-29, 191-193, 207-219; John G. 
Gunnell, “The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy,” Technology and Culture 23:3 
(July 1982), 392; Peter Burke, History and Social Theory (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1992), 30-31; Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings 
of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 158-159, 
178-184, 233, 235. 
Following this logic, an older generation of synthetic historians posited a deep-rooted 
“centralist tradition” that enthroned a series of powerful bureaucratic states to rule Latin America: 
Raymundo Faoro, Os donos do poder, rev. ed. (1959; Porto Alegre, Brazil: Editora Globo, 1975); 
Claudio Véliz, The Centralist Tradition of Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1980). 
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As Alejandro Toledo’s team of economic experts immediately found out, 
however, supplying policy prescriptions to solve the complex problems of modern 
times is extraordinarily difficult.  Once ensconced in technocratic positions, Latin 
American economists have often complained that the abstract theory valued by 
U.S. graduate schools is practically worthless for solving the everyday problems of 
government and management.  This reality has led numerous students of expertise 
to suggest that the rise of technically trained professionals to positions of power has 
not been based on their mastery of knowledge.  This includes revolutionary France, 
the supposed birthplace of technocracy.23 
Critics of functional explanations often look to the structure of 
organizations, both government bureaucracies and corporate business, as a source 
of experts’ influence.  A “slipping sideways of power” from untrained bureaucrats 
and businessmen to their technical advisors can lay the foundation for the creation 
of “technocratic organizations” in which experts perpetuate their power through 
control of key resources and the selection of their successors.  This can lead to the 
placement of technocrats in political positions that require relatively few technical 
skills--such as prime minister or president. 
Mastery of ceremony and ritual provides another potential source of power 
for the technically trained.  The use of jargon-laden speech (“economese”), 
emphasis on quantification, glorification of efficiency, specific manners of dress 
                                                 
23. Aníbal Pinto and Oswaldo Sunkell, “Latin American Economists in the United States,” 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 15:1 (Oct. 1966), 79-86; Ken Alder, Engineering the 
Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763-1815 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1997), esp. 346; Markoff and Montecinos, “The Ubiquitous Rise of Economists,” 48-49; 
Collins and Pinch, The Golem at Large, ch. 5.  
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and presentation, even the context in which experts work (the field, the laboratory, 
monumental modern office buildings, “think tanks”) all can confer legitimacy on a 
particular expert and his or her policies.  At the same time, the oft-enunciated claim 
that there is “limited ground for action” provides a powerful blame-diverting ritual 
used to shield experts from blame when things go awry.  The ability to create trust 
and reduce anxiety are two critical functions of these rituals. 
Social and political conflict provides the most devious--and perhaps the 
most important--source of power for experts.  The belief that there is a single, 
unified “policy reality” and that every problem has “one right answer” is 
fundamental to experts’ dubious claim that they are “above politics” and therefore 
the proper people to make decisions for the common good.  The invention of 
“technical” problems and “objective” determinations of success may, in fact, be an 
implicit strategy to obscure the existence of conflict in order to serve certain vested 
interests. 
Experts often share in such interests, usually as loyal vassals, but also as 
possessors of their own power.  For all the rhetoric about meritocracy and the 
occasional ascent of figures like Ávila, Fujimori, and Toledo, it is a grim fact that 
becoming an expert remains a class privilege.  In most societies, experts are 
predominantly male and share a similar social origin, values, education, and career 
pattern.  They are often the sons of the elite that preceded them to power, even in 
the Soviet Union, a country in which the shoe-pounding peasant Nikita Krushchev 
became supreme leader.  Meanwhile, patron-client relations continue to determine 
which experts achieve positions of influence, as was clearly the case of the 
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technocrats that governed 1990s Mexico.  Expertise exists in symbiosis with 
interest politics.  Of course, vested interests routinely come into conflict.  This goes 
a long way toward explaining why experts of similar background so often differ 
with each other and with factions of the lay public, even with the interests they 
ostensibly serve.  The ecology of expertise is “red in tooth and claw” with few real 
winners in the struggle for power.24 
Exactly how these functional, organizational, ritual, and conflictual 
elements come into play is unique to every historical case.  To determine how 
experts became so important to the management of Peru’s marine environment, this 
history will provide a collective biography of scientists and other technicians at 
work in Peru that traces their origins, training, career patterns, attitudes, political 
connections, and roles.  This is the first step toward a historical sociology of the 
environmental expert.25  Such a collective biography will make it possible to 
answer some basic questions: Where does specialized knowledge come from?  
                                                 
24. On points in this section, see Markoff and Montecinos, “The Ubiquitous Rise of 
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Who posseses it?  How is it used in the shaping of a decision and its execution?  
More importantly, what were these experts asked to accomplish?  Were they 
successful? 
Just by the main kind of sources they left behind--institutional reports and 
correspondence--it is obvious that the experts who came to manage Peru’s marine 
environment were creatures of organization.  Therefore, this history will also relate 
the history of the institutions to which they were attached.  How autonomous were 
they from the mandates of these organizations?  More importantly, who benefited 
from their dictates?  To get at these questions, this study will often focus on the 
interaction and conflict between experts.  This is where the political nature of 
science is most apparent. 
How did Peru’s marine experts imagine their environment?  How did they 
then go about enunciating their knowledge claims?  What sort of evidence 
constituted legitimate knowledge?  In some cases, the existence of detailed private 
journals and correspondence, as well as published statements, makes it possible to 
distinguish stages of knowledge in the making.  Ceremonies involved in the 
creation and presentation of scientific knowledge were often crucial to its impact.  
Photographs and other visual artifacts were a vital part of this rhetoric.  They are 
also vital to the reader’s imagination of Peru’s coastal environment and the experts 
who managed it.  Those reproduced here provide more than mere illustrations for 
the story that follows.  Above all, this study will give precise attention to the 
numbers on which these management regimes were based:  Tables, graphs, and 
quantitative data are just as vital to the argument of this study as they were to the 
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people who compiled them in the first place.  Those reproduced here should be 
given more than a cursory glance. 
In many ways, the history that follows explains how someone like 
Alejandro Toledo could become president.  At the end of the twentieth century, 
international power brokers and Peru’s national electorate alike looked to a “brain 
trust” to help manage the Peruvian economy and government.  The lords of Peru’s 
ruling class have looked to experts to solve a long series of problems related to 
economic development.  This study will trace how technocrats--scientists, 
engineers, economists, and other technically trained professionals exercising 
administrative power--influenced the course of Peruvian history over the last two 
centuries.  This story is fundamental to understanding how technocracy--the ideal 
that technical experts should govern society and industry--achieved its uneven 
global ascent as a political ideology during the modern age.26 
 
Overview 
This is a history of a paramount example of development projects planned 
and managed by technical experts: the origin, decline, spectacular revival, and 
tragic fate of the Peruvian guano and fishing industries.  It explains how the 
“aristocrats” who ruled the early Peruvian Republic deliberately gave birth to the 
modern, technocratic republic of today.  
                                                 
26. Definitions based on A Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary, ed. R. W. 
Burchfield (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), s.v. “technocracy.”  
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At its most basic level, this is an ecological history.  By that, I mean an 
account of change over time in the basic, natural relationships between organisms 
and their environment--including humans.  Such a history necessarily involves 
change in human understanding of these relationships and the various technologies 
used to manipulate them for human benefit.  Environmental experts used science to 
acquire power over nature in Peru.  Thus, this is a history of ecology as much as it 
is a history of the interactions studied by this “subversive” science.27 
At another level, this is a social history of an elite type, the expert.  
Ideological justifications for the rule of an “aristocracy of knowledge” have a long 
history in Peru.  The influential Peruvian priest Bartolomé Herrera (1808-1864) 
identified this intelligentsia as those with the natural right to decree the proper laws 
for society using knowledge acquired with special, God-given talents.28  This 
account analyzes the origins, influence, success, and failure of technocrats who 
managed a major ecological experiment in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Peru.  
A few such experts, like Unanue and Fujimori, became genuine aristocrats of 
knowledge.   
Finally, this is a political history of the changing relationship between the 
Peruvian state and civil society, and of Peru’s ties to centers of power in the rest of 
the world.  A technocratic elite used the institutions of the Peruvian state and 
                                                 
27. See Paul B. Sears, “Ecology--A Subversive Subject,” BioScience July 1964, 11-13.   
28. Bartolomé Herrera, “Tercer respuesta,” in Escritos y discursos (Lima, 1929), 1:131, 
originally in El Comercio 21 Oct. 1846; see epigraph to this introduction.  On Herrera and the elitist 
ideology of the modernizing “guano republic” ruled by military strongman Ramón Castilla, see 
Carmen Mc Evoy, La utopía republicana: Ideales y realidades en la formación de la cultura 
política peruana (1871-1919) (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 1997), pt. 1; 
Contreras and Cueto, Historia del Perú contemporáneo, 105-108.    
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multinational business to mediate and manipulate these political relationships.  
Though they sometimes worked for their own interests, ultimately, these 
technocrats enriched and empowered a new ruling class for Peru.  In short, this is a 
history of the Lords of Guano: environmental experts and those they served.   
In each of these areas, this study is not subject to artificial boundaries that 
presume to separate Peruvian national history from the rest of the biosphere and 
world history.  During the nineteenth century, scientists played a fundamental role 
in the “discovery” and exploitation of ancient Peruvian deposits of guano and 
nitrates, the two richest naturally occurring nitrogen fertilizers ever found.  To an 
extent much greater than is often appreciated, Peru’s “Guano Age” (1840-1879) 
and recovery from the national disaster that followed it were the creation of 
technical experts.  These discoveries, in turn, strongly influenced the decline of 
waste-recycling farming methods in the North.  This laid the foundations for 
modern, input-intensive agriculture and for the enormous nitrogen production and 
meat consumption that accompanied it. 
Events in Peru during the twentieth century also turned out to have direct 
global significance.  From 1909 to 1973, in stark contrast to the extractive economy 
of the preceding century, environmental scientists oversaw the implementation of a 
grand animal conservation experiment designed to produce a sustained yield of 
concentrated fertilizer and protein feed from living birds and fish.  This depended 
on the two-way exchange of scientific personnel, ideas, and technologies between 
Peru, the United States, and many other countries in the Northern Hemisphere.  In 
the process, experts helped bring modern, input-intensive farming to Peru, and they 
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built “big science” institutions that revolutionized understanding of the Peru 
Current marine ecosystem.  Some trends reached truly far afield.  The marked 
impact of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon on Peru’s marine 
environment inspired research that led directly to widespread international 
recognition of these events’ large-scale importance.  Through U.S. ornithologist 
and conservationist William Vogt and the issue of human population control, 
Peru’s conservation experiment clearly influenced the emergence of a globalist 
environmental movement throughout the Americas after World War II.  Such 
achievements--ostensibly linked to the disembodied exchange of “universal” 
scientific principles and techniques--were based on the rise to power of a class of 
experts entrusted to manage economic development, not just in Peru, but all over 
the world. 
As a reflection of persistent trends in global food distribution, practically 
none of this guano or fishmeal went to feed the world’s undernourished.  Peruvian 
guano went mainly to grow crops used as cattle feed during the nineteenth century, 
then to Peruvian sugar cane and cotton exported to Europe and the United States 
during the twentieth century.  After World War II, the specter of an impending 
catastrophe in the global food supply due to the world’s growing population gave 
added impetus to the exploitation of ocean fish stocks.  To serve this demand, Peru 
developed what was for a time the largest fishing industry on Earth, and it became 
the world’s poster child for rapid fishery industrialization.  Peruvian fishmeal went 
almost entirely to industrial chicken and hog farms--and ultimately to the 
pocketbooks and waistlines of human omnivores in the Northern Hemisphere (and 
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Peru’s affluent neighborhoods) who lived in the richest and fattest societies in the 
history of the world.  This is a vivid reflection of the concentration of power that 
has accompanied the rise of experts. 
All of these changes had major consequences for Peru’s guano birds, 
anchoveta fish, and their ecological community.  Misplaced faith in the capabilities 
of the international technocracy that managed these biological resources allowed 
Peru’s remarkable conservation achievements to collapse: first, because of a 
conscious decision to allow the guano bird population to wither away under 
competitive pressure from the fishing industry; second, because of a major 
miscalculation regarding the ecological impact of the El Niño event of 1972-1973, 
one of history’s great “unnatural disasters.”  Such events reveal how fleeting 
“sustainable growth” can be, even for the best-managed projects.  On the bright 
side, Peru’s environmental managers learned from some of their mistakes, and the 
fishmeal industry bounced back after a long, painful 20-year hiatus.   
 The organization of this work can best be understood in terms of a series of 
ecological relationships affecting the technology of guano and fishmeal production 
and consumption.  Science--both as a specialized body of knowledge and as a 
social practice--fundamentally affected how these relationships were interpreted 
and manipulated over time.  Expertise has its own ecology that connected nature to 
culture.  Though this account focuses on Peru, it incorporates a systematic 
comparison with Latin American and global trends and makes the argument that 
“Peruvian” events fundamentally influenced both regional and world history.  For 
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instance, the El Niño phenomenon repeatedly intervened to determine the timing of 
major crises extending far beyond Peru’s borders.    
Chapter 1 describes the origin and fate of Peru’s original guano and nitrate 
trade as part of the nineteenth century’s global obsession with manures and their 
management.  Thanks to the intervention of Humboldtian scientists, local 
knowledge of guano and nitrates among Andean peoples was converted into 
“universal” knowledge useful to a new breed of scientific farmers in the temperate 
North and a few plantation owners in the tropics.  A massive trade soon developed 
involving the south-to-north relocation of crop nutrients, as well as the west-to-east 
deportation of laborers across the Pacific to work these deposits.  These trends 
mirrored the ecological expansion of Europe into new environments all over the 
Earth during this Age of Empire.  They underscore the vital importance of 
excrement to global history. 
Chapter 1 also highlights the fabulous benefits that the fertilizer trade 
provided to the lords of Peru’s “Practical Republic,” especially during the 1860s 
and 1870s, as well as the importance of technocrats to Latin America’s newly 
independent states.  Their grand projects ended in disaster for Peru, not because of 
the lack of science-minded, progressive leadership, but due to systematic 
undercalculation of the size of Peru’s fossil guano deposits, on the one hand, and a 
devastating war with Chile sparked by an extremely powerful El Niño-Southern 
Oscillation event in 1877-1878, on the other. 
Chapter 2 describes the circumstances at the turn of the twentieth century 
that enabled conservation-minded technocrats to gain power over Peru’s guano 
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islands.  From the United States, to Russia, to Latin America, “efficiency” and 
“scientific politics” were the watchwords of the day when it came to the 
management of natural resources.  The rulers of Peru’s “Aristocratic Republic” 
(1895-1919) looked to scientists and engineers for advice on a series of issues, 
including the “awakening” of export agriculture.  These experts engineered the 
ecological transformation of the Peruvian guano industry from an extractive, 
predatory regime to a classic example of sustained-yield conservation by protecting 
the guano birds from human depredations.  These scientists also initated the 
systematic study of a recurrent climate phenomenon that affects the Peruvian coast.  
They named it “El Niño.” 
Even if foreign-owned businesses in Peru benefited greatly from these 
actions, this was not a case of cultural imperialism emanating from the industrial 
North.  Science often provided legitimation for policies already advocated by 
locals--sometimes against the interests of powerful foreign firms like the Peruvian 
Corporation of London.  In fact, the reorganization of the guano industry by 
technicians provided a rallying point for the unification of the class that ruled 
Peru’s Aristocratic Republic.  Nevertheless, further developments in the industrial 
North’s technoscience complex indirectly determined the fate of Peru’s guano 
industry.  By inventing an efficient means to synthesize nitrogen compounds 
directly from the atmosphere, northern chemists changed the entire technological 
context in which the Peruvian guano industry operated.  In fact, they liberated Peru 
from the pressure to export this valuable product of nature.  This gave the Lords of 
Guano a chance to consolidate their control over Peru’s marine environment.      
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Chapter 3 details the new managerial regime these men built.  It describes 
how modern, input-intensive agriculture became “conventional” agriculture in 
Peru.  Beginning in 1909, the Compañía Administradora del Guano (CAG) 
organized a new agroecological system that supplied guano from Peru’s marine 
environment to export agriculture on the adjacent coast.  Using the latest techniques 
of conservation science and scientific management, CAG’s managers sought to 
domesticate the guano birds’ island environment, the Andean workers who 
extracted their excrement, and the coastal farmers who consumed it.  Though these 
plans were calculated to serve Peruvian society as a whole, they mainly benefited a 
narrow segment of Peru’s coastal elite. 
The El Niño phenomenon repeatedly challenged CAG’s attempts to manage 
this agroecosystem.  In the aftermath of the powerful 1925-1926 event, scientists 
produced local observations that led international climate scientists to the 
realization that Peru’s El Niño is part of one vast climate mechanism affecting the 
entire Indo-Pacific Basin.  The Great Depression also proved difficult to handle.  
Technocrats stepped forward to manage this global crisis in Peru, as they did in so 
much of the world.  Ironically, CAG’s remarkable success during the 1930s at 
integrating cotton planters into this agroecosystem initiated a persistent fertilizer 
supply shortfall that eventually threatened CAG’s reason for being. 
Chapter 4 describes what Peru did about this problem.  In 1939, CAG hired 
New York ornithologist William Vogt to study the the guano bird population.  
Vogt’s background at one of the world’s centers of ornithological investigation 
enabled him to implement a cutting-edge animal research program in Peru.  The 
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guano bird population collapsed right before his eyes under the onslaught of an 
exceptionally long-lasting El Niño event.  This chapter follows Vogt’s reaction to 
these experiences as a study of scientific knowledge in the making.  Meanwhile, 
Vogt saw to the training of Peru’s first native-born professional ornithologist, 
Enrique Ávila.   
Chapter 4 also analyzes the uses to which Vogt’s scientific knowledge was 
put in Peru.  Based on his observation that food supply is the basic factor limiting 
the growth of the guano bird population, Vogt suggested novel approaches to bird 
management that were picked up by a creative new generation of CAG 
administrators.  Their innovative policies led to a sharp increase in guano 
production and dramatically vindicated the ideal that experts should be in charge of 
Peru’s marine environment. 
Both Vogt and Ávila carried a number of new ideas and techniques related 
to scientific conservation from the Northern Hemisphere to Peru.  Chapter 5 
investigates Vogt’s influence in the other direction and the central importance of 
Peru’s guano experiment for the history of environmentalism in the Americas.  This 
influence was premised on the application of ecological science to social thought 
regarding human population growth.  In 1940, the Peruvian guano industry gave 
birth to the Comité Nacional de Protección a la Naturaleza, probably Peru’s first 
independent conservation advocacy organization.  Vogt’s influence contributed to 
the establishment of similar guano industries in Mexico and Chile, as well as a 
series of Latin American conservation organizations like Peru’s Comité Nacional.  
Scientists and other professionals played a critical role in this hemispheric 
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movement; this points to widespread acceptance of the principle that experts should 
be in charge of environmental management.   
But this was just the beginning of Vogt’s influence on modern 
environmentalism.  Vogt deserves the title of prophet of the Age of Ecology at least 
as much as any other figure.  His intense experience with Peru’s guano birds during 
the 1939-1941 El Niño put him on a trajectory to write Road to Survival (1948), the 
most widely read U.S. environmental book before Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring.  
This jeremiad announced that humanity faced imminent catastrophe if it did not 
come to grips with rapid population growth.  Chapter 5 carefully analyzes the 
argument of this important work, as well as Vogt’s far-reaching influence on Aldo 
Leopold, Josué de Castro, and other important environmental thinkers, the birth 
control movement, even the United States’ first generation of environmental 
historians.  It repeatedly points to the formative influence of Vogt’s technocratic 
experience in Latin America on these trends.  
Chapter 6 focuses on the social relations that underlie the production, 
application, and influence of scientific knowledge.  By the 1940s, CAG had come 
to represent a real-life version of Salomon’s House, Francis Bacon’s old utopian 
ideal of a scientific research center with the mandate to exercise power over nature.  
The ethnic and gender diversity of CAG’s scientific staff was utterly remarkable if 
we take U.S. and European institutions of the time as a standard, though it was 
hardly free of prejudice based on social inequalities.  This chapter also examines 
the rivalry between marine scientists in Peru and their relevance to two key debates 
over the nature of Peru’s marine environment.  One might expect such divisions to 
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undermine the authority of experts.  Instead, the fact that CAG’s scientists believed 
in the existence of “one right answer” to every policy question acted as an 
encouragement to scientific investigation and the eventual development of Big 
Oceanographic Science in Peru. 
Chapter 6 initiates a detailed investigation of the limits to technocratic 
governance.  From CAG’s foundation, its managers wanted to extend their 
ecological purview to many other creatures in Peru’s marine environment, 
especially the small anchoveta fish that the guano birds depended on for food.  This 
almost totalitarian vision brought the guano industry into conflict with other 
humans who exploited Peru’s marine organisms.  Their conflict set the stage for an 
attempt to establish a fishmeal industry under CAG’s control during the early 
1940s. 
Chapters 7-8 describe the far-reaching outcome of this industrialization 
initiative--the replacement of Peru’s guano producers as “the most valuable birds in 
the world.”  During the 1950s and 1960s, Peru emerged as the world’s largest fish-
harvesting nation and a center for oceanographic research.  During the 1960s and 
1970s, Peru developed its own import-substituting fertilizer manufacturing 
industry.  This happened by design, though not without heated expert debate or 
popular resistance.  Two scientists, a U.S. fish population biologist and one of Latin 
America’s first neoliberal economists, played critical roles in these outcomes.  The 
exploitation of Peru’s marine environment played an important role in the 
development of a vast, global meat industry after World War II, as humans 
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increased their mastery over the planet’s nitrogen cycle.  Meanwhile, Peru’s 
poorest children publicly starved. 
Misplaced faith in technocracy, not technology run amok, ultimately 
doomed both the guano and fishmeal industries in Peru.  Well-informed Peruvian 
officials advised by the world’s best scientific talent made deliberate decisions that 
led, first, to the demise of Peru’s guano birds during the moderate El Niño of 1965, 
then to the collapse of Peru’s vast anchoveta fishery during the strong El Niño of 
1972-1973.  Because of an expensive scientific miscalculation and extremely 
limited ground for maneuver, the dreams of generations of Peruvian 
developmentalists turned into a nightmare that lasted two decades. 
The final chapter reviews how Peru’s guano and fishing industries and the 
technocrats who managed them fit into the environmental history of the Earth 
during the twentieth century.  In it, I conclude that explorations on the outer 
cultural boundaries of science are just as important to human creativity as is 
research at the world’s centers of investigation.  This final chapter also 
contemplates the persistent dilemmas that face today’s environmental technocrats 
trying to make “sustainable development” something other than a mirage. 
The epilogue briefly traces the direct ties between Peru’s Lords of Guano 
and the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962).  It ends with a 
melancholy description of Isla Don Martín, once home to Peru’s first marine 
biology laboratory and well over one million raucous guano birds, where every 
spring will be silent now that the Peruvian fishmeal industry has recovered much of 
its former glory. 
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Chapter 1 
Manure and Its Management during the Nineteenth Century: 
 A Global Perspective 
 
The industry and intelligence possessed by the farmer, may indeed almost be 
judged at a glance by the care he bestows on his dunghill. 
--Jean Baptiste Boussingault (1850) 
During the nineteenth century, one manure captured the fascination of 
capitalists, scientific farmers, even poets, like no other: guano, the accumulated 
droppings of marine birds, the most potent and complete naturally occurring 
fertilizer ever discovered.1  Because of unique environmental conditions along the 
Pacific coast of South America since the end of the Pleistocene, the Peruvian 
Republic found itself in possession of fossil guano deposits that were larger and 
richer than the rest of the world put together.  Beginning in the 1820s, Peru’s ruling 
elite tried to use this geographical advantage to engineer a modern nation.  They 
later turned to a second coastal resource, immense deposits of sodium nitrate, to 
sustain this vast undertaking.  In the early 1880s, after fighting a major war over the 
wealth of nature, this project ended in tragedy for Peru.  But the true historical 
                                                 
1. Circa 1845, the German poet and novelist Joseph Victor von Scheffel (1826-1886) wrote 
a comic poem in praise of “Guano” to ridicule the philosopher Georg Hegel’s belief in the natural 
inferiority of the New World.  It reads in part:  
 
God bless you, excellent birds, 
Remote on your far guano shore, 
For despite neighbor Hegel’s harsh words, 
You produce the most perfect manure! 
 
See Gerbi, The Dispute of the New World , 450-451.  A full Spanish translation of this poem can be 
found in BCAG 20:4 (Apr. 1944), 113-114. 
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significance of these “regional” events--and their meaning for the management of 
Peru’s marine environment after 1890, the main focus of this study--can only be 
gauged in global ecological perspective. 
During the nineteenth century, agriculture in many parts of the globe was 
transformed by an ecological revolution.  A central feature of this rural revolution 
was the exploitation of new environments, either by replacing forests and 
grasslands with farmland,2 or by directly relocating crop nutrients to cultivated 
lands.  To the latter end, millions of tons of guano and nitrates were exported from 
coastal Peru to North Atlantic farms and tropical plantations.  In the process, guano 
gave birth to today’s system of input-intensive agriculture.   
Science played an important role in this revolution.  Manure helps us to 
understand the way science worked on a global scale during this era in several 
ways: 
First, the “discovery” of guano and nitrates represents a classic case in 
which centuries-old, local know-how was validated as international scientific 
knowledge and translated into widespread popular practice.  This was not a 
situation in which a scientific advance was merely applied by farmers elsewhere in 
the world: the theory of agricultural fertilizers developed in parallel with their use.3  
Nor was there a simple equation between this process and European imperialism, as 
                                                 
2. For an overview of these changes over the long term, see John F. Richards, “Land 
Transformation,” in The Earth as Transformed by Human Action: Global and Regional Changes in 
the Biosphere over the Past 300 Years, ed. B. L. Turner II, et al. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 163-178.  
3. This study rejects Vaclav Smil’s simplistic linear model of the relationship between 
nineteenth-century science and agricultural practice in Enriching the Earth: Fritz Haber, Carl 
Bosch, and the Transformation of World Food Production (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). 
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post-colonial powers in both North and South America learned to use science for 
their own projects.4   
Second, this process of discovery illustrates the early workings of 
“Humboldtian science,” an extraordinarily influential paradigm developed by 
Alexander von Humboldt during and after his 1799-1804 sojourn to the Americas.  
Humboldtian science was not aimless, Baconian fact-gathering.  It was an entirely 
new method for doing science in the field that unified the roles of observer-
collector and theorist.  The search for exact, universal laws governing the 
geography of animal, vegetable, mineral, and human kingdoms guided these 
endeavors.  It is also important to recognize that Humboldtian science during its 
earliest stages was a community activity explicitly tied to Humboldt’s personality 
and the flowering of analytical chemistry and other sciences in post-revolutionary 
Paris.  Moreover, the experience of young Humboldtian scientists in foreign climes 
and their interaction with locals directly influenced the course of science in both the 
South American “periphery” and European “metropolis.”  In the case of guano and 
nitrates, these endeavors produced useful knowledge of great economic value--just 
as the technocratic ideal promised.5 
                                                 
4. These issues are a central preoccupation of the burgeoning study of the field sciences 
and the relationship between science and colonialism.  For an introduction to these debates, see Roy 
MacLeod, ed., “Nature and Empire: Science and the Colonial Enterprise,” Osiris, 2d ser., vol. 15 
(2000); Henrika Kuklick and Robert E. Kohler, “Science in the Field,” Osiris, 2d ser., vol. 11 
(1996).     
5. Susan Faye Cannon, “Humboldtian Science,” in Science in Culture: The Early Victorian 
Period (New York: Science History Publications, 1978), 73-110, is the benchmark study.  See also 
Nicolaas Rupke, “Enlightened Imperialism: The European Appreciation of Humboldt’s American 
Journey of Exploration,” in Geography and Enlightenment, ed. David N. Livingstone and Charles 
W. J. Withers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); idem, “Humboldtian Medicine,” 
Medical History 40 (1996), 293-310; Anne Marie Claire Godlewska, “Humboldt’s Visual Thinking: 
From Enlightenment Vision to Modern Science,” in Geography and Enlightenment; Michael 
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Third, this saga reveals who science served.  Guano and nitrates most 
clearly benefited elite interests--on both sides of the emerging North-South global 
divide.  Contrary to most scholarly opinion, guano did little during this era to 
increase the food supply for the burgeoning population of the industrial North 
Atlantic (or anywhere else).  Instead, guano primarily went to increase the 
production of meat and dairy products for the relatively affluent.6  Others bore the 
main costs of these projects.  The quest for guano deposits and laborers to work 
them had a decidedly negative impact on many peoples and environments of the 
Pacific Basin.  In fact, guano helped open the farthest reaches of this region to 
external exploitation. 
Manure science enabled Peru’s new rulers to build a modern state.  In 
relation to their dealings with guano and nitrates during this era, the lords of 
nineteenth-century Peru have often been portrayed as irrational, backward-thinking, 
greedy, and corrupt, as mere pawns manipulated by foreign capitalists.  This 
reputation is not entirely undeserved.  We can say many things, in retrospect, about 
why their grand endeavors faltered.  But we cannot say that it was for lack of faith 
                                                                                                                                        
Dettelbach, “Humboldtian Science,” in Cultures of Natural History, edited by N. Jardine, James A. 
Secord, and E. C. Spary (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 287-304; Roderick 
W. Home, “Humboldtian Science Revisited: An Australian Case Study,” History of Science 33 
(1995), 1-22; Malcolm Nicolson, “Alexander von Humboldt, Humboldtian Science and the Origins 
of the Study of Vegetation,” History of Science 25 (1987), 167-194.  Still influential, but largely 
obsolete interpretations include Brading, “Scientific Traveller,” ch. 23 of First America; William H. 
Goetzmann, “Humboldt’s Children,” ch. 5 of New Lands, New Men: America and the Second Great 
Age of Discovery (New York: Viking, 1986). 
6. Cf. Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: Europe, China, and the Making of the 
Modern World Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).  
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in science, technology, and expertise, nor that they acted blindly, without debate or 
opposition.7 
Fourth, this case vividly displays several limits to the equation of science 
and power.  To be sure, experts must bear some of the blame for overestimating 
Peru’s natural wealth and underestimating the costs of the projects on which Peru’s 
original Lords of Guano were banking.  But factors completely out of their control 
also affected the fate of their “Practical Republic”: a long-lasting economic 
depression sparked by the world’s first global debt crisis, and a horrific subsistence 
catastrophe unleashed by the most powerful El Niño-Southern Oscillation event of 
the century.  Even the best scientific knowledge cannot guarantee developmental 
success. 
Yet we should not lose sight of the things this project accomplished.  It is 
utterly remarkable to what extent guano and nitrates were converted into both 
symbols and engines of progress: Peru’s famous railroads, technical schools, 
museums, urban parks and infrastructure.  New military installations repelled a 
bold attempt by Spain to recolonize coastal Peru.  Guano also paid for the creation 
of a small but vibrant community of scientists and engineers based in Lima, many 
fleeing political unrest in Europe.  From the very beginning, experts have been 
integral to the Peruvian Republic’s ruling class.  As we shall see in subsequent 
                                                 
7. This is the central finding of Paul Gootenberg, Imagining Development: Economic Ideas 
in Peru’s “Fictitious Prosperity” of Guano, 1840-1880 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1993); cf. Stuart McCook, States of Nature: Science, Agriculture, and Environment 
in the Spanish Caribbean, 1760-1940 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002), esp. ch. 1.  
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chapters, they later decided to place even more trust in the abilities of experts in 
their quest for national development. 
 
Merde en l’histoire 
It is easy to poke fun at a history of coprology (the science of excrement)--
or worse, dismiss it as trivial or uncouth for civilized discussion.  City folk tend to 
view this foul substance with disdain or even fear, in view of its association with 
poverty and disease.  Such attitudes have ancient roots in taboos governing 
religious purity.  The Mosaic law commanded: 
 
Designate a place outside the camp where you can go to relieve yourself.  
As part of your equipment have something to dig with, and when you 
relieve yourself, dig a hole and cover up your excrement.  For the LORD 
your God moves about in your camp to protect you and to deliver your 
enemies to you.  Your camp must be holy, so that he will not see among 
you anything indecent and turn away from you.8  
But in our secular age, these attitudes are more a reflection of how divorced urban, 
industrial existence (especially the urbane intellectual) has become from natural 
cycles and humanity’s agrarian roots.  Thus, the ecologically enlightened in our 
disposable society now have to read special books about “how to shit in the woods” 
                                                 
8. Deut. 23:12-14 New International Version.  Note that Victorian scientific traveler 
Clements Markham, the future president of the Royal Geographic Society, felt compelled to refer 
euphemistically to human “guano” used as fertilizer in Peru as “the kind mentioned in Deuteronomy 
24:13”; Clements R. Markham, Markham in Peru: The Travels of Clements R. Markham, 1852-
1853, ed. Peter Blanchard (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), 41.  Cf. the Mesoamerican 
indigenous folklore on excrement described in Alfredo López Austin, Una vieja historia de la 
mierda (Mexico City: Ediciones Toledo, 1988). 
42 
to protect the wilderness from harm or to remind our children that “everyone 
poops.”9 
This separation is due, in large part, to the great success experts have had at 
manipulating natural processes for the rest of us.   A major task experts have been 
asked to perform over time has been to hide, wash away, and otherwise protect us 
from the scourge of our own excreta.  A few urban environmental historians have 
given admirable attention to the modern conquest of merde accomplished through 
the management of water, air, and human habits.  During U.S. colonization efforts 
in the Caribbean and Philippines, for example, “marines and latrines” had an 
almost inseparable affinity, as hygienists sought to liberate locals (sometimes 
forcibly) from their own pollution.  After World War II, the high failure rate of 
unregulated septic tanks in U.S. suburbia led to the intervention of experts and 
helped set the agenda for the U.S. environmental movement.  The open sewer 
remains one of the most potent (and pungent) symbols of backwardness.10 
                                                 
9. See Kathleen Meyer, How to Shit in the Woods: An Environmentally Sound Approach to 
a Lost Art (Berkeley, CA: Ten Speed Press, 1989); Taro Gomi, Everyone Poops, trans. Amanda 
Mayer Stinchecum (Brooklyn, NY: Kane/Miller Book Publishers, 1993). 
10. In their quest for a “general” or “total” human history, the French Annales school has 
given the most attention to merde en l’histoire: see Dominique Laporte, Historia de la mierda, trans. 
Nuria Pérez de Lara (1978; Valencia, Spain: Pre-Textos, 1998); Jean-Pierre Goubert, The Conquest 
of Water: The Advent of Health in the Industrial Age, trans. Andrew Wilson (1986; Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1989); Alain Corbin, The Foul and the Fragrant: Odor and the French 
Social Imagination (1982; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986); André E. Guillerme, 
The Age of Water: The Urban Environment in the North of France, A.D. 300-1800 (1983; College 
Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1988).   
Histories dealing with the struggle to sanitize and “civilize” cities in the Americas include 
Martin V. Melosi, The Sanitary City: Urban Infrastructure in America from Colonial Times to the 
Present (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Manuel Perlo Cohen, El 
paradigma porfiriano: Historia del desagüe del Valle de México (Mexico City: Miguel Ángel 
Porrua, 1999); Teresa A. Meade, “Civilizing” Rio: Reform and Resistance in a Brazilian City, 
1889-1930 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Sidney Chalhoub, Cidade 
febril: Cortiços e epidemias na corte imperial (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1996).  
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Yet excretion is as fundamental to existence as eating.  In fact, this history 
is based on the realization that many people have embraced excrement as useful 
stuff and concerned themselves with where it comes from--with its ecology--in 
order to obtain more of it for humankind. 
All organisms need a variety of nutrients to grow.  Nitrogen is one of the 
most important of these nutrients:  It is vital to building chlorophyll for 
photosynthesis; it forms the chemical bonds between amino acids used to construct 
enzymes and all other proteins; and it constitutes part of the nucleic acid chains 
(DNA and RNA) that code for protein synthesis and genetic reproduction.  Humans 
must directly consume nine essential amino acids that our body chemistry cannot 
synthesize independently.  (Thus, the need to eat “complete proteins.”)  To get 
these nutrients, experts recommend that adult men and women consume 0.75 grams 
of protein per kilogram of weight per day for good health.  Fast-growing infants 
need more than twice as much, and protein deficiency or kwashiorkor is one of the 
major nutritional problems facing the world’s poorest children.  In settled 
agricultural societies, the vast majority of these proteins (and the amino acids and 
                                                                                                                                        
A half-century ago, two U.S. historians noted the special link between sanitation and U.S. 
imperialism in the Caribbean, Merle Curti and Kendall Birr, Prelude to Point Four: American 
Technical Missions Overseas, 1838-1938 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1954), esp. ch. 
6; on the obsession of U.S. scientists and physicians with fecal pollution in the Philippines, see 
Warwick Anderson, “Excremental Colonialism: Public Health and the Poetics of Pollution,” 
Cultural Inquiry 21 (Spring 1995), 640-669.  On “septic-tank suburbia,” see Adam Rome, The 
Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American Environmentalism 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), ch. 3    
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nitrogen they contain) have to come either directly from plant horticulture or from 
animals fed on these crops.11 
In most environments, usable nitrogen is the nutrient persistently in shortest 
supply.  Practically all nitrogen in the biosphere is tied up in its unreactive, 
molecular form (N2).  Even though it makes up 78 percent of the earth’s 
atmosphere, nitrogen gas is extremely difficult to incorporate into other chemical 
compounds.  It must first be converted to nitrogen oxides (NOx), nitrate (NO3-), or 
ammonia (NH3) to be used in biological systems.  In intensively cultivated agro-
ecosystems, crop plants will quickly run out of nitrogen in these forms unless it is 
returned to the soil somehow.  Yellowing leaves and stunted growth are tell-tale 
signs that a plant is not getting the nitrogen it needs to form chlorophyll, much less 
protein-rich tissues.  Meanwhile, a class of bacteria are constantly converting 
enormous quantities of usable nitrogen back to unreactive, molecular form in a 
process known as denitrification.  Thus, ecologists speak of a “nitrogen cycle.” 
Humans still have no way to control lightning, the only inorganic 
phenomenon in nature that transforms significant amounts of nitrogen into an 
organically useful form.  But for a long time, we have known how to manipulate 
two ecological processes for this purpose: 1) by planting leguminous plants (green 
manures) or wet paddies that take advantage of the ability of some symbiotic 
bacteria to “fix” atmospheric nitrogen; 2) by recycling organic waste to return 
nutrients to a system.  More recently, scientists have figured out how to synthesize 
                                                 
11. See National Research Council (U.S.), Subcommittee on the Tenth Edition of the 
RDAs, Food and Nutrition Board, Commission on Life Sciences, Recommended Dietary 
Allowances, 10th ed. (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989), ch. 6. 
45 
nitrogen compounds directly using industrial processes.  Phosphate (PO43-), 
potassium (K+)--and water (H2O), of course--are other vital nutrients typically in 
short supply for agriculture.12 
The recycling of animal manures was crucial to the maintainance of soil 
fertility in many traditional forms of intensive agriculture.  After harvest, many Old 
World peasant societies typically set out their livestock to convert crop waste into 
nutrient-rich animal waste; their animal enclosures provided much greater dung 
concentrations whose trade could even be commercialized.  West Indian planters, 
notorious for their supposed propensity toward “soil mining,” not infrequently 
engaged in “dung farming” and other forms of manuring to maintain sugar cane 
production.  But animal manure had its disadvantages: it degraded easily, required 
heavy labor to move, and demand routinely overshot supply.  In early-modern 
Switzerland, a persistent manure shortage served to limit the development of grain 
agriculture, a struggle made even more challenging by the rapidly changing 
climatic conditions of the Little Ice Age.13 
Because humans tend to eat a diet much richer in proteins than livestock, 
the use of human night soil and other household waste recycled nitrogen and other 
                                                 
12. Vaclav Smil, “Nitrogen and Phosphorus,”  in The Earth as Transformed by Human 
Action, 423-425; idem, Enriching the Earth, xiii-xiv. 
13. Smil, Enriching the Earth, ch. 2, app. B; Fernand Braudel, The Structures of Everyday 
Life: The Limits of the Possible, vol. 1 of Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, trans. Siân 
Reynolds (1979; New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 116-117; Christian Pfister, Das Klima der 
Schweiz von 1525-1860 und seine Bedeutung in der Geschichte von Belvölkerung und 
Landwirtschaft, vol. 1 of Bevölkerung, Klima und Agrarmodernisierung 1525-1860 (Bern: Haupt, 
1984); idem and Paul Messerli, “Switzerland,” in The Earth as Transformed by Human Action, 644-
645; David Watts, The West Indies: Patterns of Development, Culture and Environmental Change 
since 1492 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 399-405, 425-428, 435, 444-446; 
idem, “Dung-Farming: A Seventeenth-Century Experiment in Agricultural Improvisation,” 
Barbados Museum and Historical Society Journal 34 (1972), 58-63. 
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nutrients even more efficiently.  In the Valley of Mexico, indigenous farmers of 
chinampas used human excrement to augment the fertility of these irrigated, raised 
fields.  This practice helped maintain some of the highest population densities in 
the ancient world.  After the Spanish conquest, Mexican chinamperos came to 
depend more on excrement from livestock newly introduced from the Old World.  
Remnants of such ancient customs are still visible in “dump heap” gardening 
among Mesoamerican peasants today.  Crop plants grow so well in these disturbed 
environments that the great student of Mesoamerican economic botany Edgar 
Anderson, among others, came to believe that settled agriculture was born in the 
dump.14 
In recent centuries, no one surpassed South Chinese farmers in recycling 
efficiency.  In the Zhujiang (Pearl River) delta, the combined use of aquaculture, 
crop and excrement recycling supported an estimated 17 to 25 people per hectare, 
creating a large agricultural surplus for export.  Early-modern European travelers in 
the region marveled at Chinese capabilities.  Later, hygienically minded observers 
were horrified by the number of parasites typically acquired by night-soil users, not 
to mention their stench.  It should also be noted that the very existence of this rich 
agricultural region was due in large part, not to local nutrient recycling, but to far-
away highland clearance for swidden agriculture, massive erosion, and the build-up 
of silt in the delta from the eleventh to sixteenth centuries.  As is so often the case, 
                                                 
14. Ross Hassig, Trade, Tribute, and Transportation: The Sixteenth-Century Political 
Economy of the Valley of Mexico (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), esp. 47-53; Edgar 
Anderson, Plants, Man, and Life (Boston: Little, Brown, 1952), ch. 9.  Anderson was a disciple of 
the cultural geographer Carl Sauer, the father, in so many ways, of environmental history in the 
United States; see ch. 5.  
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one region’s bounty was based on another region’s poverty.  This highlights the 
fact that unintentional relocation of nutrients by rivers, volcanos, and other 
processes has always been a factor in intensive agriculture, at least in some regions.  
Moreover, no closed recycling system without external inputs, no matter how 
efficient, can come close to conserving its nitrogen while maintaining maximum, 
short-term crop yields.15 
Along with muck from riparian zones, forest leaves, and a few minerals, 
fish and marine algae were among the first agricultural nutrient additives extracted 
on a significant scale from another environment altogether.  Fish fertilizer figures 
into stories of the first American Thanksgiving.  William Bradford records that the 
Indian Squanto taught the New England Pilgrims how to plant maize.  Squanto also 
“told them except they got fish” to fertilize it, their maize “would come to nothing, 
and he showed them that in the middle of April they should have store enough 
come up the brook; . . . all of which they found true by trial & experience.”  When 
Robert Cushman (my direct ancestor) and a group of additional colonists arrived 
“unexpected or looked for” in November 1621 after that first growing season, they 
fortunately found “plenty of victuals in every house,” which Cushman took as 
evidence that Providence had prepared the land for European conquest.  In fact, the 
recycling of fish scrap and market excess as fertilizer has age-old roots in Europe.  
This leads scholars to think Squanto taught the Plymouth colonists a practice he 
                                                 
15. Smil, Enriching the Earth, ch. 2, esp. p. 34; Robert B. Marks, Tigers, Rice, Silk, and 
Silt: Environment and Economy in Late Imperial South China (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 66-83, 282-288. 
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learned while he was in enslaved by Europeans, not an indigenous practice born in 
the New World.16 
By the end of the seventeenth century, areas of Japan already had a 
significant trade supplying dried fish as fertilizer.  This practice was widespread in 
commercial agriculture by the time of the Meiji Restoration in 1868.  In fact, one 
environmental historian believes “marine nutrients”--both as food and fertilizer--
“may have been the key factor limiting demographic shrinkage after the 1720s, 
despite . . . persistent soil erosion and the shift of arable land to nonfood 
production.”  The conquest of the sea was vital to the eventual modernization of 
Japan, though night soil, plant waste, and other recycled nutrients remained 
important until the widespread adoption of chemical fertilizers in the 1920s.17 
Such traditional techniques could support millions, but not billions of 
people.  Since the late eighteenth century, a continuing revolution in agricultural 
practice has completely transformed the food-producing capacity of land and labor 
all over the world.  Changes in land tenure and scientific knowledge, new crops and 
new machines tend to get most of the credit for this epochal shift.  But this 
                                                 
16. William Bradford, Of Plimoth Plantation, quoted in Major Problems in American 
Environmental History: Documents and Essays, ed. Carolyn Merchant (Lexington, MA: D. C. 
Heath, 1993), 69-70; Robert Cushman, “Reasons and Considerations Touching the Lawfullness of 
Removing Out of England into the Parts of America,” in American Environmental History, ed. 
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England (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), 45; Wines, Fertilizer in America, 8-9; Braudel, The 
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17. Conrad Totman, Early Modern Japan  (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
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emphasis has less to do with the real forces driving change and more to do with our 
deification of entrepreneurs and “advanced” technologies as the cultivators of 
progress, a faith tied to our persistent belief that the Rise of the West was 
technologically driven, autochtonous, and inevitable.18 
With the aid of a new class of agricultural scientists, humble animal dung 
and other fertilizers played a role no less significant in the transition from 
traditional, waste-recycling to modern, input-intensive forms of agriculture.  More 
than one historian believes the crucial phase of this technological revolution “began 
with manures.”19 
The rapidly urbanizing and industrializing societies of nineteenth-century 
Europe and North America initiated this shift, or at least the part relevant to this 
particular history.  Their development was hardly self-contained, however, as they 
had to look farther and farther afield for resources to fuel their growth.  An 
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ecologist would call this tendency to exploit new resources, organisms, and 
environments niche expansion, an adaptive strategy typical of ecological generalists 
(rather than specialists), the category of species most capable of rapid, sustained 
population growth.  This expansive capacity, particularly as it related to the vast 
ecological windfall that came with frontier conquest and overseas colonialism, was 
one of the secrets to the “great divergence” between the economies of Europe and 
China and between North and South during the modern era.  Europe, the United 
States--and Japan, for that matter--could not have industrialized even close to the 
extent that they did without resources taken from less-developed regions.20  
On both sides of the North Atlantic, this transition first involved the 
increasingly efficient transfer of animal wastes from the city back to the rural 
environment.  In nineteenth-century Paris, suburban marais farms used the ready 
supply of urban horse dung to produce vast quantities of vegetables for Parisian 
consumers.  Farmers in the Low Countries became so adept at recycling urban 
(especially human) waste that these techniques became widely known as the 
“Flemish system.”  U.S. cities provided horse manure and human night soil to 
nearby farms on a more limited scale, though they supplied vast quantities of dried 
blood, ground-up bone, and rendered slaughterhouse refuse as fertilizer.  These 
systems still involved recycling, of course, as urban-dwelling humans and animals 
continued to depend significantly on food and fodder grown in the nearby 
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countryside.  In recent years, rendered animal waste has instead been used directly 
as animal feed; the incorporation of nervous tissue in this waste allowed the fatal 
spread of bovine spongiform encephalopathy or “mad cow disease.”21 
On the Atlantic seaboard of the United States, a full-fledged fish fertilizer 
industry based on menhaden (Brevoortia tyrannus) emerged in the 1850s, thanks in 
part to rising demand for fish oil (and petroleum) created by the failing supply of 
whale oil.  After pressing out the oil, fish remains were ground up, dried, and sold 
as “fish guano,” a nod to the importance of Peruvian guano discussed below.  Town 
folk objected to the vile fumes emitted by these factories and frequently forced 
them to close.  This led a few crafty entrepreneurs to build floating plants that 
could be easily moved beyond the reach of authorities.  Resource depletion became 
a serious problem by 1880, and a few menhaden fishermen returned to whaling--
and marketed rendered whale remains as fertilizer.  After the turn of the century, 
farmers diverted the supply of fishmeal to livestock when they discovered its great 
value as protein-rich feed.  This pattern of recycling fishery waste as agricultural 
nutrients, then converting the fishery into a direct source of animal feed, then 
moving on to a new marine resource once the fish were depleted has been repeated 
many, many times.  It turned California’s sardine canneries into industrial ghost 
towns, and it almost did the same to Peru’s gigantic fishmeal plants, as we shall 
see.22 
                                                 
21. Smil, Enriching the Earth, 34; Richard A. Wines, Fertilizer in America: From Waste 
Recycling to Resource Exploitation (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985), 22-33.  
22. Wines, Fertilizer in America, 15, 88-95; Robert Lloyd Webb, “Menhaden Whalemen: 
Nineteenth-Century Origins of American Steam Whaling,” American Neptune 60:3 (2000), 277-
288; Arthur F. McEvoy, The Fisherman’s Problem: Ecology and Law in the California Fisheries, 
1850-1980 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), esp. 132.  
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Scientists played a fundamental role in the exploitation of a phosphate-rich 
source of animal waste that contributed to the breakdown of the old waste-recycling 
system.  Early in the nineteenth century, British farmers (like U.S. farmers) started 
making extensive use of ground-up bone recycled from slaughterhouses, dead 
draught animals--and sometimes human cemeteries.  By developing a means to 
liberate the insoluble phosphorus in bones and produce superphosphates, British 
agricultural chemists spawned modern fertilizer manufacture.  This process made 
this vital nutrient much more available to plants.  Scientists like John Bennet Lawes 
and Joseph Henry Gilbert helped turn this discovery into a profitable business by 
spending a great deal of effort promoting their agricultural value using 
experimental plots.  But bones came nowhere near meeting phosphate demand, 
even with the importation of vast quantities all the way from the Argentine pampas.  
British producers turned to rich local deposits of coprolites, the fossilized feces of 
extinct, Tertiary-period animals, as their first major, non-recycled phosphate 
source.  Entrepreneurs in the United States and other countries eventually followed 
the British lead.  As the last step in the commercial exploitation of the Great Plains 
bison, North American companies paid disenfranchised Indians to gather up the 
bones of their one-time prey and ship them to the city for processing.  In Canada, 
the Métis (a group sharing both European and indigenous ancestry) set large prairie 
fires to help them locate the bones.23 
                                                 
23. Wines, Fertilizer in America, ch. 7-9; Smil, “Nitrogen and Phosphorus,”  431; idem, 
Enriching the Earth, 11-13, 56-57; Thompson, “The Second Agricultural Revolution,” 69-70; 
Andrew C. Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison: An Environmental History, 1750-1920 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 159-162; LeRoy Barnett, “Buffalo Bone 
Industry in Canada,” Alberta History 27:1 (1979), 10-16,  27:2 (1979), 6-13.  See also Richard 
Grove, The Cambridgeshire Coprolite Mining Rush (Cambridge, UK: Oleander Press, 1976).  
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Humboldt’s Current 
None of these new inputs compared in fertilizing value to two new sources 
developed during the mid-nineteenth century along the extremely arid Pacific coast 
of South America: guano and nitrates.  Scientists again played an important role in 
publicizing and creating a market for these valuable commodities. 
Since ancient times, Peruvian farmers have recognized the fertilizing value 
of various animal manures--huanu to Quechua speakers.  This valuable knowledge 
has never been totally forgotten by locals.  In a well-known passage, the indigenous 
chronicler Garcilaso de la Vega (1539-1616) reported that the Inca and other 
indigenous Peruvians, 
 
fertilized the soil by manuring it, and in the valley of Cuzco and almost all 
the highland area they treated their maize fields with human manure [huanu 
runap], which they regarded as the best.  They go to great trouble to obtain 
it, and dry it and pulverize it in time for the sowing season.  In the [higher 
Sierra], . . . the climate is too cold for growing maize, and they sow potatoes 
and other vegetables: for this they use the manure of the Peruvian sheep 
[llamas and alpacas, huanu huanacup], which they regard as more 
beneficial than any other. 
 On the seacoast, from below Arequipa to Tarapacá, . . . they use no 
other manure but the dung of sea birds [huanu piscup], of which large and 
small varieties occur . . . in such enormous flocks that they seem incredible 
to anyone who has not seen them.  They breed on some uninhabited islands 
off the coast, where they deposit such an amount of dung that is no less 
incredible.  From a distance the heaps of it look like the snowy crests of a 
range of mountains. . . . The dung of the sea birds produces great fertility.  
In other parts of the same coast, . . . they manure with the heads of sardines 
[huanu challuap] and use nothing else. 
Twentieth-century conservationists loved to repeat de la Vega’s account of the 
management of these bird colonies: 
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In the times of the Inca kings these birds were so carefully watched that no 
one was allowed to land on the islands during the breeding season under 
pain of death, so that they should not be disturbed or driven from their 
nests.  It was also illegal to kill them at any season either on the islands or 
elsewhere, under pain of the same penalty. 
 Each island was assigned, on the Inca’s instructions, to a certain 
province, . . . in which each village had its piece and each householder in 
the village his part, according to the quantity of manure he was reckoned to 
need . . . based on the requirements of his land.24 
Eighteenth-century European scientific travelers routinely reported that 
“prodigious quantities” of “huano” were used for agriculture in many places along 
the Peruvian coast, and sometimes transported long distances.  Local informants 
agreed that guano was the feces of marine birds, especially “Huanàes,” and that the 
best-quality guano came from recently occupied bird colonies.  In 1763, Juan 
Rehr’s successor as viceregal cosmographer, Cosme Bueno, calculated the annual 
guano consumption of just one coastal province, Chancay, at approximately 90,000 
fanegas (5,000 tons).  Peru had a significant local guano industry, even a local 
guano science, long before its discovery by northerners.25 
                                                 
24. Garcilaso de la Vega, El Inca, Royal Commentaries of the Incas and General History of 
Peru: Part One, trans. Harold V. Livermore (1609; Austin: University of Texas Press, 1966), 246-
247.  For Quechua terms, confirmed using modern dictionaries, see Markham, Markham in Peru, 
41, 143.  Cf. Robert E. Coker, “Peru’s Wealth-Producing Birds,” National Geographic Magazine 
June 1920, 541; William Vogt, “Informe sobre las aves guaneras por el ornitólogo americano Señor 
William Vogt,” BCAG 18:3 (Mar. 1942), 38. 
25. Commentators included Louis Feuillée, Amédée François Frézier, Jorge Juan and 
Antonio de Ulloa.  For a summary of this early knowledge, see George Evelyn Hutchinson, “Survey 
of Existing Knowledge of Biogeochemistry: 3. The Biogeochemistry of Vertebrate Excretion,” 
Bulletin of the American Museum of Natural History 96 (1950), 43-49; Antonio Raimondi, Historia 
de la geografía del Perú: Libro primero, vol. 2 of El Perú (Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1876), 237, 
312; Cosme Bueno, “Descripcion de las Provincias pertenecientes al Arzobispado de Lima,” in 
Conocimientos de los tiempos, Ephemeride del año de 1764 (Lima, 1763), 58-60.    
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Nineteenth-century Humboldtian scientists preferred to trust their own 
observations over the opinion of locals.  It is unclear whether Alexander von 
Humboldt (1769-1859) actually landed on any of the guano islands during his 
famous five-year expedition to the “equinoctial regions of the New Continent.”  His 
encounter with the Grupo Huaura late in 1802 (if only from a distance) led him to 
believe that birds were somehow responsible for these deposits.  Nevertheless, he 
could not imagine how the vast numbers of “cormorants, flamingos, and cranes [!]” 
he observed along the Peruvian coast could sustain Peruvian agriculture, since he 
estimated that they deposited only about one centimeter of excrement on the islands 
every 300 years.  (Twentieth-century studies have shown that active colonies 
deposited more than this amount each breeding season.)  He speculated that a 
geological catastrophe might have formed these organic deposits in a manner like 
the coal and lignite deposits of Europe.26 
Humboldt’s young Peruvian disciple, Mariano Eduardo de Rivero, did some 
experiments to test his mentor’s conclusions.  After comparing the chemical 
composition of ancient “red” and “brownish” guanos from the Islas Chincha with 
freshly produced “white” guano, Rivero concluded that all types of Peruvian guano 
came originally from birds.  Moreover, he confirmed that locals harvested large 
amounts of manure from existing bird colonies year after year knowing that 
Peruvian farmers preferred fresh excrement and were willing to pay extra for it.  He 
also recognized that this fresh guano supply tended to vary from year to year due to 
                                                 
26. Martin Heinrich Klaproth, “Chemische Untersuchung des Guano aus den Inseln der 
Peruanischen Küste,” in Beitrage zur chemischen Kenntnis der Mineralkörper (Berlin: Heinrich 
August Rottmann, 1807), 4:303-306.  
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the presence or absence of birds.  Following up Bueno’s observations, Rivero 
calculated the annual consumption of just 18 haciendas in the Chancay valley at 
33,600 fanegas (1,900 metric tons).27  A later Swiss scientific traveler, Johann 
Jakob von Tschudi (1818-1889), reported Rivero’s findings to an international 
audience.  Tschudi was much more adept at ornithology than either Humboldt or 
Rivero.  He concluded, based on field observations and a captive experiment, that 
individual birds were capable of producing at least 100 to 150 grams of guano per 
day.  Nevertheless, the vast guano industry that developed after 1840 almost 
exclusively mined ancient accumulations of excrement.  Thanks in large part to 
Humboldt, foreigners ignored the possibility of exploiting Peru’s living population 
of guano birds until after 1890.28 
From subsequent marine research, we know that the Peru Current 
provisioned this biological abundance.  This “eastern boundary current” proceeds 
northwest along the Pacific coast of South America for nearly 4,000 kilometers 
from Valparaiso, Chile, past Punta Pariñas near the Peru/Ecuador border toward the 
                                                 
27. By comparison, at the beginning of the 1910s, Chancay valley farmers consumed 
nearly the same amount of guano reported by Rivero in 1827; by 1950 they were purchasing seven 
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reported by Bueno in 1763; in 1956, the peak year for the twentieth-century Peruvian guano 
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28. Mariano Eduardo de Rivero y Ustáriz, “Razón de las haciendas del valle de Chancay y 
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Andes, into the Primeval Forests, trans. Thomasina Ross (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1854), 167-170; 
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Islas Galapagos where it interacts with the equatorial current system.  It is a 
consequence of the inertial motion of the South Pacific caused by the eastward 
rotation of the earth.  This “Coriolis force” causes Pacific waters to slosh away 
from the equatorial coast of South America and back again far to the south along 
the southern coast of Chile in an immense counterclockwise gyre.  Even more 
important for biological production is the prevailing southeast trade wind caused by 
upward atmospheric convection near the equator that pushes the surface water 
toward the northwest away from the South American coast.  This produces a region 
of intense subsurface upwelling along most of the Peruvian littoral.  These cool 
waters (which originate in the dark at mid-level depths below the photic zone 
where active photosynthesis takes place) pack heavy concentrations of chemical 
nutrients that have trickled down from above.  Generations of ocean scientists have 
commented on the extraordinary coolness of these waters (15° to 22° Celsius on 
average) in comparison to the rest of the tropics.  This is up to 8° below the global 
average for Peru’s latitude (4°S to 17°S).29 
Alexander von Humboldt is often unjustly credited with discovering the 
Peru Current because he was the first scientist recognized for taking direct sea-
surface temperature measurements along the Peruvian coast.  Humboldt incorrectly 
speculated that this cold water flowed in from the south all the way from the 
Antarctic.  Circa 1840, against Humboldt’s wishes, Heinrich Berghaus insisted on 
labeling this phenomenon the “Humboldt Current” in the Royal Prussian Maritime 
                                                 
29. Warren S. Wooster, “Yearly Changes in the Peru Current,” Limnology and 
Oceanography 6:2 (Apr. 1961), 222-226; Gerhard Schott, Geographie des Indischen und Stillen 
Ozeans (Hamburg: C. Boysen, 1935), charts 25, 26. 
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Atlas to glorify the scientific accomplishments of the German nation.  The name 
stuck, partly because Peruvians welcomed this association between their country 
and one of history’s great scientists.  Of course, Humboldt’s “discovery” had been 
common knowledge among sailors in the region for centuries.30       
Unimaginably large numbers of phytoplankton feast on nutrients brought to 
the surface by upwelling, the real cause of this coolness.  They serve as food for 
predatory zooplankton.  These microscopic creatures, in turn, support enormous 
shoals of anchoveta (Engraulis ringens), a small, schooling species closely related 
to economically important fish known commonly as the anchovy, sardine, or 
pilchard.  Before the advent of Peru’s massive fishing industry after World War II, 
anchoveta and other plankton-grazing creatures fed a dazzling array of large 
predatory animals, including the tuna-like bonito (Sarda chilensis), Peruvian sea 
lions or lobos del mar (Otaria flavescens), and various cetaceans, such as the 
porpoise.  New England whalers once frequented the port of Paita to hunt sperm 
whales (Physeter catodon) that lived in abundance in the upwelling regions of the 
eastern and central equatorial Pacific.  Anchoveta also once fed a vast population of 
marine birds.  The most important producers of guano, respectively, have all been 
species of the order Pelicaniformes: the guanay or Peruvian cormorant 
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(Phalacrocorax bougainvillii), the piquero or Peruvian booby (Sula variegata), the 
alcatraz or Peruvian pelican (Pelecanus thagus) and, to a much lesser extent, the 
camanay or blue-footed booby (Sula nebouxii) (illus. 2-5).  Except for the 
camanay, they tend to nest in large, concentrated colonies on islands and points 
along the coast of Peru and northern Chile.31 
The combination of cool ocean water, prevailing onshore winds, and an 
extremely stable atmosphere gives these coasts one of the most arid climates in the 
world.  During most years, the coast gets little more than a sprinkling of mist 
(garua).  Nevertheless, this “arid” coast is extremely humid during the winter 
months and often overcast or foggy for weeks at a time, as generations of foreign 
visitors including Charles Darwin have lamented.  This almost complete lack of 
precipitation prevents the breakdown of uric acid (C5H4N4O3) and the volatilization 
and leaching of water-soluble ammonia (NH3) from guano deposits.  Even strata 
hundreds of years old retained high concentrations of nitrogen. 
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The Guano Age 
A small sample of guano numbered among the thousands of specimens in 
Alexander von Humboldt’s possession after he returned to Europe.  He passed it on 
to French chemists whose published analyses revealed its high nitrogen and 
phosphate content.  As a consequence, Humboldt usually gets credit for 
“discovering” guano.  For many years, a handful of export promoters in Peru and 
abroad tried to drum up interest in this new manure source, occasionally by sending 
small consignments to set up crop experiments in the North.  According to an 1824 
article in The American Farmer, the leading voice for agricultural improvement in 
the United States, “From the composition of the guano, it is easy to conclude its 
fertilizing properties, and it must be judged to be a powerful manure.”  It added, 
“The naturally sterile coasts of Peru, owe their fertility” to this substance.32 
Then, the German chemist Justus von Liebig published Organic Chemistry 
in Its Application to Agriculture and Physiology (1st ed., 1840).  It found a ready 
international audience and became, almost overnight, one of the most influential 
scientific texts ever written.  Liebig strongly emphasized the importance of 
nitrogen for agriculture and the necessity of fertilizer inputs, though ironically in 
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light of what happened next, he discounted the need to apply nitrogen-rich 
manures.33 
Though the excitement over Liebig’s book surely helped, clever marketing 
initiated the guano boom.  In the late 1830s, Francisco Quirós y Ampurdia (1798-
1862), a long-time promoter of European entrepreneurial ventures to restore the 
mines of his hometown Cerro de Pasco, Peru’s principal highland mining center, 
began to turn his attention toward lowland development.  In 1840, he orchestrated a 
deal between a group of French traders in Lima, a Liverpool merchant house, and 
the Peruvian government to commercialize the export of guano.  In 1841, this 
partnership exported over 8,000 metric tons of guano to Great Britain (fig. 1).  
Other groups quickly jumped into the trade.  The international propaganda 
campaign that followed touting guano’s value as a fertilizer completely blurred the 
boundary between science and salesmanship.  By December 1844, guano was being 
shipped in commercial quantities via England to the United States, and soon as far 
as the sugar cane plantations of Barbados and Mauritius.34 
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All told, from 1840-1880, Peru exported an estimated 12.7 million metric 
tons of guano from its islands with a sale value in the range of £150 million.  This 
amount of guano contained approximately 1.6 million metric tons of nitrogen, 
similar quantities of phosphate and lime (CaO), 300,000 metric tons of potash 
(K2O), and smaller amounts of manganese, iron, and other trace elements necessary 
for plant growth.  Even though its nutrients were not balanced to true agricultural 
needs, Peruvian guano was the most complete, most concentrated fertilizer 
available on the world market for decades.  British farmers purchased the lion’s 
share, followed by German, U.S., and other European agriculturists.  During the 
1870s, plantations in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and other Caribbean colonies, Mauritius, 
and China together bought 134,000 metric tons.  Thus, the Peruvian guano trade 
became truly global, though it strongly favored northwestern Europe.35 
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twentieth centuries, Enriching the Earth, 40-43, app. F; note also that Mathew’s estimates of British 
imports seem much too low when compared to Peruvian export estimates.  Cf. Heraclio Bonilla, “La 
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Scientific theory and promotional claims aside, the adoption of this new 
manure source was only a small step from applying urban waste, bone meal, and 
other recycled inputs to increase crop output.  Farmers who experimented with 
guano could see obvious results long before harvest, especially with young plants, 
and it worked wonders with a variety of crops, soil types, and moisture conditions.  
Nevertheless, its adoption was concentrated among certain crops and regions.  In 
the United States, most guano went to farms close to big cities, like those on 
western Long Island, that were already integrated into an urban-rural waste 
recycling system.  These farms were profitable enough to afford such an expensive 
input.  Around the Chesapeake Bay, guano allowed grain farmers to go back to 
“forcing” worn-out lands with manure, as tobacco planters had done during the 
early colonial period before adopting a system of long-fallow shifting cultivation 
dependent on slavery.  During the Guano Age, Chesapeake farmers converted large 
swaths of regrown pine scrub to plowed agriculture.  Antebellum farmers in the 
Deep South showed great interest in Peruvian guano; some plantation owners close 
to major ports used it on a large scale.  Most cotton planters, however, continued to 
prefer a three-field rotation system integrating maize, green manures, and swine.  
Though Peruvian guano prepared the way, the South’s true “guano craze” happened 
after the Civil War and primarily involved phosphatic guanos extracted elsewhere 
in the world.36 
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The majority of British purchases (and, therefore, the biggest share of all 
Peruvian guano) went to turnips, swedes, and grass--that is, for cattle forage.  
Instead of increasing the production of agricultural staples for Britain’s exploding 
population, much less to help reduce Ireland’s population hemorrhage after the 
potato famine of the mid-1840s, guano primarily benefited meat and dairy 
consumers.  (Contrary to the advice of agronomists at the time, cereal farmers 
disliked the surplus straw they got when using guano and feared that guano 
depleted the soil in other ways--which it did, indirectly, because of its unbalanced 
nutrients.  Cereal growers did benefit from the increased supply of cattle manure, 
however.)  Peruvian guano thus helped initiate a trend away from cereal cultivation 
in Britain that only intensified toward the end of the nineteenth century with 
massive importation of wheat from the disappearing temperate grasslands of North 
and South America.  As early as 1872, the Agricultural Economist was asking 
English farmers, “why grow corn at all?”  Guano made it possible for the world’s 
relatively affluent to eat higher on the food chain during the nineteenth century, a 
preview of events described in chapters 7-8.37 
To the later chagrin of Peru’s ruling class, guano also smoothed the way for 
the adoption of other new fertilizers.  More than any other substance, guano 
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displaced the old system of waste recycling, and it accelerated the trend whereby 
farmers on both sides of the North Atlantic, even tropical plantations, became 
dependent on external inputs.  By encouraging what economists and ecologists call 
throughput--one-way patterns of production, consumption, and waste--rather than 
recycling, it made farm operations much more like those of the factory.  Though it 
took many decades to accomplish, expert agronomists slowly gained influence over 
these operations in the name of agricultural efficiency.  Together, these factors 
gradually created an entirely new technological--and ecological--system 
surrounding intensive agriculture.  By itself, guano did not represent a radical 
departure from the fertilizers that preceded it.  Nevertheless, its use reinforced a 
series of new practices, the sum of which was revolutionary in scope.  In so many 
ways, modern industrial life, especially that of Britain’s new class of privileged 
“beefeaters,” flourished on the concentrated nutrients provided by guano.38 
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Likewise, guano had a broad impact on coastal Peru.  The Peruvian 
government lost little time in nationalizing ownership of this valuable resource so it 
could charge royalties on its extraction and control its export.  Guano export duties 
soon became Peru’s largest source of external income.  The guano trade created a 
huge financial windfall, the largest share of which went to service a growing 
internal and international debt and enrich the financiers of the nascent Peruvian 
Republic.  A significant chunk went to fund the military during this age of 
instability, and to build railroads, great wonders of modern engineering designed to 
connect the mining, agricultural, and population centers of the Andes to the Pacific 
coast--including the two highest railways ever built anywhere in the world.  These 
changes fostered a confident, progressive, even utopian mentality among Peru’s 
emerging coastal plutocracy.  For all these reasons, the period 1840-1879 has come 
to be known as Peru’s “Guano Age.”39 
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Guano Imperialism 
Shock waves from this seismic shift in the global economy impacted many 
other parts of the biosphere as the world’s imperial nations searched for new 
sources of guano, laborers to work them, and ways to control its supply.  This 
search was intimately tied with forms of “ecological imperialism,” including the 
“world hunt” for valuable wild organisms and ecological invasions species 
accompanying humans on their travels.40  Scientists (sometimes unwittingly) 
played a significant supporting role in this conquest. 
Based on reports of large marine bird colonies from hunters involved in 
annihilating the southern fur seal (Artocephalus australis), ships rushed from the 
North Atlantic to the arid, southwestern coast of Africa in search of guano islands 
like those in Peru.  From 1843-1845, as many as 300,000 metric tons of 
nitrogenous guano were rapidly exhausted from Ichaboe and other islands in this 
region for sale in Great Britain.  This flood depressed prices in the short term and 
inspired merchants of Peruvian guano to divert part of their supply to the United 
States.  Lower prices and broader distribution convinced many additional 
consumers to give guano a try, and this rapidly expanded its market.41 
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Unsatisfied with Peruvian state control of the guano supply, in the early 
1850s, speculators tried to convince the British and U.S. governments to send 
gunboats to the northern coast of Peru so they could extract guano from the Islas 
Lobos without paying export taxes.  In an expansive mood after the spectacular 
triumph over Mexico in 1848, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster offered his 
support, but the Peruvian navy preempted this by stationing several warships to 
protect these islands from “Yankee pirates.”42  North American entrepreneurs then 
targeted the Galápagos (until it was discovered they had no guano deposits) and 
tiny bird islands in the Caribbean.  Information gathered by sperm whalers and the 
“Wilkes” Exploring Expedition of 1838-1842--the United States’ first major foray 
“to extend the empire of commerce and science” by sea--proved vital to the search 
for bird colonies in remote sections of the central equatorial Pacific.43  The U.S. 
Congress passed the Guano Island Act of 1856 to legitimate their territorial claims.  
U.S. companies eventually extracted around 500,000 metric tons of phosphate-rich 
guano from Baker and Jarvis atolls, the first of several Pacific islands annexed by 
the United States under the act.  (We now know that periodic torrential rains caused 
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by the El Niño phenomenon leached the nitrogen from the marine-bird deposits in 
this normally arid equatorial region.)  This initiated an international race to claim 
even the remotest specks of land in the Pacific, and led eventually to the discovery 
of vast mineral phosphate deposits on populated Nauru, Banaba (Ocean), and 
Makatea islands.44 
The United States started its formal colonization of the Caribbean and 
Pacific by seizing several islands under the Guano Island Act.  In 1858, for 
example, it used a gunboat to forcibly take possession of Navassa (La Navase) 
Island from the black Republic of Haiti.  U.S. companies removed well over 
700,000 metric tons of mineral phosphate (not organic bird guano as is commonly 
believed) from this island for processing into superphosphate in Philadelphia and 
Baltimore.  In all, the United States officially laid claim to 66 territories under the 
Guano Island Act, nine of which are still official possessions.  U.S. companies only 
mined about twenty of these islands, since after the Civil War they increasingly 
came to rely for phosphate on rich mineral deposits in South Carolina and 
Florida.45 
In the mid-1860s, Spain tried to exercise this same sort of gunboat 
diplomacy against Peru itself.  Soon after Spain reconquered Santo Domingo and 
briefly helped the French install an Austrian noble as ruler of Mexico, three 
Spanish frigates abruptly abandoned the Spain’s Scientific Commission to the 
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Pacific and seized the Islas Chincha by force.  These “scientific” craft were quickly 
joined by a Spanish naval blockade.46  Peru responded by transferring its foremost 
resident technician, the Polish engineer Ernest Malinowski, from building railroads 
to organizing a defense.  He was joined in this endeavor by a Peruvian engineer and 
a Colombian who, like Malinowski, had been trained at France’s École 
Polytechnique.  Their artillery placements and Peru’s new steam-powered gunboats 
repelled Spain’s bombardment of Callao, disabled its most modern warship, and 
sank Spain’s pretensions of recolonizing South America.  No northern power ever 
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again tried to control the Peruvian guano trade by military force, though such 
independence came at great monetary expense for Peru.47 
Meanwhile, in its quest for laborers to man the guano mines and its 
booming coastal agricultural sector, Peruvians engaged in an imperialist enterprise 
of its own that reached all the way to the other side of the Pacific.  In 1854-1855, 
the Peruvian state used receipts from the guano trade to end the payment of tribute 
by indigenous peoples and to compensate owners for the abolition of black slavery, 
thus eliminating major sources of coerced labor and government tax income.  
Francisco Quirós, the founder of the guano trade, supervised the slaves’ 
emancipation for the Peruvian state.  Like their counterparts in the Caribbean, 
California, Mauritius, Australia, and South Africa, Peruvian entrepreneurs looked 
to China to augment their coastal labor supply.  From 1847-1874, Peruvians 
contracted over 92,000 “coolies,” primarily from South China via Portuguese 
Macao, who had been displaced by progressive environmental degradation, 
imperialist intrusion, and political unrest.  About ten percent died on the long 
voyage across the Pacific and never even made it to Peru.  Most ended up on 
coastal plantations, but thousands died as virtual slaves working alongside convicts 
in the harsh conditions of the guano islands.  Floggings were routine.  Dozens 
committed suicide.  The guano industry became synonymous with brutality.  
British humanitarians voiced their outrage against this new form of “yellow 
slavery.”  Their campaign put a stop to the Hong Kong coolie trade, but their 
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homeland kept benefiting from the opium trade and importing guano--as well as 
gold, sugar, coffee, and other products produced by slaves.  In the early 1870s 
when Chinese immigration reached its peak, labor unrest became commonplace on 
the guano islands.  As late as the 1920s, visitors still could not help but notice a 
grisly relic of the Age of Guano: “the dismal spot . . . at every island--the Chinese 
graveyard--where garments, detached bones, and twisted corpses of poor coolies 
have for many years been exposed to the merciless sun.”48 
Similar horrors were visited on other Pacific islanders by labor contractors.  
In a racist attempt to substitute “noble savages” for Asian immigrants and provide 
Peruvian coastal planters with enough workers to supply the international demand 
for cotton during the U.S. Civil War, in 1862-1863 over 30 South American ships 
embarked for the south-central Pacific in search of human cargoes.  They cajoled, 
tricked, or kidnapped at least 3,600 “colonists” who were brought to Peru for sale.  
Contrary to popular belief, only a tiny handful could have ended up on the guano 
islands, despite the best attempts of the contractors.  International humanitarian 
pressure (in the context of the Spanish blockade) put an end to this practice, but 
few islanders ever returned home, despite their mandated repatriation.  Those who 
did transferred smallpox, dysentery, and other crowd diseases to these once isolated 
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habitats.  On Easter Island (Rapa Nui) approximately 58 percent of its 4,100 
inhabitants died or disappeared during the 1860s, another in a long series of 
ecological tragedies that have hit this remote island.  The forces of “European 
biological expansion” thus arrived at the hands of South Americans, paving the 
way for formal Chilean colonization and the invasion of sheep herds.  Conditions 
among “free” African-Americans and Hawaiians working on guano islands 
elsewhere in the world were little better.49 
In the meantime, the Peruvian state made a valiant attempt to estimate how 
long the guano bonanza would last, so it could negotiate loans based on future 
receipts and make some plans for how to spend this windfall.  Early guesses ranged 
as high as 117 million tons for the Chincha Islands alone.  In 1845, the more 
reasonable Mariano de Rivero lowered this outrageous figure by 100 million.  In 
1853, the European-educated plantation owner who initiated the coolie trade, 
Domingo Elías (1805-1867), caused an enormous stir when he reported that only 6 
million tons of guano remained on the Islas Chincha.  He did this in part to 
manipulate his lucrative guano-loading contract.  But this move was part of Elías’s 
long campaign to undermine the existing conservative government and its policy to 
use guano receipts to consolidate Peru’s massive internal debt.  Within a week, the 
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Peruvian executive--a follower of Bartolomé Herrera and his vision of an 
“aristocracy of knowledge”--hired an expert commission to study the deposits and 
working conditions on the Islas Chincha.  Its members included the aging co-
founder of the Peruvian Republic’s first scientific journal and natural history 
museum, Nicolás Fernández de Piérola (1788-1857), the newly arrived French 
engineer Charles Fraguett, and a recent immigrant from war-torn Milan, the young 
naturalist-revolutionary Antonio Raimondi.  Using relatively quick stratigraphic 
surveys instead of impractical core samples, they estimated a remainder of 11.399 
million metric tons and considered “this precious fertilizer to be inexhaustible for 
many years to come.”  This was an overestimate by more than 50 percent.  Elías’s 
guess was off by much less, as it later turned out.  But Piérola’s report had more 
immediate consequences:  Elías had his guano contract revoked; he then organized 
an armed revolt that contributed within a few months to the overthrow of his foes 
as rulers of the Peruvian state.  An 1863 survey of the northern islands calculated 
6.767 million metric tons of extant phosphatic guano on Isla Lobos de Tierra alone, 
an even wilder overcount.  British observers such as the scientist Clements 
Markham, for their part, also routinely overestimated Peru’s guano deposits.50   
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These numbers had enormous political and economic importance for this 
statistical age.  The involvement of highly trained foreigners such as Fraguett and 
Markham and their seeming exactitide made them trustworthy.  This made it 
possible for the Peruvian national government to acquire a series of loans with a 
nominal value totaling £51.84 million, the largest debt burden, by far, acquired by 
any Latin American country between 1850 and “the first world debt crisis” of 1873.  
Needless to say, like so many products of nature, these deposits ran out years 
before they were expected to--by the end of 1870 in the case of the Islas Chincha.  
Raimondi was hardly the first or the last to lament that these vast quantities 
“disappeared, unfortunately, without leaving any great benefit to the country.”  He 
was less aware of the radical environmental effects these changes had on the guano 
island landscape (illus. 6).51 
 
The Origins of the Nitrate Industry 
The depletion of Peru’s richest guano deposits was no cause for dire 
concern--at least in the long term--because of the development of a new, nitrogen-
rich product from the coastal deserts of Tarapacá, the driest in the world.  Vast 
deposits of salitre, also known as saltpeter or sodium nitrate (NaNO3), lay close 
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beneath the surface crust of Peru’s southernmost province.  “Nitrate of soda,” said 
one booster, “is one day going to be called to replace guano in the markets of 
Europe when these become exhausted; salitre is going to last for centuries and 
Europe is going to be obligated to buy it to feed its impoverished soils.”52  The 
history of its local, then “universal” discovery and subsequent adoption as an 
agricultural manure is closely tied to that of Peruvian guano. 
There are no firm indications that pre-Hispanic or colonial-era farmers in 
Peru used salitre as fertilizer.  It found its first major use as an explosive.  In the 
late eighteenth century, a few local miners used sodium nitrate to make blasting 
powder, ignoring the official monopoly held by the viceregal powder works in 
Lima.  The Napoleonic wars changed all that.  In 1808, the Peruvian viceroy sent 
an expedition to Tarapacá to see if these deposits could be used to bolster colonial 
defenses.  For several years, regional chemists had been trying to develop an 
economic technique to convert “cubic niter” (sodium nitrate) to “prismatic niter” or 
potassium nitrate (KNO3)--the explosive ingredient in gunpowder.53 
Enter the scientific expert.  An entrepreneur intent on developing the 
Tarapacá deposits traveled all the way from Lima to the far reaches of Upper Peru--
almost as far as Juan Rehr after the 1746 earthquake--to consult Rehr’s compatriot, 
naturalist Thaddaeus Haenke (1761-1817).  Haenke was a native of Trébič with a 
doctorate from the University of Prague, both in the present-day Czech Republic.  
In the early 1790s, he had served on the Spanish-organized Malaspina expedition to 
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the Pacific and stayed behind in South America after becoming extremely ill with 
scurvy.  Haenke immediately revealed to his visitor the European chemical process 
for synthesizing potassium nitrate from sodium nitrate.  It was then adapted to the 
existing Peruvian technique for deriving salitre from its conglomerate ore.  
Stevedores were drafted from the small, local guano industry to load this valuable 
mineral salt for shipment from the southern port of Iquique to Lima for processing.  
Peruvian gunpowder contributed to the high death toll of the independence wars in 
South America (1808-1826).  Some of this gunpowder even made it all the way to 
Spain, but the existence of these deposits--a valuable state secret--was not widely 
publicized, and the Tarapacá nitrate industry fell into decline with the end of 
hostilities in the 1820s.54 
The official scientific discovery of Peru’s nitrate deposits happened as the 
result of the kind of chance meeting so common among expatriate communities.  In 
1821 in Madrid, the industrialist Pedro Fuentes, a Tarapacá native whose family 
was in the nitrate business, happened to run into Mariano Eduardo de Rivero y 
Ustáriz (1798-1857, illus. 7), a native of Arequipa.  Rivero was winding up a 
decade-long tour of Europe’s scientific capitals far removed from his homeland’s 
independence struggle.  He had dedicated most of his efforts to mineralogy and 
metallurgy and acquired the highest certification possible for a foreigner from the 
French École de Mines.  Fuentes proudly reported the wonders of Peruvian salitre 
to his compatriot and provided Rivero with a sample.  When Rivero returned to 
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Paris, he passed it on for expert chemical analysis to the crystallographer René-Just 
Haüy and published an article in Annales de Mines pointing to the existence of 
large processed quantities already sitting in sacks in Iquique waiting for a buyer.  
Rivero, thus, is usually credited with “discovering” Peruvian salitre.55 
This chance meeting affected the history of manure and its management in 
other ways.  In 1822 in Paris, Ecuadorian-born naturalist Leopoldo Zea (the former 
director of Madrid’s botanical garden), now in the service of independent Gran 
Colombia, contracted Rivero to head a mission to staff a school of mines and a 
natural history museum in Bogotá.  They hoped to replace the many scientists who 
had been gunned down or exiled during the wars for independence and put the 
region back on the road to progress.  With the help of Rivero’s life-long friend in 
science Alexander von Humboldt, they organized and equipped a small team of 
technicians from the Parisian scientific community to travel to Colombia.  It 
included the mining engineer Jean Baptiste Boussingault (1802-1887), a young 
Frenchman who wanted desparately to follow in the footsteps of his friend 
Humboldt, especially to see active Andean volcanoes.56 
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In most areas this mission did not fulfill the lofty goals set by the Gran 
Colombian Congress, though Boussingault and Rivero did reestablish a 
meteorological observatory in Bogotá, and they assisted Antioquian gold miners 
with their amalgamation techniques.  As with so many nineteenth-century voyages 
to the tropics in the mold of Humboldtian science, this expedition’s most important 
contribution involved bridging the chasm separating local understanding of the 
South American environment and the “universal” knowledge of European science.  
In the process, it opened entire new realms for learned research on both shores.  
Rivero and Boussingault continued Humboldt’s “practical astronomy” in the region 
and collaborated on a number of studies published in Colombia and Europe.57  
Rivero must have passed on his knowledge of Peruvian salitre and guano to 
Boussingault before Bolívar reappointed Rivero--on Humboldt’s recommendation--
as the Director General of Mines and Public Instruction in Peru.  There, he served 
alongside Hipólito Unanue and Nicolás Fernández de Piérola among the Peruvian 
Republic’s first technocrats.58 
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Boussingault, was utterly fascinated by the extent of the coastal guano trade 
after he visited the northern port of Paita in 1832.  These first-hand observations 
ultimately had an immense effect on his life.  He later recalled:  
 
Along a great extent of the coast of Peru, the soil, which . . . is perfectly 
barren of itself is rendered fertile, and is made to yield abundant crops, by 
the application of guano; and this manure, which effects a change so prompt 
and so remarkable, consists almost exclusively of ammoniacal salts.  It was 
with this fact before me that in 1832, when I was on the coasts of the 
Southern Ocean, I adopted the opinion which . . . well-established facts 
[now] prove beyond doubt that salts, having ammonia [NH3] for their base, 
must be ranked among the most powerful of all agents in promoting 
vegetation.59 
After his return home to France, Boussingault devoted the rest of his scientific 
career to laboratory and field research on the role of nitrogen in plant nutrition.  
After two decades of experimentation and “contradictory” results, he finally came 
to the “definite judgment” in the mid-1850s (several years after agricultural 
empirics) that mineral nitrates had fertilizing capabilities similar to the “most 
active” organic manures.  Thanks to the inspiration provided by Peruvian 
agricultural practices, Boussingault went on to reveal more of the chemical 
workings of the nitrogen cycle than any other individual.  He also became an 
outspoken proponent of nitrogen fertilizers of all sorts--to the great benefit of 
Peruvian exporters.60 
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In the meantime, European warfare, not agricultural science, revived the 
Tarapacá nitrate industry.  The revolutions of 1830 motivated several countries to 
import Peruvian salitre for the first time, a total of 2,718 metric tons in 1830-1831.  
When the most famous Humboldtian traveler of them all, the budding geologist 
Charles Darwin, arrived on the central Pacific coast of South America in 1835, he 
went to some effort to visit Peru’s booming saltpeter works.  According to Darwin, 
some of this production was already beginning to be used by enterprising 
Europeans as an agricultural manure, though it cost far too much in these early 
years to be used on a large scale for this purpose.61 
Peruvian salitre exports multiplied from 50,000 metric tons during the 
1830s, to over 400,000 metric tons during the 1850s.  As with guano, Great Britain 
imported the majority, followed by France, Germany, and the United States.  Chile, 
northern Peru, and the Antilles took a small share; some even made it to 
Australia.62 
As the nitrate industry grew, it attracted more and more people, especially 
technically minded foreigners.  Late in 1853, right after he finished his tasks on the 
Islas Chincha, the Peruvian government sent the naturalist Antonio Raimondi 
(1826-1890) to investigate Tarapacá, the first of many exploratory expeditions he 
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performed for the Peruvian state.  These trips took him all the way to the distant 
Peruvian Amazon and allowed him to more than fulfill his romantic dream, directly 
inspired by Humboldt, to leave behind the tragic events of 1848-1849 in Italy for 
the sublime nature of the American tropics.63  The Peruvian state also sent Ernest 
Malinowski (1818-1899) to Tarapacá in 1853.  Like Raimondi, Malinowski was a 
European refugee: the Russian invasion of Poland in 1830 had forced him to leave 
his homeland for France, then Algeria and Peru.  He traveled to Tarapacá explicitly 
to investage an application for a patent to use steam heat to purify salitre registered 
by Pedro Gamboni Vera, a mechanically adept Chilean who came north to seek his 
fortune in the nitrate fields after abandoning his original plan to study industry in 
the United States.  Twenty years later, the Peruvian state again called on Raimondi 
to adjudicate a patent dispute between Gamboni and three other firms over a 
process to extract iodine on a massive scale from the nitrate industry’s waste water.  
By this time, an international cohort of industrial engineers from Europe and the 
Americas were involved in a race to develop new technological systems to 
maximize the efficiency and profitability of nitrate manufacture in Tarapacá, as 
well as newly discovered deposits in the Atacama desert of Bolivia and 
northernmost Chile.  The fact that immigrant entrepreneurs like Gamboni had few 
Peruvian loyalties proved to be important in the eventual War of the Pacific.64 
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These new technological systems did little to reduce the nitrate factories’ 
voracious demand for resources.  As late as the mid-nineteenth century, this driest 
of deserts still had riparian forests of algarrobo or carob trees (Prosopis spp.) that 
had formed layer upon layer of ancient wood.  All this wood, living and dead, was 
soon consumed for charcoal and building materials.  This forced nitrate 
manufactueres to import coal and lumber from as far away as England and Oregon.  
Meanwhile, the underground aquifers that nourished these trees were practically 
sucked dry by the nitrate factories’ thirst for water.  The entirely barren wastes of 
today in this region are a human creation.65 
These remote oases of industry in the midst of the desert also had to import 
laborers.  Thousands of Gamboni’s countrymen came north for work, though they 
were always outnumbered by highland Peruvian and Bolivian laborers.  Most were 
hired by enganche, a regional system of contracting laborers first developed in 
central Chile in the 1850s by the North American railway builder Henry Meiggs.  
He brought it with him in the 1860s when he became Peru’s main railway builder.  
This form of debt peonage quickly spread to other construction and mining 
companies in Peru.  With the decline of the coolie trade, it became the dominant 
system for importing workers along much of the Pacific coast of Latin America.66 
Despite these import costs, new, faster, more-efficient steam technologies 
like Gamboni’s patented system and economies of scale gradually reduced the cost 
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of production for large companies with connections to foreign capital.  This pushed 
Peruvian-born producers still using older methods to the margins of the industry.  
In 1866, the price of nitrates on the British market fell to the level of guano for the 
first time.67 
European farmers took a little while to switch, however.  This was partly 
out of agrarian conservatism.  (Latin American farmers were not the only group 
guilty of “routinism” during this or any era).68  But sodium nitrate had a major 
disadvantage: it did not smell like a good fertilizer.  In stark contrast to growing 
urban prejudice against the stench of excrement and decay, which was thought to 
cause disease, farmers used foul odors to help detect the best fertilizers.  This came 
from long experience with animal manures, but it also worked with guano and 
fishmeal.  Unscrupulous salesmen often adulterated or faked fertilizers.  Farmers 
quickly learned that genuine Peruvian product had a tell-tale ammoniacal stench.  
Like city dwellers, farmers, too, may have become more sensitive to smell in the 
course of the nineteenth century.69  From the point of view of the agricultural 
chemist, the last remnants of guano from the Islas Chincha still had a higher 
nitrogen content than impure sodium nitrate, as well as other valuable nutrients.  
Thus, North Atlantic farmers, at least for the moment, were willing to pay the 
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premium charged by the Peruvian government as it tried to milk the last shilling 
before its most valuable natural resource dried up forever.  In response, farmers 
took greater care to avoid wasting this precious substance, often by consulting 
experts.70 
 
Miasmas and the “Practical Republic” 
Meanwhile, fear of miasmas, the foul-smelling vapors thought to emanate 
from human excrement and other putrifying waste, inhibited the development of 
sewer farming and directed Peru’s wealth based on manures toward new goals.  In 
the days before the “Pasteurization” of health science and the obsession with insect 
vectors in “tropical” medicine, any campaign against an epidemic required an 
attack against excrement.  Many experts believed the safest thing to do was to wash 
this filth away as fast and as efficiently as possible.  This process diluted its 
nitrogen content.  It also removed a potential competitor for nitrates, guano, and 
other forms of fertilizer.71 
The massive urban epidemics of the mid-nineteenth century provided real 
cause for alarm.  More than a few porteños blamed the yellow fever epidemic of 
1871, the worst that ever hit Buenos Aires, on heavy (El Niño related?) early-
summer rains that flooded the Argentine capital’s cesspools and turned its streets 
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into giant sewers.72  Buenos Aires authorities used the presence of open latrines as 
one excuse among many to evacuate Buenos Aires’ teeming tenements.  Many, rich 
and poor alike, never moved back to the city center.  This initiated the 
suburbanization and sanitization of Argentina’s capital and its transformation into 
the “Paris of South America.”  Far to the north, a yellow-fever epidemic in 1878 
(thought to have come from Havana) killed 20,000 people in the Mississippi 
Valley.  The city fathers of Memphis, Tennessee, the worst-hit urban area, decided 
that a new sewer system was the best way to fight back.  Their celebrated 
“sanitary” network rigorously segregated sewage from storm runoff (potentially 
making it more valuable as a fertilizer) before dumping it in a bayou of the 
Mississippi River, out-of-sight of the city and out-of-reach of farmers.  Excrement 
unified the ecological history of the rural, urban, tropical, and temperate worlds in 
many ways during the Guano Age.73 
Peru’s capital city was also beset by epidemics.  During the austral summer 
of 1868, yellow fever descended on Lima.  Both rich and poor died in such 
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numbers that the cemetery outside the city wall originally built by hygienists to 
prevent this sort of outbreak could not hold all the corpses, 4,222 in all.  Manuel 
Pardo y Lavalle (1834-1878), a practical-minded businessman educated in political 
economy at the College de France, took control of relief efforts during the Lima 
epidemic.  His work was so highly regarded that a junta of city notables elected 
him mayor of Lima, a major step toward the presidency of the country.  
Meanwhile, Peruvian guano exports reached an all-time high in 1870--over 
700,000 metric tons--and sold at record prices under a controversial contract with 
the French firm Dreyfus Bros. & Co.  In 1870 and 1872, with the Islas Chincha at 
or near exhaustion, Peru floated two loans intended to raise £34.1 million, the 
largest ever for a Latin American government.74 
Thanks to Peru’s massive guano income, the city had plenty of cash for 
rapid urban reconstruction, years before other Latin American capitals experiencing 
similar plagues.  Guano paid for street paving, waste disposal, and potable water 
infrastructure, all to protect against disease.  Other projects were meant to be more 
spectacular:  In July 1872, just before Pardo took office as Peru’s first civilian 
president, Lima witnessed the inauguration of the Exposition Palace, a permanent 
museum to art and industry modeled after the grand exhibition halls of the world’s 
fairs.  It was surrounded by a large, formal, healthful French garden and stood 
across a wide boulevard from the new Palace of Vaccination.  This open avenue, 
reminiscent of Vienna’s Ringstrasse, replaced the old, defensive wall that enclosed 
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the tightly spaced center of Lima.  Its post-1746 colonial landscape started to 
disappear rapidly after the tragedy of 1868.75   
These new temples to Science, Reason, and Progress--“the myths of the 
nineteenth century” according to José Carlos Mariátegui--did not work as talismans 
against further disaster.  Only days after the inauguration of Exposition Park, 
violence related to Pardo’s impending inauguration left the out-going president 
murdered.  A mob hung the mutilated bodies of the instigators of this plot from 
Juan Rehr’s cathedral towers, then decapitated and burned them.  Public order in 
Lima has always hung by a thread.76  Events like this go a long way toward 
explaining why the lords of Peru’s ruling class began to become so obsessed with 
the equation between “Order and Progress” during this era.  Yet despite their best 
efforts, a world debt crisis, a global environmental cataclysm, and a disastrous 
regional war brought the whole country to the brink of chaos by the end of the 
1870s. 
Manuel Pardo’s new administration recognized the danger and tried to 
engineer a long-term solution.  During his first major public address as president, 
Pardo announced that service on Peru’s huge outstanding debt was consuming 
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almost all of its eroding guano income--practically the sole basis of the national 
budget.  Not for the first time, the Peruvian state was bankrupt.77 
Many Peruvians blamed sodium nitrate for these problems.  Reality was a 
bit more complicated:  Little by little, brand-name guarantees, official chemical 
assays by government inspectors, consumer protection laws, and scientific 
advocacy convinced farmers on both sides of the North Atlantic to trust new kinds 
of stenchless fertilizer.  Seed cakes--a new, concentrated organic fertilizer made 
from what was once considered agricultural waste--had acquired an enthusiastic 
market.  Europe’s state-subsidized sugar-beet growers, veritable fanatics for 
agricultural science compared to other farmers, led the switch to nitrates and other 
chemical fertilizers, especially in Germany.  The explosion of beet-sugar 
production, tied to an obsession with increasing yields, helped make sugar an 
article of mass consumption and convenient source of calories for working-class 
Europeans about this time.  Thus, Peruvian nitrates helped keep Europe’s poor 
alive, if not healthy.  Germany’s new-found obsession for artificially fertilized root 
crops also dramatically increased the availability of cattle fodder.  As in England, 
this enabled Germany’s relatively affluent to increase dramatically their 
consumption of meat.  Since this entailed an increase in the manure supply, this 
new system did not eliminate farming based on waste recycling.  It did, however, 
bring an abrupt end to the traditional, three-field system of crop rotation and its 
replacement by a quasi-industrial “free economy” (freie Wirtschaft) that concerned 
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itself little with the ecological constraints of the individual farm.  Meanwhile, 
small, competitively priced quantities of sulphate of ammonia [(NH4)2SO4] had 
begun to appear on the fertilizer market, as Europe’s coal-steel complex installed 
recovery ovens that captured this by-product from the airless heating of coal, a 
process used to make coke (to replace wood charcoal for pig-iron smelting) and 
coal gas (to replace whale oil for city lighting)--all important ecological shifts in 
their own right that reinforced the process of northern industrialization.78 
More importantly, Peruvian guano was falling in quality and reputation as 
contractors exploited partially leached deposits along the north Peruvian coast.    
Imposing an export duty on nitrates to fill the Peruvian government’s coffers and to 
manipulate international demand was not an attractive option.  On the one hand, a 
high, uniform nitrate tax would tend to drive small, inefficient producers--the only 
part of the industry still owned by Peruvian nationals--out of business.  On the 
other hand, a tax that protected small producers would discourage technological 
innovation and foreign investment, the lifeblood of the industry.  Peru’s governing 
officials were prisoners of circumstance on this count, not unbending devotees of 
the free market.  They certainly were not impotent pawns of foreign capitalists.79 
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The steps taken by Pardo’s government to establish an international cartel to 
control the nitrate trade make this clear.  In 1873, his government first proposed the 
establishment of a quasi-state company, the Compañía Administradora del Estanco 
del Salitre, that would have monopoly control over salitre exports and work on a 
quota system.  In 1875, the Peruvian Congress and president finally agreed to 
nationalize the Tarapacá nitrate industry--at high levels of compensation to ensure 
owner support.  Pardo placed expropriation under the control of two expert 
commissions: a team of engineers to evaluate the resources and capacity of each 
nitrate factory, and a team of lawyers to confirm legal title to all these properties.80 
This policy was in line with ongoing administrative reforms designed to 
create a “Practical Republic” managed by a new class of highly trained public 
servants.  These included the reoganization of Peru’s national corps of civil 
engineers and architects, the creation of a new Faculty of Political and 
Administrative Sciences (now the economics faculty) at the Universidad de San 
Marcos, and the establishment of a permanent national school of engineering and 
mining in Lima.  This last event finally brought to fulfillment Mariano de Rivero’s 
life-long dream to establish a school of mines in Andean South America.  (During 
the 1840s, Rivero had worked to establish an “escuela central de minas” at 
Huánuco, a remote inland city that eventually became the gateway to Peru’s main 
coca growing region.)  Engineers trained at this national school played an important 
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role in the future of the Peruvian guano industry.81  At least during this phase of its 
history, Peru was keeping pace with most of the Americas (including California) 
when it came to building viable institutions for training a technocratic elite.82 
These institutions were established too late, however, to influence Peru’s 
nitrate expropriation.  The two expert commissions appointed by Pardo did not 
function as well as planned.  They could not agree over who had jurisdiction to set 
property values.  The two Peruvian engineers charged with evaluating the nitrate 
deposits were given neither the resources nor the time to do direct testing on a large 
scale.  They had to rely on estimates provided by the owners, a policy designed to 
win their support for nationalization.  To avoid graft, the engineers averaged the 
claims made by different owners with similar capacities to ensure a fair, if inflated, 
distribution of payments.83 
 Other events made their work largely irrelevant.  Pardo’s government 
blindly tried to negotiate a new, £7 million loan against future nitrate proceeds to 
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pay for the expropriation and to finish Peru’s Andean railways--still far from 
completion.  But this was made utterly impossible by the financial panic of 1873 
and ensuing global debt crisis.  Things deteriorated further after the two Ottoman 
caliphates stopped servicing £100 million owed to European creditors.  Peru 
brought in the new year 1876 by defaulting on £33 million in loans, by which time 
Peru’s neighbor Bolivia was in similar financial straits.  Peru proceeded with the 
nationalization anyway, according to its Minister of Finance, to provide “fresh 
income which can fulfill, when the guano is exhausted, the republic’s obligations to 
its overseas creditors.”  It did this partly from a position of strength: this sharp 
economic downturn forced even the largest nitrate manufacturers to the verge of 
bankruptcy.  Two-thirds of the nitrate manufacturers eagerly accepted sale 
certificates promising future remuneration.  These were attractive, because the 
Peruvian government paid interest in the meantime (with loans supplied by 
Peruvian banks), while many companies kept producing nitrates as before for a 
commission.  The old British guano contractor Antony Gibbs & Sons, now a big 
player in the nitrate business, acted as Peru’s sole agent for European nitrate sales.  
With this cartel in place, nitrate prices jumped by 30 percent, while guano exports 
recovered a bit.84 
Then nature intervened.   
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El Niño and the War of the Pacific 
In 1877 and 1878, intense rains pummeled the dry northern coast of Peru.  
This created a “year of abundance” for peasants who knew to plant rainfed crops 
and take advantage of such periodic events.  But the rains utterly destroyed the 
steam pumps and irrigation canals that fed Piura’s troubled cotton industry--giving 
a respite to its algarrobo savannas, which were being cut down systematically to 
feed these engines.  Worse, from the point of view of progress-minded Peruvians, 
floods washed out the Salaverry-Trujillo sugar railroad, the only major “guano” 
route nearing completion.  The total impact of this climate disaster for Peru still 
needs to be evaluated.85 
Peru’s neighbors were hit much worse.  The austral summer rains of 1877-
1878 never arrived in central Bolivia.  Cochabamba, Bolivia’s breadbasket, 
exported starving peasants instead of grain.  A malaria epidemic spread up from the 
lowlands, leading to a crackdown on migration by health authorities.  The mines at 
Potosí, Bolivia’s biggest source of external income, had to shut down because of 
lack of water.  Grain prices increased by a factor of ten, and a famine ensued that 
lasted into 1879.  Oruro, Bolivia’s other major mining center, was paralyzed when, 
despite official efforts, incoming migrants came close to exhausting its food.  This 
conjuncture of drought, disease, famine, and economic breakdown was remarkably 
similar to the events of 1804-1805 in Upper Peru, another year of disastrous floods 
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along the northern Peruvian coast.  Chile and Peru sent some relief supplies, but 
this classic subsistence crisis perilously weakened Bolivia.86 
Chile had little grain to sell to its neighbor because it, too, experienced “a 
truly phenomenal year” in 1877--so anomalous that it inspired Benjamín Vicuña 
MacKenna, the dean of Chilean historians, to write that year what may be Latin 
America’s first national environmental history.  The year started with the capital’s 
earliest summer rainstorm of the century (9 February) followed by a wet autumn 
with consistently low barometer readings.  The skies opened up in July.  Santiago 
was spared major damage (unlike a similar event in 1783), but the southern half of 
the central valley was devastated, including the year’s wheat crop, a vital economic 
sector already in rapid decline.  It even rained in the nitrate fields of the Atacama 
Desert--an extremely rare event.  Chilean agricultural production and exports 
declined across the board and remained depressed through 1878.  Local food 
shortages and high prices made these hungry years for many of Chile’s poor.  
Vicuña MacKenna noted the correspondence between this Chilean disaster and 
strange weather in Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii, Tahiti, and the Marquesas.  
This coincidence made perfect sense to him since a tsunami associated with a 
powerful May earthquake in southern Peru had affected the entire Pacific Basin.  
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He concluded that these events proved the need for an improved meteorological 
service in the Pacific Basin.87 
That is exactly what Chile, Mexico, and many other countries got from this 
environmental crisis.  The new government of Porfirio Díaz decided to organize a 
modern meteorological network after it, too, experienced widespread droughts--and 
a few food riots--during 1877.  In California, after a major drought the previous 
winter had given the coup de grace to California’s herding economy, its new 
meteorological stations received heavy precipitation in January and February 1878, 
sometimes in quantities that stood as records until 1998.  The Central Valley’s 
mechanized farms produced a bumper wheat crop that confirmed their dominance 
over the trans-Pacific grain trade, a position held not long before by Chile.  This 
dampened the spirits of progress-minded Chileans even further, since California’s 
rising fortunes seemed to erect an enormous barrier to the recovery of Chilean 
wheat exports.88 
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The Pacific rim of the Americas got off easy during these years compared to 
the rest of the world.  A persistent climate anomaly linked, in part, to one of the 
most powerful El Niño-Southern Oscillation events in history affected practically 
the entire globe during the late 1870s.  Floods like those preceding the 1871 yellow 
fever epidemic returned in force on the Argentine pampas, another of Chile’s 
competitors as a wheat exporter.  Argentine governing officials turned this seeming 
disaster to its advantage.  Following on the heels of a prolonged drought, a 
smallpox epidemic, a “grand invasion” of cattle, and now, a flood, General Julio 
Roca marched his army across the grassland frontier to complete the genocidal 
murder of Argentina’s last unconquered indigenous nomads.  The final “Conquest 
of the Desert” in 1879-1880 further strengthened Argentina’s position as Chile’s 
most powerful rival, opened vast new regions to agricultural production, and 
provided Roca with a springboard to the presidency.89   Besides the areas listed by 
Vicuña MacKenna, New Guinea, New Caledonia, Samoa, the Philippines, Korea, 
southern Africa, Morocco, Algeria, and much of the Caribbean Basin experienced 
anomalous droughts.  The Scottish scientific traveler Henry Forbes, a future Lord 
of Guano, personally witnessed the harvest failures and forest fires that beset much 
of Indonesia during these years.  The failure of the monsoon over the East African 
highlands led to the weakest Nile River flood in a century.  But these paled before 
the apocalypse experienced by British-ruled India, northern China, and northeastern 
Brazil.  No one knows for sure how many died of starvation or disease in these 
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regions--many because of Malthusian attitudes among those who could have done 
something to ameliorate these disasters.  Twenty to 30 million is a reasonable guess 
of the total number who died from what scientists writing in Nature referred to as 
“the southern drought.” 90 
Other regions experienced problems during these years tangentially linked 
to ENSO but closely related to manure and its management.  As we have already 
seen, Cuba and the Mississippi Valley experienced a tragic yellow fever epidemic.  
In the British Isles, the 1877 and 1878 planting--and prime manuring--seasons were 
exceptionally cool and wet.  This reduced demand for Peruvian guano and nitrates.  
Things only got worse in 1879, when western and central Europe experienced their 
coldest, wettest growing season since 1816, the “year without a summer.”  By this 
time, after a series of poor harvests, England’s “age of high farming” was over and 
its long agricultural depression well-advanced.  Britain relied increasingly on food 
purchased abroad--even from regions like India facing famines.  English rural life 
never recovered.  In contrast, farmers on the Continent soon rebounded and entered 
a new phase of intensification, Europe’s “first green revolution,” in which nutrient-
rich seed cakes, urban waste recycling, new chemical fertilizers, and imported 
nitrates all played an important role.91 
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This did not help Peru or Bolivia in the short term.  From 1878 onward, 
Peruvian guano sold at its lowest prices since the early 1850s because of declining 
quality and demand.  Nitrate purchasers held back their orders, expecting the 
inflated price to crash in these circumstances.  But Peruvian officials were looking 
ahead to the end of the crisis and tried to solidify their cartel.  Even though the 
government of Pardo’s successor was having trouble paying off the debt to its own 
nitrate manufacturers, it looked to take advantage of the ongoing crisis and buy up 
nitrate companies in Bolivia’s sector of the Atacama Desert.  Many sold out, but by 
far the largest concern, the British- and Chilean-owned Antofagasta Nitrate and 
Railway Co. would not, nor would it join in a cartel, even when promised a 
guaranteed share of world nitrate sales.  In February 1878, in desparate need of 
funds, the Bolivian government imposed a moderate export tax on this company as 
a requirement for renewing its contract to extract nitrates from Bolivian soil.92 
Chile’s ruling class, with British acquiescence, decided to take advantage of 
Bolivia’s weak situation.  Much like Peru, Chile had been in dire economic straits 
for three years before the floods of 1877, its government was deeply in debt, and 
things looked bad for the foreseeable future.  Months before Bolivia seized the 
Antofagasta Nitrate and Railway Co. for its refusal to pay this new tax, a political 
faction led by Chilean capitalists who owned a major interest in this company and 
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the trade that supplied this region presented war as Chile’s only “salvation.”  Even 
though most Chilean-owned nitrate firms had gone bankrupt by this date, they 
argued that Chileans had a natural right to salitre because men like Pedro Gamboni 
had invested Chilean ingenuity, capital, and labor to build the industry.  Historians 
have buried the events that followed beneath a pile of nationalist posturing and 
legalist rhetoric.  No matter how one looks at it, Chilean jingoists carried the day: 
like any self-respecting power during this Age of Empire, Chile invaded its weaker 
neighbor for its natural resources. 
 Peru and Bolivia had signed a mutual defense pact in 1873 for just this sort 
of situation.  Chileans knew this and were well-prepared when Peru jumped into 
the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) to defend Bolivia.  The Chilean military quickly 
occupied the nitrate fields of Antofagasta and Tarapacá, Peru’s guano islands, and 
Lima itself, though Peru and Bolivia fought on in a long, bloody war of attrition.  
Chile’s superior weapons and organization eventually crushed its politically 
unstable opposition.  By force of arms, Chile took over Bolivia’s outlet to the sea 
and Peru’s southernmost coastal provinces.  Chile acquired the monopoly over 
nitrate production that Peru had long coveted, and eventually established its own 
cartel.  Within a decade, just as its jingoists had foreseen, Chile was exporting over 
one million metric tons a year, and its Nitrate Age was in full swing, though this 
bonanza went on to spark yet another global debt crisis and Chilean civil war 
before the nineteenth century was over.  By treaty, Peru was allowed to retain only 
50 percent of the paltry income that came from its remaining guano deposits--all of 
which went to foreign creditors.  Chile carried away Peru’s national library, the 
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brand-new rolling stock of the Salaverry-Trujillo railway, and many other “engines 
of progress.”  Under these circumstances, several internal factions in Peru revolted 
against centralized rule, and Peru remained in turmoil for over a decade.  This was 
a huge blow against the Peruvian coastal elite’s long quest for national hegemony.  
Contrast this to the outcome in Bolivia, where General Narcisco Campero Leyes, 
an enlightened conservative trained in engineering at the École Spéciale Militaire 
de Saint-Cyr in France, rose to power during the war and laid the foundations for 
years of stable oligarchic rule.93 
Thus, Peru suffered a disastrous national defeat in its quest to supply the 
world’s ever-increasing demand for concentrated fertilizer and explosives.  The 
point here is not to blame El Niño for the outcomes of the 1870s.  The economic 
bust of the mid-1870s, other climate mechanisms, and plenty of human volition 
were involved in this global crisis.  In some ways, these were unnatural disasters 
indivisible from the rapid emergence of a new industrial economy hungry for 
resources from all over the world.94   
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The War of the Pacific underscores the importance of manure and its 
management to nineteenth-century global history.  Beginning with Alexander von 
Humboldt’s “discovery” of Peruvian guano circa 1802, science and expertise 
proved crucial to the reorientation of agricultural manures from waste-recycling to 
input-intensive farming.  Partly because hygienists feared the spread of epidemics 
and tried to wash away urban sources of human excrement, “scientific” farmers 
became increasingly dependent on concentrated manures shipped from as far away 
as Peru and remote atolls in the central Pacific.  This new, industrial form of 
agriculture proved unable to prevent the famines of the late 1870s, largely because 
it was oriented toward the luxury production of meat, on the one hand, and 
working-class consumption of cheap sugar, on the other.  Britain, at least, became 
much more dependent on grain imports as it fell into its great agricultural 
depression.  This drove the conquest of the world’s temperate grasslands for grain 
agriculture.  It also siphoned foodstuffs and laborers away from populations on the 
margins of existence toward the world’s centers of capitalist production.  As we 
shall see, these forces made the world ever more dependent on input-intensive 
agriculture. 
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The Guano Age ended in utter tragedy for those Peruvians who tried to 
make the nineteenth century an Age of Progress.  Ever since, the old Lords of 
Guano have been dismissed as little more than architects of a “fictitious prosperity” 
and national collapse.  Yet the timing and extent of these disasters during the 1870s 
helps us to understand why intelligent men made the decisions that brought about 
Peru’s nitrate debacle.  This liberates us, somewhat, from the vicious blame-game 
that has always surrounded the outcome of the War of the Pacific.  People today are 
still unconscious of the powerful role El Niño played in bringing an end to the 
Guano Age, but science-minded Peruvians never again let themselves be ignorant 
of its impact on their country’s fortunes.  As in Roca’s Argentina, Porfirio Díaz’s 
Mexico, and Campero’s Bolivia, ruling-class Peruvians looked to the conquest of 
new ecological frontiers, to exports, to environmental science--to an aristocracy of 
knowledge--to rebuild their nation.  Above all, they looked to the conservation of 
the guano birds, the original source of the fossil deposits that fueled the Guano 
Age, for a way out of the problems left by the War of the Pacific.   
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Chapter 2 
The Birth of the Conservation Technocrat in Peru 
 
The guano problem is eminently a national problem. 
--José Antonio de Lavalle y García (1912) 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Peruvian guano industry lay in 
ruins.  Nevertheless, some guano remained on Peru’s coastal islands, and Peru’s 
rulers recognized the potential value of this natural resource for the pursuit of 
national development.  Peruvian government officials first looked to foreign 
lenders in this pursuit, as they had for decades.  But in other matters they 
increasingly turned to experts for developmental advice, both Peruvians and 
foreigners.  Between 1890 and 1915, a handful of scientists and engineers 
definitively solved Peru’s “guano problem” when they formulated a viable plan to 
redirect guano-based development.  They established a company to provide 
fertilizer on a sustained-yield basis for Peruvian export agriculture based on the 
careful conservation of Peru’s existing colonies of marine birds.  Such reforms 
provided a rallying point for the unification of the class that ruled Peru’s 
“Aristocratic Republic” (1895-1919).  These actions gave birth to the conservation 
technocrat in Peru.  These new Lords of Guano, in turn, built Peru’s modern, 
technocratic republic. 
 
The Global Conservation Movement 
By placing environmental experts in charge of its affairs, Peru joined a 
movement that was transforming the management of nature the world over at the 
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turn of the twentieth century.  During this era, governments increasingly resorted to 
conservation experts to guarantee efficient use of resources and rationalize 
production.  John Wesley Powell, the Humboldtian explorer of the “arid regions of 
the West” and eventual director of the U.S. Geological Survey, and Gifford 
Pinchot, the French-trained professional forester who established the U.S. Forest 
Service and later served as governor of Pennsylvania, are probably the best-known 
representatives of this technocratic movement, at least in North America.  Both 
men shared the utilitarian belief that equitable distribution of natural resources via 
public ownership and expert management would provide for the “greatest good of 
the greatest number for the longest time.”  Nevertheless, private “trusts” tended to 
benefit most from these conservation projects, particularly hydraulic development 
in the arid U.S. West.1 
                                                 
1. Samuel P. Hays founded this technocratic interpretation in Conservation and the Gospel 
of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1959), see esp. pp. 2-4.  Stephen Fox, in contrast, argues in The American 
Conservation Movement: John Muir and His Legacy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1981) that amateurs like John Muir formed the base of American conservationism.  Clayton R. 
Koppes emphasizes the conflicts and contradictions between different visions of conservation in 
“Efficiency, Equity, Esthetics: Shifting Themes in American Conservationism,” in The Ends of the 
Earth, 230-251.  An avalanche of more recent studies point to the diverse origins of U.S. 
conservationism, perhaps a secret to its power and persistence as a movement; see esp. Robert 
Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental Movement 
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 1993), ch. 1; Vera Norwood, Made from This Earth: American 
Women and Nature (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993).  
On Powell and Pinchot, see also Char Miller, Gifford Pinchot and the Making of Modern 
Environmentalism (Washington, DC: Island Press/Shearwater Books, 2001); Donald Worster, A 
River Running West: The Life of John Wesley Powell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); 
Douglas H. Strong, Dreamers & Defenders: American Conservationists (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1988), ch. 2-3; Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire, ch. 15. 
On the beneficiaries of these hydraulic projects, see Pisani, Family Farm to Agribusiness; 
Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water, rev. ed. (New 
York: Penguin, 1993); Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American 
West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).  
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But this movement was much, much larger than the United States.  Late 
czarist Russia and the early Soviet Union also nurtured a distinctive conservation 
movement dominated by professional scientists.  It somehow managed to survive 
the Stalinist purges and emphasis on production at all costs of the 1930s.2  Both 
movements were preceded and paralleled by conservation efforts--often led by 
physicians or engineers--in British, French, and Dutch colonies.  The great 
droughts of the late 1870s had given many of these efforts new impetus.  Decades 
later, these conservation regimes often lived on after decolonization under the 
control of native-born technocrats.  This global conservation movement clearly 
transcended ideological and national affinities.3 
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of the World” (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000); Peter Boomgaard, “Oriental Nature, 
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Environment and History 5:3 (Oct. 1999), 257-292; David Gilmartin, “Scientific Empire and 
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Colonialism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); William Beinhart, “Introduction: The 
Politics of Colonial Conservation,” Journal of Southern African Studies 15:2 (Jan. 1989), 143-162; 
Daniel R. Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 
1850-1940 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), esp. ch. 6-7, 9-10; John McCracken, 
“Experts and Expertise in Colonial Malawi,” African Affairs 81:132 (Jan. 1982), 101-116.  On 
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This trend had its analogue in Latin America.  Beginning in 1861, the self-
taught Brazilian forester Manuel Gomes Archer and a team of black slaves 
replanted what is now Tijuca National Park above Rio de Janeiro with native trees 
to guard its urban water supply.  After 1911, the reorganized Brazilian Forest 
Service took a decidedly different tack: Portuguese-trained agronomist Edmundo 
Navarro de Andrade devoted it to planting Australian eucalyptus in place of the 
Atlantic rainforest.  After returning to the private sector as manager of forestry for a 
railroad company, he almost single-handedly set up Brazil to become the world’s 
largest producer of eucalyptus wood.4 
Well before the Great Drought of 1877-1878 had taken its full course, a 
group of engineers and scientists met for a series of debates at the Instituto 
Polytechnico in the capital of the Brazilian Empire.  This led to the creation of a 
commission of engineers to tour the devastated Northeast.  With an eye to the 
British drought response in India, they recommended an elaborate system of 
reservoir construction and tree planting to permanently alter the climate of the dry 
sertão.  The Brazilian state hired an English hydraulic engineer to plan three 
                                                                                                                                        
conservation thought and policy in explicit connection to the events of the 1870s, see Grove, “The 
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Transfers to India, 1700-1947 ed. Roy MacLeod and Deepak Kumar (New Delhi: Sage 
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4. José Drummond, “The Garden in the Machine: An Environmental History of Brazil’s 
Tijuca Forest,” Environmental History 1:1 (Jan. 1996), 83-104; Robin W. Doughty, The Eucalyptus: 
A Natural and Commercial History of the Gum Tree (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2000), ch. 5; Warren Dean, With Broadax and Firebrand: The Destruction of the Brazilian 
Atlantic Forest (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), 223-225, 232-
238. 
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enormous dam projects.  Northeastern politicians, who wanted railroads not dams, 
organized their own team of Brazilian engineers to rebut this foreigner’s plan.  
They eventually derailed construction, but after subsequent droughts, the Brazilian 
Republic revived and completed these projects.  Beginning in 1909--the same year 
Peru embarked on its guano conservation experiment by founding the Compañía 
Administradora del Guano--the Brazilian state systematically built an enormous 
technocratic apparatus to manage these hydraulic systems against drought.  Much 
like the vast hydraulic empire in the United States, to which it was closely tied, this 
Brazilian leviathan grew into one of the largest reservoir systems in the world.5   
Similarly, Miguel Ángel de Quevedo, Mexico’s “apostle of the tree,” 
became interested in watershed conservation while completing his degree in 
hydraulic engineering at France’s École Polytechnique, and then supervising the 
massive project to drain the Valley of Mexico during the 1890s.  With the vital 
assistance of economist José Yves Limantour, the most powerful of the científicos 
who advised the government of Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911), Quevedo laid the 
foundations for the Mexico City park system, Mexico’s expansive forest reserve 
system, and after the Mexican Revolution, its national parks system.  In fact, 
middle-class ingenieros and licenciados disgruntled with the authoritarian 
científicos helped carry an outspoken water conservationist all the way to the 
                                                 
5. Cunniff, “The Great Drought,” ch. 4, 6.  See also Gerald Michael Greenfield, The 
Realities of Images: Imperial Brazil and the Great Drought, Transactions of the American 
Philosophical Society, v. 91, pt. 1 (Philadelphia, 2001); Marco Antonio Villa, Vida e morte no 
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presidency during the first phase of the Revolution:  Francisco Madero, a former 
student at the Technical Agricultural School of the University of California, had 
played an important role in planning hydraulic projects in the region where his 
family owned an irrigated cotton-growing empire--one of the centers, it should be 
added, of subsequent revolutionary violence.6 
It is important to underscore that the new generation of conservation 
technocrats who rose to power in the Americas during this era hardly imposed 
views of the world that were totally foreign.  In Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, 
technocrats validated positions already promoted by a class of local partisans.  
These conservation movements were not a clear-cut case of foreign cultural 
imperialism like that exercised by Europe and the United States over their formal 
overseas colonies.  Nor did conservation science serve some autochtonous 
“national interest” for Latin Americans.  But these movements were eminently 
about domination.  Peru’s twentieth-century experiment in marine conservation is 
best understood as a form of internal colonialism akin to that practiced by Brazil, 
Mexico, the United States, Russia, and so many other countries so both “nationals” 
                                                 
6. Lane Simonian, Defending the Land of the Jaguar: A History of Conservation in Mexico 
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and “foreigners” could benefit from the exploitation of humans and nature located 
within their national frontiers.7 
 
Order and “Progress” 
The devastating War of the Pacific broke down commercial organization 
and seemingly demolished much of the “ficitious prosperity” built up in Peru 
during the Guano Age.   Nevertheless, fossil guano deposits remained on a few 
islands, although of lower quality, and various state officials and businessmen 
began to look for ways to make guano a part of Peru’s economic reconstruction.  
As in Mexico and Brazil, science, technology, and expertise held great prestige as 
instruments of progress among a class of Peruvian modernizers.  Even more so than 
during the Guano Age, they provided the grounds for agreement between 
competing factions and the restoration of political order in Peru. 
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In January 1890, after years of discussion, Peru signed the so-called Grace 
Contract.  This international agreement got its name from Michael P. Grace, an 
Irish-born businessman who had immigrated to Peru in the late 1850s to assist his 
brother William--the future mayor of New York City and founder of W. R. Grace 
& Co.--with the family business supplying ships anchored at the Islas Chincha.  
During the long unrest of the 1880s, Michael sold arms to the Peruvian government 
and bought up choice highland mines and coastal plantations for the family 
company.  Of course, he wanted to protect these investments, and perhaps get a 
hold on the central Andean railway itself.  Playing a role much like Francisco 
Quirós 50 years before, Michael Grace orchestrated an agreement between British 
bondholders and the government of General Andrés Cáceres that retired the huge, 
£51 million (US$250 million) foreign debt that had accrued since the default of 
1876.  In return for canceling the debt, bondholders received shares in the Peruvian 
Corporation of London which received control of Peru’s railways for 66 years and 
the right to extract and export two to three million long tons of guano.  The 
Peruvian Corporation promised to complete, modernize, and extend these rail lines 
and to allow local contractors to extract guano from the Islas Chincha for Peruvian 
agriculture.   
The costs and benefits of this agreement to the parties involved have been 
hotly debated ever since.  But it is safe to say that the Peruvian Corporation 
managed its railroads incompetently during its first two decades of existence and 
paid low dividends to its stockholders while providing mediocre, expensive service 
to most Peruvian users.  From the point of view of Peruvian state officials, the 
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railroads did provide some measure of integration necessary for control of national 
territory, although they had the contradictory effect of increasing the regional 
compartmentalization of Peru’s internal economy between north, central, and 
south.  Railroad construction also helped reinitiate the exchange of technology and 
expertise between Europe and Peru interrupted by the War of the Pacific.  At least 
in one sense, the Grace Contract was an immediate failure.  After canceling their 
debt, Peruvian officials expected to raise new foreign loans, but a downturn in the 
Argentine economy caused an intense financial crisis in European banks (the so-
called Baring Panic of 1890) and made North Atlantic financiers wary of loaning 
large sums to Latin American countries.  As a consequence, the Peruvian 
government was unable to contract a foreign loan until 1905 and could not do so on 
a large scale until the 1920s.  This agreement proved to be an immense boon, 
however, for Michael Grace and his family’s New York-based firm, and eventually 
for other multinationals owning mining concerns in the Andes and large sugar cane 
plantations on the coast.8 
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After more than a decade of almost constant civil war, Peru regained a 
measure of political stability when the charismatic strongman Nicolás de Piérola 
(1839-1913) from the southern city of Arequipa grabbed the reins of power in 
1895.  Piérola was the son of the technocrat who had served on the 1853 guano 
island commission and worked with Mariano de Rivero to organize Peru’s first 
scientific institutions after independence.  The younger Piérola deserves much of 
the blame for Peru’s instability during the quarter century leading up to 1895.  As 
Minister of Finance, he had been the mastermind behind the notorious Dreyfus 
contract and guano loans of 1870 and 1872.  He came from a city that was often 
rebellious against the dictates of the capital, and he led a series of armed rebellions 
against Manuel Pardo and his followers belonging to the Partido Civil.  One such 
revolt catapulted Piérola to power but seriously undermined Peruvian unity during 
the War of the Pacific.  His followers vociferously--sometimes violently--opposed 
attempts by other factions to establish political hegemony after the war, including 
the Grace Contract.  But when Piérola returned to power in 1895, he agreed to 
share influence over the central government with his old enemies in the Partido 
Civil.  This confederation gained further strength by recognizing the regional 
power of the landed aristocracy of the Sierra.  These factions came to an agreement 
largely because they had grown tired of squabbling and shared a desire to put Peru 
back on the path to prosperity.  Much of Peru then entered a relatively peaceful 
period from 1895 to 1919 known by historians as the Aristocratic Republic.  This 
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was followed by the relatively stable rule of dictator Augusto B. Leguía from 1919-
1930 known as the oncenio.9  
Internal political peace and the recovery of the world economy from the 
crisis of the early 1890s allowed economic expansion to return to Peru.  Plantation 
sugar production along the coast grew rapidly thanks to burgeoning international 
demand.  Mine owners and wool producers enjoyed greater access to markets with 
the expanded railroad system in the Sierra.  Even the remote Amazon region 
prospered briefly during the rubber export boom.  This growth trend lasted thanks 
to the development of local industry, the initiation of copper, cotton, and petroleum 
exports, and the influx of U.S. investment.10  These foreign business connections 
were particularly important since they potentially linked Peru to U.S., British, and 
German expertise.  Scientists and engineers from these countries supplanted former 
French dominance in most areas. 
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The return of prosperity nurtured the development of a progressive, 
nationalist ethos among the coastal elite and encouraged the formation of a 
coherent, self-conscious class of professional intellectuals.  Like their brethren in 
other parts of Latin America, the vast majority of these educated individuals 
idealized rational development through science and technology, education, 
European immigration, foreign investment, and public hygiene.  These self-
proclaimed “positivists” especially promoted the scientific study of natural 
resources and hoped to use these studies to craft plans for rational state 
development.  They certainly were not unimaginative promoters of orthodox free-
market economics.  Moreover, their support for scientific investigation and state-
directed development extended far beyond mere rhetoric:  As we shall soon see, 
positivist principles determined the form of a spectacularly successful conservation 
project.  For those who have not already done so, it is high time to abandon the 
fatalistic view that turn-of-the-century Latin American intellectuals neglected to 
produce innovative ideas and lasting institutions that had a significant impact on 
material life--at least for the privileged class that gave birth to them.  In short, the 
rulers of country after country during this era looked to “scientific politics” as the 
answer to the ubiquitous problem of “order and progress.”11 
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One new, explicitly nationalist scientific organization exemplified this 
postivist logic like no other in Peru.  Akin to a similar institution founded in Costa 
Rica about this time, the Sociedad Geográfica de Lima (est. 1888) gave enormous 
impetus to the description--and ultimately to the exploitation--of Peru’s natural and 
human resources.12  Its members, the cream of scientific and political life in Peru, 
gave birth to the “El Niño” phenomenon as a scientific category.  In 1891, Luis 
Carranza (1848-1898), the society’s founding president and a major architect of the 
peace of 1895, directed the society’s focus to the torrential rains and catastrophic 
floods that were threatening Lima, as well as the northern Peruvian coast.  Camilo 
N. Carrillo (1830-1900), a naval hydrographer and prominent science educator, 
passed on the report from local fishermen living near his hometown Paita that a 
weak ocean current that normally appears every summer about Christmas along the 
northern coast was very strong that year.  Carrillo attached the folk name “El Niño” 
(referring to the advent of the Christ Child) to the more general oceanic changes of 
1891.  To keep track of such events around Peru, the Sociedad Geográfica 
organized a network of meteorological observers.  As part of this project, the Piura 
physician Víctor Eguiguren (1852-1919) compiled and published regional oral 
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tradition of similar climate anomalies in northern Peru since 1791.  This folk 
tabulation now forms the backbone of all global chronologies of the ENSO 
phenomenon.  A digest of this work was presented in English at an international 
congress in London in 1896.13  But for many years, foreign scientists viewed Peru’s 
“El Niño” as little more than a regional geographical curiosity, even though this 
1891 event again corresponded with severe climate anomalies in many parts of the 
globe, including a catastrophic summer drought, extreme winter, and major famine 
in central Russia.14 
Political peace allowed state officials to turn their attention from the 
establishment of order toward the material interests of Peruvians, particularly those 
on the coast closest to the center of state power in Lima.  In Janurary 1896, the 
same year that he eliminated export taxes for the benefit of agro-exporters, 
President Piérola carried through an initiative to establish a Ministerio de Fomento 
(Ministry of Development) first proposed when he was dictator during the War of 
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the Pacific.  This ministry was authorized to develop the “moral” and “physical 
energies and natural riches of the country . . . enlarge the initiative and energy . . . 
of industrial life,”  and diffuse “all classes of useful knowledge.”  In line with 
ministries of development elsewhere in Latin America, its formation was a clear 
message that Peruvian state bureaucrats would take an active role in the planning, 
funding, and direction of progressive endeavors within Peru’s territorial 
boundaries.  To accomplish these ends, the Ministerio de Fomento sponsored a 
series of scientific expeditions and learned studies and published them in an 
illustrated journal.  More concretely, it took over the administration of all state-
financed civil engineering projects in Peru, such as the reconstruction of bridges, 
irrigation canals, and dikes destroyed by the 1891 El Niño in the northern 
department of Piura.15   
As their predecessors had done, officials in the Ministerio de Fomento 
moved to take advantage of scientific and practical expertise developed in other 
parts of the world.  The Ministerio translated and published many foreign studies to 
great effect and sent locally trained Peruvians to study agricultural and industrial 
practices and obtain advanced degrees overseas.  Circa 1908, after completing 
degrees in agronomic engineering, Alfredo Ferreyros traveled to the United States, 
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Hawaii, and Java to study sugar production, while Gerardo Klinge journeyed to the 
United States, Argentina, and Australia to make a comparative study of cattle 
raising.  Klinge (1887-1961) returned to play a key role in the development of 
agronomic science in Peru over the following years, first as chief of a cotton 
experimental station in Lima, later as founder of an agricultural research center at 
La Molina (now the site of the Universidad Nacional Agraria).  He eventually tried 
to meld his scientific and economic interests in export agriculture with right-wing 
politics.16 
       
Peru’s Agricultural Revolution 
This kind of state support for science and technology was hardly new, but 
this trend did represent a major increase in scientific activity in Peru.  In the case of 
agronomy, this was indicative of the economic vigor and growing political power 
of export agriculture.  Interest in science and expertise marked this sector’s turn 
toward modern, input-intensive practices--Peru’s agricultural revolution.  
At the turn of the century, export agriculture was one of the most dynamic 
economic sectors in Peru, and it provided the basis of wealth and social status for 
much of the coastal elite.  In 1896, Piérola organized by decree the Sociedad 
Nacional de Agricultura (reorganized in 1914 as the Sociedad Nacional Agraria), a 
state corporation designed to represent the interests of the agricultural and livestock 
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sector to the state.  It rapidly developed into one of the most influential corporate 
interest groups in Peruvian politics and was dominated from the beginning by sugar 
planters.17 
Like their brethren in the Caribbean, many plantation owners who produced 
sugar and cotton for export realized the value of scientific agriculture and looked 
around the world for new ideas, techniques, and expertise.  Through the Sociedad 
Nacional de Agricultura, they pushed for agricultural studies by state-employed 
agronomists and the establishment of a national agricultural school.  In 1901, the 
Peruvian state invited a team of Belgian agronomists from the Faculté Universitaire 
des Sciences Agronomiqes de Gembloux, a leading center for sugar beet research, 
to do an agricultural survey of the country.  In 1902, this team revived a project 
from Pardo’s Practical Republic of the 1870s and founded the Escuela Nacional de 
Agricultura y Veterinaria in Lima to train a corps of Peruvian agronomic engineers.  
The leader of this mission, George Vanderghem (1875-1932), stayed in Peru the 
rest of his life, where he worked variously as director of the Escuela Nacional, the 
manager of the British Sugar Company’s San Jacinto estate, and after the 
destructive El Niño floods of 1925-1926, as the organizer of the Peruvian 
government’s first true network of meteorological observatories.  Progress-minded 
Peruvians also published a series of agricultural manuals and journals, such as José 
Luis Torres’s Cartilla de agricultura del Perú (1896), and continually lobbied for 
state investment in expensive irrigation systems.  These actions introduced many 
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innovations made during the Guano Age elsewhere in the world to coastal Peruvian 
agriculture.18 
Irrigation management soon became a focus of this rationalizing drive.  The 
key to successful farming on the extremely arid Peruvian coast has always been 
access to water for irrigation.  Coastal agriculture ultimately relied on rivers fed by 
seasonal precipitation and snowmelt in the Sierra.  The expansion of thirsty sugar 
and rice estates during the late nineteenth century placed an increasing strain on the 
traditional system of water rationing inherited from the era of Spanish colonial rule.  
In this system, water rights were tied to the ownership of specific plots and were 
adjudicated by local judges (jueces) organized in a complex bureaucracy.  Water 
frequently inspired violent struggles over its control, so to followers of the 
positivist maxim “order and progress” it was a prime target for governmental 
reform.  In 1899, Piérola’s Minister of Justice formed a commission of large 
landowners and prominent lawyers to frame a national water code ostensibly 
intended to rationalize and democratize access to this vital natural resource.  In 
1902, the Peruvian Congress officially adopted a revised version of the 
commission’s recommendations modeled on the Spanish water code of 1879.  
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Ministerio de Fomento officials had final authority over this new system.  But real 
power lay with district water boards (comunidades de regantes), each run by an 
elected full-time administrator overseen by an elected three-man executive 
committee (sindicato regional).  Large landowners dominated this new system 
since voting for administrative officials was apportioned to individual landowners 
according to the amount of land cultivated, or--in an even more egregious example 
of those “with” dominating those “without”--the existing size of their water 
allocation.  This contributed directly to the growth of latifundia, particularly on 
Peru’s north coast, as smallholders prevented from gaining regular access to water 
were forced to sell out to large landowners and become proletarians.19 
In 1918, the government of José Pardo y Barreda (1864-1947)--two-time 
President, three-time graduate and professor of the Faculty of Political and 
Administrative Sciences, patriarch of a sugar-growing empire, and symbol of the 
fragile consensus that unified the Aristocratic Republic--threw out this ostensibly 
democratic system for a technocratic reform that would have made his father, 
Manuel Pardo, proud.  At a tense moment when agro-exporters in Peru were 
prospering and wage workers were suffering from high prices during World War I, 
the Peruvian state gave power over water allocation to local boards (comisiones 
técnicas de irrigación) composed of state-appointed hydraulic engineers.  It was 
hoped that this move would boost domestic food production, lower local food 
prices, and put a lid on social unrest.  It largely failed on all these counts, and there 
is little evidence that it put an end to the dispossession of smallholders, at least near 
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the centers of cane cultivation.  In fact, both cotton and cane planters enjoyed 
record profits during the “dance of the millions” after the war, and cultivation of 
both crops increased steadily for several years thereafter.20  Still, this was an 
important victory for the technocratic ideal, and the Peruvian state invested 
unprecedented sums in the extension of this hydraulic network during the 1920s.  
This included the Lambayeque Irrigation Project managed by U.S. civil engineer 
Charles W. Sutton, a vast scheme to divert a tributary of the Amazon beneath the 
Andes in order to conquer Peru’s desert frontier for export agriculture (map 2).21 
But the most notable triumph of Peruvian scientific agriculture in the 
twentieth century was accomplished by a local plant breeder without ties to any of 
these new organizations or projects.  The Puerto Rican immigrant Fermín Tangüis 
(1851-1932) arrived in Peru in 1873 after the Ten Years’ War against Spanish 
colonial rule forced him to abandon his medical education in Cuba.  He eventually 
settled down as a yeoman cotton farmer along the Peruvian coast near Pisco. In 
response to the spread of the fungal disease cotton wilt to his locale in 1904, an 
unwelcome consequence of the global transportation revolution of this era, Tangüis 
began an experiment in empirical plant selection using wild cotton varieties native 
to the Peruvian coast, a center of natural genetic diversity for cotton.  Meanwhile, 
Gerardo Klinge independently tried to do the same at a state-funded experimental 
station in Lima using resistant cotton varieties provided by the U.S. Department of 
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Agriculture.  By the 1910s, without such help, Tangüis had bred a disease-resistant 
strain (Gossypium barbadense hybrid) with ultra-long fibers particularly suitable to 
use in high-speed textile machinery.  As an added bonus from the point of view of 
Peruvian economic nationalists, this strain would only grow readily in the cool, arid 
environment of the central and southern coasts of Peru and had no equal competitor 
on the global market.  Tangüis freely shared knowledge of his new cultivar in line 
with his belief that the fruits of science should belong to the public.  He 
consciously chose not to profit selfishly from his discovery.  The blossoming of 
cotton agriculture in this region after World War I grew directly from Tangüis’s 
innovation.  The prestige of agronomic science in Peru--and Tangüis’s status as a 
national hero--grew right along with it.22  
These developments in scientific agriculture were hardly unique to Peru.  A 
flurry of recent historical research has revealed that many regions of Latin America 
and the Carribean experienced a similar “agricultural awakening” during the first 
decades of the twentieth century.  As with Peruvian cotton, this awakening was 
driven not only by the pressures of a global agricultural market, but also by the 
global exchange of cultivars, crop diseases and pests.  Moving beyond the 
triumphal histories of the past, newer students of the history of Latin American 
agronomy have identified some unintended consequences of “success.”  For 
example, the South American cane toad (Bufo marinus) was introduced to Australia 
and many other locales worldwide after its successful use by scientists to control an 
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insect pest of sugar cane in Puerto Rico.  Experts thereby unleashed a biological 
plague of Biblical proportions on the island continent.23  More troublingly, 
selective breeding and the war against plant disease were so successful that they 
drove down prices and profits for sugar cane growers over the long term.  This 
created a situation in many countries where only the most highly capitalized firms 
administered by trained technicians with control over huge expanses of land and 
resources could survive international competition.  This raised the stakes for 
agronomic success ever higher.24 
Coastal farmers in Peru at the turn of the century came to resent the Grace 
Contract because the Islas Chincha could not provide enough fertilizer for existing 
coastal agriculture, much less for its expansion or the eventual modernization of 
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farming in the Sierra.  Although Peruvian river valleys are blessed with fertile, 
alluvial soils derived from other recently formed soils (entisols) along its dry coast, 
any crop grown intensively on the same plot of ground for several seasons will 
naturally deplete the soil of nutrients.  These profit-minded farmers, some of whom 
were in the process of building huge export-agribusiness empires, found it much 
more sensible to apply concentrated Peruvian guano than to use other methods to 
recover these nutrients, such as spreading ash produced by burning sugar-cane 
bagasse, rotating legume crops like alfalfa, or applying expensive imported 
fertilizers.  Though guano production and sales in Peru were on the increase, they 
could not keep up with growing local interest.25  Sugar and cotton growers began to 
fight each other for access to the limited guano supply.  The sugar interest 
dominated the Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura, and they used their superior 
wealth and influence to obtain special discounts and preferential access to guano.  
Thus, the guano shortage most immediately threatened Peruvian cotton growers, 
who were also dealing with cotton wilt.  Meanwhile, the Peruvian Corporation of 
London was exporting much larger quantities of guano than it had in previous 
years.26 
From the point of view of Peruvian nationalists--and not a few foreign-
owned businesses that owned a stake in export agriculture--something had to be 
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done to stop the Peruvian Corporation of London from exporting more than its fair 
share of the guano supply.  As they did for so many things, these “aristocrats” 
looked to the Peruvian state for an answer.  José Otero, an engineer working for the 
Ministerio de Fomento, spoke for many coastal growers--and the growing middle 
class of technicians that served them--when he declared,  
 
It is time for the Government to solve definitively the matter of providing 
guano . . . exclusively for the agriculture of this country, by prohibiting its 
exportation, properly regulating its extraction, and seeing that it arrives . . . 
to small farmers, in quantities related to need. 
In 1906, he proposed that Peru establish an expertly managed assay and sales 
offices that could provide a certified product at a price related to its fertilizing 
content; this office would also distribute propaganda to encourage its diversified 
and efficient use.  Peruvian officials were already well aware that Peru’s living 
colonies of guano birds were valuable and that they needed protection.  The 
original directive that created the Ministerio de Fomento enforced a ban on egg 
hunting on the guano islands and required this state ministry to dedicate itself to 
“the reproduction of fertilizer.”  In 1906, Peru closed the Islas Chincha to guano 
harvest during the summer nesting season to give the bird population a chance to 
recover from human activity.  This only increased pressure for action. 27   
Peruvians knew they had a lot to gain if they could somehow revive and 
redirect the guano industry for their own use.  By supporting state intervention 
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schemes like these that served their immediate interests, agro-exporters, the 
supposed arch-liberals of Peruvian politics, adopted a political economy that 
corresponded with the agro-exporters of Brazil’s “Old Republic” and the científicos 
of Porfirian Mexico.28  They set the stage for a technocratic solution to the “guano 
problem” to be instituted by the Peruvian state. 
 
The Coker Mission, 1906-1908 
Peru’s progress-minded elite concentrated their efforts on agriculture and 
mining for export, but they also hoped to benefit someday from the incredible 
richness of Peru’s coastal waters, one of the most productive marine ecosystems in 
the world.  One foreign observer, the globe-trotting U.S. ornithologist Robert 
Cushman Murphy, provided vivid testimony to this effect.  He noted “many times a 
day” while sailing off the Peruvian coast in the late 1910s, “vast, seething schools 
of surface fish, breaching whales, incredible flocks of birds . . . bands of frolicking 
lobos . . . [and] enormous shoals of porpoises, far larger than any I had ever seen 
throughout a hundred degrees of latitude on the Atlantic.”  Coastal Peruvians began 
to conceive of the Pacific Ocean as their next great frontier about this time.29 
The Peruvian state looked to a budding conservation technocrat from the 
United States to provide some developmental advice on this matter.  In June 1906, 
the Ministerio de Fomento made funds available to hire a pisciculturist “to procure, 
with scientific principles as a guide, the conservation and reproduction of species of 
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fish” in Peruvian territorial waters.  It decided to consult the U.S. Bureau of 
Fisheries.  This was a good place to go for expertise: the Bureau was one of the 
most precocious of the young scientific institutions in the United States and a world 
leader in its field.  It had been founded by the U.S. Congress in 1870 to study the 
sharp decline of commercial catches on the Atlantic coast.  Ocean science was one 
of the strongest points of scientific institutionalization in the United States during 
the late nineteenth century.  As we shall see in later chapters, Peru followed a 
similar path in the development of its own scientific institutions during the 
twentieth century.30  
The Bureau of Fisheries recommended one of its young employees, Robert 
E. Coker (1875-1967), the son of a prominent cotton planter from South Carolina.  
Despite his Old South upbringing, Coker was one of the new breed of professional 
scientists trained in the United States according to the German research model.  
This “graduate school” system combining formal education with sustained basic 
research had proven its worth as far back as Justus von Liebig’s reknowned 
chemistry lab at the University of Giessen; it had become the hallmark of 
Germany’s dominance in so many intellectual disciplines during this era.  Coker 
had a newly minted Ph.D. in zoology from Johns Hopkins University, the training 
ground for several of the architects of the biology profession in the United States.  
Even before he graduated, Coker had already used his expertise to affect change in 
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the laws governing oyster production in North Carolina.  In 1905, he advised the 
North Carolina General Assembly to limit access to coastal estuaries in the public 
domain by leasing fishing rights on a rotational basis.  Not only did legislation 
following his recommendations allow for a sustained yield, protection from 
competitive overfishing led to a thousand-fold increase in the oyster harvest over 
the next several years.  Fresh off this success, Coker turned down a post-doctoral 
fellowship from his alma mater to take up Peru’s challenge.31 
Coker arrived in Lima in February 1907.  He spent the rest of the year 
exploring coastal Peru by land and sea.  A bubonic plague epidemic delayed his 
voyage to Tumbes to study the depleted tropical oyster beds near the Ecuadorian 
border.  This event not only diverted Coker’s research, but also radically 
strengthened the authority of hygienists in Peru’s coastal ports.  In fact, this was a 
local extension of the global plague pandemic of the 1890s that had done so much 
to empower public-health technocrats in Asia.  Thus, Coker tangentially 
encountered one of the ecological phenomena that led so many men like him to the 
tropics to bolster “civilization” during this era.  From May to July, Coker spent a 
total of 25 days observing the bird colonies and the activities of guano workers on 
the Islas Chincha and Islas Ballestas.  He negotiated a contract extension to 
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February 1908 so he would have a chance to observe the guano islands during peak 
nesting season.  This itinerary gave Coker the opportunity to make comparative 
observations for almost the entire coast of Peru, although it gave him little time for 
sustained scientific investigation.32 
 Even though he had the most advanced scientific training available at the 
time, Coker did not introduce any techniques during his voyages that were 
unknown in Peru.  In fact, he did not decisively break with the basic pattern of 
traveling naturalistic study established by Humboldt over a century before.33  Coker 
made use of a few simple, accurate, durable traveling instruments, gathered 
statistics, and made extensive specimen collections with a view toward the 
sophisticated scientific description of complex environmental phenomena.  He 
observed the behavior and breeding of the guano birds and made some rough bird 
population estimates “by eye.”  He took regular air and water temperature 
measurements and noted the great regularity of the “cold Humboldt current.”  
Coker collected over 801 total specimens: including 54 birds, 302 fish, 134 
mollusks, 111 crustaceans, 60 echinoderms, and 82 marine alga (illus. 8).  He sent 
several specimens to the United States for study, classification, and formal 
description.  Following the instructions in his contract, Coker submitted a formal 
report on his “preliminary study” of marine production in Peru, including the 
reason for the apparent decline in several economic species.  The Ministerio de 
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Fomento translated and published his work in Spanish in its illustrated journal, a 
firm indication of its dedication to the public dissemination of useful science.34  
At first glance, Coker’s methods were neither original nor particularly 
elaborate; a Peruvian like Camilo Carrillo could have accomplished something 
similar.  But Coker’s work had other, less tangible virtues that are the essence of 
scientific expertise and technical “know-how.”  Coker brought with him to Peru the 
highly trained eye and indoctrination of a conservation scientist.  He considered the 
opinions of interested locals, especially where their knowledge reached beyond his 
in time and space.  He then used his judgment to recombine local “common 
wisdom,” his own theoretical and empirical understanding, and earlier scientific 
theory regarding the Peruvian coast.  This new scientific knowledge cannot be 
separated from either Coker’s personality or his social status as a foreigner working 
among natives, nor the fact that he did this work in the field.  Such social relations 
in the production of knowledge are one of the most distinctive, though often 
overlooked, features of the old, nineteenth-century paradigm of Humboldtian 
science.  They lived on among the international consultants who came to dominate 
twentieth-century science and engineering in the “developing world.” 
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In the short term, Coker revolutionized the ornithological study of Peru’s 
guano-producing Pelicaniformes.  Based on his knowledge of the entire Peruvian 
coast, Coker identified the gregarious guanay as the most important guano 
contributor.  During the time of his visit, it nested in the largest colonies and 
seemed to be able to compete most successfully, in a Darwinian sense, for “a 
home” on the flat areas of the guano islands.  The second most important guano 
bird in his view, the alcatraz, also nested on flat parts of the main guano islands.  It 
appeared to suffer greatly from the guano industry because it was much more 
skittish than the guanay, although it continued to breed successfully along the far 
northern coast.  The piquero nested year-round mainly in cliff colonies where its 
guano could not be exploited effectively, although it sometimes colonized the level 
areas of a couple important guano islands, such as the Islas Guañape.  He thought it 
was the third-most important guano bird, in contrast to J. J. von Tschudi and 
Antonio Raimondi who, based on limited observations, believed it to be the most 
important.  Even though the camanay did not nest in colonies, Coker thought it 
produced significant amounts of phosphate-rich guano pobre (less than three 
percent nitrogen by weight) on two islands, Lobos de Afuera and Lobos de Tierra, 
near the tropical waters of Ecuador.  He rejected Raimondi’s old assertion that the 
potoyunco or Peruvian diving petrel (Pelecanoides garnotii) produced significant 
amounts of useful guano in its nest burrows.35 
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Coker’s conclusions do not necessarily represent an objective improvement 
in scientific understanding of Peru’s guano ecology.  As we have already seen with 
the 1877-1878 and 1891 El Niño events, this ecology has a history of its own and in 
no way represents an eternal, unchanging “geographic basis” for human history.  
Differences in opinion regarding the dominance of the piquero, for example, may 
indicate a real change over time in the species composition of Peru’s marine 
environment, due either to climate change or transformations caused by the guano 
industry.  As we shall see, such changes in marine-bird biodiversity definitely 
happened later in the twentieth century under the careful watch of ornithologists. 
Right or wrong, Coker’s conclusions had a huge impact on the management 
of Peru’s marine environment.  Among all of Peru’s marine extraction activities, 
Coker considered the plight of the guano industry to be “most urgent” and most 
amenable to immediate solution.  The exhaustion of Peru’s last remaining ancient 
deposits was imminent.  But in line with some Peruvian observers, he thought the 
remaining birds could easily produce enough excrement to supply both Peruvian 
agriculture and the Peruvian Corporation if they were rationally managed.  This 
meant Peruvians would have to stop acting “like beasts of prey” towards the guano 
birds and begin to treat them as “domestic animals”--under the shepherding eye of 
conservation technocrats--as North Carolinians were treating their oysters.  For 
example, on Isla Lobos de Afuera, Coker watched Peruvian Corporation workers 
displace an entire rookery of 80,000 pelicans, one of the only colonies along the 
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entire coast.  For good reason, he thought this bird to be in danger of extinction 
because of the guano industry.  Peru’s 1906 closure of the Islas Chincha to protect 
the guano birds was a step in the right direction, but inadequate in Coker’s view.  
Since the birds never completely deserted the islands voluntarily, “There can be no 
season when the islands may be worked without disturbance of the birds.”36 
Using what he termed “entirely scientific criteria,” Coker outlined a five-
part policy the Peruvian state would have to impose if the guano industry was to 
continue.  It was posited entirely on the concept of yearly, sustained-yield 
production from living birds.  First, Peru should immediately turn all coastal 
islands into a bird sanctuary, and any private use of island resources, such as egg 
collecting and hunting, should be permanently prohibited.  Second, only one 
contractor per island should receive the concession for guano extraction; it was 
hoped this would relieve the disruption of breeding caused by intense competition 
for deposits.  Third, Peru should establish a permanent closed season during the 
peak November to March breeding period to allow the birds to reproduce in peace.  
Fourth, since the entire year was important to the cycle of breeding, Peru should 
implement a long-term rotation policy.  Each island should be closed for at least 
one year between each season of guano production--the longer the closed period, 
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the better the birds could reproduce.  Fifth, Peru should create a national monopoly 
responsible for the entire process of guano production and distribution.  This 
company would guarantee its quality, not only when it left the islands, but when it 
reached consumers.  Coker strongly believed that a single company with a long-
term stake in the birds’ welfare could best provide guano for the Peruvian common 
weal because it would eliminate the rapacious competition of interests intent only 
on short-term material gain.  Finally, Coker “conservatively appraised” the worth 
of each pair of guanay at US$1.43 per year in terms of the guano and up to a pair of 
offspring they produced.  This clinched his argument by creating the dual 
appearance of scientific accuracy and economic value for his judgments.  In 
essence, Coker wanted the Peruvian state to implement the core principles of 
scientific conservation to protect what amounted to “the most valuable bird in the 
world.”37 
 When he returned to the United States late in 1908, Coker left Peru with a 
viable technocratic plan to reform its guano industry.  In later years, he did not 
forget what he had accomplished as a young consultant in Peru, even after he 
reached the top of his field, first as Chief of the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries’ Division 
of Scientific Inquiry (1915-1922), then as an eminent ecology professor at the 
University of North Carolina (1922-1947), and finally as a science popularizer and 
organizer of marine science studies in the Caribbean (1947-1962).  Coker 
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repeatedly praised Peru’s conservation experiment in American scientific journals 
and popular works.  In his view, Peru’s “far-sighted” environmental managers 
compared quite favorably to those who irrationally squandered rich marine 
resources in the United States like the Chesapeake Bay oyster beds.38  He also 
served as an early mentor of Howard T. Odum, one of the founders of systems 
ecology and a major proponent of ecosystem management.39  Coker was neither the 
first nor the last notable foreign talent who strongly influenced the management of 
Peru’s marine environment and then moved on to nurture the spirit of “technocratic 
optimism” among scientists elsewhere in the world. 
 
Founding a Public-Private Monopoly 
A foreign scientific consultant prepared the ground for the revival of the 
Peruvian guano industry, but prominent Peruvians actually planted the seed.  As is 
so often the case in post-colonial countries, the opinions of a foreign expert 
provided technocratic justification for the implementation of a group of policies 
already advocated by locals. 
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The Cuban-born financial wizard José Payán de Reyna (1844-1919) gave 
crucial support to Coker’s plan.  Payán was Peru’s analogue to Porfirian Mexico’s 
powerful Minister of Finance, José Yves Limantour.  Both were major proponents 
of centralized state planning and economic diversification, and they led the 
progressive vanguard that provided the political opening for the birth of the 
conservation technocrat in both Mexico and Peru.  Payán is usually given a lot of 
credit for the “autonomous development” Peru achieved at the turn of the century.  
In many ways, he was a precursor of the plutocrats who stand behind the 
economist-technocrats of today. 
Like Tangüis, Payán was a refugee from the Ten Years’ War against 
Spanish colonial dominance in Cuba.  He abandoned his medical education when 
hostilities began and soon emigrated to Peru in search of better opportunities.  Like 
many of his generation, Payán’s attitudes were powerfully shaped by the debacle of 
the 1880s.  He believed “a fever of unproductive works and lamentable system of 
fiscal prodigality” posited on a universal belief in the inexhaustibility of guano and 
nitrates had led to Peru’s downfall.  Before the end of the War of the Pacific, Payán 
began working to place Peru’s financial system on a sure footing.  Using the capital 
of 120 Peruvian notables, he revived the Banco del Callao, one of only two 
financial institutions in Peru to survive the war.  In 1897, it was reorganized as the 
Banco del Perú y Londres, an international bank based on the British gold standard 
and open to foreign investors.  This bank was Peru’s key financial institution until 
it met its demise during the Great Depression.  As the long-time president of Peru’s 
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stock exchange and an influential member of the board of directors of many key 
businesses, Payán stood at the apex of Peru’s capitalist system.40 
Payán was the mastermind behind several quasi-state monopolies at the turn 
of the century, including the Compañía Recaudadora de Impuestos, an organization 
for collecting taxes, and the Compañía Salinera del Perú, a salt monopoly.  He 
firmly believed that the state and private investors should work in tandem to 
promote the establishment of capitalist institutions in Peru.  This view stemmed 
from Payán’s declared dedication to Spencerian positivism and Social Darwinism.  
Though Social Darwinism is better known for its amoral defense of “survival by 
the fittest” and environmental destruction, many thinkers--especially Latin 
Americans concerned with living in backward, “degenerate” societies--adopted the 
view that nature requires moral (i.e., human) intervention if civilization is to 
achieve true progress.  Payán believed some business endeavors needed protection 
from ruthless competition.  This fit well with Coker’s contention that the guano 
birds required a refuge from rapacious man if they were to survive.  This 
benevolent, managerial understanding of the implications of Darwinian selection 
had a profound impact on conservationism and provided abundant opportunities for 
technocratic intervention during this era.41 
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Even with Payán’s backing, it still took a while to gather support for 
Coker’s plan.  Many of Payán’s schemes met with opposition.  The Peruvian 
Corporation of London, for example, blocked his plan to establish a European-
based financial market for Peruvian land.  Prominent agro-exporters frequently 
took sides against Payán’s interventionist and protectionist positions on state 
monetary policy.  After guano production and sales fell sharply in 1908, Coker’s 
plan provided an amenable way to reconcile their differences.42 
The crucial decision fell to a new president.  On 1 March 1909, Augusto B. 
Leguía (1863-1932) issued an executive decree to create a limited stock company--
the Compañía Administradora del Guano (CAG).  He reserved government funds 
totaling 30,000 gold libras peruanas (Lp.) to capitalize this parastatal organization, 
a sum equal to 3 million soles (S/.) or US$628,000.  Such a decision befitted this 
president, a prominent businessman who left managing the British Sugar Company 
to serve the Aristocratic Republic as Minister of Finance.  It presaged Leguía’s 
long, controversial second term as executive, when he used dictatorial powers to 
build a new Peruvian Fatherland (Nueva Patria) on the principle that “the State is . 
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. . the most efficacious agent for carrying out the beautiful work of human 
solidarity.”43 
This law followed Coker’s recommendations closely.  It turned over to 
CAG all guano-bearing properties under government jurisdiction for five years, and 
it gave CAG the sole right to extract, transport, unload, and sell guano for national 
agriculture at a price in proportion to its total nitrogen content.  The law also 
strictly required the company to guard the guano birds in “whatever relates to the 
reproduction of the fertilizer.”  An accompanying law divided the guano islands 
between CAG and the Peruvian Corporation.  Peru no longer simply reserved the 
Islas Chincha for national agriculture--it now claimed nearly all islands and points 
south of Callao, although still not the rich guano-producing regions from the Islas 
Ballestas to Punta Doña María.44 
The rules that established CAG’s administration reflected the range of 
political and economic interests behind this technocratic experiment.  A board of 
nine directors periodically formulated official company policy and regulations.  
The Peruvian state held a majority of shares in CAG, although private stockholders 
elected the majority of CAG directors.  No private individual was allowed to own 
more than five percent of CAG.  Its directorial board also had permanent 
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representatives from the Sociedad Nacional Agraria, state creditors, and the 
government itself.  During the first weeks after the initial offering of CAG stock on 
the Bolsa Comercial de Lima, a large number of investors bought shares.  
Prominent agro-exporters from several coastal regions bought the largest portion.  
This administrative structure and its financial underpinnings embodied Payán’s 
belief that a public-private consortium was the best way to raise capital, spread risk, 
and broaden the financial and political stake in new enterprises in Peru’s potentially 
unstable political and economic environment.  Institutions like CAG held the 
Aristocratic Republic together.  Even though shareholders were theoretically 
allowed to influence board governance, few bothered to attend shareholder 
meetings.  Corporate control remained firmly in the hands of a select few, with 
high state officials retaining decisive authority.  A tiny oligarchy actually governed 
the Aristocratic Republic.45 
During CAG’s first years of existence, businessmen like Payán, CAG’s first 
president, dominated its board of directors.  But as the years passed, more and more 
men claiming doctoral or engineering degrees came to serve on CAG’s board.  This 
indicated both the partial infiltration of professionals into the higher eschelons of 
political and economic power in Peru and a growing interest in obtaining 
professional degrees among the sons of Peru’s ruling class.  In this way, Peruvians 
with technical training gained some say regarding CAG’s general affairs over the 
years.  They first worked to ensure that CAG provided a profit to its shareholders 
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and creditors, but they also used CAG from the beginning to provide subsidies to 
agriculture and funds for other state development plans.  Over time, CAG’s 
managerial culture became technocratic even at the very top. 
In accord with the emerging theory of scientific management, this was also 
true at the level of day-to-day operations.  CAG was centrally managed from its 
headquarters in Lima by the company general manager (gerente).  Francisco Ballén 
Valle Riestra (1875-1949, illus. 9) served as CAG gerente for 33 of the 54 years 
CAG operated.  Ballén did not have the same technical qualifications as subsequent 
general managers, though he came from a family that had made its name in the 
professions:  His father was an Ecuadorian medical doctor and his mother was the 
daughter of a Peruvian military hero.  In line with Leguía’s ongoing attempt to 
appoint men with foreign business training to offices of prominence, Ballén had 
schooling from the “colegio of Mr. Williams” in Lima and ten years of travel and 
experience in Europe and the United States.  By appointing him, Leguía also made 
Ballén into a client in his growing patronage network.  In 1914, in a classic social 
move that bolstered his professional position, Ballén married into another important 
political family, just as Leguía had done when he married into the family of 
Scottish sugar-exporter Henry Swayne.  Ballén’s brother-in-law, Hernán Velarde 
Diez Canseco, was extremely close to Leguía: he served as Peru’s ambassador to 
the United States during the last six years of Leguía’s notorious oncenio. 
Patron-client and family relationships were also vital to the construction of 
a technocratic class in Mexico, both during Limantour’s reign as chief of the 
Porfirian “wizards of progress” and decades later when political cliques 
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(camarillas) within the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI) provided 
the means for deciding which técnicos would be appointed to positions of 
authority--even who would be “elected” president.  The same can be said for how 
most economists acquire political influence in the Peru of today.46     
Such connections were as unavoidable as they were indispensable within 
Peru’s inbred ruling elite.  Nevertheless, Ballén’s actions as a manager were 
consistently in accord with the technocratic ideal.  As we shall see, he had immense 
influence over CAG’s history and garnered both local prestige and international 
recognition for his actions to protect the guano birds, modernize Peruvian 
agriculture, and promote other conservation programs in Peru.  Like his scientific 
forebears in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Ballén was given foreign 
membership in several international scientific and conservation organizations for 
these accomplishments.  During the celebration of his 25th anniversary as CAG 
general manager, he received a plaque engraved with the motto “Organization, 
Efficiency, Probity” that proclaimed him “the organizer of the guano industry in 
Peru.”  These honors were fitting indications of the technocratic values behind the 
reorganization of guano production in Peru, even if Ballén did not exactly fit the 
technocratic prototype.47 
                                                 
46. On the continuing role of patronage in the recruitment of technocrats in Mexico and 
Peru, see Tenorio, Mexico at the World’s Fairs, ch. 4; Camp, Political Recruitment across Two 
Centuries, esp. ch. 1; Centeno, Democracy within Reason, ch. 6; Smith, Labyrinths of Power, 
passim; Catherine M. Conaghan, “Stars of the Crisis: The Ascent of Economists in Peruvian Public 
Life,” in The Politics of Expertise in Latin America, 142-164. 
47. Sources for this section on Ballén include Diccionario biográfico de peruanos 
contemporáneos, ed. Juan Pedro Paz-Soldan (Lima: Librería e Imprenta Gil, 1917, 1921), s.v. 
“Ballén, Francisco”; Diccionario histórico y biográfico del Perú, s.v. “Velarde Diez Canseco, 
Hernán”; “Nota editorial,” BCAG 14:8 (Aug. 1938), 303-305; Murphy, “The Most Valuable Bird in 
the World,” 298; idem, Bird Islands, 57; “Sobre el premio del Franklin Institute de Pensilvania a 
145 
During the following years, Ballén oversaw the gradual construction of an 
integrated industry with control over many aspects of fertilizer production, 
transport, and sale in Peru.  One of Ballén’s first acts was to hire a group of 
cartographers to map precisely the guano islands and their distance from 
agricultural ports so CAG could maximize the efficiency of guano extraction and 
transport.  CAG also passed out a farming questionnaire to try to determine the 
fertilizing needs of coastal agriculture.48   
Nevertheless, CAG faced a crisis of public confidence almost as soon as it 
began producing guano.  CAG’s guano production fell during its first three years of 
operation, as it rotated extraction on the Islas Chincha, the most productive area 
under its jurisdiction.  Its annual profits were minuscule, leading many to suggest 
that CAG’s scientific administration cost too much.  Even though the act that 
created CAG granted a much larger guano-producing area to Peru for national 
agriculture than it had before, Peruvian agricultural interests complained that the 
Peruvian Corporation still received too much preference since it retained control of 
the richest guano islands.  They had reason to complain: the Peruvian Corporation 
exported almost twice as much guano as CAG produced for Peruvian farmers 
during these years, and this foreign interest made no attempt to rotate production or 
conserve the bird stock.  To make matters worse, a “sinister ocean current” arrived 
from the north in late 1911 and caused the birds to flee breeding islands en masse; 
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this El Niño nearly ruined the season’s production of fresh guano and caused the 
deaths of millions of nestlings and eggs.  Even though CAG production recovered 
somewhat during the next two seasons and the Peruvian Corporation curtailed 
guano exports, demand for guano in Peru skyrocketed as farmers hoarded whatever 
they could of the limited supply and threatened to make a mockery of plans to 
distribute this scarce resource “rationally.”49   
CAG survived this rough beginning because Peruvian agricultural 
modernizers rushed to its defense.  The agronomist José Antonio de Lavalle y 
García was one of the most outspoken advocates of CAG during its early years.  He 
unequivocally declared in 1912, “The guano problem is eminently a national 
problem.”  He believed Peru was endowed “by Nature to have a prosperous and 
intensive agriculture” and grimaced as foreigners drained the “vital forces and 
productive energy of the nation” for agriculture on the other side of the world.  
Lavalle agreed with Payán that the Age of Guano was an “orgiastic waste” based 
upon “inexhaustible intellectual myopia and egoism” for which all Peruvians had 
“to pay the consequences.”  Only “just and energetic administration” of “a rational 
system of rotation and exploitation . . . that takes into consideration the 
conservation and better utilization of the [guano] birds” would solve Peru’s 
“commercial inferiority.”  Lavalle had a relatively straight-forward answer to the 
guano problem: Peru should actively enforce the 21st clause of the Grace Contract 
which allowed “the government of Peru to consume the guano that is necessary for 
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its agriculture” and which gave the Peruvian Corporation the right to export only 
“guano existing” at the time of its signing.  Lavalle’s attack conveniently displaced 
criticism from CAG to an unpopular foreign corporation.50 
A Peruvian consortium of farming and industrial interests chimed in with a 
statement that further reveals the modernizing mentality behind CAG’s support and 
anti-Peruvian Corporation rhetoric.  “The rational fertilizing of the earth,” they 
claimed, acted as the key to agricultural growth, since it “put in circulation . . . 
materials that exist in a latent state in nature.”  This practice enabled the “necessary 
progressive evolution from an extensive to an intensive system” of agriculture.  
With its unique capacity to produce guano, Peru could make up for its “inferior 
economic conditions” and catch up with rich agricultural nations.  Repeating an 
upper-class mantra that became increasingly threadbare as the twentieth century 
progressed, they believed modern agriculture would lead to “progressive 
enculturation” of the rural poor and lower food prices for the coastal “proletarian 
masses.”  In other words, guano had the potential to carry the Peruvian nation 
forward into the prosperous, modern world of the twentieth century by enabling 
input-intensive agriculture.51 
 
The Forbes Mission, 1911-1913 
 As soon as CAG was founded, a battle for control of Peru’s guano islands 
was probably inevitable.  But the Peruvian Corporation of London realized that 
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guano-bird conservation was in its own long-term interest and agreed to debate 
Peru’s ruling elite on technocratic terms.  Meanwhile, it looked to another expert 
for a resolution of this budding controversy. 
 The Peruvian Corporation handpicked its own scientific consultant, the 
Scottish naturalist Henry Ogg Forbes (1851-1932), to study the guano bird 
populations and determine the best policy for their “conservation and increase.”  
Forbes had recently retired as director of the Museums of Liverpool and was a 
distinguished scientific explorer.  Like Charles Darwin and so many other 
nineteenth-century British naturalists, Forbes left the study of medicine for field 
science and established his reputation with a best-selling travel account, A 
Naturalist’s Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago (1885), and scientific papers 
based on his explorations.52 
Forbes was the quintessential colonial scientist of the age of British imperial 
expansion.53  From 1885-1887, he led an expedition for the Royal Geographic 
Society and Colonial Office to explore the Owen Stanley Range of New Guinea, 
the high spine of mountains lying between German claims on the northeast coast of 
the island and Port Moresby, the colonial capital of the newly established British 
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Protectorate (illus. 10).  Forbes named the highest peak of this chain Huxley 
Pinnacle after his “honoured master in biology,” the famed Darwinian T. H. 
Huxley, only to see it renamed Mt. Victoria by another colonial scientific explorer 
in competition for prestige.  The rest of Forbes’s colonial career mixed 
administrative and scientific duties in Oceania: he served variously as acting deputy 
commissioner of New Guinea, director of the Canterbury natural history museum 
in New Zealand, and explorer of the Chatham Islands in the far South and Kuril 
Islands in the far North Pacific.54  Back in Britain, Forbes became best-known in 
scientific circles for his contribution to primatology; his two-volume Handbook to 
the Primates was published in several editions.  He and his wife Annabella Keith 
Forbes, who acompanied him on his early travels and acquired a reputation of her 
own as a naturalist, remained bird enthusiasts and made substantive contributions 
to the ornithological literature.55  In stark contrast to Coker, Forbes was a senior 
member of the last generation of British professional scientific polymaths.  Would 
his career as a scientist and agent of British imperial expansion mean that the 
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Peruvian Corporation could count on him to decide in favor of British interests in 
Peru? 
 Forbes arrived in Peru on Christmas Day, 1911, just in time to witness the 
advent of a significant El Niño event.  Although he did not know it, Forbes had the 
fortune to be one of the first scientists to observe in detail the effects of the El 
Niño-Southern Oscillation on both sides of the Pacific, for he had been witness to 
the ravages wrought by the tremendous drought of 1877-1878 on the forests and 
plantations of Dutch-ruled Indonesia.  After receiving the blessing of President 
Leguía and other Peruvian officials, Forbes spent more than a year studying the 
guano birds.  He first visited the northern coast to observe the impact of the 1911-
1912 El Niño on the bird population in response to a report of a stream of floating 
bird corpses 200 kilometers long.  But Forbes spent most of his time near Pisco 
focusing on the human impact on the guano birds.  In his May 1913 report, he 
concluded that ill-timed extraction of guano often interfered with mating and 
nesting.  He particularly condemned practices on the Islas Ballestas, where for ten 
consecutive years independent contractors hired by the Peruvian Corporation had 
begun harvest in April, before guano-producing nestlings could fly.  “This is 
without a doubt one of the principal causes of the decline of the birds” and guano 
production, Forbes admonished, discounting the effects of the 1911-1912 climate 
anomaly on bird reproduction.  Not only had contractors tried to maximize profits 
without regard for the birds’ welfare, but they also had made huge piles of stone on 
the islands that made subsequent harvests difficult.  Forbes also pointed out the 
threat posed by predatory birds, coastal fishermen, and Peruvian Corporation 
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workers who preyed upon guano bird eggs and chicks.  Production statistics 
corroborate his observations: the Peruvian Corporation harvested guano on the Islas 
Ballestas, Ferrol, Guañape, Huaura, Lobos de Afuera, Lobos de Tierra, Macabí, and 
Pescadores almost continuously from 1909 to the onset of World War I in 1914.56 
Like Coker, Forbes concluded his study with a series of policy suggestions.  
First, Forbes interpreted the 21st clause of the Grace Contract to prohibit the 
Peruvian Corporation from harvesting new guano deposits, much to its chagrin.  
Forbes agreed with Peruvian nationalists that the Peruvian Corporation only had the 
right to mine deposits that existed in 1890 when the Grace Contract was signed and 
that most of the Peruvian Corporation’s harvest since that date had been fresh 
guano taken illegally.  He declared that all guano islands except for Isla Lobos de 
Afuera should be put under CAG’s more-competent administration.  The Peruvian 
Corporation could mine guano pobre on this island to fulfill its remaining quota.  
This was a position even more extreme than that taken by the Peruvian mining 
engineer Marco Denegri whose 1910 stratigraphic study had determined that guano 
from Islas Lobos de Afuera and Lobos de Tierra would be required to fulfill the 
Grace Contract.  Second, Forbes suggested policies that would improve the guano 
birds’ welfare: private contractors should be banned from harvesting guano; yearly 
extraction should only take place during the winter from 1 June to 10 September; 
the period between harvests on each island should be increased to three or four 
years; no unauthorized visitor should come within one mile of the islands at any 
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time; a guardian force with gasoline-powered boats should patrol the coastal waters 
to keep the islands in “a state of perfect rest”; and professional hunters should shoot 
or poison the predators that threatened the birds.  Finally, Forbes suggested that 
Peru should hire permanent scientists to systematically inspect the guano islands 
and gather baseline data on bird behavior and biology.  After making these clear-
headed recommendations, Forbes, who was at the end of his scientific career, 
retired to Britain and published two brief articles on Peruvian sea birds.57 
Indeed, proponents of guano nationalization and state centralization in Peru 
had gained an important ally, although this should not have come as a big surprise 
to those who believed in government by experts.  The technocratic ideal, after all, is 
premised on scientific objectivity.  Experts tend to lose their authority if they are 
nakedly subject to the powers they serve.  Social circumstances entitled Forbes to 
make such a forthright pronouncement against his employer’s interests:  His career 
did not depend on his decision, a luxury denied to many who followed in his 
footsteps.  Moreover, as a foreigner, he did not have to stay in Peru and live with 
the consequences of his recommendations.  His situation clearly reveals why 
foreign consultants remain so vital to the politics of expertise in Latin America: 
their prestige depends on their social distance from the problem at hand.  Without a 
doubt, Forbes was a tremendous boon for technocracy in Peru.  
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A Technocratic Solution 
The Aristocratic Republic was not governed by consensus.  Peru’s oligarchs 
constantly bickered over how to divide the spoils of power, and their conflicts 
occasionally became contests of military force.  This is clearest in the case of 
Guillermo Billinghurst (1851-1915), once one of Peru’s most successful nitrate 
entrepreneurs.  He despised the peace his close ally Nicolás de Piérola had made 
with the Partido Civil.  In 1899, Piérola chose Eduardo López de Romaña (1847-
1912), a British-trained civil engineer from Arequipa who had served as Peru’s first 
Minister of Development, to succeed him as President.  López was elected almost 
unanimously by Peru’s tiny electorate.  Nevertheless, Billinghurst, whom most 
viewed as Piérola’s heir apparent, tried to organize an insurrection.  He failed, and 
the first technocrat to hold the Peruvian Republic’s highest office accomplished a 
peaceful transfer of power, the first since the end of the Guano Age.58 
Billinghurst had his revenge, at least temporarily.  Intense factionalism 
during the 1912 election to replace Leguía threw the decision into the hands of the 
Peruvian Congress.  Billinghurst, who had returned to political prominence as the 
popular mayor of Lima, won this parliamentary contest, cheered on by crowds of 
supporters.  As President, he forced through a series of populist reforms that finally 
unified his elitist opponents.  Billinghurst tried to dissolve Congress and call new 
elections to eliminate their resistance.  Masses of unruly working-class protestors 
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paraded the streets in support of further reforms.  This threat to constitutionalism, 
elite dominance, and public order led to Billinghurst’s overthrow by the military in 
February 1914.59             
In this context, a technocratic solution to the guano problem helped mend 
the divisions that were tearing apart the Aristocratic Republic.  The installation of 
an authoritarian junta headed by Colonel Oscar Benavides created ideal conditions 
to implement Forbes’s recommendations.  This junta closed the Islas Ballestas, the 
Peruvian Corporation’s biggest guano producers, by decree only weeks after taking 
power.  This closure was intended to give the bird population and guano levels time 
to regenerate; the islands would be allowed to reopen in 1916, but only to provide 
fertilizer for Peruvian agriculture.  Thus, Peruvan state officials used scientific 
opinion and resource conservation as rationale to act in the interest of their biggest 
supporters, Peru’s agricultural modernizers.   
Ignoring Forbes’s conclusions, the Peruvian Corporation cried foul 
immediately and warned that this unilateral action could threaten Peru’s ability to 
negotiate foreign loans.  Although CAG and the Benavides regime stood by the 
decree at first, the government eventually backed down and rescinded the closure 
of the Islas Ballestas in May 1914.  In January 1915, the executive adopted a law 
passed by the legislature that again confiscated the Peruvian Corporation’s 
exploitation rights (evidence of the popularity of this attack among Peru’s political 
                                                 
59. Pike, The Modern History of Peru, 198-202; Contreras and Cueto, Historia del Perú 
contemporáneo, 188-189; Enciclopedia ilustrada del Perú, s.v. “Billinghurst, Guillermo E.” Cf. 
Peter Blanchard, “A Populist Precursor: Guillermo Billinghurst,” JLAS 9:2 (1977), 251-273; Steve 
Stein, Populism in Peru: The Emergence of the Masses and the Politics of Social Control (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), ch. 2.  
155 
class).  Later that year, the government made a deal that finally resolved this 
controversy: CAG would purchase guano from the Peruvian Corporation at 
international market prices and guarantee fertilizer at subsidized prices to all 
Peruvian farmers who wanted it.  This followed a precedent set by the Peruvian 
Corporation: by special arrangement with the Peruvian government, it had sold 
guano at export prices to Peruvian haciendas owned by the British Sugar Co. 
beginning in 1914.  The Benavides regime bowed to international pressure but did 
not forget the class whose interests it served.60 
This mostly took care of the problem of guano supply, but CAG still had to 
do something about Peruvian guano demand in order to rationalize guano 
distribution fully.  Hoarding and speculation were big problems.  Many coastal 
farmers routinely asked for far more guano than they could use during a year and 
then kept it for the next season or sold it to other farmers at a markup.  
Furthermore, many farmers were applying guano in proportions unsuited for their 
chosen crop or local soil type.  From the beginning, CAG tried to forestall this by 
distributing agricultural questionaires, but most coastal growers were not willing to 
give in so easily to CAG’s supervision when it had little to offer in return.  Some 
falsified their responses; most simply failed to return them.61   
In 1914, CAG hired its first real technocrat to resolve this problem.  
Agronomic engineer José Antonio de Lavalle y García (1888-1957, illus. 11), one 
                                                 
60. MCAG 5 (1914), 29-41, 44; MCAG 7 (1916), iv, 86-87.  This account differs 
substantially from Miller, “British Firms and the Peruvian Government,” 377-378.  
61. See app. 3; CAG, Sección Técnica, Las necesidades de guano de la agricultura 
nacional, 13-16; Macera, “El guano y la agricultura peruana de exportación,” 388, 396.  
156 
of Peru’s foremost young scientific talents, was the obvious choice to head its new 
Technical Section.  As we have seen, he had already come to the rescue of CAG’s 
embattled managers on more than one occasion.  Lavalle was solely a product of 
professional scientific education in Peru, and he had received the gold medal as the 
outstanding graduate of the new Escuela de Agricultura in 1909.  After graduation, 
he succeeded Gerardo Klinge as director of the Lima cotton experimental station.  
Like most professional scientists in twentieth-century Peru--even those from the 
best families--Lavalle also had to work as a chemistry professor and agricultural 
administrator to make ends meet.  He soon became a major figure in several 
scientific organizations in Peru, including the important Sociedad Geográfica de 
Lima.  Lavalle was also a prolific scientific author and attended several 
international scientific meetings. 
But he was not a technocrat whose power and influence were based solely 
on expertise.  His father had served as Piérola’s Minister of State, and he was the 
grandson of the conservative diplomat José Antonio de Lavalle y Árias de 
Saavedra, founder of the Revista de Lima, an important mid-nineteenth-century 
outlet for scientists and other intellectuals, and head of the ill-fated diplomatic 
mission to Chile that tried to forestall the War of the Pacific.  The Lavalles were 
closely tied by blood, marriage, and business--though not by politics--to the Pardo 
clan and, according to a biographer of the time, “related by marriage to the most 
ancient Spanish families of the colonial epoch” that held “the highest social 
position . . . at the aristocratic center” of limeña cultural life.  Lavalle had immense 
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social prestige and political connections that might serve him where his expertise 
could not.  Even more than Ballén, he was both an aristocrat and a technocrat.62 
Beginning in June 1914, Lavalle and a team of assistants embarked on an 
agricultural census of the Peruvian coast focused on fertilizer use.  Lavalle, who 
had been trained by Belgian agricultural chemist George Vanderghem, paid special 
attention to coastal soils.  From thousands of analyses, he discovered--somewhat to 
his surprise considering how intensively this region was being cultivated--that they 
were quite rich in nitrogen and phosphorus.  This was clear evidence that coastal 
farmers had paid careful attention to the fertility of their soils over the long term.  
Unsurprisingly, he discovered that farmers used a variety of fertilizers and 
techniques for applying them.  Cotton growers depended most heavily on guano 
rico.  Nevertheless, cane plantations consumed the overwhelming majority of the 
fertilizer supply, and many farmers would not or could not purchase fertilizers at all 
(table 1).  In Lavalle’s view, one major cause of the guano shortage was the 
indiscriminate overapplication of fertilizer by some farmers; in a few cases, he 
thought its overuse reduced crop yields.  In short, this was prime territory for 
technocratic management.63 
Lavalle’s surveys established an independent basis for calculating “national 
demand” for fertilizer and rationing the guano supply.  CAG immediately used 
them for this purpose, and they served as the backbone to CAG’s guano 
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distribution regime for years to come.  The publication of Lavalle’s results also 
bolstered CAG’s prestige as a scientifically managed institution.  As we shall see in 
the next chapter, these calculations allowed CAG’s managers to significantly 
extend their technocratic control over Peruvian agriculture. 
Nature also cooperated with CAG’s designs.  In 1915-1916, guano 
production nearly doubled from the previous year, suggesting that the guano bird 
population had recovered from the shock of the 1911-1912 El Niño and that CAG’s 
conservation policies were beginning to bear fruit.  With Lavalle’s statistical 
knowledge regulating guano demand and a diplomatic agreement with the Peruvian 
Corporation guaranteeing guano supply, CAG was able to meet national demand 
for guano for the first time in 1915-1916.  It even started to make a decent return to 
its investors. 
 
The Conquest of Nitrogen 
Two external factors helped strengthen CAG’s hand.  First, hostilities on the 
other side of the globe dramatically increased international demand for foodstuffs 
and raw materials, especially Chilean nitrates.  Second, a series of technological 
innovations by German chemical manufacturers initiated an epochal change in the 
relationship between industry, agribusiness, and the environment that soon made 
guano completely irrelevant as a global commodity. 
The latter change had the longest-term implications.  In fact, the premature 
belief at the turn of the century that Chilean nitrates would soon be exhausted like 
Peru’s fossil guano deposits helped to bring about these far-reaching innovations.  
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In an influential 1898 address focused on England’s persistent agricultural 
depression, a prominent physical scientist spoke for many who were frightened by 
depletion of the world’s natural resources.  He announced, “Our wheat-producing 
soil is totally unequal to the strain put upon it.”  He thought things would worsen 
when Chilean nitrate deposits failed.  Therefore, “all civilised nations stand in 
deadly peril of not having enough to eat”--not just British-ruled India and other 
“southern” regions affected by recurring famines.  (India, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, China, and East Africa again experienced devastating precipitation 
extremes and mortality in 1896-1900.)64  Such catastrophist ideas had a profound 
influence on conservationism during this era and, as we shall see in chapter 5, on 
the environmental movement after World War II. 
German scientists, with keener foresight, were less concerned with food 
security than with the threat that a war with Great Britain would cut them off from 
Chilean nitrate supplies needed to produce explosives.  Both sides looked for a 
techno-fix: a renewed effort toward fixing nitrogen directly from the atmosphere.  
In short order, experts in several industrial countries developed two new, high-
temperature techniques to synthesize nitrogen compounds directly.  These were so 
energy intensive, however, that they were only barely viable commercially.65 
Beginning in 1909--the same year CAG was founded--things began to 
change rapidly insofar as the human relationship with nitrogen was concerned.  In 
one of the farthest-reaching scientific discoveries of all time, the chemist Fritz 
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Haber (1868-1934), a German Jew, discovered a workable catalytic process for 
synthesizing ammonia (NH3) from purified, gaseous nitrogen and hydrogen at high 
pressure.  (Recall from chapter 1 that atmospheric nitrogen must be converted from 
its unreactive molecular form, N2, to be incorporated into organic systems.)  As an 
added bonus, ammonia can be used to synthesize an infinity of nitrogen-based 
chemicals.  The industrial engineer Carl Bosch (1874-1940) then developed a 
complicated technological system that scaled-up Haber’s basic process in order to 
produce ammonia and its derivatives in commercial quantities.  Germany’s 
preexisting water-coal-steel complex made it possible to industrialize this new 
Haber-Bosch process quickly and profitably.  By the end of 1913, their employer, 
the chemical giant BASF, was operating a plant producing 20 tons a day of 
ammonium sulfate, a derivative of ammonia and sulphuric acid, using the Haber-
Bosch process.  This stable compound could be used directly as a fertilizer or 
shipped to munitions plants for conversion into explosives.  During its first full 
year of operation, 1914, BASF produced the equivalent of 5,500 metric tons of 
nitrogen.  This was about the same amount of nitrogen produced by Peru’s depleted 
guano birds that year--but less than six percent of the quantity of nitrates Germany 
imported from Chile that year before its supplies were cut off by the onset of World 
War I.  War on an industrial scale required the dramatic growth of all types of 
nitrogen production in a morbid race to see which side could blow up the other first 
(table 2).  BASF successfully expanded its productive capacity to keep pace with 
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the war, and this spectacular achievement of technoscience made it possible for 
Germany to keep fighting to the bitter end.66 
The Versailles Treaty compelled BASF to share the intricacies of the 
Haber-Bosch process with the war’s victors, though the “technological momentum” 
built up by the German chemical industry during the 1910s enabled it to maintain 
its primacy in nitrogen synthesis and similar techniques until World War II.  This 
high-technology process quickly surpassed all other forms of inorganic nitrogen-
compound production worldwide.  The even greater demand for explosives during 
World War II strengthened its dominance.  Since 1945, the widespread adoption of 
high-yielding, hybrid grain varieties and input-intensive agricultural practices (the 
so-called Green Revolution), tied to continuing improvements in the efficiency and 
scale of the basic Haber-Bosch process, has driven the consumption of nitrogen 
fertilizers ever higher.  Since 1960, the United States, Germany, Japan, Soviet 
Union, and other industrial powers have made a big business exporting technology, 
expertise, and capital to build fertilizer production facilities in the post-colonial 
world.  By the year 2000, this industry had become so vast that fertilizer 
manufacturers using the Haber-Bosch process worldwide only needed ten days to 
synthesize compounds containing more nitrogen than Peru’s guano and nitrate 
miners extracted during the entire 19th century.  Human ingenuity has conquered 
the supply side of the nitrogen cycle.67 
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Over the long term, the triumph of the Haber-Bosch process contributed 
powerfully to a fundamental shift in the relationship between humans and the 
environment during the twentieth century.  The widespread consumption of 
nitrogen fertilizers has had a number of ecological costs and benefits.  On a global 
scale, it dramatically increased the productivity of agricultural land and labor--for 
some regions and crops much more than others.  This removed some of the 
pressure to expand the extent of agricultural lands, the most important human force 
driving ecological change on a global scale during the nineteenth century.  
Abundant fertilizer also allowed many farmers to dispense with crop rotation and 
legume cultivation while maintaining yields, in other words, to establish 
monocultures of enormous scale.  The consequent increase in the global food 
supply made it possible for the human population to surpass six billion by the end 
of the century. 
On the other hand, cheap nitrogen fertilizers created major water pollution 
problems, directly through leaching and inefficient overapplication, and indirectly 
via the vast increase in nitrogen-rich manure produced by protein-hungry livestock 
that consume much of this agricultural surplus.  Synthetic nitrogen fertilizers are so 
inexpensive that this once-valuable manure is often thrown away as waste.  The 
increasing consumption of meat and animal fats and declining direct consumption 
of beans and other pulses, in turn, has had a detrimental effect on the long-term 
health of the world’s more affluent.  As we shall see in later chapters, many of the 
world’s poor have benefited little from this glut of food, and the immediate 
nutritional health of those on the margins of this agro-industrial system has 
163 
declined in many cases.  Perversely, smallholding farmers have benefited least 
from these improvements.  Thus, the change in world nitrogen production and 
consumption during the twentieth century has mirrored the growth of an ever-
widening gap between the fantastic wealth of the few (on both sides of the North-
South divide) who have benefited most from industrialization and the stark poverty 
of the many who remain at farthest remove from industrial livelihoods.  Enormous 
energy is needed to create the high temperatures and pressures required for 
ammonia syntheses, as well as to run the machines needed to transport and apply 
these compounds.  Therefore, the conquest of nitrogen has contributed significantly 
to the rise in fossil fuel consumption and the consequent production of greenhouse 
gases, which may cause big problems for humanity in the near future.  In short, this 
human-caused change radically accelerated the cycling of nitrogen through natural 
systems with far-reaching consequences, perhaps requiring a return to the concern 
for nitrogen conservation that existed circa 1900.68 
By stoking demand for external nitrogen inputs, the widespread use of 
Peruvian guano and nitrates paved the way for these epochal changes, even though 
their quantities were minuscule in comparison to later production via the Haber-
Bosch process.  Peru’s Guano Age was a crucial stage in the human conquest of 
nitrogen. 
But these changes still lay decades in the future for the story at hand.  In the 
short term, World War I created an immense economic opportunity for Peruvian 
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businessmen, but also social and political challenges.  Even though Peru and many 
other countries experienced a sharp economic crisis at the beginning of the war 
when the British navy cut Germany off from overseas trade, the Allies soon 
demanded vast quantities of agricultural staples and minerals from South America.  
British, U.S., Peruvian, even German firms in Peru got rich supplying the European 
war effort, especially W. R. Grace & Co., which both produced and transported 
these goods.  Though Peru may have gained in a moral sense, the Great War made 
it abundantly clear how much it lost economically during the War of the Pacific:  
From 1914-1918, Chile’s salitre factories exported over 12 million metric tons of 
nitrates to keep the Allies’ guns firing, more than three times the total exported by 
Peru from 1830-1879.  But escalating wartime prices--and stagnant wages--hurt the 
situation of both blue- and white-collar Peruvian workers.  As in many other parts 
of the world, the abrupt depression that accompanied the return of peace brought 
class conflict in Peru to a head, leading to the brutally repressed general strike of 
1919.  In this context, Augusto Leguía seized power from the weakening lords of 
the Aristocratic Republic and opened the way for technocrats to gain even more 
prominence under his 11-year dictatorship.69 
Meanwhile, high international freight rates, disruptions to European 
agriculture, and a glut of nitrogen fertilizer immediately after the war all prevented 
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the Peruvian Corporation from exporting any guano from mid-1916 to mid-1920.  
This fertilizer instead went straight to Peruvian sugar and cotton growers, who 
earned a combined US$92 million, 41 percent of Peru’s total export income, from 
their fertilized crops during these years.  The Peruvian Corporation again exported 
guano during the 1920s, but by this time, CAG had reinforced its industry 
monopoly, and the Peruvian Corporation was forced to mine guano under the 
supervision of CAG’s conservation technocrats.  In 1929, faced with increasingly 
poor prospects for guano as the Haber-Bosch process conquered the world fertilizer 
market (and permanently destroyed the demand for Chilean nitrates), the Peruvian 
Corporation gave up its remaining control over exports after 38 years in the guano 
trade.  By this date, the Peruvian Corporation had only sold 1.376 million long tons 
of guano of the two million promised by the Grace Contract: 938,469 long tons 
(mainly phosphatic guano pobre) before CAG’s establishment, and an additional 
322,413 long tons of guano rico and 114,622 long tons of guano pobre after 1909.  
Add guano extraction to the list of the Peruvian Corporation’s endeavors in Peru 
that were never fully realized.  Nevertheless, it still got something valuable in 1929 
in return for giving up its claims: perpetual ownership of the main railway lines in 
Peru, a concession it had been trying to obtain since the end of World War I.70 
Even though conservation technocrats were only partly responsible for the 
resolution of this controversy, the events described in this chapter reenforced the 
opinion that science and state intervention could serve the economic interests of 
                                                 
70. Miller, “British Firms and the Peruvian Government,” 382, 386; idem, “The Making of 
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Peruvians in their quest for national order and progress.  This quest, moreover, 
proved to be quite compatible with the interests of foreign investors, Peru’s conflict 
with the Peruvian Corporation notwithstanding.  In order to solve the “guano 
problem,” Peruvian state officials followed the recommendations of two foreign 
scientific consultants and established a state guano monopoly based on the 
principle of sustained-yield conservation.  Peru’s ruling class, though divided on 
many problems, threw its almost full support behind this project.  Now the 
Compañía Administradora del Guano had the political opportunity to deliver on its 
technocratic promise.  Its managers were firmly installed as the Lords of Guano.  
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Chapter 3 
Managing an Agroecological System:  
The Compañía Administradora del Guano 
 
The Peruvian Guano Administration . . . operates the greatest of all industries based 
upon the conservation of wild animals. 
--Robert Cushman Murphy (1940) 
With the formation of the Compañía Administradora del Guano in 1909, 
Peruvians established the barebones of an apparatus to control the guano industry.  
Support for the technocratic ideal in Peru gained enormously from the controversy 
that ensued between the Peruvian state and the Peruvian Corporation of London.  
But it remained to be seen whether the conservation science on which CAG based 
its managerial regime was founded on an accurate enough understanding of the 
natural world to fulfill its technocratic promise.  Were guanayes, piqueros, 
alcatraces, and camanayes managable as “domestic animals” as Robert Coker and 
Henry Forbes hoped?  Of course, wild animals were only part of CAG’s purview.  
Could the behavior of the people associated with the guano industry be controlled?  
The Lords of Guano who administered CAG looked to the fashionable principles of 
scientific management and social hygiene for help as they sought to manipulate the 
social relations of guano production, distribution, and use. 
To understand how CAG’s management regime worked, it is useful to think 
of it as an interconnected agroecological system.  An agroecological system or 
agroecosystem is a conceptual tool used to delineate the multiple ecological 
relationships present in a crop system.  These differ from so-called natural 
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ecosystems because they encompass large-scale human manipulation of biological 
productivity.  The agroecosystem described in the pages that follow linked the 
tremendous productivity of Peru’s marine environment to the production of export 
crops in the irrigated valleys of the adjacent coast. 
It is important to recognize that the meaning of “agroecology” is itself tied 
to a present-day movement that seeks to apply “modern ecological knowledge and 
methods” to “the design and management of sustainable ecosystems.”  This 
movement is founded on normative principles distinctly different from those 
governing input-intensive agriculture.  Its “guiding principles of sustainability” 
include recycling crop nutrients and relying on natural processes of nutrient 
fixation and exchange.  Agroecologists seek to slow down, even reverse, the trend 
toward use of manufactured chemicals brought about by the unwavering drive to 
maximize crop and labor productivity.  Many also oppose the concentration of 
ownership typical of modern agribusiness.  In essence, the proponents of 
agroecology want to overturn many of the assumptions held by such old-school 
agronomists as José Antonio de Lavalle y García and Gerardo Klinge who saw 
farming tradition and peasant routine as major barriers to human progress.1 
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From an agroecological perspective, it is possible in hindsight to make 
“expert” recommendations stating what Peruvians could have done to better 
manage their environment.  But historical studies of Latin America, particularly of 
economic development and environmental change, often take a moralistic tone that 
dismisses the region as a failure.  To be fair, the historian must respect the options 
that were available in the past.  Therefore, rather than presupposing a normative 
position regarding what constitutes “sustainable” agriculture, I will use insights 
derived from the science of ecology to understand how input-intensive agriculture 
became conventional practice in Peru.  The Compañía Administradora del Guano 
makes a fascinating case study because it promoted “sustainable” practices in one 
realm and “unsustainable” practices in another.  In fact, the undeniable success of 
CAG’s sustained-yield conservation program actually drove the development of 
input-intensive export agriculture in Peru. 
This points to a major dilemma for those of us who want to mitigate or 
reduce the environmental damage caused by modern life and see that the costs and 
benefits of these practices are shared fairly by all classes of society:  How do we 
draw boundaries around a practice and decide that it is sustainable, much less just?  
This issue mirrors a long-standing dilemma of working ecologists:  How can we 
reduce nature into categories small enough to be studied (and manipulated) without 
violating the governing principle of ecology, that life on earth is interconnected?  I 
will use the institutional history of Compañía Administradora del Guano to 
delineate the ecological and social relationships that linked Peru’s marine 
environment to export agriculture. 
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Readers can draw their own moral conclusions from what transpired.  From 
1915 to 1934, CAG delivered perfectly on its technocratic promise.  Thanks to its 
conservation policies, the guano bird population and guano production grew 
spectacularly.  As a consequence, CAG was able to supply the growing demand for 
concentrated fertilizer in Peru.  Only a narrow, already privileged segment of 
Peruvian society received most of the benefits provided by this regime. 
Meanwhile, in adapting this agroecological system to the vagaries of the El 
Niño phenomenon and Great Depression, CAG’s managers discovered how 
interconnected nature and modern society really are.  In fact, they contributed to 
one of the most important environmental discoveries of the twentieth century.  
After the powerful 1925-1926 El Niño event, scientists with ties to the Peruvian 
guano industry and agribusiness produced observations crucial to the realization 
that the “Peruvian” El Niño is connected to the Southern Oscillation and that both 
are part of one vast climate mechanism affecting the entire Indo-Pacific Basin.  
Such discoveries opened new possibilities and bred new challenges for the Lords of 
Guano. 
 
Shepherding the Guano Birds 
CAG’s control over this agroecological system linking Peru’s marine 
environment to the export of agricultural staples started with the guano birds.  The 
conservation science of Coker and Forbes fulfilled its promise in dramatic fashion 
under CAG’s tenure:  Annual guano production increased by more than a factor of 
four from the nadir following the El Niño event of 1911-1912 until 1938 when a 
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“La Niña” event with abnormally intense upwelling, cool surface waters, and high 
bioproductivity carried the guano bird population to its highest levels in decades 
(fig. 2).  As in every ecological system, this change affected other species: some 
favorably, others negatively.  CAG tried to manipulate these relationships to boost 
guano production.  In accord with prevailing scientific fashion of the time, it 
focused on predators and parasites of the guano birds with varying success.  Other 
species were affected as an unplanned consequence of these activities. 
Without a doubt, the most significant action taken by CAG to aid guano 
bird reproduction during this era involved protecting the birds from the guano 
industry itself.  This was the key to CAG’s initial success.  “Thick beds of bones in 
hollows and gulches” on the guano islands evinced the industry’s destructive 
potential.  According to locals, thousands of young birds “were driven to slaughter 
by wanton guano contractors in the old time purely [to get] them out of the way of 
the diggers.”  In 1914, CAG permanently stopped contracting out the guano 
harvest.  This gave CAG much more control over the behavior of island workers.  
Every visitor to the guano islands was strictly ordered to leave the birds alone.  
Even more significantly, CAG consistently set harvest times to come after the end 
of peak nesting on each island.  These policies had an immediate impact: the 
ornithologist Robert Cushman Murphy credited the absence of the Peruvian 
Corporation on Islas Lobos de Afuera and Lobos de Tierra during the war for the 
noticeable expansion of the alcatraz colonies on these islands by 1919.  The guano 
birds eventually became acclimated to the presence of workers.  The guanay 
adapted best--even tolerating machines and colonizing some island buildings (illus. 
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12).  The rough nesting census done by the ornithologist William Vogt in the early 
1940s indicated that guano harvesting on the Islas Chinchas may have influenced 
many birds to flee to the nearby Islas Ballestas.  But in regions and times when 
good nesting space was harder to come by, especially on the isolated, densely 
populated Islas Guañape and Macabí, workers had no discernable impact.  Each 
harvest under CAG seems to have caused, at worst, only a brief decrease in the 
local bird population.2   
In contrast, the rotation policy promoted by Coker and Forbes was not as 
important to bird conservation as these scientists thought.  CAG rotated extraction 
on most islands and points, but did so quite haphazardly.  CAG implemented this 
policy most consistently on the three Islas Chincha, its most important guano 
producers from 1909-1962; it extracted guano on each of the islands every other or 
every third year from the 1909-10 season until 1958 with only four exceptions.3  
But CAG extracted guano for many years consecutively during the 1910s and 
1920s on several of its top guano-producing territories, including the Islas 
Ballestas.  Only during the 1930s did CAG implement a rotation schedule for most 
of its top-producing territories, although it resumed intensive production on several 
islands in the 1940s, including its second-largest guano producer, the Islas 
Guañape.  CAG made almost no attempt to alternate harvests on the Islas Macabí 
and Lobos de Tierra, largely because they were so remote from the rest of the 
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guano islands, nor did it alternate extraction on the new properties it brought into 
production after 1946, including Isla La Vieja.  It seems rotation did not 
significantly affect the reproductive success of the guanay and piquero populations 
along the Peruvian coast, though it may have discouraged the relative increase of 
the skittish alcatraz.  It is possible that more elaborate statistical analysis may 
indicate a subtle but significant correlation between intensified extraction and 
declining guano production, but available evidence points to climatic variation as 
the overwhelming factor influencing guano production fluctuations before the 
1960s.  As figure 2 makes clear, the biggest drops in guano production from 1910-
1985 all corresponded with strong El Niño events.  Direct scientific studies of the 
guano bird population since 1939 directly support this conclusion.  Rotation did 
serve another useful purpose, however: it allowed CAG to distribute its limited 
workforce and ships much more efficiently.  In any case, it is clear that CAG’s 
management did not fully implement scientific recommendations, although they 
continued to credit the rotation policy for production increases.4 
Humans posed another threat to the guano birds.  The presence of a human 
trespasser collecting guano, eggs, or chicks could spook an entire colony and raise 
tremendous havoc.  Consequently, following Forbes’s suggestion, CAG established 
permanent, military-style guard stations on its most important guano-producing 
islands and points to ensure their isolation (see map 1).  In 1915-1916, CAG posted 
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its first guardians on nine islands and three coastal areas; by 1932, it operated 
stations on 31 islands and 13 coastal sites.  CAG markedly increased real spending 
on these guardian installations from 1915 until the El Niño crisis of 1939-1941.  In 
line with Forbes’s recommendation, Lavalle supervised the establishment of 
meteorological stations on seven island groups.  Guardians at these stations logged 
daily measurements of the ocean currents, prevailing winds, air and water 
temperatures, and the activity of the bird colonies.  Lavalle hoped these 
observations would help CAG learn how climatic variations--especially the El Niño 
phenomenon--affected the guano birds, but later scientists found these readings to 
be too unreliable to be of much use.  Guards were known to abandon their other 
duties on occasion to relieve their boredom at these isolated locations, but they 
generally did an adequate job of preventing trespassers from disturbing the 
colonies, despite the frequent presence of local fishermen against whom, as we 
shall see in chapter 6, CAG waged a political war for years.5     
But CAG’s guardian system had a decidedly negative impact on other 
coastal bird species.  Island guards routinely hunted three birds to provide fresh 
meat for their sparsely provisioned tables: the potoyunco or Peruvian diving petrel 
(Pelecanoides garnotii), the chuita or red-footed shag (Phalacrocorax gaimardi), 
and the pingüino or Humboldt penguin (Spheniscus humboldti, illus. 13).  Repeated 
guano extraction also disturbed the breeding of the potoyunco and Humboldt 
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penguin by removing the material they need to dig nesting burrows.  These birds, 
common during the mid-nineteenth century, were virtually eliminated from the 
guano islands and came to nest only in sea caves or on a handful of lofty islands 
unamenable to colonization by the principal guano birds, such as Isla San Gallán.  
Of course, these guardians did nothing to prevent others elsewhere along the coast 
from hunting or collecting eggs from these birds or capturing penguins for the pet 
and zoo trade.  As a consequence of these pressures, today the chuita is classified as 
near-threatened and the Humboldt penguin as “vulnerable.”  The potoyunco only 
breeds in four locations and is in imminent danger of extinction.6 
CAG cared little for most coastal birds that did not contribute to guano 
production.  But it cared deeply for the guano birds’ natural enemies, if only to get 
rid of them:  The simeón or band-tailed gull (Larus belcheri), the cleo or kelp gull 
(L. dominicanus), the pájaro ladrón or southern skua (Catharacta skua chilensis), 
the gallinazo or turkey vulture (Cathartes aura), and the buitre or Andean condor 
(Vultur gryphus) all preyed on eggs, chicks, dead birds, and stole fish from the 
guano bird colonies.  The halcón real or peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus) and 
cernícalo or kestrel (Falco sparverius) occasionally caught adult guano birds on the 
wing.7  In his 1913 report, Henry Forbes recommended either shooting these 
predatory birds or killing them with poisoned bait to protect the guano birds and 
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their young.  Within a few years CAG got government permission to hire military 
marksmen, then to arm its own guardians and lighthouse keepers for this purpose.  
Robert Cushman Murphy reported that 5,000 gulls were shot in February and 
March of 1917 on the southern islands, although he thought this measure had little 
effect since these pests were “extremely abundant” again when he visited a few 
years afterward (illus. 14).  Murphy was a bit more concerned about the condors.  
At first, he thought it “seemed criminal that sharpshooters . . . should be employed 
for the express purpose of killing such magnificent creatures.”  But then one day 
over Isla Asia in December 1919 Murphy sighted 18 condors, “several whose bare, 
distended crops hung down like goiters from the weight of stolen eggs.”  He 
directly blamed the condors for creating “a waste of empty nests and broken egg-
shells . . . deserted for the season” on half of the island.  This led to a change of 
heart: “After witnessing the damage that these birds had done at Asia, my 
sympathies inclined more toward the victims and the practical attitude of the guano 
administration.”  CAG, after all, was raising “defenseless” guano birds in “a system 
of more or less artificial culture” instead of protecting the harmonies of a natural 
community.  Therefore, Murphy’s moral calculus allowed these “veritable harpys” 
to be executed without remorse (illus. 15).  From 1937 to 1940, when CAG was 
making record profits, it purchased 47,500 shotgun cartridges, 38,000 Winchester 
rifle cartridges, and 35,000 carbine cartridges to kill predatory birds--an indication 
of the immense scale of this organized killing.8   
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Since it was following conservation orthodoxy of the time, which identified 
“varmints” either as unworthy of protection or deserving of extirpation, CAG never 
questioned the efficacy of its predator policy.  As a direct consequence, today the 
band-tailed gull and condor are reputedly much less common along the Peruvian 
coast.  Contrary to common wisdom, however, Andean condors today are not 
classified as threatened or endangered as is their close relative the California 
condor (Gymnogyps califorianus), and they still seasonally visit the coast to raid 
sea lion and guano bird colonies.9 
Even though this experiment in ecological alteration affected several other 
bird species negatively, it undoubtedly helped increase guano production for 
several decades.  CAG’s guardian and predator-control policies achieved their 
greatest success on Isla La Vieja, the lofty island guarding the entrance to the rich 
Bahía de Independencia.  Even though it harbored a large breeding colony of the 
zarcillo or Inca tern (Larosterna inca), Isla La Vieja was insignificant as a producer 
of guano until 1948 when CAG installed a guard station and undertook a systematic 
campaign against its large population of condors after preparing the island surface 
on its windward side to make it more amenable to nesting.  Guanayes then 
colonized this territory in unprecedented numbers and made it CAG’s largest 
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guano-producing territory during the 1950s.10  CAG’s predator control policy was 
good for its bottom line but, ironically, it ended up hurting CAG politically.  As we 
shall see in chapter 7, in its conflicts with the nascent anchoveta industry during the 
1950s, CAG was accused of allowing the guano bird population to grow too large 
and too domesticated with this policy, and thus setting up the industry for 
collapse.11 
CAG looked to a different set of experts to orchestrate its campaign against 
the guano birds’ smaller natural enemies.  Bio-medicine was the most advanced 
sector of Peru’s scientific establishment during the early twentieth century, as it 
was in many parts of Latin America.  This was due in part to the far-reaching 
triumph of tropical medicine, Pasteurian bacteriology, and hygienism, but also to 
growing interest in tropical plant pathology and livestock diseases, as well as a 
vigorous local tradition of environmental medicine in Peru, known as “Andean 
biology.”12  The persistent belief that bio-medical science would soon conquer the 
world’s worst diseases infected CAG’s managers and strongly influenced their 
attempts to manage Peru’s marine environment. 
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Henry Forbes unwittingly inspired CAG’s campaign to “sanitize” the guano 
islands for the birds’ protection.  When he visited the northern coast of Peru in 
search of the cause of the casualties of 1911-1912, he dissected a handful of bird 
corpses and found no clear signs of disease, only large numbers of ectoparasites.  
Forbes tentatively concluded that lack of food related to the incursion of warm 
waters was the primary cause of guano bird migration and death.  Forbes’s 
criticized the Peruvian Corporation’s habit of piling stones on the islands primarily 
because they took space away from the nesting colonies and made the guano 
harvest more difficult.  CAG workers then began systematically dumping tons of 
stone into the ocean to “clean” the islands for guano extraction.13 
José Antonio de Lavalle y García almost single-handedly changed the way 
in which this cleaning was conceived.  The 1911-1912 and 1917 El Niño events 
directly inspired this shift in thinking.  In three ground-breaking scientific papers, 
Lavalle analyzed the impacts of these events on Peru’s coastal ecology.  In line 
with his training in plant pathology and direct experience in the battle against 
cotton wilt, he thought a disease was the most likely cause of the increased bird 
mortality he observed during these years.  After studying a number of corpses, 
Lavalle concluded that heat and humidity associated with these events encouraged 
the growth of the common fungus Aspergillus fumigatus to such an extent that it 
killed many birds.  (This is the same type of organism responsible for the “white 
plague” currently destroying fan corals in the Caribbean.)  Lavalle felt this disease 
directly threatened the well-being of the guano industry, so he recommended the 
                                                 
13. MCAG 5 (1914), 77-78, 91; MCAG 8 (1917), ix; ECAG, 16; MCAG 12 (1921), 11. 
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burning of all bird corpses, the direct killing of sick birds, and spraying the islands 
with sanitizing disinfectant or hot water after each harvest.  Lavalle thought these 
procedures (and, interestingly, the artificial breeding of endemic island spiders as a 
biological control) would also help eradicate blood-sucking garrapatas or ticks 
(Ornithidorus amblus) that lived under surface rocks and infested both the birds 
and guano workers.  Lavalle suspected these arthropods served as vectors for 
disease, in the same manner that insects were known to carry plague, typhus, 
malaria, and sleeping sickness.14 
Other Peruvian scientists followed Lavalle’s lead and researched this 
epidemiological angle for years.  In 1924, Peruvian bacteriologist Julio César 
Gastiaburú Rocco (1881-1960) made a major discovery among sick guano birds: 
He isolated the first wild instance of “bird cholera” (the bacillus Pasteurella), a 
deadly bacterial disease infecting domestic fowl.  This discovery had ominous 
implications: it suggested that this disease might have jumped the species barrier 
from chickens to Pelecaniformes quite recently.  If the guano birds had developed 
no immunity to this bacteria, there was potential for the spread of a cataclysmic 
epidemic--perhaps one on the apocalyptic scale of the rinderpest pandemic widely 
known to have passed from domestic to wild African ungulates during the 1890s.15  
                                                 
14. Lavalle, “Una hipótesis sobre la mortalidad de las aves”; idem, “Informe preliminar 
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15. Peruvians had reason to be worried, as they had been with bubonic plague during 
Coker’s visit.  From the late 1880s until after the turn of the century, rinderpest, persistent drought, 
and a series of other ecological disasters devastated vast swaths of eastern Africa from Eritrea all the 
way to South Africa, opening the way for European colonization in the region.  See Helge Kjekshus, 
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Gastiaburú’s discovery inspired more suggestions to clean the islands with 
antiseptic, and it led Luis Gamarra Dulanto, one of Lavalle’s successors as chief of 
CAG’s Technical Section, to ban domestic fowl from the islands in the early 
1930s--eliminating one of the island workers’ only sources of fresh meat.  In the 
interest of hygiene, Gamarra later organized a campaign using poison against rats, 
another non-native species on the guano islands (illus. 16).  In 1960, CAG’s 
resident ornithologist tried a different tack: he tested the efficacy of Aldrin, 
benzene hexachloride, and other chemical pesticides against the garrapatas.  
Fortunately, this experiment failed.  In the United States, bioaccumulation of such 
chlorinated hydrocarbons was directly responsible for the near extinction of several 
bird species, including the brown pelican--the northern variety of one of Peru’s 
main guano birds!16 
As part of their zeal to control the environment of the guano islands, this 
obsession with infection led Peruvian scientists to make some frightening proposals 
regarding island sanitation.  Without a doubt, this was a reasonable approach to the 
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16. MCAG 15 (1924), 93-108; MCAG 19 (1928), 254-255; Murphy, “Los invertebrados 
terrestres de las islas guaneras del Peru,” trans. Lavalle, MCAG 12 (1921), 95-116; Johannes Wille, 
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problem of variation in the guano bird population, especially in view of the 
spectacular discovery by other Latin American scientists that insects served as the 
vectors of yellow fever, Chagas disease, and mosaic disease in sugar cane.  But in 
this case, this epidemiological bias led to a scientific dead end.  Forbes’s suggestion 
that the availability of fish for the guano birds was the proximate cause for ups and 
downs in guano production later turned out to be correct.  In other words, the 
success of bio-medical science in Peru stood in the way of the development of new 
techniques to foment guano production.17 
But the short-sightedness and limitations of some of CAG’s conservation 
policies should not be interpreted as a failure.  Far from it.  Where things counted 
most--the protection of the guanay and piquero to ensure the sustained production 
of fertilizer for national agriculture--CAG succeeded marvelously under 
technocratic control. 
 
Disciplining Workers 
Meanwhile, CAG applied many of these same principles of contagion and 
control to the humans who worked on the guano islands.  Rather than resorting to 
violence, as conservationists did against the guano birds’ natural enemies, CAG 
relied on hygiene and quantification to discipline its workers into increasing guano 
                                                 
17. See Cueto, Excelencia científica en la periferia, ch. 4, esp. p. 134; McCook, States of 
Nature, ch. 4; Stepan, Beginnings of Brazilian Science; idem, “The Interplay between Socio-
Economic Factors and Medical Science: Yellow Fever Research, Cuba and the United States,” 
Social Studies of Science 8 (1978), 397-423. 
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production.  CAG employed physicians and statisticians to implement this new 
efficiency-minded managerial regime. 
As it did during the nineteenth century, guano extraction still depended on 
back-breaking labor with simple hand tools: pickaxes, shovels, and now screens to 
remove worthless stones, and brooms to pick up valuable leftover dust (illus. 17-
18).  To further minimize losses, CAG replaced the wasteful, labor-saving chutes 
used during the Guano Age to load ships directly (see illus. 2) with jute-fiber sacks 
imported from South Asia.  Guano workers continued to rely primarily on burros, 
small railway cars, and cable trolleys to move guano and drinking water around the 
islands, though CAG gradually supplemented these with an extensive infrastructure 
of docks, roads for motorized tractors, administration and service buildings, guard 
houses, even lighthouses to aid coastal navigation.18 
The guano industry no longer depended on coolie workers imported from 
China as it had during the Age of Guano.  Instead, CAG recruited seasonal wage 
laborers from the Sierra through the enganche system, just as railroad contractors 
and nitrate miners, then coastal planters and highland miners had done during the 
nineteenth century.19  In this system, CAG paid an agent (enganchador) to journey 
to the highlands and recruit indigenous male peasants--adults, adolescents, and 
sometimes children--with a cash advance.  These seasonal laborers then worked off 
the advance with usurious interest (typically 20 to 30 percent of their wages for five 
                                                 
18. Murphy, Bird Islands, 96; Coker, “Peru’s Wealth-Producing Birds,” 562, 564; “La 
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months of work) and ideally made a little additional cash to take back to the 
highlands.  Since workers could not run away once they arrived on the islands, this 
was a secure investment for CAG, although potentially even more exploitative for 
employees than plantation work.  During the 1920s, CAG obtained approximately 
three-fourths of its laborers in this way, the majority from the department of 
Ancash and a minority from the department of Ayacucho.  This pattern changed 
little over the years.  During the period 1937-1941, for example, CAG recruited 60 
to 70 percent of the 3,000-plus workforce it employed each year from just one 
highland province, Yungay, which was connected by railway to the port of 
Chimbote.  Many individuals returned year after year to the guano islands. 
Compared to other manual jobs on the coast available to migrant workers, 
employment on the guano islands offered fairly good pay and benefits.  In 1919, 
CAG implemented the eight-hour day when it became national law after a 
sustained, sometimes violent campaign led by urban workers.  In that year, guano 
workers typically received S/.7.20 (US$1.63) and rations for working a six-day 
week with national holidays off.  This compared favorably to the pay given 
highland migrants on coastal plantations:  At Cayaltí, a sugar plantation owned by 
the politically powerful Aspíllaga brothers in the Saña river valley southeast of 
Chiclayo, contracted laborers in 1919 received S/.6.72 per week for completing set 
tasks that typically took ten to 12 hours each day to complete.  Likewise, the 
Aspíllagas paid S/.6 to S/.9 per week to workers on their cotton plantation near 
Pisco in 1919, depending on the season.  CAG raised its wages steadily over the 
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years, though periods of rapid inflation consumed most of these gains in real terms 
(table 3).20 
Working conditions on the guano islands were difficult if not downright 
dangerous, although they were a marked improvement over the dark days of the 
nineteenth-century guano industry.  Like their earlier counterparts, most guano 
workers contracted conjunctivitis, chronic coughs, and other respiratory problems 
acquired from exposure to pulverized guano.  Bronchitis, malaria (the scourge of 
highland migrants to the coast), and influenza were the most common causes of 
worker hospitalization.  Their disease environment also overlapped with the guano 
birds: ticks--especially in their larval stage when they were known as chui-chuis--
easily adapted to feasting on human hosts, day and night.  Like coastal plantations, 
CAG provided a spartan diet of easily transportable foods: rice, beans, dried meat, 
hard bread, and tea with sugar.  During CAG’s early years, workers occasionally 
suffered from scurvy from lack of fresh food.  Guano workers had to provide their 
own bedding and usually slept in crude tents made from wood frames, woven cane, 
and old sacks.  To make matters worse, these habitations typically harbored clouds 
of flies bred by poor sanitation which made gastrointestinal problems like 
dysentery all too common.  Everything metal on the islands was painted with 
poisonous red lead to prevent corrosion.   
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Hygienists and labor activists routinely complained about this work 
environment.  In response, beginning in 1916, CAG paid a series of physicians to 
study health conditions on the islands, recommend improvements, and provide free 
medical care to its workers.  CAG’s managers eagerly published their periodic 
reports which tended to rate island working conditions much better than those 
encontered by plantation and mine workers, and the military rank-and-file.  CAG 
kept the highly critical 1929 report by Humberto Bravo Otayza under wraps, 
however.  Intervention by hygienic experts led to the gradual construction of new 
“scientifically prepared, hygienic habitations” and hospitals during periods when 
guano production was most profitable.  In its later years, CAG even offered life 
insurance to its workers and sports facilities on the islands.  But it is important to 
note that sanitation campaigns against human excrement on the islands were 
designed to protect the guano birds more than they were the workers.21 
As one might expect, some of CAG’s managers and overseers treated their 
workers with disdain.  For example, Murphy reported that one boss on Isla Chincha 
Norte, “adopted the policy of selecting only the stupidest of the Indians as his own 
workmen, his philosophy being that if he chose blockheads, and taught them 
nothing, they would never become fit for other work. . . . He had kept the same 
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dull, steady crew for years.”  The presence of physicians was not all good for the 
workers; it exposed them to the hygienists’ disciplinary zeal:  Alcohol was 
forbidden.  Even worse, Bravo complained that the lonely, prison-like conditions of 
the guano islands caused frequent fights and “a lamentable confusion of instincts” 
among the highlanders that he claimed led to sodomy and pederasty.  Bravo argued 
that workers, therefore, required much greater vigilance and control--by experts in 
hygiene, of course.  I am not aware of any notable cases of organized labor unrest 
during CAG’s history, but that did not stop CAG from worrying about it.  In the 
mid-1930s, CAG organized special Guardia Civil detachments on the islands to 
keep order, and it accused the Yungay newspaper Adelante of promoting discontent 
among guano workers.  I also know of one case from the 1960s in which a known 
labor activist used seasonal work on the guano islands to make money to support 
his onshore organizing activities during the rest of the year.22 
In line with the theories of scientific management, CAG gradually 
developed an elaborate written set of quantified work standards.  For its first 30 
years, CAG organized its workers according to the gang system, with workers 
divided according to physical capacity into small groups under a foreman.  During 
the early 1940s, CAG began paying its workers by the task, and it hired a new class 
of overseers (tarjadores) to carefully record every sack and every kilo of guano 
produced by each worker.  This made it much easier for higher officials to 
                                                 
22. Murphy, Bird Islands, 184, 341-342; MCAG 9 (1918), 12; MCAG 11 (1920), xiii; 
MCAG 17 (1926), xiv, xx; MCAG 22 (1931), xiv; MCAG 23 (1932), i, xvi; MCAG 26 (1935), v; 
Macera, “El guano y la agricultura peruana de exportación,” 419-420, 471; Daniel Castro, 
Southwestern University, Georgetown, TX, personal communication, Feb. 2002. 
188 
supervise the efficiency of operations from afar, though it is difficult to gauge how 
much--if at all--this changed the arbitrariness of labor relations on the islands.23 
Over the years, coastal planters pressured CAG to reduce the pay and social 
services it offered.  This would have allowed CAG to charge them the lowest price 
for guano possible without sacrificing CAG’s profitabily--and their stock 
dividends.  By keeping enganche wages low, it would also have allowed them to 
pay their own peons less.  Even though CAG’s managers served Peru’s agricultural 
czars on most matters, they were also state employees and, therefore, vulnerable to 
political pressure to improve working conditions, especially after 1940 when 
APRA, Peru’s leading pro-labor party, consolidated its power and influence.  The 
technocratic ideal enabled CAG to operate with some autonomy on the issue of 
labor relations.  Like a few of their brethren who managed Peru’s mines and 
agribusiness, CAG’s managers generally favored an ameliorative, paternalistic 
labor policy intended to discipline and civilize their workers through codified work 
rules, hygienic reform, and a small measure of technological progress.  To please 
both pro-business and pro-labor forces, they installed a middle class of statisticians 
and physicians on the guano islands to execute and quantify the results of these 
new policies.  These statistics were then used to prove to the public that CAG was 
not slighting efficiency, profitability, or worker health.  CAG’s higher officials 
were proud of their progressive attitudes: they published scores of photographs 
over the years glorifying working conditions and installations on the islands.   
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In short, CAG was an experiment in the scientific management of workers 
as much as it was a venture in scientific conservation.  Nevertheless, guano 
extraction has remained labor intensive and working conditions spartan to the 
present day, despite occasional attempts to mechanize aspects of production, such 
as the pulverization of guano.24 
 
Serving Agribusiness 
CAG existed to provide services and income to Peruvian agribusiness.  
Ultimately, the Lords of Guano were vassals to the lords of the Peruvian Republic.  
But CAG’s managers did this job so efficiently that they were allowed to exercise 
autonomy in many parts of their technocratic fiefdom.  Under some circumstances, 
they extended this authority back to Peru’s agricultural estates. 
From CAG’s foundation, it worked to integrate its control over guano 
transport, distribution, and sale and submit these operations to quantifiable 
principles of quality and efficiency.  CAG acquired a fleet of boats to transport 
guano from the islands to the coast.  It purchased its first steamer in 1912, and by 
1926, the company controlled a large, diverse fleet operated according to the 
precise charts and transportation tables Francisco Ballén had developed as one of 
his first acts as CAG general manager.  In 1914, the Forbes report provided CAG 
with the political impetus it needed to end the old contract system of guano 
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extraction and take direct control over work on the islands.  CAG’s income and 
returns to its stockholders jumped dramatically by eliminating this middle man.25  
CAG gradually developed a network of warehouses and shops to distribute guano, 
including several offices in the Sierra that provided agricultural extension services.  
In the mid-1920s, after years of bitter negotiations, CAG obtained a 50 percent 
discount on the fare charged to transport guano on railroad lines owned by the 
Peruvian Corporation.  Such acts were necessary to promote guano use by highland 
farmers--and to bolster CAG’s weak claim that it existed to serve all Peruvian 
farmers. 
CAG’s most important innovation involved setting the price of each bag of 
guano.  As we have seen, guano sales were highly susceptible to fraud.  From the 
outset, CAG used its technical capacity to standardize this system.  A CAG official 
removed a scoop of guano from every sack that arrived at a mainland port, mixed it 
in a bag with samples from all other sacks in the same shipment, and sent the 
combined sample to Lima for chemical assay.  Purchasers promised to pay (on 
credit) a price based on the average nitrogen content of the lot.  To establish trust in 
this pricing system, CAG did this under the shared supervision of the port authority 
and a local representative from Sociedad Nacional Agraria.  A watchful state 
official policed this transaction--in this case to check the arbitrary action of another 
quasi-state official.  At least for the moment, this pricing system retained an ancient 
practice of the marketplace: shared participation in the exchange of goods by 
interested parties.  Faith in chemical science guaranteed the hidden content of this 
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product and the value of the exchange.  This “objective” system replaced the face-
to-face negotiation once used to set prices with an impersonal standard set far 
away.  But this process never became truly transparent.  Real power to negotiate the 
price of guano fell to a small board of technocrats and politicos that met each year 
in Lima.  This is just one example of a centralizing trend that has allowed 
technocrats to gain power over trade in societies all over the world.26 
There were limits to CAG’s attempts to dominate fertilizer supply in Peru.  
By this time, agronomists and farmers knew that guano was an unbalanced 
fertilizer and that many crops responded better to other nutrient inputs.  CAG tried 
to market other forms of fertilizer to serve this need, and on a couple of occasions it 
obtained a monopoly concession from the Peruvian government to sell all forms of 
fertilizer in Peru.  But during most of its existence, CAG had to compete with 
other, much more powerful transnational companies on the fertilizer market.  
Before World War II, the importation of most concentrated fertilizers in Peru was 
controlled by local subsidiaries of the Stickstoff-Syndikat and Pottasche-Syndikat, 
two German fertilizer cartels that, thanks to Haber and Bosch’s innovation and 
Germany’s resource endowment, dominated the global market for synthetic 
nitrogen and potassium fertilizers.27  The German-Peruvian sugar giant 
Gildemeister & Co.--which got its initial start producing nitrates in Tarapacá before 
the War of the Pacific--served as the main Peruvian distributor of Chilean nitrates.  
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Independent agents (usually large agricultural firms like Gildemeister & Co. or 
Peruvian Corporation railroads) retained the right to sell guano directly to farmers 
in many coastal valleys.  The cheapness of CAG’s main product, not technocratic 
control over the Peruvian fertilizer market, was ultimately what made CAG 
competitive and allowed it to succeed as a business.28 
CAG’s duties went far beyond overseeing fertilizer extraction and delivery.  
Its mission to promote scientific development in Peru also meant that it should use 
its profits and distribution apparatus to introduce science to the people CAG 
served--Peruvian farmers.  Besides providing the all-important assays that 
determined the quality and price of Peruvian guano, CAG agricultural chemists 
performed free fertilizer, soil, water, plant disease, and pesticide analyses for 
farmers interested in using the latest scientific techniques to manage their crops.  
José Antonio de Lavalle y García and other CAG technicians often visited farmers 
personally, and they eventually ran three regional laboratories that provided 
technical services to coastal farmers.  In 1925, Lavalle regularized CAG’s 
publication of technical pamphlets by establishing the monthly Boletín de la 
Compañía Administradora del Guano to “instruct farmers in a simple manner on 
the principles of . . . soil types and the application of guano.”  The Boletín also 
published meteorological data, agricultural studies, and scientific papers, taking 
over some of the earlier duties of the Boletín published by the Ministerio de 
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Fomento.  At least initially, it was circulated free-of-charge to Peruvian farmers and 
notable scientists and engineers, as well as to agricultural schools and extension 
services throughout Peru and the Americas.  Its circulation remained about 500 in 
the late 1940s, and it was published continuously until the late 1960s--a remarkable 
achievement for a technical periodical in Latin America, in terms of both continuity 
and distribution.  By law, CAG also provided special discounts and loans to 
farmers, including food producers and smallholders, to help extend and strengthen 
scientific, input-intensive agriculture in Peru.  Meanwhile, CAG’s agronomists 
continued to supervise the distribution of guano through the request system 
initiated by Lavalle in 1915.29 
In these ways, CAG enabled professional agronomists to gain a measure of 
control over Peruvian agriculture.  As we have already seen, such policies 
paralleled technocratic measures taken by the Ministerio de Fomento, for example, 
when José Pardo’s government inaugurated a new irrigation management system to 
forestall social conflict in 1919.  During the 1920s, Augusto Leguía’s dictatorship 
took these state interventions in Peruvian agriculture to a new level with the help of 
millions of dollars in loans and investment poured into the country from abroad, 
mostly from the United States.  Besides hiring Charles Sutton to build the giant 
Lambayeque Irrigation Project, Leguía’s government established a series of 
experimental farms and cattle ranches in less-developed regions, relocated the 
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Escuela Nacional de Agricultura to the La Molina estate on Lima’s outskirts, and 
placed the Banco Agraria under foreign management.  Only months before 
Leguía’s overthrow, he issued a decree attempting to organize all farmers and 
herders in Peru into societies under the supervision of the Ministerio de Fomento.30 
Agro-exporters in Peru reaped enormous benefits by turning over some of 
their concerns to these technocrats.  Until the early 1940s, large-scale agribusiness 
profited so exclusively from this agroecological system under CAG’s control that 
patterns of guano consumption become a marker of the changing fortunes of this 
dominant economic sector.  As table 4 shows, a total of 567 different large 
purchasers consumed nine times more guano than the tens of thousands of 
smallholders who bought fertilizer from CAG during its first 26 years of operation.  
This was particularly true during World War I and the initial shock of the Great 
Depression.  Even among large purchasers, only a handful received the majority of 
CAG’s output.  As table 5 shows, the top 25 Peruvian guano purchasers consumed 
almost exactly half of CAG’s total production from 1909-1935, even though they 
represented only 4.4 percent of all large purchasers and a tiny fraction of the 
number who purchased some quantity of guano during this period.  As with 
irrigation water, the other major input needed for agriculture along Peru’s arid 
coast, guano was “evenly” distributed on the basis of number of planted hectares.  
Thus, guano distribution during this period is a reflection of the extraordinary 
concentration of land holdings in the hands of a few.  Patterns of guano distribution 
began to change in the mid-1930s when CAG’s overseers elected to ration the 
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guano supply and distribute it preferentially to smallholders and the growers of 
food crops for reasons discussed below. 
The largest single guano purchasers were sugar plantations, indicative of the 
concentration of ownership among a handful of sugar companies, their 
technological advancement, and their continuing ability to influence Peruvian 
politics.  Sugar cane growers were the first to be integrated into this agroecological 
system connecting Peru’s marine environment to coastal agriculture.  During the 
1910s, more guano went to sugar cane than to all other crops put together.   
Two giant multinational firms consumed the largest share of guano.  Most 
of their product ended up in the United States or Europe, either as refined sugar or 
rum under the Cartavio label.  Gildemeister & Co.’s Casa Grande estate led the 
way in guano purchases and its ability to takeover its neighboring competitors.  
After swallowing the 1,687 hectare Sausal estate in the 1910s, the 19,777 hectare 
Roma estate in 1927, and many other smaller properties, Casa Grande came to 
control 40,848 hectares in the Valle Chicama (map 3).  Gildemeister & Co. later 
acquired the 7,048 hectare Laredo and 1,479 hectare El Deán sugar estates in the 
Moche Valley near Trujillo, as well as an additional 3,800 hectares planted with 
rice and cotton in the Jequetepeque Valley.  By the time the Revolutionary 
Government of the Armed Forces expropriated its vast properties in the 1970s, 
Gildemeister & Co. cultivated over 32,000 hectares of the best agricultural land in 
northern Peru and owned a whopping 435,000 hectares (4,350 square kilometers), 
an area larger than Rhode Island.  This made it the largest private landowner, by 
far, in the entire country.  W.R. Grace & Co. went from being a major player in the 
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nineteenth-century guano trade, to one of the biggest beneficiaries of the Grace 
Contract, to becoming the twentieth century’s second-most important guano 
consumer with its vast Cartavio estate in the Valle Chicama (5,196 cultivated 
hectares, acquired in the 1880s) and Paramonga estate in the Valle Pativilca (7,203 
cultivated hectares, acquired in 1927).   
Several of Peru’s prominent political families also numbered among CAG’s 
biggest customers, such as the 6,632 hectare Tumán y Calupe estate near Chiclayo 
owned by the family of President José Pardo.  The British Sugar Company, a 
multinational firm tied up with Augusto Leguía’s political fortunes, purchased vast 
quantities of guano for its Santa Bárbara and 3,895 hectare San Jacinto estates 
before it dissolved. 
Cheap fertilizer helped many of CAG’s largest benefiaries make big profits, 
even during times of economic adversity:  The Larco Herrera brothers, owners of 
the 8,941 hectare Chiclín estate, made US$3.03 million during the glory years of 
the Peruvian sugar industry from 1909-1920.  Casa Grande was able to show a 
profit of US$7.22 million and return US$4.30 million to its shareholders as 
dividends during the chaotic 1919-1934 period.31 
This systematic concentration of landholdings, guano (and water) 
consumption, and sugar production in Peru illustrates a global trend in twentieth-
century agriculture:  Large-scale, input-intensive, mechanized agriculture required 
huge capital investments.  The need to keep these implements running near 
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maximum capacity to make a profit from economies of scale created periodic 
market gluts and low prices.  In this vicious cycle, only the biggest, most efficient 
producers could stay in business.  Faced with these demands, some of Peru’s 
richest families of agro-exporters ended up selling out to their larger competitors 
during periods of low prices or after bad harvests.  As a result of these trends, a few 
highly capitalized companies turned several northern valleys into great irrigated 
monocultures of cane surrounding small islands of modern industry totally 
dependent on the outside world for food, machinery, expertise, and other 
ammenties (illus. 19).  This replicated trends typical of the history of the plantation 
complex, as well as Peruvian nitrate, metals, and fishmeal extraction.32  For all 
these reasons, CAG was often under intense political pressure to provide sugar 
planters with low prices, a preferential guano supply, and other technical services in 
order to keep marginal Peruvian producers in business. 
With these economic forces at work, many Peruvian planters along the 
central and southern coast converted their holdings to other crops, especially to 
cotton.  A few cotton estates show up on the list of major guano purchasers, most 
notably the Nosiglia brothers’ San Benito estate and Esquivel y Retes.  The latter 
had been buying guano as long as any in the world:  Mariano de Rivero listed 
Esquivel y Retes among the haciendas that purchased guano in 1827.33  But it 
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attained new prominence in the twentieth century under the management of one of 
the leading lights of the Aristocratic Republic.   
Esquivel y Retes was owned by Amador del Solar Cáceres (1863-1922), the 
most notable son of a family of staunch supporters of the Partido Civilista.  The 
pattern of his career reveals the ties that bound together guano, agriculture, and 
power in Peru.  Rather than choosing a profession like many of his brothers, one of 
whom was an important highway engineer, Amador mixed business and political 
pursuits.  He and his brother Grimaldo were reputedly among the first to grow 
cotton on a large scale in the Valle Chancay.  Few cotton farmers acquired such 
large concentrations of land.  Thanks to a close friendship established when they 
were schoolmates, Amador was given key governmental posts during both 
presidential administrations of José Pardo.  Amador’s prestige also translated into 
positions on the directorial boards of three of the firms masterminded by financier 
José Payán: the Compañía Peruana de Vapores (a merchant shipping company), the 
Compañía Internacional de Seguros (one of Peru’s first insurance companies), and 
CAG itself, where he served from 1914 until 1920 when Leguía’s authoritarian 
takeover forced his exit from public life.  Despite Pardo and Payán’s occasional 
technocratic schemes, the social standing of men like Amador del Solar, not 
technical accomplishment, overwhelmingly determined who succeeded in politics 
and business under the Aristocratic Republic.34 
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That said, CAG’s beneficiaries during this period were not all multinational 
corporations and born-members of Peru’s ruling elite.  Cotton allowed a few 
newcomers to join Peru’s coastal aristocracy, which fostered the illusion that Peru’s 
national oligarchy was open to men of merit.  Cotton cultivation had much smaller 
start-up costs than sugar cane, and its complex social relations of production 
(especially its dependence on sharecropping) allowed a broader segment of society 
to have some control over estate management and its benefits.  Fermín Tangüis 
himself bought no small amount of guano for the Urrutia estate he rented and later 
owned near Pisco.35 
Nikumatsu Okada acquired a more substantial quantity of guano for his 
cotton plantation.  Like so many Japanese immigrants, including Alberto 
Fujimori’s parents, Okada came to Peru early in the century as a laborer contracted 
by one of the sugar companies on Peru’s northern coast.  After completing his 
indenture, he walked south across the coastal desert seeking his fortune.  He settled 
as a sharecropper (yanacón) on a cotton estate in the Valle Chancay and gradually 
worked his way up to water manager, a position of great responsibility in the 
agricultural regime of the arid Peruvian coast.  In 1923, he rented the derelict La 
Huaca hacienda (another guano purchaser on Rivero’s 1827 list) and proceeded to 
restore its buildings and infrastructure, some dating from the colonial period when 
the Jesuits managed it as a sugar cane plantation.  He eventually made it big as a 
cotton planter, urban benefactor, local politician, and leader of the extended 
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community of Japanese-Peruvians.  Obviously, Okada was an exceptional customer 
for CAG, though he was not the only Japanese immigrant to profit handsomely 
from cotton cultivation.  In 1941, the Emperor Hirohito decorated him as one of 
Japan’s most prominent expatriates. This was ill-timed.  Soon after Pearl Harbor, 
Peru made an alliance with the United States, and racist officials summarily 
expropriated Okada’s hard-won property, then arrested and deported him to the 
United States where he lived in an internment camp with thousands of other 
innocent, disenfranchised Japanese for the duration of World War II.  He returned 
to Japan penniless.36 
Okada’s short-lived fortune was based on the considerable economic 
advantage held by Peruvian cotton on international markets from the mid-1910s 
until the crisis of the late 1930s.  Figures 3-4 illustrate the comparative edge 
enjoyed by cotton in Peru:  Except for a noticeable spike in cane cultivation in 1929 
(when the partially completed Lambayeque Irrigation Project started serving Peru’s 
prime cane-growing region just before the bust of the Great Depression) and the 
period after 1964, cotton cultivation always far outpaced sugar cane.  Meanwhile, 
both crops gobbled up thousands of coastal hectares once devoted either to food 
crops and forage or to natural desert and riparian vegetation.  Figures 5-6 show that 
export income from cotton started at virtual parity with cane sugar and consistently 
grew at a faster rate except for the mid-1940s and the period after 1961.  Prices and 
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income from both cane sugar and cotton oscillated wildly during this period, 
however, much to Peruvian agro-exporters chagrin. 
Most of these gains for cotton must be credited to the success of disease-
resistant Tangüis strain.  This ultra-long-staple hybrid represented only 8.1 percent 
of national cotton production in 1918 but increased thereafter to a peak of 92.9 
percent in 1937.  Tangüis cotton did not succeed merely on its own merits.  The 
ravages of the boll weevil in the U.S. South during the 1920s made market entry 
easier for Peruvian cotton exporters.  Field experiments and promotional 
propaganda by CAG agronomists demonstrated to farmers that Tangüis cotton was 
nearly twice as productive as other popular varieties with the application of set 
amounts of nitrogen fertilizer.  Farmers who adopted this new variety almost 
always adopted the use of guano along with it.  Guano became the single-most-
important input that cotton farmers purchased for cultivation: it represented 
approximately 20 percent of their costs, compared to ten percent for sugar cane 
planters.  By the early 1930s, cotton consumed more guano than all other Peruvian 
crops put together.  Several coastal regions, most notably the irrigated valleys 
served by the ports of Pisco and Cerro Azul, became more important customers for 
CAG as a consequence.37  More than any other factor, Tangüis cotton propelled the 
expansion of the agroecological system linking marine to agricultural productivity 
along Peru’s coast. 
Tangüis cotton was a truly modern crop, depending on scientific expertise, 
substantial material inputs and credit, vast transport and marketing networks, 
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sustained political advocacy, and state largesse for its success.  More than any other 
factor except for irrigation water, guano allowed cotton growers to maintain the 
intensity of their planting without suffering significant losses in productivity.  Even 
though agronomists warned against the risks, Peruvian agribusiness kept large 
swaths of the central and southern Peruvian coast under a cotton monoculture 
during this period, only allowing their fields the briefest rest between crops.  (This 
led to major problems in later years.)  Such far-reaching changes accompanying the 
introduction of a new biological variety paralleled those brought by the 
introduction of new sugar cane and banana varieties elsewhere in Latin America 
and presaged the worldwide transformation of grain agriculture brought about by 
the development of high-yielding hybrids after World War II.  “Tropical” 
plantation agriculture contributed greatly to the birth to what agroecologists now 
call “conventional” agriculture.   
Both cotton and cane farmers obviously had a big stake in keeping the price 
of guano low.  When the great international crash in crop prices of the early 1920s 
hit coastal planters, they put intense pressure on Leguía’s government through the 
Sociedad Nacional Agraria to lower export taxes and to revoke the guano price 
increase Leguía had imposed when he came to power in 1919.  After a couple years 
of foot dragging, he gave them what they wanted and established a guano price 
structure indexed to crop price changes that kept prices relatively low for the rest of 
his tenure.  The Peruvian state further subsidized the expansion of export 
agriculture by building irrigation and highway networks along the arid coast, 
including 40,000 hectares of new irrigated land during Leguía’s oncenio.  A good 
203 
portion of this was funded by the so-called London Contract of 1922 which 
provided a loan of £1.25 million to be paid off by the proceeds of guano sales.  
After Leguía passed from the scene, the Peruvian state continued to use the 
reformed guano industry to finance and amortize large foreign loans in order to 
build public works, just as it had done during the Age of Guano.38 
CAG provided many other benefits to Peru’s money-conscious coastal elite.  
Figure 7 and appendix 4 show that except for brief periods (especially the mid-
1940s), CAG made substantial profits even though it kept its prices far below what 
it could have charged on an open international market.  It consistently provided its 
investors--many of whom, like the Aspíllaga brothers, were agro-exporters and 
powerful members of Peru’s ruling class--a guaranteed, though limited yearly 
return.  As a bloc, they received Lp. 22,400 each fiscal year during the 1920s, and 
every shareholder received dividends worth ten percent of their shares’ value every 
fiscal year after 1930.  In all, from 1909 until CAG’s reorganization in 1963, its 
investors made more than $180 million in 1979 U.S. dollars.  Taxes on each bag of 
guano also funded a number of other government projects, including the Sociedad 
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Nacional Agraria.  Thus, CAG even paid for the defense of the political interests of 
Peruvian agro-exporters.39 
CAG’s management retained a share of this income to build an elaborate 
new office building in central Lima befitting their prominence on Peru’s economic 
and political landscape: one block from the Congreso, two blocks from the Banco 
del Perú y Londres, three blocks from the cathedral and presidential palace, and just 
around the corner from Gildemeister & Co.’s Peruvian headquarters.  In contrast to 
Gildemeister’s daring Art Deco office design, CAG’s main office had a 
neoclassical façade consciously intended to be “reminiscent of Saxon banking 
institutions” (illus. 20).  Its colonnaded central hall was explicitly meant to convey 
the “sobriety” of CAG’s administrators and create trust in their capabilities:  Low 
wooden railings compartmentalized this open space into simple offices with 
“elegant and severe English-style furniture.”  These compartments made the 
bureaucratic categories delineated by CAG’s organizational flowchart into a 
tangible reality.  The adjoining salon of directors had ornately carved cedar 
furniture and wall paneling befitting the superior social station and power of the 
board of directors within CAG’s administrative hierarchy.  The well-equipped 
agricultural laboratory on the third floor was no less important for CAG’s image 
and function.  Lavalle routinely published a photograph in his Boletín advertising 
his domain as the model of scientific order and cleanliness and as a component 
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vital to the success of Peruvian agriculture (illus. 21).  On 23 September 1925, the 
first day of spring, President Leguía, the presidents of the Sociedad Nacional 
Agraria and both chambers of Congress (perpetuating the fiction that Peru was a 
democratic republic), the general managers of all of Lima’s major banks, Lavalle’s 
mentor George Vanderghem (director of both the Escuela Nacional de Agricultura 
and the newly established Peruvian Meteorological Service), CAG’s entire 
Directorate and managerial staff, and many other notables attended the opening 
ceremony for this building with top hats in hand.  An Augustinian friar said a 
benediction that blessed this new Palace of Scientific Administration built for the 
Lords of Guano.40 
This ceremony showed for all to see that the rulers of the Aristocratic 
Republic and Leguía’s oncenio and the main beneficiaries of CAG’s services were 
one and the same. 
 
Dealing with Crisis--The 1925-1926 El Niño 
Agriculture was but one part of Augusto Leguía’s grand strategy to “put an 
American”--or some other qualified expert--“in charge of every branch of our 
government’s activities.”  Leguía’s “Nueva Patria” of the 1920s placed public 
health, the postal service, telegraph communications, customs, tax collection, the 
Ministry of Education, secret service, national police, army, navy, air force 
academy, Lima traffic service, and countless construction projects under the direct 
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supervision of foreign technicians.  Most importantly, Leguía established a new 
Banco de la Reserva in 1922, South America’s first centralized “bank of banks,” to 
orchestrate financing for these activities.41 
Peru was hardly alone in adopting such policies.  A generation of scientists, 
engineers, and physicians produced by the world’s new “knowledge factories” 
moved into positions of power and influence all over the globe during and after 
World War I.  From 1917-1934, the governments of Mexico, Guatemala, 
Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia, Weimar Germany, South Africa, Poland, 
China, Turkey--and Peru--all invited Princeton economics professor Edwin Walter 
Kemmerer (1875-1945), one of the architects of the U.S. Federal Reserve system, 
to carry out financial reforms.  The Rockefeller Foundation sent public health 
commissions to most Latin American countries as part of its all-out war against 
yellow fever and other epidemic diseases.  Industrialists in Brazil, Colombia, Japan 
and many other countries embraced the doctrines of scientific management.  In 
1929, a wartime technocrat, Herbert Hoover, became the first engineer to occupy 
the U.S. White House.42  In this context, an English engineer transplanted to 
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Berkeley, California, coined the neologism ‘technocracy’ to describe “industrial 
management on a nation-wide scale . . . [for] the accomplishment of a great 
national purpose.”43 
The 1920s are often portrayed as the last hurrah for laissez-faire capitalism, 
which they certainly seemed after the managerialism of the war years.  The idea 
behind these endeavors was to place experts in positions where they could ensure 
the smooth operation of local government and business as part of a peaceful, 
international capitalist order.  In the case of Peru, Leguía’s reliance on foreign 
technocrats was meant to assuage the internal factionalism, economic instability, 
and intense class conflict that had led to the fall of the Aristocratic Republic in 
1919--and to prevent his numerous political foes from occupying positions of 
influence.  These projects did not work out as intended because these experts had to 
face a series of unforeseen crises that were beyond their understanding, much less 
their control.  The international links forged by these experts turned out to be 
crucial to their response to these challenges.  
The agroecological system linking the excretory production of three species 
of marine birds to the export of agricultural staples from Peru was not stable.  Local 
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manifestations of two, recurrent global phenomena were responsible for this 
instability: ENSO and economic depression.  We must credit experts from this 
period, not only for recognizing that these were global phenomena, but also for 
influencing the outcomes of these crises, for better or for worse.   
The first of these phenomena, El Niño, intensely affected the agroecological 
system described in this chapter due to its direct impact on the welfare of the guano 
birds and the hydrography of Peru’s arid coastal valleys.  These local impacts 
attracted so much attention, in fact, that an international network of environmental 
scientists came to the realization during the late 1920s that these “Peruvian” events 
were directly connected to climate anomalies elsewhere in the Pacific Basin.  CAG 
and Peruvian agribusiness played a crucial role in the “discovery” of the large-scale 
climate phenomenon we now know as the El Niño-Southern Oscillation. 
As we have seen, CAG’s conservation policies did not work exactly as 
intended, but they functioned well enough where it counted most.  From the five-
year running average of new guano production, it is abundantly clear that the guano 
bird population grew dramatically during the first three decades of CAG’s tenure.  
While these numbers cannot be used as an exact measure of the guano bird 
population, they definitely indicate a general increase in nesting colony size and 
duration.44 
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The success of the guano birds meant success for Peruvian agriculture, 
since the deposit of excrement by these fish eaters represented the crucial step in an 
agroecological system that ultimately connected the biological productivity of 
marine phytoplankton to crop production on the adjacent coast.  In 1915-1916, the 
first fiscal year that CAG produced enough guano to meet national demand, CAG 
and the Peruvian Corporation together extracted only 58,929 metric tons of guano 
rico; CAG’s portion of which averaged 10.16 percent nitrogen by weight.  In 1938, 
CAG produced what was then a record harvest of 168,619 metric tons for national 
agriculture with a nitrogen concentration of 13.96 percent.  Thus, CAG was able to 
provide Peruvian farmers with almost five times as much nitrogen as it had two 
decades before.45 
 Though this growth in the average guano supply was sustained over 30 
years, it varied greatly from year to year.  As we have already seen, environmental 
shocks in 1911-1912 and 1917 caused great concern for José Antonio de Lavalle y 
García and other members of CAG’s management because of their obvious, 
negative impact on the guano birds.  In an attempt to explain these happenings, 
besides his studies of avian parasites and disease, Lavalle published ground-
breaking scientific papers on guano bird nesting habits and the aguaje or “Callao 
painter,” an algal bloom often associated with El Niño events known to cause the 
massive, localized deaths of marine plankton and fish.  As we shall see, these 
                                                                                                                                        
and Duffy, Hays, and Plenge, “The Conservation Status of Peruvian Seabirds,” 252, are therefore 
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Peruvian Anchoveta and Its Upwelling Ecosystem, 219-233; Tovar, Guillén, and Nakama, “Monthly 
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45. See app. 2-3. 
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studies turned out to have important implications for CAG’s future management of 
the guano islands.46 
Then, in 1925-1926, the most powerful El Niño event since at least 1891 hit 
Peru and caused widespread environmental disruption.  Torrential rains and 
flooding affected at least 11 of Peru’s 25 departments, from Tumbes in the north to 
Tacna in the south, to Madre de Dios in the Amazon Basin.  Even Lima 
experienced rainstorms--an extreme rarity, and not at all typical of strong El Niño 
events.  The greatest tragedies associated with this natural disaster were felt on a 
human scale:  Torrential rains washed away the cemetery in Ascope and severely 
damaged the churches in several major towns in the cane-growing region of the 
arid north coast.  Potable water was nearly impossible to come by in many places.  
The city mothers of Chiclayo wrote a detailed epistle directly to President Leguía 
pleading for assistance, though they had it good compared to the inhabitants of 
Uchucmara, whose entire town was obliterated by a giant landslide (huayco), an 
event all too common during periods of heavy precipitation or seismic activity in 
the Andes.47 
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This natural disaster affected the agroecological system managed by CAG 
on almost every level.  The guano birds abandoned their northern nesting colonies 
en masse when the inflow of tropical waters caused the anchoveta, their main food 
source, to disappear beyond their reach.  Guano production declined precipitously.  
Demand also declined because many farmers’ fields, especially sugar planters north 
of Trujillo and Ica-valley cotton growers, were inundated.  Most of Peru’s railroads 
were damaged, which left the Peruvian Corporation with a big repair bill and cut 
off many producers from the external market (illus. 22).  CAG sent Lavalle on a 
tour of the southern coast to determine ways that agricultural science could help 
mitigate this event’s impact.48 
But this environmental crisis was only one problem facing Peruvian 
agribusiness.  CAG quickly recovered from this ecological disturbance thanks to 
the resilience of the guano birds.  El Niño, after all, was a recurring feature of the 
marine ecosystem, and the guano birds had evolved adaptations to deal with it.  
Most adult birds simply migrated south during these lean years, and enough 
survived for the population to bounce back rapidly when conditions improved.  But 
many sugar producers were not so adaptable:  Their fortunes had been on a roller-
coaster ride tied to the extreme volatility of agricultural prices since World War I.  
Many did not financially survive this environmental-economic one-two punch:  
Víctor Larco Herrera, one of the largest sugar planters in Peru, was forced to sell 
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his immense Roma estate to Gildemeister & Co. to get out from under a mountain 
of debt he had acquired during the wartime boom.  Labor unrest contributed further 
to the demise of his agricultural empire.  W. R. Grace & Co. bought out the owners 
of the flood-damaged Paramonga estate in 1927.  Thus, the El Niño of 1925-1926 
helped these two multinational corporations to become the undisputed kings of 
sugar along the Peruvian coast.49 
This El Niño had even farther-reaching effects in the world of science 
thanks to the work of a scientific traveler from the United States and a resident 
German technician, both with intimate ties to the Peruvian guano industry and 
agribusiness.  The fact that we know this large-scale climate phenomenon today as 
‘El Niño’ is largely due to their work and would not have happened in the way it 
did without the existence of the agroecological system overseen by CAG. 
In 1919-1920, three New York-based scientific institutions sent the marine 
ornithologist Robert Cushman Murphy (1887-1973) to Peru to study its famous 
guano birds.  Murphy inevitably worked in close collaboration with CAG and its 
engineers, and he spent the rest of his noteworthy career promoting Peruvian guano 
extraction as “the greatest of all industries based upon the conservation of wild 
animals” in the world.50 
Murphy happened to be on his second field expedition to Peru when a 
powerful El Niño event struck early in 1925.  As a trained naturalist, Murphy 
                                                 
49. Klarén, Modernization, Dislocation, and Aprismo, 16, 18-20. 
50. Murphy, Oceanic Birds, 1:27; idem, “Inter-American Conservation,” Bird-Lore May-
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readily noted the appearance of caimans, “man-eating sharks,” dolphin-fish, frigate 
birds, and several other tropical marine species far south of their normal range 
along the Peruvian coast.  He also noted the massive deaths of plankton, fish, and 
marine birds that depended on the Peru Current.  Like any good environmental 
scientist, Murphy was not satisfied with his own limited perceptions, so he rapidly 
organized an observation network to help him investigate this major climate 
anomaly.  But rather than asking CAG’s engineers or other knowledgable 
Peruvians for help, Murphy followed a course typical of scientific travelers from 
the North: he looked to his own countrymen for “reliable” observations.  Murphy 
looked first to engineers working for the International Petroleum Company (IPC), a 
subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey.  In an extreme case of technocratic rule 
under Leguía’s “Nueva Patria,” the IPC’s foreign-born managers not only ran a 
huge industrial enclave working the oil deposits of far northwestern Peru, but they 
also had direct authority to govern this region.  From Murphy’s point of view, they 
were in an ideal position to observe--and as English-speakers to report--the 
environmental, economic, and social impact of the 1925-1926 El Niño along the 
far-northern coast of Peru.51 
Other foreign technicians were watching the development of this 
phenomenon just as carefully.  In 1915, with special permission from the first 
Benavides regime in the face of intense opposition from other Peruvian traders and 
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sugar planters, Gildemeister & Co. began construction of a modern port at Puerto 
Chicama (Puerto Malabrigo).  It wanted to have direct control over the shipment of 
goods to and from its vast Casa Grande Zuckerplantagen.  Beginning in the 1910s, 
this multinational imported dozens of technicians from Germany to oversee such 
infrastructural improvements.  One of these, Peter Reimers, the general manager of 
this new port facility, established a meteorological observatory on 1 December 
1924 to track changing ocean conditions.  As it turned out, this was just in time to 
observe the onset of the 1925-1926 El Niño, and Puerto Chicama happens to be in a 
good location on the north coast of Peru to detect the environmental variations of 
significant El Niño events.  Thanks, in part, to Gildemeister & Co.’s long-term 
stability and interest in the project, this station has operated continuously ever 
since.  As a consequence, its single sea-surface temperature thermometer has often 
been used by later scientists as the quantitative definition of an El Niño event.52 
Meanwhile, Murphy’s reports to friends back in New York City sparked the 
interest of the president of the American Geographical Society, the famed South 
American explorer Isaiah Bowman (1878-1950).  Bowman offered to publish 
Murphy’s eyewitness report.  The resulting January 1926 article in The 
Geographical Review immediately became the authoritative account of these events 
for the international scientific community.  Significantly, Murphy chose to use the 
term ‘El Niño’ that Carrillo had borrowed from Peruvian fisherfolk to refer to the 
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entire set of “oceanic and climatic phenomena” observed along the Pacific coast of 
South America that year.  This article’s almost immediate publication in Peru by 
CAG also made it the classic account of the 1925 event for readers in El Niño’s 
homeland.  Its translator, Lavalle, pointed out a major shortcoming of the English-
language article: except for two brief mentions, Murphy had failed to credit him--or 
any native Peruvians for that matter--with making significant scientific 
observations of this event.  Murphy also neglected to credit the source of data from 
Puerto Chicama or the origin of the term ‘El Niño,’ yet he found room to name 
approximately 30 North Americans who helped him to understand this event.53 
This slight was not a figment of Lavalle’s imagination.  Bowman and his 
collaborators consciously excluded Peruvian locals from the network of “competent 
observers” they formed during the late 1920s to keep an eye out for future El Niño 
events.  Instead, they relied almost entirely on British and U.S. residents in Peru, 
Ecuador, and Chile, including Grace Steamship Lines, the most important company 
involved in shipping goods and people from Pacific South America to the Northern 
Hemisphere.  This underscores, yet again, the importance of foreign business in the 
growth of Peru’s scientific capabilities and in creating the opportunity for these 
capabilities to be exploited outside Peru.  The social differentiation this created 
between foreign and native scientists foreshadows the sort of attitudes that 
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disrupted the relationships among the diverse team of experts CAG hired years 
later to extend its management of Peru’s marine environment.54  
Meanwhile, international interest in this powerful El Niño took on a life of 
its own once scientific knowledge of this event had been extracted from the 
Peruvian context.  By the end of the 1920s, key environmental scientists from 
California, Java, Germany, and beyond were aware of the close connection between 
Peru and climate cycles all over the Indo-Pacific basin.  The Pan-Pacific Science 
Congress, a new institution explicitly modeled after one of the pillars of Latin 
American science, the Pan-American Science Congress, made this connection 
possible.  Its emergence, combined with the competing aspirations of colonial 
powers around the Pacific, made conditions perfect during the 1920s for the rapid 
spread of scientific knowledge across political and cultural boundaries.55 
The basic facts of this growing awareness of the El Niño phenomenon are 
fairly straightforward, though little known.  T. Wayland Vaughan (1879-1952) 
helped organize the first Pan-Pacific Science Congress held at Honolulu in 1920 to 
aggrandize the United States’ most important overseas colony.  Via a connection 
with Bowman, Vaughan became interested in the Peruvian El Niño because of its 
relevance to his grandiose plan to convert the Scripps Institution of Oceanography 
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(SIO), where he was named director in 1924, into the preeminent scientific 
institution in the Pacific Basin.  Latin America, where he had long experience as a 
working geologist, was pivotal to these plans.  Moreover, Vaughan could not help 
but notice the correlation between extraordinary events in Peru and California in 
1925: exceptionally warm winter ocean temperatures off the Scripps pier, the 
abrupt disappearance of the albacore tuna, disruptions in coastal sardine 
distribution, and immense damage to Scripps’s own physical plant caused by 
torrential rains and wave action.  South American observerations, thus, seemed to 
hold promise for an ongoing SIO project funded by local utility companies that was 
attempting long-range forecasts of Southern California rainfall.56 
At Vaughan’s behest, a summary of Murphy’s Peruvian observations was 
read at the Third Pan-Pacific Science Congress held in Tokyo in 1926.  This 
presentation highlighted Murphy’s uncertainty whether “El Niño” was a “restricted 
coastal” phenomenon or a “surface movement of colossal extent.”  Dutch colonial 
scientists in Java soon provided the answer to this question.  When the director of 
the Netherlands East Indies Meteorological Observatory returned to Batavia (now 
Jakarta) after attending the Tokyo meeting, he passed on Murphy’s observations to 
his new colleague Hendrik Petrus Berlage, Jr. (1896-1968).  Berlage had just taken 
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up the search for a practical way to use the Southern Oscillation, a quasi-cyclic 
variation in atmospheric pressure over the South Pacific, to make seasonal 
precipitation forecasts for what is now Indonesia.  (The Southern Oscillation had 
first been identified earlier just a few years before by Gilbert Walker, a British 
colonial scientist running the Indian Meteorological Service who was trying to 
predict the Indian monsoon after the great famines of the late nineteenth century.)  
Murphy’s work on the 1925 El Niño filled in a crucial piece of the puzzle.  Berlage 
made the connection between Peruvian events and climate anomalies on the other 
side of the Pacific.  He somehow obtained the Sociedad Geográfica de Lima’s 1894 
report of rainfall anomalies in Piura since 1791, and he used it to determined that 
they correlated almost exactly with a six- to seven-year cycle in the “east monsoon” 
he had been studying.  He announced his results at the 1929 Pacific Science 
Congress held in Batavia to showcase Dutch colonial science in Southeast Asia.  
Berlage spent the rest of his career compiling data--most significantly, using 
Reimers’s Puerto Chicama sea-surface temperatures--to hone his empirical 
understanding of the Southern Oscillation (fig. 8).  Berlage made the direct 
connection between the Peruvian science done by employees of CAG and 
Gildemeister & Co. and observations made by colonial meteorlogical services on 
the other side of the Pacific.  He established much of the empirical basis for our 
modern understanding of ENSO.57 
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In fact, Berlage’s discovery almost immediately circled back to Peru.  
Gerhard Schott (1866-1961), the director of Deutsche Seewarte, the German 
national oceanographic observatory in Hamburg, and one of the most influential 
students of the Pacific Ocean, happened to be in attendance at the Batavia congress.  
He had already become interested in the 1925 Peruvian El Niño thanks, in part, to 
the report of a merchant seaman involved in compiling data for the German marine 
science establishment.  During his trip home across the Pacific, Schott took a 
special detour to Peru explicitly to find out more about the El Niño phenomenon, 
where he made a special presentation to the Sociedad Geográfica de Lima 
explaining the broad significance of these events.  In 1931, he authored a 
fundamental German-language study of anomalies in the Peru Current that posited 
the first detailed oceanographic explanation for El Niño.  It was based on 
observations by German ships in the region as well as shore observations by 
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Gildemeister & Co. and North Americans in Peru.  CAG quickly translated and 
published it for Peruvian readers.58 
Though it had important consequences for the future development of 
scientific understanding of Peru’s marine environment, the 1925-1926 disaster did 
not act as a major agent of change in the historical context of the time.  The guano 
birds and coastal agribusiness, for the most part, returned to normal soon after this 
event was over.  The agroecological system linking marine production to export 
agriculture survived this crisis almost unscathed, thereby vindicating the policies of 
CAG’s management. 
Instead, this event is significant because it briefly revealed trends that 
would become important in the changed context of subsequent crises.  It helps to 
explain why Peruvians looked to New York and Southern California to recruit 
future marine science experts.  It foreshadows the direct influence so-called 
Peruvian events would have on environmental science and conservation elsewhere 
in the world--and reasons why such “peripheral” influences are so often ignored by 
historians.  It also raises the question why the Peruvian guano industry (and fishing 
industry) suffered so much during future El Niño events.  Finally, the response to 
the 1925-1926 El Niño shows the global nature of the connections between 
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government, business, and expertise during this era.  Such linkages again came into 
play in the response to the sharp economic downturn of 1929.   
 
Dealing with Crisis--The Great Depression 
In some ways, Latin America became much more integrated into the global 
economy during the 1920s, thanks to the influence of defenders of the gold 
standard and central banking, the insatiable hunger of regimes like Leguía’s Nueva 
Patria for debt financing and foreign investment, and increased demand in the 
industrial North for basic commodities produced in the South.  (Economists call 
these trends “export-led growth.”)  In fact, the international discovery of the El 
Niño phenomenon is an important cultural product of this integration.  On the other 
hand, the overwhelming success of scientific agriculture for certain crops, along 
with the construction of protectionist barriers, created unstable prices and steadily 
worsened the terms of trade for producers of staples like sugar and cotton.59  
Technocrats and their patrons hoped that the intervention of experts would 
encourage global economic integration and dampen the boom-bust cycles chronic 
to industrial capitalism.  Instead, these oscillations became much worse.  The vast 
capitalist edifice built by men like Kemmerer and Leguía came close to collapsing 
altogether during the Great Depression of the 1930s.  CAG and the rest of Peru 
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faced a far greater crisis than they had during the 1925-1926 El Niño.  Technocrats 
became the men of the hour as a consequence.  
Even before the Great Crash of 1929, Peruvian agro-exporters responded to 
these pressures by increasing the amount of area they planted in cash crops.  Like 
market farmers in many other parts of the world, they hoped to make up for 
sagging international prices and balance their accounts by exporting larger 
quantities.  The laws of supply and demand doomed this response to fail during a 
long economic downturn, so the governments of a few countries dependent on 
commodity exports intervened to limit exports to prevent this, as in the case of 
Brazil’s coffee valorization program.  Chile took this strategy to an even further 
degree:  From 1927-1931, as its nitrate sector was hurt more and more by 
competition from synthetic fertilizers, the technocratic government of Coronel 
Carlos Ibáñez appointed a cadre of engineers to key administrative posts all over 
the country in a futile attempt to rescue the Chile’s economy and old oligarchic 
order from their downward slide.60 
Of course, this was no ordinary downturn: this was the onset of the Great 
Depression.61  The fortunes of cane and cotton growers plummeted from Cuba and 
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Mauritius to Texas and Egypt.  This had a direct impact on the agroecological 
system CAG presumed to manage.  In Peru, the cotton market reached bottom in 
1931; crop productivity dropped right along with it, since cotton growers were 
extremely dependent on guano purchases, which many could no longer afford.  
Looked at over the long term, the fortunes of Peruvian cane sugar exporters had 
been on a downward trend since the end of World War I, reaching a nadir in 1934.  
By this date, 14 of 42 sugar ingenios in operation in Peru in 1929 had closed their 
doors permanently, further concentrating this industry in the hands of a few.  
(Sugar cane productivity continued to decline steadily from 1931 to 1938 for a 
number of reasons, including decreased fertilizer purchases.  The abrupt increase in 
sugar cane production during the late 1930s was due to the rapid adoption of a new, 
high-yielding cane hybrid.)  As patterns of guano purchases make clear, smaller 
producers of cotton and grain around Lima, along the south-central coast, and near 
Arequipa were hit the hardest, while the biggest sugar planters of the north coast 
were best able to continue business as usual.  The return of the El Niño 
phenomenon late in 1930 made these difficulties even worse.62 
This economic blow shattered the social and political peace that Leguía had 
forcefully maintained during his oncenio.  The Peruvian mining industry was hit 
much harder by this economic shock, leading to violent confrontations between 
workers, management, and the military in the highlands.  José Payán’s Banco del 
                                                                                                                                        
Economic History of Twentieth-Century Latin America; Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in 
Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973). 
62. See app. 3, 5-6, 7 and fig. 3-7; Thorp and Bertram, Peru, 1890-1977, 172; Macera, “El 
guano y la agricultura peruana de exportación,” 473-474.  
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Perú y Londres failed as a consequence of the Great Crash, and no one was willing 
to pick up its pieces because it had become a symbol of Leguía’s faltering regime.  
A military junta led by Luis Sánchez Cerro (1890-1933), an upstart army major 
from Arequipa, finally deposed and imprisoned Leguía during the austral winter of 
1930.  An angry mob in Lima took its revenge on the homes of Leguía and his 
main collaborators.  With Peru’s old coastal oligarchy in disarray, Leguía’s fall 
opened a brief window of opportunity for democracy in Peru.  In 1931, Sánchez 
Cerro defeated Raúl Haya de la Torre, the charismatic leader of the Alianza Popular 
Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), in the first mass election in Peruvian history.  
An aprista assassin brought an end to Sánchez Cerro’s presidency just over a year 
later.  Congress asked General Oscar Benavides to serve out his term.  After the 
election of 1936, Benavides refused to step down and hand over power to APRA.  
It proved impossible to install a popular democracy to rule the Peruvian state under 
the tense conditions of the 1930s.63 
Similar unrest and authoritarian interventions affected most other Latin 
American countries during the early 1930s.  Even though some critics blamed 
economic experts like Kemmerer for this catastrophe (the Peruvian Communist 
Party, for example, labeled him “the Yankee Hunger Maker”), Latin America’s 
besieged rulers kept looking to “financial physicians” to save their faltering 
economies and political systems.64  Latin Americans were not alone in embracing 
expertise.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt installed his own “brain trust” to govern 
                                                 
63. Contreras and Cueto, Historia del Perú contemporáneo, 233-242; Mallon, The Defense 
of Community in Peru’s Central Highlands, 239-243; Stein, Populism in Peru, passim.  
64. Drake, The Money Doctor in the Andes, 228 [quote]. 
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the United States after he took power in 1933 from Herbert Hoover.  In its various 
manifestations, tecnocracia (Spanish, Portuguese), technokratie (German), 
technocratie (French, Dutch), technocrazia (Italian), tekunokurashi (Japanese), 
technokracie (Czech), technokratija (Latvian), et cetera, technocracy was the 
watchword of the Great Depression.65 
Sometimes expert intervention worked, at least for political purposes.  A 
visit by Kemmerer to Colombia in 1930 helped accomplish a peaceful transfer of 
power to the Liberal Party after 43 years of Conservative dominance.  Leguía also 
requested Kemmerer’s presence in Peru, but he was busy in Colombia and arrived 
too late to save Leguía.  With prodding from New York bankers and the U.S. 
ambassador, who held out the empty promise of a new loan, Sánchez Cerro’s 
military government welcomed a team of eight experts headed by Kemmerer to 
Peru to provide advice on economic policy.  Like his Colombian counterpart, 
Sánchez Cerro desparately needed the political legitimacy such a ritual could 
provide to his regime.66 
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Bail-out loans were never forthcoming.  First Bolivia, then Peru (in March 
1931, only two months after Kemmerer’s visit!), then Chile, then Colombia, and 
many other Latin American states defaulted on their foreign loans, dropped the 
gold standard, and retreated from the orthodox, deflationary economic policies 
advocated by Kemmerer.  But this happened belatedly.  In fact, many historians 
blame economic orthodoxy for making the Great Depression so bad, for so long, in 
so many parts of the world.  No Latin American country repudiated its foreign 
obligations, however, and most resumed servicing their debts in the 1950s.  All 
Latin American states retained their central banks, the key innovation of this earlier 
generation of technocrats.  In broad terms, the global capitalist system these experts 
presumed to manage survived this crisis, though it never returned to its old 
alignment.67 
These violent shifts in the political and economic winds had a direct impact 
on CAG, and they reinforced, rather than weakened, CAG’s technocratic 
tendencies.  After Leguía’s overthrow, CAG totally overturned its management.  
Ballén and his family had close ties to Leguía that made his position untenable 
under the new regime.  Of course, sacking Ballén for his political connections 
violated the technocratic ideal.  To remedy this, CAG’s new board of directors 
named engineers both to replace Ballén as general manager and to take over as 
company president.  It also promoted Lavalle to a top managerial post. 
In 1931, CAG hired one of Peru’s foremost young technicians and science 
educators, José Rafael de la Puente (1890-1934), to take Lavalle’s old place as head 
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of CAG’s Technical Section.  De la Puente had been born into a limeña military 
family and trained as a mining engineer at the Escuela de Ingenieros, a legacy of 
Manuel Pardo’s “practical republic” during the waning days of the Guano Age.  De 
la Puente dramatically raised his political visibility in 1930 when he stepped in as 
director of the Escuela de Ingenieros during a major institutional crisis initiated by 
student demonstrations after Leguía’s overthrow; he was given his position at CAG 
partly as a reward.  After three years of service, CAG promoted him to general 
manager.  CAG finally had a talented man at its head who perfectly fit the 
technocratic ideal--but then de la Puente died suddenly in a May 1934 accident.  
Ballén, despite his earlier dismissal, came back as interim chief, and stayed on until 
he retired in 1945 at age 70.68 
As an institution, CAG made a valiant attempt to maintain its system of 
fertilizer supply and to preserve the fortunes of its patrons during this great global 
crisis.  CAG slashed its prices.  It also made arrangements to provide farmers with 
easy credit for fertilizer purchases.  This lending pattern led directly to the 
establishment of the Banco Agrícola in 1931, an institution that markedly improved 
credit availability in rural Peru.  CAG also helped the Peruvian state with its fiscal 
problems.  Because local demand for guano was temporarily depressed, CAG had a 
large surplus that it could sell on overseas markets for a foreign exchange value 
worth ten to 15 times the bargain price it charged Peruvian farmers.  In fact, 57 
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percent of CAG’s net income from 1930 to 1934 came from guano exports to the 
United States, Europe, Costa Rica, and Japan.  Much of this income went straight 
to the government’s coffers and the pocketbooks of stock-holding agro-exporters.69 
At least for Peruvian cotton growers, the Great Depression did not last long.  
Ironically, their success during the mid-to-late 1930s led to the partial undoing of 
the agroecological system CAG had maintained for over two decades.   
On the level of national accounts, cotton led the Peruvian economy back 
from the Great Depression.  Peru’s default and the systematic devaluation of the 
Peruvian sol actually made Peruvian exports more profitable, since it increased the 
local exchange value of foreign currency.  Meanwhile, international cotton prices 
recovered rapidly as U.S. producers, especially in Texas, struggled with continued 
economic and social upheaval, crop pests, and climate extremes.  Beginning in 
1933, Peruvian farmers along the central and southern coast scrambled to profit 
from these favorable conditions by converting their lands to a monoculture of 
Tangüis cotton, often with capital borrowed from the new Banco Agrícola.  Half a 
century after the El Niño floods of 1877-1878 practically destroyed Piura cotton 
production, farmers in that region started to export Pima cotton on a large scale 
with the help of several new irrigation projects.  Cotton became Peru’s biggest 
export.  It has been estimated that half of the total arable land along the coast was 
planted in cotton and half of the coastal population depended on cotton for their 
living at the peak of the boom circa 1938.  Guano consumption went up across the 
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board in cotton-growing regions.  In fact, so many farmers suddenly wanted to buy 
guano that this boom immediately created a shortfall in the guano supply.70 
In his analysis of this emerging crisis, one of CAG’s growing team of 
agronomists, Luis Gamarra Dulanto, raised the specter of Malthus:  Guano had 
aided the progressive conquest of new lands, advances in agricultural technology, 
and the emergence of intensive cotton agriculture on the Peruvian coast.  As a 
direct consequence, the production of crops had gone up “arithmetically,” but 
success had caused demand for fertilizer to go up “geometrically.”  Even if his 
understanding of Malthus was more than a little confused, he rightly recognized 
that CAG simply had no way to raise guano production overnight to meet this new 
demand.  Were there basic natural limits to this agroecological system?  Observers 
continued to ask this question until the guano industry met its ultimate demise in 
the early 1970s.71 
 CAG’s managers tried a number of stop-gap solutions in an attempt to 
maintain the fertilizer system they had so laboriously built.  They immediately 
rationed guano distribution to cotton growers and other major purchasers.  But by 
1938, even though it produced a record guano harvest, CAG could only fill 50 
percent of total requests.  CAG leaned heavily on its cadre of experts to prevent 
hoarding and fraud.  As Lavalle had done in 1914, a commission of agronomic 
engineers toured the Peruvian coast to ensure that guano was being used rationally.  
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Thereafter, CAG required all farmers to fill out a 13-part form to accurately 
estimate their fertilizer requirements.  These technicians thus reinforced CAG’s 
technocratic control over coastal agriculture, although the system they oversaw was 
still subject to abuse by purchasers who misrepresented their crop choice.  
Meanwhile, CAG printed conservation instructions for guano use in the front of 
each Boletín; it stopped exporting guano; and it required all large purchasers to 
make an up-front deposit to guarantee their requests.  As guano demand continued 
to rise, CAG arranged to sell nitrates from Chile and synthetic fertilizers from 
Europe and the United States at below-market prices.  CAG remained devoted to its 
island rotation policy despite the pressure to maximize short-term production.  Of 
its 25 most productive guano-producing territories, CAG only intensified its work 
significantly on Isla Santa between 1934 and 1939.72 
As the hundreds of letters and dozens of newspaper articles reprinted in its 
yearly reports make clear, CAG’s existence had always been controversial, and it 
became a lightning rod for criticism under these conditions.  Peru’s chief executive, 
General Oscar Benavides, appointed an independent expert to resolve this growing 
controversy.  (He obviously remembered the role Henry Forbes had played during 
CAG’s run-in with the Peruvian Corporation the last time he was in this position.)  
Benavides selected Carlos Alayza y Roel (b. 1878), a mining engineer who had 
built a successful political career acting as a mediator for labor conflicts at Peru’s 
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highland mines.  Alayza personally visited all of the main guano islands and 
audited CAG’s entire operations.  In his 1936 report, Alayza endorsed CAG’s 
rationing policy.  Moreover, he concluded that CAG was capable of supplying even 
more guano at low prices if it invested in its productive infrastructure, reduced its 
remittance to the state budget, and stepped up its enforcement of conservation 
procedures.  To make sure Alayza’s recommendations were implemented, 
Benavides decreed his hiring as CAG’s second-in-command and later his 
appointment to CAG’s board of directors.73 
CAG’s managers had made a valiant effort to continue business as usual 
during this crisis.  Now, Benavides’s authoritarian support for the technocratic ideal 
enabled them to exercise a measure of independence from agribusiness.  CAG 
jacked up the price it charged cotton and sugar cane exporters for guano, though it 
allowed cane growers to pay a lower price, thus revealing the sugar interest’s 
continuing political influence.  This new policy hurt marginal, cash-poor farmers 
the most, further encouraging concentration of ownership in Peru’s coastal valleys.  
Food producers received the biggest discounts: a clear sign of growing concern that 
this export boom was threatening Peru’s food security.  Meanwhile, CAG’s profits 
climbed to unprecedented heights.  As usual, some of these were reinvested in 
irrigation projects designed to benefit farmers.74 
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By the late 1930s, despite CAG’s occasional shortcomings, Alayza, Robert 
Cushman Murphy, and many others deemed its technocratic management of Peru’s 
coastal environment a marvelous success.  CAG’s managers lorded over an 
efficient, productive system premised on the maintenance of an environment 
amenable to the guano birds’ increase.  The guanay, piquero, and their natural 
enemies--as well as the humans who extracted and used guano--were all seemingly 
domesticated.  Despite the rumblings of the late 1930s, large-scale sugar and cotton 
producers overwhelmingly benefited from this agroecological system, both during 
periods of prosperity and penury.  CAG funded a number of other development 
schemes, not to mention its main patrons: its stockholders, the Sociedad Nacional 
Agraria, and, above all, the Peruvian state.  This was an enormous triumph for the 
technocratic ideal. 
Peru’s Lords of Guano enabled the dramatic expansion of scientific 
agriculture in Peru’s coastal valleys.  Input-intensive practices became 
“conventional,” in the process.  Now CAG had to deal with the shortfall between 
fertilizer demand and guano supply.  Since Alayza, Francisco Ballén, and the rest 
of CAG’s management had extra money available to throw at the problem, they 
looked to science for a definitive solution to Peru’s fertilizer crisis.  Perhaps further 
studies of Peru’s marine environment would suggest new strategies for increasing 
guano production?  With direct presidential authorization, in 1938, CAG looked to 
hire a foreign expert to study the guano birds.  It acquired the services of one of the 
most important conservationists of the twentieth century. 
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Chapter 4 
The Lords of the Guanay: 
Professional Ornithology and the Guano Industry’s Redirection  
 
There will be no true Conservation while this discipline is the patrimony of 
distinguished professors, outstanding academic circles, cultivated social nuclei, 
calloused institutions.  In order to be effective, Conservation has to become the 
ABC of the man on the street. 
--Enrique Ávila (1954) 
The emergence of professional ornithology in Peru after 1938 was a direct 
consequence of the decision by CAG’s managers to resolve the crisis of guano 
supply by technocratic means.  The proposals of Robert Coker and Henry Forbes 
had led to the remarkable recovery of the guano bird colonies and an almost 
fourteen-fold increase in the supply of nitrogen to Peruvian agriculture from the El 
Niño of 1911-1912 to the La Niña of 1938.1  These scientists brilliantly solved 
Peru’s initial “guano problem.”  But programs initiated by Francisco Ballén, José 
Antonio de Lavalle y García, and others had greatly expanded input-intensive 
agriculture in Peru, especially among farmers producing cotton for export.  The 
natural increase of guano production simply could not keep up with the market 
forces driving up the number of farmers who wanted it.  Then, an El Niño even 
more destructive than the event of 1925-1926 devastated Peru’s marine 
environment and the guano birds from 1939 until 1941.  CAG’s managers again 
looked to scientists to solve this new guano-supply problem. 
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Peru had no home-grown expert with enough understanding of ornithology 
to plan and execute a scientific research project sufficient to suggest a definitive 
solution to this crisis of guano supply, so CAG again looked abroad for expertise.  
In 1939, it hired the U.S. ornithologist William Vogt.  Vogt implemented a research 
program that was on the cutting edge of the sciences of ornithology, ethology, 
ecology, and wildlife management.  He mentored Peru’s first native-born 
professional ornithologist, Enrique Ávila, who continued Vogt’s program and 
trained the next generation of professional marine-bird scientists in Peru.  Ávila’s 
experiences typify the trials experienced by students of humble origin who attempt 
to gain social prestige via education and technocratic careers in Latin America.  
Meanwhile, a new generation of managers inspired by Vogt’s work developed 
policies that renewed the guano industry, while Peruvian state officials struggled to 
reorient the guano supply from export agriculture to other developmental concerns.  
In the process, CAG came to administer a different agroecological system. 
 
Recruiting a Bird Expert 
The Compañía Administradora del Guano looked to the United States for 
ornithological expertise because it already had a close connection to a leading U.S. 
ornithologist:  CAG sent its initial request for assistance to Robert Cushman 
Murphy.  After his work on the 1925 El Niño, he had become curator of oceanic 
birds and assistant director of the American Museum of Natural History in New 
York City.  As author of the award-winning, definitive work on Oceanic Birds of 
South America (2 vol., 1936), Murphy was the world’s undisputed authority on the 
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marine birds of the southern Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.  CAG wanted Murphy to 
come to Peru himself, but he was too busy with his duties as president of the 
Audubon Society, so he tabbed William Vogt (1902-1968), a native of Mineola, 
New York, for the job (illus. 23).2 
Like so many North Americans during the early twentieth century, Vogt 
first developed his interest in nature during recreation away from the rapidly 
expanding urban centers of industrial North America.  As a child, he grew up with 
his Anglo mother and step-father in what was then rural Long Island; they spent 
most summers in the wild Adirondacks.  His family moved to Brooklyn in 1914; 
thereafter, the Boy Scouts provided him with the opportunity to escape the big city.  
He contracted polio during the great epidemic of 1916 while at Scout summer 
camp.  His physical condition thereafter prevented him from becoming a 
professional forester, his ideal career.  Later in life, his buddies admired him greatly 
for his stoicism as he trekked through the rough in search of his greatest love--
birds.  At the Manual Training High School of Brooklyn and what is now Bard 
College, Vogt mainly developed his interest in literature.  After graduating from 
college in 1925, he worked as an insurance investigator--and was soon fired 
because of his disability--and then as an editor and drama critic for the gigantic 
New York publishing industry.3 
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Vogt’s career as an ornithologist took off in the 1930s, and it illustrates the 
intimate connections between avocational bird-watching, conservation activism, 
and professional scientific research that typified North American ornithology 
during the mid-twentieth century.  Vogt first got to know the famed birders Roger 
Tory Peterson, John Hopkinson Baker, and Robert Cushman Murphy at meetings 
of the Linnaean Society at the American Museum of Natural History and 
excursions with the Bronx County Bird Club.  In December 1930, while Vogt and 
Peterson were counting ducks along the Hudson River, Vogt suggested that 
Peterson compile his bird drawings into a book.  Vogt then used his connections to 
find a publisher for A Field Guide to the Birds (1934), the first of the celebrated 
Peterson Field Guide series.  These vividly illustrated, easy-to-use field guides 
contributed enormously to the explosion of U.S. interest in birding after World War 
II--and to growing public concern for the fate of these wild creatures.  Meanwhile, 
Vogt acquired his first experience in wildlife management as director of the Jones 
Beach State Bird Sanctuary on Long Island, a reserve attached to the famous rustic-
styled state park built for auto-mobile New Yorkers by Robert Moses.  (Vogt 
despised the changes the “bulldozer-subdivider Moses”--probably the most 
powerful urban technocrat of the twentieth century--wrought on his beloved Long 
Island.)4 
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Except for an occasional graduate class, Vogt never acquired formal 
scientific training, still a common situation among U.S. ornithologists in the 1930s.  
(Murphy himself only had a master’s degree from Columbia.)  Instead, Vogt 
nurtured his scientific credentials in apprenticeship to scientists employed by the 
Ornithology Department of the American Museum of Natural History.  In 1933, 
Vogt collaborated with Murphy on a study of the anomalous migration of little auks 
or dovekies (Alle alle) late in 1932; they concluded that peculiar meteorological 
conditions over the North Atlantic forced this offshore species to seek shelter on 
the Atlantic coast from Canada to Cuba.  Besides forging their relationship and 
Vogt’s links to the world of professional ornithology, this event was important 
because both Murphy and Vogt personally observed similar happenings in Peru 
related to the El Niño phenomenon: Murphy in 1925-1926 and Vogt in 1939-1941.  
Meanwhile, Vogt came into association with Ernst Mayr at the Museum.  Mayr, 
who is best known as one of the main architects of the neo-Darwinian evolutionary 
synthesis, had made it his duty to raise the standards of ornithological research in 
the United States after his arrival from Germany in 1931.  Through the Linnaean 
Society of New York (whose journal he edited), Mayr worked to establish 
mentoring relationships with up-and-coming young birders.  In accord with Mayr’s 
dictum that even amateur birders “should have a problem,” Vogt took to observing 
the behavior and ecological relationships of a shorebird, the eastern willet 
(Catoptrophorus semipalmatus) and won the 1938 Linnaean Prize for 
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Ornithological Research for his work.  Vogt also played a major role in the 
organization of the Audubon Society’s Breeding Bird Census (est. 1937) that, ever 
since, has brought together amateur and professional birders for the systematic 
gathering of scientific data.  Vogt cut his teeth as a practicing scientist in close 
association with the vanguard for reform of ornithology in the United States.5 
In 1934, the National Association of Audubon Societies purchased the 
journal Bird-Lore from Frank Chapman, the long-time head of the American 
Museum’s Ornithology Department, and adopted it as its official organ.  With 
Murphy’s support, the investment banker John Baker had recently become 
executive director of the Association.  Baker handpicked his friend Vogt to succeed 
Chapman as editor.  Beginning with the January-February 1935 issue, Vogt worked 
with the illustrator Peterson to give the magazine a complete face-life, and he 
commissioned articles on a diversity of topics from such leading conservationists as 
Hugh Bennett and Aldo Leopold who gave the magazine a much more pessimistic 
tone befitting the Dust Bowl decade.  These articles sometimes offered “no quarter” 
to sentimentality among rank-and-file birders.  Later in life, Peterson recalled one 
notorious issue that was  
 
undeniably depressing.  There was an essay by [the ecologist Paul] 
Errington about the suicidal tendencies of muskrats under population 
pressures; another described the difficulties of winter survival of quail; a 
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third dealt with the ecological effects of poisons--the entire issue reeked of 
death and destruction.6 
Vogt himself wrote a series of editorials decrying the destruction of wetlands and 
use of poisons for insect control, years before Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring 
(1962).7   
In the pages of Bird-Lore, these authors first aired to a mass audience 
several of the ideas that became orthodoxy to Vogt and the later U.S. 
environmental movement.  Murphy’s comments regarding “posterity’s world” 
epitomized the expanding worldview of the conservationist during the 1930s:  
 
Conservation in its broad sense is intimately concerned, of course, not 
merely with birds, flowers, and landscapes, but no less with power and 
transportation, agriculture, industry, health, fashion, advertising and other 
social habits, alterations and trends of every sort that affect the renewable or 
non-renewable natural resources of the earth.8 
With these sort of associations, Vogt was taking an active role in the incipient 
metamorphisis of the turn-of-the century conservation movement into modern 
environmentalism.   
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Bird-Lore Jan.-Feb. 1938, 5-6; Douglas E. Wade, “Death Is Upon Them: The Record of a Weather-
Killed Bob-White Covey,” Bird-Lore Jan.-Feb. 1938, 7-10; Lee R. Dice, “Poison and Ecology,” 
Bird-Lore Jan.-Feb. 1938, 12-17--a defense of the lowly coyote; H. H. Bennett, “Wild Life and 
Erosion Control,” Bird-Lore Mar.-Apr. 1936, 115-121; Leopold, “Naturschutz in Germany,” Bird-
Lore Mar.-Apr. 1936, 102-111; idem, “Conservation Esthetic,” Bird-Lore Mar.-Apr. 1938, 101-109.  
7. For good examples of Vogt’s conservation advocacy, see “Editorial,” Bird-Lore Mar.-
Apr. 1935, 127; “Editorial,” Bird-Lore July-Aug. 1937, 296; “Editorial,” Bird-Lore July-Aug. 1938, 
273; Vogt, Thirst on the Land: A Plea for Water Conservation for the Benefit of Man and Wildlife, 
National Association of Audubon Societies Circular no. 32 (New York: National Audubon Society, 
1937). 
8. Murphy, “Posterity’s World,” Bird-Lore May-June 1938, 184-191, quote p. 188; 
Murphy wrote a monthly column as president of the National Association of Audubon Societies 
from 1937 to 1940. 
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Vogt’s pessimism and zeal also could make him difficult to get along with.  
In 1938, he and several others tried to organize an office rebellion against the 
autocratic tendencies of his boss and one-time friend, Baker, but Vogt instead 
found himself in the hospital suffering from “nervous exhaustion” and jobless at 
the opportune time when CAG was looking for an ornithologist.9 
 
Implementing a Research Program  
From a provincial, myopic North American point of view, Peru was “his 
Elba,” but Vogt was a godsend for Peruvian ornithological science.  Few people in 
the world were more qualified to take on the tasks CAG gave him.  As CAG 
ornithologist, he traveled from Isla Lobos de Tierra in the north to Isla Santa Rosa 
in the south, implemented several new research techniques, and brought with him 
perspectives that were at the cutting edge of scientific theory in the Northern 
Hemisphere.  Vogt’s understanding of intellectual currents in ecology, ethology, 
and evolution fundamentally shaped the way he perceived the guano birds and their 
environment.  His role in the vanguard of U.S. conservationists, likewise, molded 
his views of the proper relationship between humans and the natural world.  His 
different way of seeing nature inspired his new prescriptions for the Peruvians who 
profited from these birds. 
The late 1920s and 1930s were a fertile period for innovation in ecological 
theory.  At least in animal studies, they were marked by a turn away from 
                                                 
9. Graham, The Audubon Ark, 117-118, 142-144; Margaret Morse Nice to Vogt, 9 Dec. 
1937, Vogt papers, box 1:2.   
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descriptive studies of individual organisms in their environment (autecology) or 
entire natural communities (synecology) toward quantitative studies of population 
dynamics.  Vogt’s ideas and work in Peru reflected this transition.  In his own 
words, Vogt came to Peru in 1939 “to help conserve the balance between species 
continually sought by Nature.”10  This perspective was the essential premise of 
Clemenstian successionalism, the dominant ecological paradigm of the 1930s, 
named for the U.S. plant ecologist Frederic Clements who emphasized the tendency 
of the species mixture of plant and animal communities to develop toward a stable, 
“climax” state.  This “balance between species” was the foundational doctrine of 
Aldo Leopold’s Game Management (1933), “the bible of the wildlife profession” 
that Vogt relied on heavily while designing his research on the guano islands.   
Although Vogt did his best to complete a holistic study of the guano birds’ 
natural community, he was not a prisoner to the steady-state assumptions that 
underlay community ecology.  He was familiar with recent innovations in 
population ecology, particularly ongoing research on periodic fluctuations in the 
population of fur-bearing animals in Canada based on the historical records of the 
Hudson Bay Company.  Vogt liberally employed the concepts of “biotic potential” 
and “environmental resistance” in his analysis of changes in the guano bird 
population.  He knew it was possible to predict mathematically the future guano 
bird population if he could derive accurate measures of bird fecundity and 
mortality.  To this end, Vogt tried to establish a statistical basis for his studies, but 
he had a poor mathematical background and little success.  Without a doubt, Vogt 
                                                 
10. “Homenaje al Sr. William Vogt,” BCNPN 1:1 (May 1944), 10. 
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derived his most important ecological principles from the English ecologist Charles 
Elton’s Animal Ecology (1st ed., 1927), a work that overtly interpreted animal 
communities in economic terms.  Vogt rigorously applied four of Elton’s key 
concepts to his work: the food chain, appropriate food size, the pyramid of 
numbers, and the ecological niche, all of which were based on the crucial 
supposition that food is the basic determinant of the natural order.11 
Vogt’s awareness of new research relevant to the study of guano birds went 
beyond ecology.  He was familiar with revolutionary work in the field of ethology, 
the study of the behavior of organisms in their natural environment.  In 1935, Vogt 
and Gladwyn Kingsley Noble, the director of the American Museum’s Department 
of Experimental Biology, completed a ground-breaking study on morphological sex 
recognition in wild birds at the Jones Beach Sanctuary.  Vogt worked closely 
during the late 1930s with other leaders in the field.  These included Mayr, 
Margaret Morse Nice (an unpaid “amateur” scientist--because of her social status 
                                                 
11. Ref. for this section: Vogt journal, Isla Chincha Norte, 17 Mar. 1939, Vogt papers, box 
3:1; Vogt, “Informe sobre las aves guaneras,” 25; Charles Elton, “Periodic Fluctuations in the 
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119-163; idem, Animal Ecology (New York: Macmillan, 1927).   
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as a married woman), and Dutch-born ethologist Niko Tinbergen, all of whom were 
close associates of the German “father of ethology” Konrad Lorenz.  Their theories 
regarding territory formation, which Vogt had begun to test during his investigation 
of willets, strongly influenced his work on the guano islands of Peru, and he 
explicity followed the “phenomenological” or descriptive method of research 
favored by these investigators during this period.  Following Lorenz, Vogt rejected 
most behaviorist interpretations of guano bird behavior.  Instead, he viewed the 
initiation and termination of behaviors as governed by inborn physiological 
thresholds initiated by sensory and biochemical “releaser” mechanisms.  This 
played into his understanding of bird behavior as ultimately determined by material 
factors like the availability of food and nesting materials.12 
                                                 
12. G. K. Noble and Vogt, “An Experimental Study of Sex Recognition in Birds,” The Auk 
52 (July 1935), 278-286; Vogt journal, Isla Chincha Norte, 6 Apr. 1941, Vogt papers, box 3:1; Vogt, 
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Vogt on occasion formulated his interpretations in terms of the natural 
selection of genes.  This indicated that he was familiar with the ongoing formation 
of the neo-Darwinian evolutionary synthesis in biology.  But another aspect of 
orthodox evolutionary theory formed Vogt’s conceptualization of Peru’s coastal 
ecology.  He presupposed that the entire community of species of the Peruvian 
coast was the evolutionary result of millennia of extremely gradual adaptation to 
local environmental conditions.  He assumed (incorrectly) that the Peruvian marine 
environment had been basically unchanged for the last million years or so (though 
he did recognize its year-to-year variability).  Each species was thus adapted to an 
extremely specific way of life, a unique ecological niche.  Since this process was so 
slow, Vogt thought humans were likely to cause extinction whenever they change a 
species’ environment in a fundamental way--as the guano industry had done for the 
potoyunco by eliminating the guano it needed to build nesting burrows.  Evolution 
could not be used as a tool for ecological management by this logic.  Any human 
manipulation of these ecological relationships was to be considered interference 
with natural processes.  Therefore, Vogt believed the best way to manage the guano 
islands and to maximize their natural productivity was to recreate the pristine 
natural conditions that existed in centuries past, before humans started extracting 
guano.13 
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Upon his arrival at Isla Chincha Norte in January 1939, Vogt and his 
assistants immediately built a large burlap blind so they could closely observe the 
nesting behavior of the guano birds without risk of human disturbance (illus. 24).  
This became the site where much of Vogt’s new scientific understanding of the 
guano birds was made.  Blinds are a key part of the ornithologist’s equipment 
because they establish a thin barrier between the observer and the observed.  Vogt 
was surprised, at first, that guanayes would stampede from their nests on relatively 
undisturbed islands, even when he approached from a great distance.  With the aid 
of observations by island guards, he came to recognize that this tendency was even 
greater when birds were raising their second brood of the breeding season--an 
observation of great importance for the timing of guano extraction.  With this 
introduction, Vogt was equally surprised later to encounter colonies where he and 
his wife Juana Allraum Vogt could walk among the “stupidly tame” birds without 
causing any significant disturbance (illus. 25).   
Like Murphy and his network of foreign observers, Vogt used several other 
techniques that extended his limited ability to observe the guano birds and their 
environment.  To track nesting mortality and bird migration, he immediately started 
the first large-scale banding program in Peru.  Vogt and his assistants banded over 
39,000 birds in 1940.  In order to work, this tactic required the participation of a 
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vast network of observers, most self-selected volunteers in a region with little bird-
watching tradition.  Vogt was quite pleased with the enthusiasm and accuracy with 
which the island guards compiled records of recovered bands in order to obtain a 
finder’s fee.  Dozens of other observers, some as far away as Colombia and 
southern Chile,also returned bands, making the project a spectacular success.  On 
island after island, Vogt and his assistants made extensive measurements of local 
ambient and oceanic conditions using simple meteorological instruments.  They 
measured the nesting densities of a number of colonies and made crude attempts at 
determining their statistical distribution.  Vogt later introduced the use of aerial 
photographs, which he hoped to use with these density estimates to calculate 
colony size for entire islands--and eventually for the entire coast.  He hoped, 
someday, that these observations and the new mathematical “laws” of population 
growth could be used to make precise demographic predictions.  In 1955, at a time 
when the guano bird population was at its peak during the twentieth century, CAG 
and the Peruvian air force used these techniques to make the first good population 
estimate for the entire Peruvian coast.  Of an estimated 33,280,000 birds, 81 
percent were guanayes, 17 percent piqueros, and two percent alcatrazes.14 
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Vogt also made extensive, though less systematic observations of the other 
organisms that inhabited the environs of the bird colonies in an attempt to identify 
the ecological relationships that affected their welfare.  When he and his assistants 
came anywhere near to the colonies, particularly when they sat for hours in the 
blind, they simply could not ignore the presence of lice and ticks.  Like earlier 
Peruvian scientists, Vogt wondered how these parasites might impact the health of 
the colonies.  A healthy bird carried quite a load of parasites.  Might a lack of food 
increase the level of their attacks?  Older fledglings certainly spent a great deal of 
effort to gain access to the ocean to wash themselves of these pests and cool 
themselves.  Since he did not think it worth the effort to capture and kill large 
numbers of birds to quantify their parasite load, Vogt opted to use his own body as 
a scientific subject: he carefully noted the number of parasites that attacked him 
when he sat in the blind and tried to correlate these attacks to local climatic 
conditions.  This self-observation provided the basis for many of Vogt’s 
conclusions regarding the microclimate of the nesting colonies.15   
In search of “natural” ways to manage the bird colonies, Vogt paid a great 
deal of attention to the predators of these parasites.  In particular, he observed the 
behavior of eight different arachnid species and the lagartija and saltojo lizards 
(Tropidurus peruvianus and Phillodactylus sp.) that coexisted with the bird 
colonies.  Vogt experimented with the construction of small shelters for the lizards 
so they could effectively regulate their body temperatures in areas that had been 
                                                 
15. Vogt, “Enumeración preliminar de algunos problemas,” 293-296; idem, “Informe sobre 
las aves guaneras,” 113-114. 
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completely cleared of rocks by guano workers in their drive to eliminate parasites.  
Even though he already doubted the effectiveness of killing predators, Vogt also 
tried lacing eggs with strychnine to eliminate the local vulture population.  Finally, 
as he became more and more convinced that food supply was the key to the 
stability of the bird colonies, Vogt made systematic hauls and microscopic analyses 
of plankton, the primary producers of the marine environment, with the assistance 
of the U.S. planktonologist Mary Sears.16 
But how should he interpret his observations?  It was vital for Vogt to 
figure out exactly which factors led to the initiation, expansion, and abandonment 
of nesting colonies to enable CAG to manage them more effectively.  Vogt’s work 
was made much easier by the fact that male and female guanayes become subtly 
differentiated during mating season.  Harking back to his work with Noble and 
foreshadowing Tinbergen’s famous experiments with gulls, Vogt speculated that 
their green eyelids and red eye borders were centers of recognition.  Vogt 
immediately recognized that the guano birds did not cooperate by sharing 
protection of egg clutches as do Australian emus, although he toyed briefly with the 
anthropomorphic idea that the guanayes organized themselves in military ranks, 
especially when feeding.  Vogt soon came to the conclusion that each bird acted as 
a complete individualist except during its nesting relationship with a single mate.  
Vogt eventually formed the hypothesis that adult males defend nesting territories 
                                                 
16. Vogt journal, Isla Chincha Norte, 5 Feb. 1939, Chucuito to Isla Don Martín, 10 Feb. 
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with a favorable microclimate, especially flat, open sites with exposure to cool 
southern winds and a smooth surface that discouraged the multiplication of 
parasites.  Males then actively sought to attract females to these sites through 
specific calls, gestures, and the construction of small nest mounds.  Late in 1939, 
he first recorded in his journal the observation that intense predation on the 
periphery of nesting colonies tended to make the periphery unstable.  This 
observation probably would not have meant much to Vogt if not for his preformed 
notion that predators are integral to the “balance of nature.”  Vogt later noticed that 
other factors were involved in this peripheral instability, such as the tendency of 
chicks to wander from the nest and unpaired adult birds to fight over nesting 
materials.   
Finally in 1941, Vogt made some basic generalizations from these 
observations, in effect, describing the life-cycle of a typical nesting colony each 
year:  Colonizing guanayes first struggled to occupy the most ecologically desirable 
territory; a colony would then grow outward from this nucleus at a consistent 
density (which he measured precisely on several islands) and would become more 
stable as the colony grew, since chicks at the center were likely to be forced back to 
the nest by their neighbors and because the adult birds at the center were more 
likely to defend their prime territories.  The periphery of the colony was less stable, 
not simply because of predation, but because the birds were less advanced in the 
breeding cycle, less invested in their chicks, less devoted to their nests as a 
consequence, and, therefore, more likely to leave the nests when food was scarce.  
In Vogt’s understanding, much like a sheep dog or wolf with a flock of sheep, 
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predators helped keep the colony intact by picking off these stragglers; predation  
also helped to prevent overpopulation.  The fact that Vogt came to no conclusions 
regarding the competitive advantage presented by these behaviors was a clear 
indication that he belonged to the era before the neo-Darwinian synthesis in 
biology.17 
Vogt also noted some marked behavioral differences between the three 
main species of guano birds.  The piqueros were more territorial and less 
gregarious than the guanayes, although not to the extent of their close relatives, the 
camanayes--which he deemed to be economically useless as producers of guano.  
The piqueros also tolerated a much broader range of nesting conditions, including 
cliffs, and ate a broader range of fish, although not to the extent of the alcatrazes 
which could nest successfully in deep crevices and even on the hot northern island 
Lobos de Tierra.  In short, the different guano birds occupied quite different 
ecological niches and were not in competition with each other for resources in a 
significant way.18  All of these observations had profound significance for the 
management of the bird colonies.   
Vogt’s final generalizations regarding territoriality were strongly influenced 
by his chance observation of a protracted “ecological depression on the Peruvian 
coast.”  The field sciences have always been constrained by a fundamental 
uncertainty:  Are the conditions observed at a particular time and place “normal” 
                                                 
17. Vogt journal, Isla Chincha Norte, 5 Feb. 1939, 10 Aug. 1939, 15 Nov. 1939, 23 Nov. 
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enough that they can be used to constitute genuine, general knowledge of an 
organism or the environment?  
A strong El Niño event blasted Peru almost continuously from 1939 to 1941 
just as the rest of the world was finally leaving the Great Depression behind and 
entering the Second World War.  The persistence of this environmental shift 
“radically modified” the ecological relationships of the Peruvian littoral to an 
extent comparable to the more extreme but shorter-lived El Niño events of 1982-
1983 and 1997-1998.19 
Sitting in his blind on Isla Chincha Norte, Vogt shared the palpable 
discomfort of the guano bird colonies as the air temperature rose, particularly when 
the north wind blew, to a high temperature of 26 degrees Celsius (79 degrees 
Fahrenheit) in the shade in March 1941, and up to 41 degrees Celsius (106 degrees 
Fahrenheit) in the sun--far above normal for this cool maritime environment.  Many 
older chicks began a dangerous search for water to drink and cool off in; this led 
thousands to plunge like lemmings over cliffs to their deaths.  Although Vogt never 
interpreted his observations explicitly in such terms at this point in his career, this 
was exactly the sort of behavior that initially led Charles Elton to his interest in 
animal population cycles--and others (including Vogt) to the belief that 
overpopulation “naturally” leads to high rates of suicide.20  Some adult guanayes 
stayed to shield their chicks from the sun, but eventually 90 percent abandoned 
their nests.  All nesting piqueros under Vogt’s observation left their eggs and 
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chicks to certain death.  Not all animals suffered from these changed conditions: 
condors, vultures, skuas, and flies (Sarcophaga sp.) had a field day on all this 
carrion.  Meanwhile, blue-footed boobies arrived like “Cassandra’s voices of 
death” as far south as Isla Santa Rosa, 1,000 miles from their normal range.     
These anomalies threatened to ruin Vogt’s entire research project--not to 
mention their impact on guano production.  But this El Niño provided other 
scientific opportunties.  It gave Vogt the chance to observe the behavior of a new 
pelican colony on Isla Chincha Norte.  Helpful observers from hundreds of miles 
away began to return leg bands from migrating guano birds, as far north as 
Buenaventura, Colombia, and as far south as the Isla de Chiloé in southern Chile.  
These returns indicated that most guano birds migrated south to Chilean waters to 
wait out El Niño events.  But many never returned to their home range.  So many 
birds died at Iquique that this northern Chilean city had to hire trucks for their 
removal.  Physicians there were kind enough to send a few back to Vogt for 
examination.21 
Why had these parents abandoned their young?  The heat could not be the 
only answer, because it would not explain how the few remaining birds 
successfully recruited young and why so many birds that left soon died.  Following 
Elton’s lead, Vogt suspected that lack of food was the answer.  This inspired his 
interest in plankton, the first link of the “food chain” that led to the guano birds.  
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Using the language of Clementsian successionalisim, Vogt ultimately concluded 
from his microscopic analyses that an “etenophore-salp climax” community of 
plankton typical of warm, tropical waters had replaced a much more productive and 
nutritious “radiolarian-copepod climax” typical of cold waters.  This signified a 
sharp decline in primary production at the base of the “pyramid of numbers” and a 
catastrophe for the animals living at its apex that depended on their abundance for 
sustenance.  (According to this basic Eltonian concept, a population of predators 
[the guano birds] requires a much larger population of primary consumers [the 
anchoveta] and a vast population of primary producers [phytoplankton] in order to 
subsist.)  Vogt found abundant qualitative signs of starvation in the guano birds that 
did not fly away: he recovered vegetable matter from the stomachs of several 
moribund birds he dissected (both chicks and adults), and he saw many an adult 
return from feeding only to find an aggressive swarm of hungry chicks barring the 
way to the nest--leading the besieged parent to regurgitate a small amount of 
precious food to rid itself of these beggars.  The din of feeding calls from hungry 
chicks lasted longer and longer--until it ended altogether with their massive deaths.  
George Leove of W. R. Grace & Co., another U.S. expatriate, confirmed that he 
had observed many emaciated birds during the 1925 cataclysm at Isla Lobos de 
Tierra.22 
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But what had happened to their principal food source, the anchoveta?  This 
question was much more difficult to answer empirically.  At least everyone agreed 
that schools of fish were much less common at the surface and seemed to be out of 
sight and out of reach of the guano birds during their daily quests for food.  
According to Elton’s pyramid of numbers, if plankton (the base) and guano birds 
(the apex) had displayed a sharp change in kind and numbers during this El Niño 
event, then the anchoveta (the middle) must have declined in numbers, as well.23 
With strong prodding from his Peruvian colleagues, who respected the 
tradition of epidemiological research that Lavalle had established, Vogt did not 
totally rule out disease as a factor in this population crisis.  For this part of his 
studies, he relied on the expertise of the well-developed community of physicians 
and hygienists in the region.  Director Telémaco Battistini Sánchez and pathologist 
Quentin M. Geimán of the Peruvian Instituto Nacional de Higíene y Salud Pública 
personally travelled to Isla Chincha Norte to take tissue samples, determine the 
parasite load of birds in various states of health, and dissect corpses.  Marshall 
Hertig, also of the Instituto Nacional, did an extended study of ticks to determine 
their life cycle and possible role as disease vectors.  Together, they concluded that 
even healthy guano birds carry an extensive load of parasites besides the obvious 
ticks and lice: nematodes, tapeworms in the intestines, flagellates in the cloaca.  
They detected no noticeable organisms in the birds’ blood, although that did not 
rule out ectoparasites as vectors of disease (such as viruses).  They concluded that 
aspergillosis caused some bird deaths, confirming Lavalle’s earlier work, but they 
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encountered few cases, especially compared to the number of obvious cases of 
malnutrition.  Along the coast of Tarapacá, where many of the guano birds had 
migrated, the Iquique physician J. García Suárez reported the appearance of 
external symptoms of “bird cholera” among dead and dying birds.  Neither Chilean 
nor Peruvian scientists could confirm this bacteriologically, even among birds 
returning from the south to central Peru that showed similar symptoms.  Many 
observers also noted the appearance of “pata pálida” (palid foot) among moribund 
birds.  Vogt related this visible illness to anemia, although his hematology 
experiments were inconclusive.  Disease certainly caused many deaths, Vogt 
explained to his superiors, but the evidence overwhelmingly indicated that food, 
not disease, was the root ecological cause of this population crisis.24   
Based on all these observations, Vogt took this conclusion one step farther:  
He declared that the availability of anchoveta fundamentally limited the size of the 
guano bird population and the growth of the Peruvian guano industry.  As we shall 
see in later chapters, this theoretical conclusion led Vogt into a nasty debate with 
his Peruvian colleagues that had major significance for the future development of 
Peru’s fishing industry. 
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Vogt’s Recommendations 
Vogt was not ready to admit that the carnage caused by this El Niño event 
indicated that the guano birds live in a constant, chaotic struggle with their 
environment.  Instead, when making his policy recommendations he fell back on 
the Clementsian idea that biological communities tend to exist in cyclic equilibrium 
unless they are disturbed by humans.  Guano birds could travel only a limited 
distance away from their nests in a day, so breeding failure was inevitable during El 
Niño events when their principal food, the anchoveta, was difficult to find.  Elton’s 
pyramid of numbers simply collapsed for the birds. Vogt insisted that these events 
were cyclic, not abnormal, happening every seven years or so.  They served to 
prevent what he termed an “irruption” (progressive overpopulation) among the 
guano birds that would lead to even greater ecological disruption.  Based on his 
limited observations of successful breeding and the past experience of the Peruvian 
guano industry, Vogt reasoned that the guano birds were remarkably fecund and 
would recover rapidly from an “ecological depression,” just as the global economy 
always recovered from periodic economic downturns, even the Great Depression.  
Vogt concluded, furthermore, that massive death from disease was unlikely in a 
population in balance with its environment.  In fact, he thought parasites were 
beneficial to the guano bird population as a whole, since they probably helped kill 
off birds with more dangerous infections.25   
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These observations had tremendous implications for scientific management 
of the guano birds and the development of input-intensive Peruvian agriculture 
based on guano.  The population of guano birds depended on the supply of 
anchoveta; thus, guano production would plateau when both fish and birds attained 
their “climax” populations, and then crash again during the next El Niño event.  
Moreover, any exploitation of the anchoveta would put the guano bird population at 
risk of collapse.26  Vogt’s general message was clear: beyond a certain level, 
Peruvian farmers would have to look somewhere other than Peru’s marine 
environment for concentrated fertilizer. 
Yet these natural limits to the growth of guano production did not mean 
humans could not alter the existing environment to favor the guano birds in some 
ways.  Vogt reasoned that the guano islands had been altered from their primoridial 
state when their ancient deposits were removed during the nineteenth century, so 
there was no harm in further alterations, particularly if they were done to replicate 
the pristine past.  After studying the microclimate of the bird colonies, Vogt 
confirmed Lavalle’s 1918 conclusion that guanayes, at least, preferred to nest in 
areas exposed to the prevailing winds.   With this in mind, Vogt proposed that CAG 
use explosives to flatten the topography on more crowded islands to open new 
areas to the wind and to fill crevices.  He hoped this would give them a semblance 
of the “aerodynamic” quality of the dome-like guano deposits he supposed existed 
in ages past.  (In fact, by flattening the surface of some guano islands, human 
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guano extraction actually made them more attractive to the guano birds, especially 
in the case of Isla Macabí; see illus. 2.)  Vogt hoped that World War II might turn 
out to be a boon for such a project, since the end of hostilities would likely produce 
a sudden glut of cheap munitions.  
Some CAG employees suggested that CAG should exterminate the piquero 
and perhaps even the alcatraz populations to rid the guanayes of competition for 
food and nesting space, especially since the guanayes produced a superior grade of 
guano.  Vogt strongly objected to this notion, arguing that the three main guano 
birds occupied distinctly different niches in the local ecology.  The alcatrazes, for 
example, were much less affected by El Niño events and produced significant 
quantities of guano when most of the guanayes had flown to Chile.  In fact, Vogt 
thought CAG could manipulate these ecological differences: much more guano 
could be harvested from the piqueros by taking full advantage of their propensity to 
nest on cliffs.  All CAG needed to do was hang nesting platforms over the cliffs.  
Not only would they increase the area available for nesting, but they could be 
raised after the chicks fledged in order to harvest the guano.  Vogt had already 
demonstrated their potiential by experimentation, although he admitted they might 
not be economical because of the expense of wood and steel cable in Peru.  (Vogt 
thought Peruvian industrialization would eventually remove this barrier.  As we 
shall see in the next chapter, by the end of the 1940s, Vogt became convinced that 
industrialization was impossible for most of Latin America, including Peru.)   
Finally, Vogt proposed the construction of safety ramps that would help 
young birds reach the water to bathe, structures akin to the fish ladders that helped 
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spawning salmon get over dams.  This action would help control parasites during 
“normal” years and reduce the number of accidental deaths during hot El Niño 
conditions.27 
Despite his apparent enthusiasm for environmental alteration on the guano 
islands, Vogt criticized many of CAG’s older island hygiene policies.  In some 
ways, he thought CAG had made the islands too clean.  He noted that all the 
predators of bird parasites required shelter to regulate their body temperatures, but 
rock and guano removal had eliminated almost all surface shelter on many islands.  
To make matters worse, guano workers routinely killed the saltojo lizard in the 
belief (he thought unfounded) that they were poisonous.  This had to be stopped, 
Vogt contended, and CAG needed to construct hundreds of lizard shelters to 
remedy the harm already done.  Island surface cleaning also removed feathers and 
other material the birds needed to build nests.  This led to increased competition 
and fighting between the birds for scarce nest material, the lack of which probably 
increased chick mortality.  He thought CAG should leave this material behind.   
In some ways, however, Vogt thought the guano islands were not clean 
enough.  Like so many North American scientists in the tropics--including Murphy 
during his visit to the guano islands 20 years before--Vogt was obsessed with the 
uncleanliness of human excrement.  The guano workers routinely defecated in the 
open air, he noted with disgust, and their feces provided a food source for flies and 
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dung beetles which distracted the lizards from the birds’ parasites.  Human dung 
also fed rats which posed a threat to both humans and the guano birds.  Vogt 
implored his superiors to install clean, comfortable latrines near work sites and 
perhaps introduce ferrets (all male to prevent any unwanted reproduction) to 
eliminate the rats.  Vogt thought poison-laced grain would not work because the 
rats had an alternative food source and easily developed resistance to poisons--thus 
revealing, in incipient form, the sort of attitude toward poisons that became so 
important during the later DDT controversy in the United States.28 
Vogt further admonished CAG for failing to eliminate chickens and other 
fowl from the habitations of its island workers.  He agreed with Luis Gamarra that 
these birds potentially carried diseases of Old World origin to which the guano 
birds had no immunity.  Pet and feral cats also needed to be eliminated since they 
preyed on the lizards.  He thought CAG should stop wasting its resources on gulls 
and vultures which “naturally” helped to prevent guano bird overpopulation, in his 
view.  Nevertheless, he shared Murphy’s view that the Andean condor posed a 
genuine threat to the colonies.  But he thought these “majestic”  birds should only 
be killed after they had been observed preying on a colony.  Otherwise, Vogt 
feared, these national symbols might suffer the fate of the California condor, which 
was nearly extinct.  In sum, CAG needed to return the environment of the guano 
islands to as “pristine” a condition as possible, even if this required even greater 
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alteration of the islands to make up for other human changes of their ecology.  
Paradoxically, Vogt did not blanch at suggesting the use of fire to “disinfect” the 
nesting areas after each harvest to eliminate parasites.29 
What was the broader meaning of these recommendations?  Vogt 
undeniably recognized that humans had the capacity to destroy the natural 
ecological balance of the Peruvian littoral as, he noted, they had destroyed the U.S. 
southern Plains and created the Dust Bowl.  In contrast to Coker and Forbes who 
emphasized the direct threat humans posed toward the guano birds alone, Vogt 
chose to emphasize the more subtle dangers posed by human alteration of the 
guano islands’ ecological community.  He thought CAG had done a good job 
protecting the guano birds, but now the total environment of the guano birds 
needed human vigilance, if the guano birds were to be fully protected.  This meant 
that the entire ecology of the guano birds needed investigation in all of its 
complexities, a gargantuan task.  The anchoveta, the guano birds’ primary food 
source and the proximate cause for the disruption of guano production during El 
Niño years, needed special attention.  Therefore, Peru had to increase its investment 
in the technocratic management of its marine environment by a significant sum.  
Such a declaration was in keeping with concurrent proposals in the United States 
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for ecologists, agronomists, and soil scientists to supervise the recovery of the 
grasslands and agriculture of the southern Great Plains.30  
 
Training a Successor 
Vogt was not the man to oversee this expansion.  By the time he began 
work on his final report, Vogt had worn out his welcome in Peru in a fight with 
CAG’s other experts over the scientific basis for his recommendations and plans to 
exploit Peru’s anchoveta fishery.  In December 1941, Francisco Ballén informed 
Vogt that CAG’s board of directors had decided to terminate his contract “despite 
the importance of [his] studies.”  As a conciliation, they gave Vogt permission to 
use his data in any way he saw fit once he returned to the United States.  But they 
did not give up on the idea that CAG should employ a professional ornithologist: 
they promised to hire Vogt’s assistant to continue his research if Vogt was able to 
obtain a scholarship for him to study in the United States.31 
In September 1940, after he encountered him during a vacation to Arequipa, 
Vogt had hired Enrique Ávila, a native of the Lake Titicaca region, to assist him 
during his second full season observing birds at Isla Chincha Norte.  “Hank,” as 
Vogt called him, had decent English skills and some scientific training, although 
Vogt was appalled at their inadequacy in places, particularly Ávila’s antiquated, 
state-published textbook Zoología peruana.  He appreciated Ávila’s ability to learn 
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quickly, however, and gave him the responsibility to record offshore ocean 
temperatures so they could follow the local development of the El Niño 
phenomenon.  Ávila stayed on as Vogt’s assistant until Vogt’s termination and 
even translated Vogt’s reports into Spanish for use by CAG officials.32 
As we learned in the introduction, Ávila was acutely aware of his inferior 
social status in Peru.  He recognized, even more than Vogt did, the opportunity for 
social elevation that the technocratic ideal promised for a man with his background. 
In 1942, Vogt used his connections to arrange for Ávila to study at the 
University of Wisconsin with his friend Aldo Leopold (1887-1948).  Vogt could 
not have provided Ávila with a more qualified mentor.  Leopold was the definition 
of the conservation technocrat and had done as much as anyone to expand the 
purview of nature management in the United States.  Although one of his 
biographers claims that Leopold “was not by nature an engineer,” he certainly was 
by nurture.33  After obtaining a master’s degree in 1909 from the Yale Forest 
School, the first professional program in forestry in the United States, Leopold 
worked variously as an administrator for Gifford Pinchot’s U.S. Forest Service in 
the U.S. Borderlands and as a wildlife researcher in the upper Midwest.  In 1933, 
he took a position as the University of Wisconsin’s new professor of game 
management in its Department of Agricultural Economics.  That same year, he 
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promised “control over nature” through “co-ordination of science and use” to those 
who followed the guidelines of his new textbook Game Management. 
Leopold is better-known today for his philosophical streak.  He prefaced 
this declaration of technocratic optimism in Game Management with a caution: 
 
We of the industrial age boast of our control over nature.  Plant or animal, 
star or atom, wind or river--there is no force in earth or sky which we will 
not shortly harness to build “the good life” for ourselves.  But what is the 
good life?  Is all this glut of power to be used for only bread-and-butter 
ends?  Man cannot live by bread, or Fords, alone.  Are we too poor in purse 
or spirit to apply some of it to keep the land pleasant to see, and good to live 
in?34 
Leopold took this question to heart and became a major political activist for the 
preservation of undeveloped wilderness areas.  Meanwhile, he began to formulate 
his famed land ethic, a philosophical rule that would govern humans’ relationship 
with their natural environment: 
 
Quit thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic problem.  
Examine each question in terms of what is ethically and esthetically right, 
as well as what is economically expedient.  A thing is right when it tends to 
preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.  It is 
wrong when it tends otherwise. 
This prophet of the Age of Ecology worked to instill these principles in his 
Peruvian disciple.  As we shall see in the next chapter, their relationship helped to 
reinforce Vogt’s already profound attachment to Leopold.35 
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Ávila had a tough time completing his studies, but finish he did.  In 1945, 
Ávila returned to Peru with a master’s degree and a five-year contract to take over 
Vogt’s former duties as CAG ornithologist.  In fact, Ávila had an academic degree 
equal to or better than his two mentors in an age when a doctorate was still more 
the exception than the rule among field scientists anywhere in the Americas.  
Because of the El Niño of 1939-1941, CAG was in deep financial trouble and 
political turmoil for most of the 1940s.  The fact that CAG hired Ávila at all is a 
testament to its devotion to the technocratic ideal.   
Ávila struggled to establish an ambitious bird research program.  His 
overall goal was to reduce the fluctuation of the guano bird population.  Ideally, he 
hoped to continue Vogt’s studies of the birds’ external environment and ecology 
and combine these with new studies of their anatomy and physiology.  But Ávila 
ran into constant barriers in his bird research, some economic, some political.  
CAG’s directorate only reluctantly agreed to pay for a fraction of the equipment he 
requested for an ornithology lab.  Bird banding had gone on hiatus after Vogt’s 
departure; Ávila wanted to band 80,000 birds over four years, but had trouble 
acquiring the US$9,000 needed to purchase bands.  Even after he acquired some 
bands, he had trouble obtaining reliable transport to the guano islands to do the 
actual work, or to do timely scientific investigations of any kind.  Ávila did 
eventually band 20,000 birds in 1950, and CAG banded 58,000 more in 1956.  In 
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accord with local scientific interests, Ávila migrated to the well-established study 
of guano bird parasites and epidemiology.36 
Ávila’s training and degree only provided him with a small measure of 
prestige at CAG, much less than he expected.  Vogt had tried to warn Ávila that his 
colleagues might not automatically bow to his expertise: “You will have a much 
higher scientific standard than many of the people with whom you will be 
associated,” Vogt cautioned.  “Some of them will recognize this and, consciously 
or unconsciously, resent it and tend to drag you down if they have the chance.  This 
is the inevitable situation facing a pioneer,” Vogt added, referring to his own 
troubled experience at CAG.  “It is unfortunate that a scientist should have to 
consider such things, but it is inescapable in the United States, and even more so in 
Latin America.”   
Vogt may have been correct, but the pattern of Ávila’s experience suggest 
that other forms of discrimination were a factor.  For example, when all of the 
“bigwigs and técnicos” at CAG received a cost-of-living increase in their salaries in 
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1946 and again in 1947, Ávila was overlooked.  He complained to Vogt that he was 
forced to send his wife and daughter back to live with their family in Puno because 
his S/.900 a month salary (US$138) simply would not cover their living expenses 
when his paycheck was losing more than 20 percent of its real value every year due 
to inflation.  Ávila received less than half the pay of his scientific peer at CAG, the 
German oceanographer Erwin Schweigger, though his salary certainly qualified as 
a middle-class income in Peru.  Ávila also failed to obtain patronage for his brother 
Néstor at CAG.  He confided to Vogt that things might have been different if he 
declared membership in the APRA party, implying that his superiors’ personnel 
decisions were biased by political partisanship.  (According to his widow, Ávila 
was both apolitical and an atheist.)  Ávila’s racial identity and provincial origin did 
not help his situation any, nor, as we shall see in chapter 6, did his involvement in a 
bitter scientific debate with his peers over the growth of the anchoveta fishery in 
Peru.37 
But Ávila was not satisfied to simply sit back and take these slights.  He 
was no fool, and recognized that Peruvian politics, even in a technocratic institution 
like CAG, operated on the basis of patronage not merit.  First, he appealed to his 
own scientific patrons for help.  Robert Cushman Murphy promised to put in a 
good word for Ávila “to prevent his bosses in Lima from doing a number of things 
which are dead wrong” ecologically.  Murphy spoke in Ávila’s favor to his old 
friend Enrique Dibos Dammert, a prominent Peruvian agribusinessman friendly to 
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conservationism who had recently been appointed to CAG’s board of directors.  
When this did not work as intended, Ávila contemplated taking a job with the 
Sociedad Chilena de Fertilizantes--Chile’s analogue to CAG--and even submitted 
his resignation.  This strategy worked: his superiors promised to improve Ávila’s 
working conditions and provide him with greater institutional support for his bird 
research.   
Fortunately, the growing guano bird population provided the funds CAG 
needed to deliver on this promise.  As part of a broad strategy to improve its 
scientific apparatus during the late 1940s and early 1950s, CAG established a 
permanent marine biology research station on Isla Don Martín and placed it under 
Ávila’s control.  Once entrenched in this position, Ávila went to work on a series of 
scientific studies and trained Peru’s next guano bird expert, his assistant Rómulo 
Jordán Sotelo.  Jordán eventually took marine bird research to a new level and 
trained another generation of Peruvian bird experts at the Instituto del Mar del 
Perú.38 
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Ávila was not the only person struggling to make a career as a professional 
ornithologist during these years.  As other institutions tied to Peru’s fishing 
industry began to hire scientists, the science faculty of the Universidad Nacional 
Mayor de San Marcos in Lima came to recognize the need for a local academic 
training program in marine science.  Following CAG’s lead, it hired a foreign 
expert, the German marine biologist Hans-Wilhelm Koepcke, for the job.  In 1950, 
the German ornithologist Maria Miculicz-Radecki (1924-1971) took up residence 
in Peru after finishing her doctorate at the University of Kiel.  She almost 
immediately married Koepcke (to whom she was probably already engaged), and 
they worked together for two decades at the university’s Museo de Historia Natural 
“Javier Prado” as researchers and as mentors to a new generation of Peruvian 
biologists.  Even though she had credentials equal to her husband, she was never 
granted a professorship before she died tragically in a plane crash in the course of 
her tropical bird research.39 
By the time Ávila finally consolidated his position at CAG in the mid-
1950s, he had become noticeably dissatisfied with the narrow elitism that went 
along with the technocratic ideal in Peru.  In fact, he began to see this elitism as a 
major barrier, not only to his career and the progress of science, but to 
environmental protection in Peru: “There will be no true Conservation while this 
discipline is the patrimony of distinguished professors, outstanding academic 
                                                 
39. Diccionario histórico y biográfico del Perú, s.v. “Koepcke Miculicz-Radecki, María 
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de Lima (Lima, 1964); Vegas Vélez, “La investigación oceanográfica en el Perú desde Humboldt a 
nuestros días,” 148. 
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circles, cultivated social nuclei, calloused institutions.”  Like Vogt and Leopold, 
Ávila came to believe that the “material conquest” being directed by the 
developmental experts of his day would be seen as “ephemeral” or even “illusory” 
by  “future societies.”  In his view, the Peruvian populace needed to be properly 
educated so they could tell the difference proper technocratic direction and 
impractical developmental nostrums: “In order to be effective, Conservation has to 
become the ABC of the man on the street.”40  As we shall see in the next chapter, 
Ávila had many reasons to be unhappy with Peru’s elitist conservation movement. 
In stark contrast to his mentors and much of Peru’s scientific elite, Ávila 
was all too aware of the unmet needs of those “poor in purse” in his own society.  
To use Leopold’s words, Peru lacked both “bread and Fords.”  How could a poor 
country like Peru continue its development while showing respect for the 
“impoverished earth” (esquilmada planeta)?  This was the central dilemma that 
faced the new cohort of Peruvian marine scientists Ávila founded.  For his part, 
Ávila thought only “an advanced ecological ethic,” premised on the imperative that 
each generation should leave “an equally giving, equally productive, equally 
healthy earth” to its offspring, would provide a solution to this modern dilemma.   
Echoing the Mexican intellectual José Vasconcelos’s statements on the Cosmic 
Race, Ávila believed it was Latin America’s historical duty to follow the dictates of 
“contemporary ecology” if it was to justify itself as “the New Continent and 
Promised Land in World History.”41 
                                                 
40. Ávila’s emphasis; Ávila, “Etica en marcha,” BCAG 30:5 (May 1954), 22-23.  
41. Ibid., Ávila’s emphasis; Leopold, Game Management, vii.  
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Opening New Horizons 
Vogt’s guano bird research had little impact on scientific understanding in 
the rest of the world, even though it spoke to a number of major concerns in the 
fields of ornithology, ecology, and ethology.  Vogt simply neglected to publish 
anything of note on these subjects for English-speaking scientists upon his return to 
the United States.  He became preoccupied with what he thought were much more 
pressing concerns.  In Peru, however, Vogt’s work had a major impact on 
conservation science.  His studies eventually helped propel Peru’s guano industry 
to new levels of success during the 1950s. 
But in the short term, nothing Vogt discovered could have helped CAG 
avoid the crisis of the early 1940s.  Under the onslaught of the El Niño 
phenomenon and with the outbreak of World War II, the old agroecological system 
that linked guano production to the export of agricultural staples completely fell 
apart.  These external shocks caused agricultural demand for guano to fall 
significantly, though not nearly enough to regain parity with the guano supply, 
much less to resolve pent-up demand.  Moreover, El Niño acted differently this 
time around.  From 1939-1941, it worsened for three consecutive nesting seasons, 
rather than the usual one or two.  It returned again in force in 1943.  Only the 
strongest adult guanayes and piqueros could cope with these conditions, and they 
failed to recruit a vigorous year-class of offspring until 1944.  Guano production 
and sales plummeted, along with CAG’s profits, bottoming out at 67,537 metric 
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tons sold in 1943, the lowest figure since 1922-1923.  This only met one-fourth of 
Peruvian national demand.42   
Thanks to a series of political shifts, export agribusiness completely lost its 
privileged access to the guano supply during this ecological depression.  CAG 
therefore lost its main bastion of political support with far-reaching consequences.  
But CAG’s technocratic redirection saved it from extinction for the time being. 
In 1939, Manuel Prado y Urgarteche (1889-1967) replaced General 
Benavides as Peru’s chief executive.  His less-than-democratic election represented 
the return of civilian government to Peru after Sánchez Cerro’s assassination in 
1933.  Prado was the first president of Peru with genuine scientific credentials.  He 
was an expert in hydraulic engineering and held a doctorate in civil engineering 
from the Escuela de Ingenieros (1910), where he wrote his thesis on pluviometrics, 
the study of precipitation and runoff measurement, an ancillary science of 
meteorology.  At least initially, Prado’s career followed a pattern typical of the 
early-twentieth-century Peruvian technocrats we have seen:  He briefly worked as a 
mathematics professor at the Universidad de San Marcos, then served as inspector 
of works for the Lima municipal council, before beginning an undistinguished 
parliamentary career that led to his exile during Leguía’s dictatorship. 
Prado’s ascent to the heights of political power was only marginally based 
on his expertise.  He was from one of Peru’s most prominent banking families 
whose rise was deeply rooted in the schemes of the Aristocratic Republic.  His 
brother Jorge, a military officer, was General Benavides’s right-hand man.  Thanks 
                                                 
42. See app. 2-4, and fig. 2, 7.  
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to these connections, as well as his scientific credentials, Manuel was named 
director of the Banco Central de Reserva in the aftermath of Peru’s default on its 
foreign loans.  He oversaw the systematic abandonment of the orthodox monetary 
policies advocated by “the money doctor of the Andes,” Edwin Kemmerer.  Such 
acts helped Peru out of the Depression.  Several years later, when a trial balloon 
indicated Jorge was untenable as a presidential candidate, Benavides handpicked 
Manuel as his successor.  Manuel Prado enthusiastically adopted the persona of the 
engineer as president, and like Leguía, he is remembered as one of the gran 
constructores of modern Peru.43 
In this spirit, Prado made the agronomic engineer Carlos Moreyra Paz 
Soldán (b. 1898) one of his closest aides, first as Minister of Development and 
Public Works during his first term in office (1939-1945) and then as vice president 
during his second term (1956-1962).  Moreyra had worked with the agronomist 
Gerardo Klinge as a sugar estate manager and presided over the Sociedad Nacional 
Agraria.  He had even closer ties to the Prados’ financial empire, including a stint 
as director of the Banco Popular.  But what really solidified his place among Peru’s 
ruling elite was the development of his family’s Hacienda San Isidro into one of 
Lima’s richest suburbs.  By attaining these high governmental positions, Prado and 
                                                 
43. Felipe Portocarrero Suárez, El Imperio Prado, 1890-1970 (Lima: Universidad del 
Pacífico, Centro de Investigaciones, 1995), 81-89, 115-123, 158-159; Gilbert, The Oligarchy and 
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infrastructure, see Peru: Obra de gobierno del presidente de la República Dr. Manuel Prado, 1939-
1945 (Buenos Aires: Guillermo Kraft, 1945). 
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Moreyra opened new horizons for the technically trained--at least those who 
belonged to Peru’s leading families.44 
With regard to guano and national agriculture, Prado’s administration 
initially tried to maintain the status quo of the late 1930s.  As table 6 shows, the 
lion’s share of guano continued to go to cotton and sugar planters, though they had 
to pay extra to get it.   
But Prado’s government gradually took a populist turn.  Many historians 
have interpreted this as a recognition of the rising political influence of the urban 
middle class and working-class supporters of Haya’s persecuted APRA party.  
Others see it as a pragmatic (even cynical) response to the conditions of a world at 
war explicitly intended to prevent urban unrest and co-opt APRA support.  Since so 
much of coastal Peru’s arable land was devoted to export crops, its coastal 
population was highly dependent on food imports, especially wheat and rice.  The 
severe inflation of food prices during World War II distorted Peru’s international 
balance of trade and hurt wage-earning Peruvians badly.  In March 1940, Prado’s 
government began controlling food prices at the cost of creating shortages.  This 
paved the way for more state interventions in Peru’s agricultural economy, 
including a series of decrees limiting the amount of coastal property that could be 
planted in export crops.  In June 1943, as part of this broader policy, CAG gave 
food producers absolute priority in guano purchases in an attempt to stimulate 
domestic food production.  By law, export-crop growers had to find other sources 
                                                 
44. Diccionario histórico y biográfico del Perú, s.v. “Moreyra Paz Soldán, Carlos”; La 
obra de los ingenieros en el progreso del Perú (Lima) 2 (1931), s.v. “Moreyra Paz Soldán, Carlos”; 
Malpica, Los dueños del Perú, 90.   
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of fertilizer.  These were hard to come by, of course, since much of the world’s 
nitrogen production was headed for explosives manufacture.  In the short term, 
these policies had little effect, at least on consumer prices:  According to CAG, the 
cost of living in Peru continued to increase by 233 percent and the price of imports 
by 261 percent from 1943-1948.  As Enrique Ávila discovered, wage increases 
seldom kept pace, even though the Peruvian government was creating more and 
more public sector jobs to oversee and enforce these changes, for example, in its 
new Ministry of Agriculture (est. 1943).45 
Prado and his successors wanted to use guano to encourage directed 
agricultural development and diversification.  To a significant extent, they 
succeeded, at least over the long term.  As table 6 shows, Prado’s distribution 
policy reinforced a trend begun during Benavides’s tenure that enabled small 
purchasers to consume a far greater proportion of CAG’s production.  For the rest 
of its existence, CAG encouraged the sale of fertilizer to small producers by 
offering them lower prices and priority access.  In the process, these small 
purchasers became integrated into the system of input-intensive agriculture.  
Nevertheless, small purchasers only bought more guano than large purchasers 
during one year of CAG’s entire history, 1943.  Peruvian smallholders had many 
things working against them as they struggled to compete with modern 
agribusiness, including government price controls designed to benefit urban 
consumers at their expense.  These forces led increasing numbers of rural peasants 
                                                 
45. MCAG 36 (1945), iv; MCAG 40 (1949), lii-liii; Thorp and Bertram, Peru, 1890-1977, 
173, 177-179, 199-201.  
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to leave the land for the barriadas (shanty-towns) that began to envelop Lima and 
other Peruvian cities after 1950.46 
CAG’s guano distribution policy was much more successful at encouraging 
agribusiness to cultivate food crops and forage for dairy cattle on a large scale.  
Irrigated rice became one of the principal products of Lambayeque and the rapidly 
developing Piura- and Jequetepeque-valley regions.  (Gildemeister & Co. owned 
huge tracts of land in the latter.)  Lima-area farmers converted much of their 
property to the cultivation of grain, forage, and other food crops--if they did not 
pave it under altogether for urban developement.  In the late 1950s, CAG finally 
achieved a long-term goal by convincing grain and potato planters in the Sierra, 
                                                 
46. Key works for understanding trends in peasant agriculture, rural proletarianization, and 
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especially around Huancayo, to adopt input-intensive agricultural practices.  Such 
shifts are reflected in the regional distribution of guano in Peru.47 
In sum, these policies achieved some of their populist intent.  They 
broadened the distribution of guano by region, crop, and property size, though they 
still provided the greatest benefits to a new class of agricultural lords dedicated to 
the provision of food to Peru’s burgeoning urban areas.  But in terms of the total 
area dedicated to export agriculture along the Peruvian coast, these policies 
convinced few farmers to convert their lands to food production.  Guano never 
came close to making Peru self-sufficient in food production. 
Meanwhile, political conflict over these policies came close to destroying 
any pretensions CAG might have had to autonomy--a vital ingredient, at least 
theoretically, to true technocratic governance.   
After a complicated series of political machinations, partly inspired by the 
triumph of “democratic” forces in World War II, Manuel Prado decided to step 
aside at the end of his presidential term.  He scheduled elections for June 1945 and 
his favored candidate, José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, a law professor from 
Arequipa, won a clear majority of Peru’s limited electorate with vital support from 
the legalized APRA party, which gained control of Congress.  This seemingly 
peaceful and democratic transfer of power, the first at the executive level since the 
1910s, was hardly tranquil where CAG was concerned. 
                                                 
47. See app. 7; Macera, “El guano y la agricultura peruana de exportación,” 442, 445; 
Thorp and Bertram, Peru, 1890-1977, passim.   
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Old-guard agro-exporters did not submit freely to these populist policies.  
They owned a majority of private shares in CAG, and they used CAG’s board of 
directors to rally their forces against Prado’s restrictive guano distribution policy.  
Agro-exporters stood to lose money, not only from their lack of access to cheap 
fertilizer at a time when fertilizer imports were difficult and expensive to obtain, 
but also because Prado’s policies sold CAG’s scarce product at the lowest possible 
price, thus eroding their dividends even further.  At its annual meeting early in 
1945, the board elected a new president, agronomist Gerardo Klinge.  His immense 
scientific prestige notwithstanding, Klinge was the complete opposite of the image 
of the impartial technocrat.  He had been a leading partisan of the Partido Nacional 
Agrario, an ultra-conservative front for Peruvian agro-exporters that had taken an 
unbending stance in favor of free trade and vocally opposed Prado’s election in 
1939.  Klinge made sure that cotton and sugar cane planters were able to resume 
their consumption of limited amounts of guano.  Other partisans expressed extreme 
dissatisfaction with CAG’s management.  Some even suggested dissolving the 
Sección Técnica to reduce CAG’s overhead and increase its profitability.  Francisco 
Ballén, sensing the change in the political winds, announced his retirement as 
general manager in July 1945 after 33 years of service. 
CAG’s old-guard directorate initially appointed Ernesto Diez Canseco 
Yáñez (b. 1907) to replace Ballén.  He had the proper technical credentials: a 
degree in mining engineering with a speciality in industrial hygiene and years of 
experience as a manager in Peru’s northern oil fields and highland mines.  He had 
the added prestige of having recently completed a course of study at Harvard 
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University funded by the Rockefeller Foundation.  Like Prado and Moreyra, and 
for that matter, Lavalle and Ballén, family connections cleared the way for his 
promotion.  Diez Canseco Yáñez’s father, Ernesto Diez Canseco Masías-- a one-
time mining engineer with long experience at Cerro de Pasco--happened to be 
president of the Peruvian Senate.  Everyone knew Diez Canseco Yáñez got this job 
as a cronyist political favor. 
When Bustamante’s government took power in August 1945 after trouncing 
his conservative rivals at the polls, it began a complete house cleaning at CAG.  
Bustamante summarily booted out General Benavides’s old client-technocrat, 
Carlos Alayza, as the government’s representative on CAG’s board of directors and 
replaced him with the agronomic engineer Carlos Llosa Belaúnde.  Klinge and four 
other board members resigned before Bustamante could force their exit.  Diez 
Canseco Yáñez followed them out the door when the newly elected Congress 
announced an investigation of CAG’s management.  A veteran manager, the 
agronomist Rómulo E. Lanatta (who had been originally hired in the midst of the 
crisis following Leguía’s overthrow in 1930), took over in the interim.  An 
emergency shareholders’ meeting elected an almost entirely new board of directors.  
Six of ten posts were filled by men with engineering degrees, including the 
presidency by José Barreda Bustamante and the vice-presidency by Robert 
Cushman Murphy’s old friend Enrique Dibos Dammert (both of whom were agro-
exporters of a different political stripe.)  Dibos succeeded Barreda as board 
president in 1947 and 1948.  Meanwhile, three present or former CAG technicians 
were rumored to be under consideration for Ballén’s old position: Lavalle, 
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Gamarra, and Lanatta.  But the new board promoted the president’s man, Carlos 
Llosa, to the post. 48 
This new group of managers thus obtained their positions primarily for their 
political allegiances, rather than for their technical qualifications.  Carlos Llosa 
Belaúnde (illus. 26), yet another product of Peru’s Escuela Nacional de 
Agricultura, presided over CAG from 1945 to 1954.  Llosa’s administrative skills 
immediately won the confidence of his superiors and most of CAG’s remaining 
technocratic corps.  Yet considering the intense scrutiny he faced during the 
political polarization of these years, it is nearly miraculous he survived in this 
position.     
Even before Bustamante took office, several of Peru’s leading agro-
exporters had been plotting against him and his aprista allies.  They despised his 
continued interventions in the agricultural economy.  For example, in 1947 
Bustamante and APRA forced through a major, pro-labor reform in coastal 
sharecropping (yanaconizaje) that eliminated many of the advantages held by large 
cotton producers.  Agro-exporters had their revenge.  In 1948, as Bustamante’s 
government proved unable to resolve an accelerating economic crisis and unwilling 
to put down working-class unrest, they convinced the Peruvian military to replace 
Bustamante’s faltering government with a right-wing dictatorship devoted to free 
trade.  Besides losing his political patron, Llosa had to face intense criticism from 
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another expert, Rómulo Lanatta, who doubted Llosa’s devotion to CAG’s 
conservation policies and fiscal probity.49   
Llosa was able to survive because he and the rest of CAG’s technicians 
achieved overwhelming success at redirecting CAG’s system of guano production 
and distribution to serve several masters.  Their actions stunningly vindicated the 
ideal of environmental management by experts, at least where the guano industry’s 
fortunes were concerned.  Llosa’s staying power is again testimony to the ability of 
the technocratic ideal to provide grounds for agreement between opposing factions.   
Under Llosa, CAG did not forget agro-exporters.  Despite President 
Bustamante’s continued devotion to Prado’s diversification policies, CAG allowed 
cotton and sugar cane planters to retain the access to guano they had gained in 
1945.  As a payback for the vocal support it got from powerful agro-exporters, the 
military junta that took power in 1948 instructed CAG to triple the price of guano, 
ostensibly to stabilize CAG’s finances.  This made guano too expensive for many 
small producers and freed up some (though not all) of the supply for agro-exporters 
eager to profit from the pent-up international demand for sugar and cotton after the 
war.  (Despite the declining price of Chilean nitrates and synthetics produced by 
the Haber-Bosch process, imported fertilizers were still more expensive.)  CAG’s 
stockholders reaped enormous dividends. 
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Such manipulation of the guano supply could do nothing to remedy the 
basic problem: there simply was not enough guano to go around in Peru.  CAG 
could not even supply half of total Peruvian demand for nitrogen fertilizer.  CAG 
again went into the fertilizer import business to help ease the pain of this transition 
to synthetic fertilizers.  In February 1946, Bustamante’s government had given 
CAG permission to import and sell duty-free nitrates and synthetic fertilizers to 
commercial farmers, although CAG was not allowed to establish a distribution 
monopoly.  That year, CAG imported and sold 11,966 metric tons of nitrates from 
Chile to large producers and 6,606 metric tons to smallholders.  By 1958, CAG still 
sold 29,305 of the 766,656 metric tons of fertilizer imported nationwide.  Under 
Llosa, CAG also looked to improve the services it offered to “scientific” farmers in 
Peru.  In 1951, a German company completed a new industrial plant for CAG in 
Callao that could mix guano rico and pobre, imported nitrates, and other chemicals 
in set proportions.  This enabled CAG to market a full line of fertilizers chemically 
balanced for use on different crops.  Peruvian cane and cotton planters never again 
purchased the majority of guano (Prado’s diversification policy was never totally 
undone), but this powerful economic interest continued to receive a valuable 
service from CAG during the late-1940s and 1950s.50 
The main reason CAG prospered during these years, however, had to do 
with its management of Peru’s marine ecology.  Under Llosa’s watch, crews of 
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workers “conditioned” the islands for the guano birds in line with the 1942 Vogt 
report.  Almost immediately after he took over as general manager, Llosa instructed 
Enrique Ávila to do a survey of each island to identify locations amenable to 
“surface regularization” with explosives.  Much of the stone produced by these 
landscape alterations was then used to build containment walls on the islands.  In 
accord with Vogt’s recommendations, these were designed to reduce losses by 
preventing hot, thirsty chicks from falling to their deaths in search of water and by 
discouraging adult birds from launching themselves into the air from the edge of 
cliffs.  (Vogt had observed that birds tend to defecate at take off.)  CAG workers 
built over 31 kilometers of walls of this type by 1949, remnants of which are 
immediately apparent on the guano islands today.  As noted in chapter 3, CAG 
initiated a major campaign against the condor population of Isla La Vieja in 1946, 
and it soon became CAG’s single largest guano-producing territory.  During the 
late 1940s when CAG was flush with money, Llosa arranged the purchase of 
loading machinery and several new ships so CAG could more rapidly transport 
guano away from the islands.  Llosa rationalized this expense (which was harshly 
criticized by Lanatta) with the argument that CAG could regularize its island 
rotation schedule and leave the bird colonies in peace for a longer period each year, 
since loading and transport slowed guano exploitation more than any other factor.  
CAG put off indefinitely, however, Vogt’s suggestion to build cliff platforms for 
the piqueros, much less shelters for the lizards, and it completely ignored his advice 
to stop indiscriminate shooting of other predatory birds, despite Ávila’s protests.51 
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CAG’s managers did not follow Vogt’s counsel to the letter.  Instead, they 
took several of his observations of bird behavior and developed their own ways to 
take advantage of them.  The most important policy change adopted by CAG after 
1945, by far, was an extension of two of Vogt’s main findings: 1) that food and 
competition for nesting space were the basic factors limiting the total size of the 
breeding population, and 2) that most birds migrated south during El Niño years 
when warm surface water flowed in from the north. 
During his first year as general manager, Llosa became obsessed with 
circumventing the cyclic “ecological depressions” caused by El Niño.  He seized on 
the observation that not all guano birds flew to Chile during the 1939-1941 crisis: 
many hung around coastal points in southern Peru.  What kept them from 
establishing breeding colonies in the south during El Niño years?  The answer was 
seemingly obvious: there were no suitable islands.  But what prevented successful 
nesting on the mainland?  Llosa reasoned that the wild fox or zorro (Dusycyon 
sechurae), rats, feral cats, and other predators prevented them from establishing 
viable colonies on coastal points, even though there was sufficient anchoveta in 
adjacent seas.  He came up with a brilliant solution:  CAG would create artificial 
“islands” along the southern coast by building walls to isolate coastal points of land 
already frequented by roosting guano birds.  Llosa hoped these would provide a 
breeding refuge during El Niño years and perhaps prevent the guanayes from 
                                                                                                                                        
MCAG 38 (1947), i-v; MCAG 39 (1948), vii; MCAG 40 (1949), vi-vii.  Again, this scheduling was 
not as strict nor as careful as CAG claimed it to be; see Lanatta, Informe, 25-26. 
285 
“wasting” so much of their excrement over Chile.  (All available evidence indicates 
Llosa came up with this idea on his own.)   
CAG workers completed construction of walls isolating Puntas Tres 
Hermanas, Lomas, and Coles in 1948 (illus. 31).  In fact, CAG did not have to wait 
for another big El Niño for this experiment to bear fruit: birds almost immediately 
colonized Punta Coles.  This unexpected success led to the decision to isolate 
points along a stretch of the north-central coast where there were no islands in order 
to promote “even exploitation of the sea surface” by the guano birds.  As this 
policy continued to prove its worth, CAG completed isolation walls around 14 
mainland points by 1961.  CAG also conditioned the surface of these coastal points 
and tried to reduce their vulnerability to contraband guano and egg extraction.  It 
increased the number of manned guard stations to a peak of 24 in 1955, although its 
real spending on its guardian staff and stations by the late 1950s was less than one-
third of what it had been during the late 1930s.52   
These isolation walls allowed the guano birds to surpass their former 
breeding limits.  Guano production reached new heights during the 1950s thanks to 
dramatic production increases from these artifical guano islands.  Some rapidly 
joined the ranks of Peru’s most lucrative guano-producing territories.  In 1945, 
                                                 
52. These walls were situated (in order of construction) on Puntas Tres Hermanas, Lomas, 
Coles, Atico, Litera, Culebras, San Juan, Colorado, Salinas, Malabrigo, La Chira, Pampa Redonda, 
La Grama, and Lomitas; see map 1.  Each Memoria lists all operating guard stations and their 
operating cost; MCAG 38 (1947), i-ii, v-vi; MCAG 39 (1948), vii; MCAG 40 (1949), v-vi; MCAG 44 
(1953), iv; MCAG 45 (1954), v; MCAG 46 (1955), vi; MCAG 47 (1956), vi, xvii; MCAG 48 (1957), 
vi; MCAG 49 (1958), xvii-xviii; MCAG 52 (1961), xi; Murphy, El guano y la pesca de anchoveta: 
Informe oficial al Supremo Gobierno (Lima: CAG, 1954), 23-24; idem, “Peru Profits from Sea 
Fowl,” National Geographic Magazine Mar. 1959, 401, 404-405, 408-409; Gamarra, “Ensayo sobre 
la zoonomía de las aves guaneras,” 113-116; Tovar, Guillén, and Nakama, “Monthly Population 
Size of Three Guano Bird Species off Peru,” 213-214. 
286 
CAG removed less than two percent of its guano from coastal points.  In 1956, 
coastal points supplied nearly 30 percent of total guano production.  In that year, 
CAG extracted an all-time record of 332,223 metric tons of fresh guano rico at an 
all-time record concentration of 15.21 percent nitrogen by weight.  If only for a 
season, CAG produced more guano--and significantly more nitrogen--than was 
mined in an average year during the Guano Age!  By this measure alone, the 
Compañía Administradora del Guano was an immense triumph for the principle of 
sustained-yield conservation.53 
Carlos Llosa gave full credit to “long and patient scientific studies” for the 
record guano harvests of these years.54  These production increases demonstrated 
the worth of Vogt’s science in the most dramatic way possible.  It is worth 
underscoring that Llosa, Ávila, and the rest of CAG’s managers arrived at these 
policies not by following Vogt’s specific recommendations for environmental 
management, but by creatively applying his general scientific observations.  This 
showed the value of placing technically competent individuals, not only in research 
and advisory positions, but also in positions of power. 
The institutionalization of professional ornithology at CAG had given its 
technocrats new tools with which to “domesticate” the guano birds and their 
breeding territory.  This enabled CAG to increase the supply of guano to agro-
exporters, though not to the levels of the 1930s.  It also allowed CAG to continue 
encouraging the adoption of input-intensive practices by other farmers--both large 
                                                 
53. See app. 1, 8; “Anexos: Gráfico no. 2,” MCAG 54 (1963).  
54. MCAG 42 (1951), 71-72. 
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and small--in new parts of the country, especially grain producers.  Both right- and 
left-wing partisans had reason to be pleased, if not fully satisfied, since CAG never 
again came close to supplying Peru’s entire demand for concentrated fertilizer.  
The choice of William Vogt was pivotal for the continued development of the 
guano industry and the technocratic ideal in Peru. 
Through Vogt, CAG’s triumph also inspired widespread enthusiasm for 
environmental management by experts that reached far beyond Peru’s borders.  
Similar to Jean Baptiste Boussingault’s brief encounter with the Peruvian guano 
trade over a century before, which led to his life-long fascination with the 
fertilizing powers of nitrogen compounds, Vogt’s intense experience with Peru’s 
guano birds during the disastrous El Niño of 1939-1941 made him obsessed with 
the relationship between population, subsistence, and environmental change.  His 
Peruvian sojourn was hardly a career detour.  It put this Lord of the Guanay on a 
trajectory to become one of the main architects of modern environmentalism. 
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Chapter 5 
The Road to Survival: 
William Vogt and Environmentalism in the Americas 
 
Your prophecies on Mexican agriculture at the end of the next 100 years have 
produced quite a national commotion.   
‘Guano,’ my dear Doctor, ‘guano’ is the word. 
--Carlos Benítez to William Vogt (1946) 
Many things are at stake in the history of environmentalism.  Long before 
the identity politics of recent years, creating a sense of belonging has been one of 
the fundamental motivations for writing history.  Belonging is tied up with who 
deserves credit for triumphs and failures in the past, as well as who deserves 
influence within the halls of power in the present.  The history of guano-bird 
conservation in Peru belongs at the core of the history of environmentalism, since, 
as this chapter will show, Peru’s experiment had a powerful, reciprocal influence 
on environmentalism in the rest of the Americas during the mid-twentieth century.     
It is still common wisdom that the modern environmental movement was 
born in the United States and Western Europe during the twentieth century as a 
revolt against the excesses of industrialization.  The first generation of self-
identified environmental historians ratified this belief with histories of the passing 
of the frontier, of the invention of National Parks, of the preservation of wilderness, 
of the drive to protect “beauty, health, and permanence.”  Indeed, William Vogt’s 
initial interest in conservation was inspired by the threat that urban civilization 
posed toward wild birds.  More recently, historians have written new accounts that 
have expanded environmentalism to a plurality of movements.  This trend has been 
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pushed especially by critics of “environmental racism,” the tendency of policies 
designed to protect (or hurt) the environment to privilege the interests of affluent, 
professional, white (sub)urbanites and to discriminate against poor, working-class 
people of color, especially those living near sources of industrial pollution.   
Richard Grove, a historian of European “green imperialism,” has pushed 
back by centuries the date when modern environmentalism got its start.  Grove 
turned completely on its head the notion that environmentalism was initially a 
response to industrialism: instead, he argues, environmentalism has its origins in 
the first-hand encounter of European scientists, technicians, and physicians with 
“tropical island Edens” dessicated by the forces of colonialism and the plantation 
complex.  In short, modern environmentalism was born on the colonial “periphery” 
of the imperial world system between the sixteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries.  
Most recently, a historian of “global environmentalism” reasserts the old notion 
that environmentalism--now in two phases (1750-1945, 1962-present)--
fundamentally represents a rejection of northern industrialism.  Between these two 
periods, an “age of ecological innocence” supposedly intervened when 
environmental ideas failed to alter the course of the great Age of Development.1 
                                                 
1. On these points, see Ramachandra Guha’s recent survey, Environmentalism: A Global 
History (New York: Longman, 2000); Richard Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, 
Tropical Island Edens and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600-1860 (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995); Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the 
American Environmental Movement (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1993); Anna Bramwell, 
Ecology in the 20th Century: A History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989); Samuel P. 
Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955-1985 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987); David Pepper, The Roots of Modern 
Environmentalism (London: Croom Helm, 1984); Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American 
Mind, 3d ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982).  This short list necessarily omits many 
important, though less-seminal essays and books.  One recent work attempts to extend Grove’s 
conclusions to more recent North American imperialism in the Pacific Basin: Gary Kroll, 
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This brief recitation is necessary to demonstrate how important the 
“Peruvian” events described in this work are for our understanding of this global 
history.  We only need to look back to the 1940s to discover an instance when 
events on the periphery of the industrial world powerfully influenced the history of 
environmentalism.  One of the major fixtures of modern environmental thought is 
the belief that many (if not most) of the world’s problems are a consequence of the 
exploding human population--or worse, that the world stands on the verge of an 
apocalypse because of progressive overpopulation.  It is only a slight exaggeration 
to say that such “neo-Malthusian” ideas got their start when the North American 
conservationist William Vogt witnessed the collapse of Peru’s guano bird 
population due to a subsistence crisis caused by the El Niño of 1939-1941.  (Note 
that this trend stemmed from Vogt’s encounter with a successful environmental 
management project overseas, rather than the degradation emphasized by Grove.)    
A few years later, Vogt’s visit to El Salvador, the most densely populated country 
in the Americas, fully convinced him that overpopulation doomed most of the Latin 
American “continent” to eternal poverty, strife, and environmental catastrophe.2  At 
least for Vogt, this was no age of ecological innocence. 
In fact, Vogt’s experience in Peru fundamentally changed the course of his 
career and by extension the trajectory of environmentalism in the Americas.  Even 
before he left Peru, Vogt’s engagement with CAG contributed to the organization 
                                                                                                                                        
“Exploration in the Mare Incognita: Natural History and Conservation in Early-Twentieth Century 
America” (Ph.D. diss., University of Oklahoma, 2000). 
2. On Vogt’s conception of Latin America as a unified ecological and cultural region, see 
“A Continent Slides to Ruin,” Harper’s Magazine June 1948, 481-489; cf. Martin E.Lewis and 
Kärin E. Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
Univeristy of California Press, 1997). 
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of the Comité Nacional de Protección a la Naturaleza (National Committee for the 
Protection of Nature), an elitist group of professionals who hoped to use its shared 
prestige to influence the course of economic development in Peru.  Such activities 
made Vogt an ideal candidate to head a new conservation office within the Pan-
American Union.  Vogt used this office to spread his ideas to other Latin American 
countries, especially Mexico and Chile.  To a striking extent (illustrated by this 
chapter’s epigraph), guano remained a focus of Vogt’s post-CAG activities.  This 
reveals not only CAG’s international notoriety, but also its influence on Vogt’s 
understanding of the ecological relationship between the fertility and integrity of 
the soil, the health and productivity of the land, and human prosperity. 
When he returned permanently to the United States, Vogt’s professional 
experience in Latin America equipped him to play a key role in the emergence of 
the environmental movement in his homeland, both as a popular author and as an 
outspoken advocate of birth and population control.  His seminal 1948 book Road 
to Survival was a manifesto advocating a new human relationship to the 
environment.  It displayed Vogt’s continued allegiance to the technocratic ideal.  At 
least initially, Vogt had much more impact on environmentalism than his now 
better-known colleague Aldo Leopold.  But it is difficult to separate their 
involvement since they were such close friends and collaborators, particularly when 
it came to their shared interest in animal “irruptions,” the publication of Leopold’s 
A Sand County Almanac--and, as we have already seen, the career of their young 
disciple Enrique Ávila.  Together, Vogt, Leopold, and a small group of U.S. 
conservation professionals created an important part of the ideological framework 
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of later environmentalists.  (Note that Vogt, like many conservationists, often 
crossed the amateur-professional divide during the course of his career.)3 
The broader reception of Vogt’s ideas was, of course, an important part of 
this process and one over which he had little control.  The horrors unleashed by 
World War II and the growing potential for nuclear holocaust made many readers 
receptive to Vogt’s apocalyptic rhetoric.  At the same time, a widespread desire to 
reject these horrors and attribute them to totalitarian extremism led most people to 
dismiss Vogt as an anti-progressive fatalist.  In the reception of Vogt’s book, one 
sees the opening of an international, optimist vs. pessimist divide over the issue of 
economic development.  This had its analog in Vogt’s 1930s experience as editor 
of Bird-Lore, his conflict within CAG’s scientific cadre, and the development of 
the Peruvian fishing industry (subjects of chapters 6-8).  People tended to read what 
they wanted in Road to Survival.  I am no different, my pretensions to historical 
objectivity notwithstanding.  My singular reading of this important book has a 
purpose: it is intended to place it in the context of Vogt’s Peruvian and Latin 
                                                 
3. Historians have long debated whether the U.S. conservation movement had its strongest 
root in professionalism or amateur reformism--and whether a conflict between these two traditions 
led to the destruction of important natural areas, such as the Hetch Hetchy Valley in California, to 
make way for technological progress.  Samuel Hays, in Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: 
The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univeristy Press, 
1959), wrote the classic study of U.S. conservationism as a movement of technocratically inclined 
professionals such as U.S. Forest Service chief Gifford Pinchot.  Stephen Fox, in contrast, argues in 
The American Conservation Movement: John Muir and His Legacy (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1981) that a vocal group of amateurs led by John Muir formed the base of 
American conservationism.  Of course, these two perspectives are not mutually exclusive.  Note that 
Hays later concluded that “technical professionals” diverted the U.S. environmental movement from 
most of its more radical aims after 1970, in Beauty, Health, and Permananence, ch. 12, esp. pp. 
419-422.     
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American experience and pursue an alternative reading emphasizing Vogt’s anti-
capitalist, anti-imperialist, and technocratic notions. 
Some of Vogt’s ideas will seem abhorrent to present-day readers, as they 
did to his contemporaries, particularly his assertion that progress in public health 
and medicine is undesirable, even dangerous, since it encourages population 
growth by decreasing the death rate.  Vogt freely associated with eugenicists, who 
welcomed the demise of “less fit” (i.e., less educated, less prosperous, less 
WASPy) humans.  In their hands, the population explosion became the new 
“yellow peril.”  Such fears profoundly influenced both population control policies 
and crop-breeding research supported by the Rockefeller family during the 1950s.  
It is well-known that the latter led to the development of high-yielding grain 
varieties that formed the basis for the so-called Green Revolution--a major case in 
which environmental ideas influenced the course of world development during this 
supposed “age of ecological innocence.” 
As we shall see in chapter 8, Vogt’s population thinking turned around and 
affected the course of events in Peru, when defenders of Peru’s new fishing 
industry cynically claimed they were reducing world hunger.  Even more 
remarkably, Vogt influenced the writing of environmental history, particularly the 
so-called Berkeley School of historical demography which almost single-handedly 
convinced us that the indigenous population of the Americas was very large before 
1500, and that the forces of what we now call “ecological imperialism” helped 
Europeans along in their conquest of the globe.  As much as Aldo Leopold, Vogt 
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deserves the title “prophet” of the Age of Ecology and credit for initiating an 
environmental movement that was geographically, if not socially, broad-based.4 
  
The Comité Nacional de Protección a la Naturaleza 
The continued development of a conservation movement in Peru was a 
direct extension of Peru’s guano experiment.  During his tenure as CAG 
ornithologist, Vogt acted as a catalyst for the establishment of what was probably 
the first Peruvian society established solely for conservation advocacy.  This 
organization is significant because it displays links between conservation 
movements in the Americas, especially the importance of technocrats to these 
groups.  Most significantly, this society’s failings reveal important barriers that face 
environmentalisms premised on the interests of a select few.5      
                                                 
4. On Vogt’s importance to the U.S. environmental movement, see Gottlieb, Forcing the 
Spring, 36-37; Fox, The American Conservation Movement, 306-313; Worster, Nature’s Economy, 
352.  Cf. Max Oelschlaeger, “Aldo Leopold and the Age of Ecology,” ch. 7 in The Idea of 
Wilderness: From Prehistory to the Age of Ecology (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); 
Nash, “Aldo Leopold: Prophet,” ch. 11 in Wilderness and the American Mind.  Vogt is unjustly 
ignored in several other prominent histories.  On the transition from a professional-dominated 
conservation movement to a popular environmental movement, see Hays, “From Conservation to 
Environment: Environmental Politics in the United States since World War II,” in Out of the 
Woods: Essays in Environmental History, ed. Char Miller and Hal Rothman (Pittsburgh, PA: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 101-126.  
5. The shortcomings of elitist, technocratic, gender-biased, even racist conservation 
movements is becoming a leitmotif of environmental histories of the colonial and postcolonial 
worlds.  See Dean, With Broadax and Firebrand, esp. 241-242, 257-264, 361-363; Simonian, 
Defending the Land of the Jaguar; Melissa Leach and Cathy Green, “Gender and Environmental 
History: From Representation of Women and Nature to Gender Analysis of Ecology and Politics,” 
Environment and History 3:3 (Oct. 1997), 343-370; John M. MacKenzie, ed., Imperialism and the 
Natural World (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1990); Ramachandra Guha, The 
Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalaya (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1989); Anker, Imperial Ecology; Drayton, Nature’s 
Government; Beinart, “Introduction: The Politics of Colonial Conservation”; McCracken, “Experts 
and Expertise in Colonial Malawi.” 
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In April 1940, Vogt and CAG’s general manager Francisco Ballén invited a 
distinguished group of Peruvian scientists and professionals to meet with one of 
Vogt’s old colleagues, T. Gilbert Pearson.  Pearson had been one of the founding 
officers of the National Association of Audubon Societies in 1905 and later became 
its domineering president.  After he was deposed by John Hopkinson Baker in 1933 
(which led directly to Vogt’s hiring as editor of Bird-Lore), Pearson devoted his 
time to international bird protection from a small office at Audubon headquarters in 
New York.  Since September 1939, he had been traveling around South America 
distributing conservation and ornithology literature, setting up societies on the 
model of the International Committee for the Conservation of Birds, and organizing 
support for an international “convention for the protection of the fauna, flora, and 
natural beauty of the Americas.”  His interest in the fate of “North American 
migratory birds” in South America was the primary motivation for his trip south, 
however.  To quote Texas nature writer John Graves, Pearson sweated himself 
“where the Eskimo curlew went.”6 
During this meeting at the swank Hotel Bolívar in central Lima, 25 
Peruvian notables founded the Comité Nacional de Protección a la Naturaleza to 
conserve not only birds, but also “animals, plant species, and beautiful scenery” in 
Peru, as well as to promote the welfare of “culture, science, and the economy of our 
country today, and even more for generations to come.”  Echoing the economic 
                                                 
6. See epigraph of this work, p. v; John Graves, Goodbye to a River (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1960), 159.  The extinct Eskimo curlew (Numenius borealis) once ranged from Arctic 
Canada to Patagonia.  Its last confirmed sitings were in 1962 in Texas and 1963 in Barbados.  David 
Allen Sibley, National Audubon Society: The Sibley Guide to Birds (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2000), 14; Roger Tory Peterson, A Field Guide to the Birds of Texas and Adjacent States (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1963), 98-99, 278.    
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nationalism that led to the foundation of CAG, its members vowed to fight against 
the wrongful enrichment of exploitative foreigners who threatened to destroy “our 
national patrimony.”  (This implicitly blamed outsiders for Peru’s environmental 
plight and conveniently overlooked that foreign-owned agribusiness had benefited 
most from guano bird conservation.)  The Comité Nacional hoped to form a state-
supported political society similar to the powerful Sociedad Nacional Agraria that 
would have direct influence over natural resource use through the Ministerio de 
Fomento.  Besides this political function, the Comité Nacional aimed to study 
environmental problems, gather and diffuse information, and “instill in youth a love 
for Nature, exalting its aesthetic, scientific, and industrial values.”  Its members 
took up a number of causes advocated by Vogt and other North American 
conservationists, but as their rhetoric makes clear, they continued to promote rapid 
economic development.7 
This Peruvian organization was not established in a vacuum.  It was part of 
a nascent movement throughout Latin America linked to the U.S. conservation 
movement.  It is analogous to movements in other world regions under the 
influence of Europe’s imperial powers, such as the Netherlands Indies Society for 
the Protection of Nature (est. 1912).  Mexico, under the leadership of hydraulic 
engineer Miguel Ángel de Quevedo, “the apostle of the tree,” had already 
established the first Latin American conservation organization on the model of the 
                                                 
7. BCNPN 1:1 (1944), 1-2, 5-6, 8-9; “Comments by T. Gilbert Pearson, Chairman of the 
Pan-American Section of the International Committee for Bird Preservation and Chairman of the 
United States Section,” 1942 [?], Vogt papers, box 3:3; Graham, The Audubon Ark, 46-47, 117; 
Pearson, “Birding Below the Line,” Bird-Lore July-Aug. 1940, 315-322.  
297 
International Committee for the Conservation of Birds in 1931, followed by 
Argentina in 1937.  Pearson’s tour of nine of ten Hispanic republics in South 
America was a big success: Paraguay, Chile, Bolivia, and Colombia founded 
similar societies within six months of Peru, followed by Brazil in 1942.  The list of 
directors of these associations reads like a who’s-who list of important scientists 
and scientific organizations, an indication of the intimate connection between 
expertise and conservationism in Latin America.8 
The membership of Peru’s Comité Nacional was no exception (illus. 32).  
Its original members included German botanist Augusto Weberbauer who ran the 
Parque Zoológico y Botánico, one of the most important sites where the Lima 
populace had contact with “wild” nature, and biogeographer Javier Pulgar Vidal 
who authored the most influential text ever published on Peruvian ecology Las 
ocho regiones naturales del Perú (1st ed., 1941).  Five founding members had ties 
to the guano industry and agribusiness, including CAG agronomist Luis Gamarra.  
Young fishery technician Enrique del Solar, recently returned from training in 
Japan, also attended this initial meeting.  Other important scientists who later 
joined the Comité Nacional included the great student of altitudinal physiology 
Carlos Monge, CAG general manager Carlos Llosa, and CAG oceanographer 
Erwin Schweigger.  Only one woman, the jurist and women’s activist Luz Jarrín de 
Peñaloza, associated with the Comité Nacional over the years; she was never 
granted official membership, however, an honor given only to her husband.  Even 
                                                 
8. BCNPN 1:1 (1944), 176-190; “Comments by T. Gilbert Pearson”; Simonian, Defending 
the Land of the Jaguar, 81; Boomgaard, “Oriental Nature, Its Friends and Its Enemies: Conservation 
of Nature in Late-Colonial Indonesia, 1889-1949.” 
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though this organization did not have explicit technocratic powers, such individuals 
gave the Comité Nacional a masculine aura of technocratic authority.9 
Carlos A. Barreda y Ramos (b. 1890) presided over the Comité Nacional for 
30 years.  Like Enrique Ávila, Barreda was a native of the highland city of Puno, 
and he was an enthusiastic agent of agricultural modernization in the Sierra.  After 
earning an agronomy degree from the Escuela Nacional de Agricultura y 
Veterinaria in 1919, Barreda returned home to teach at the state secondary school in 
Puno and to manage various livestock haciendas.  In 1930, he was appointed the 
director of a model farm near the highland city of Abancay, and then was elected 
senator for the Department of Puno in 1939.  As senator, Barreda advocated a 
number of soil conservation projects.  He authored laws that established the 
Ministerio de Agricultura and a national center for domestication of the vicuña.  He 
also published conservation propaganda, including an influential 1940 pamplet on 
national parks in Peru.  Barreda epitomized the importance of agricultural concerns 
in the Peruvian conservation movement, an interest he shared with Vogt, his 
colleagues at CAG, and conservationists throughout the Americas.10 
Another North American played a major role on the Comité Nacional.  His 
example illustrates, yet again, the importance of technocrats to Peruvian 
                                                 
9. BCNPN 1:1 (1944), 1, 2, 176-190; BCNPN 7 (1950), 2-3; BCNPN 20 (1965-1970), 65-
69, 118; “Miembros del Comité Geofísico Peruano,” n.d., SIO Subject Files box 8/folder 10.  On 
Monge and for prosopographical information on scientists in Peru, see Cueto, Excelencia científica 
en la periferia; idem, “Andean Biology in Peru: Scientific Styles in the Periphery.”  
10. BCNPN 1:1 (1944), 31; BCNPN 20 (1965-1970), 26, 44-48, 68; Diccionario biográfico 
del Perú, s.v. “Barreda Y Ramos, Carlos A.”  Cf. Vogt, “Un peligro futuro para el Perú,” BCNPN 
1:1 (1944), 144-152; Gamarra, “El abonamiento de las tierras”; idem, “La erosión de los suelos un 
problema nacional,” BCAG 23:9 (Sept. 1947), 141-147; Worster, Dust Bowl; Tobey, Saving the 
Prairies; Simonian, Defending the Land of the Jaguar. 
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conservation and the immense prestige a foreign expert could attain in Peru.  Albert 
A. Giesecke (1883-1968) obtained a degree in economics from the Wharton School 
of Commerce and Finance at the University of Pennsylvania, the first professional 
business school in the United States, before completing a Ph.D. in political science 
at Cornell in 1908.  He was a direct product of the movement toward the 
“scientific” study of business, politics, and society in U.S. universities, the 
“knowledge factories” that produced a new class of management professionals to 
govern the world.11  In 1909, the same year Ballén was appointed CAG’s general 
manager because of his foreign business experience, a Peruvian envoy recruited 
Giesecke to establish a business faculty at the Colegio Nacional de Guadalupe, a 
prestigious state secondary school supported by the guano industry.  Giesecke later 
took over rectorship of the Universidad de San Antonio Abad and served 12 years 
as alcalde (mayor) of Cuzco Province.  In 1923, he was en route to the University 
of Pennsylvania to resume his career as a political scientist, but President Augusto 
Leguía tempted him to remain in Peru by offering a top administrative post in the 
Ministry of Public Education, where he stayed until Leguía’s overthrow in 1930.  
He remained in Peru for 34 additional years as a U.S. embassy offical.  Giesecke’s 
career attests to the direct influence U.S. experts had over the affairs of the 
Peruvian state during this era.12 
                                                 
11. See Noble, America by Design; Chandler, The Visible Hand, esp. 464-468.  
12. BCNPN 20 (1965-1970), 58-64; Diccionario histórico y biográfico del Perú, s.v. 
“Giesecke, Alberto”; Jorge Basadre, Peruanos del siglo 20 (Lima: Ediciones Rikchay Perú, 1981), 
65.   
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There may be no figure who has been more important for the promotion of 
cultural tourism in Peru than Giesecke.  His devotion to “the protection of nature” 
was a natural extension of his interest in archaeology and tourism.  Though it is 
often overlooked, cultural preservation has been integral to the national parks 
movement in many countries.  In fact, national parks and monuments were first 
established in the United States partly to make up for its comparative lack of urban 
cultural treasures.13   
In 1911-1912, Giesecke helped organize logistics for the U.S. expedition 
that discovered the lost ancient city of Machu Picchu.  As Cuzco’s alcalde, he saw 
to the construction of a paved highway connecting Cuzco’s main plaza to the 
megalithic hill fortress of Sacsayhuaman.  Later, he personally supervised the 
construction of a highway to the important Pachacamac ruin south of Lima, as well 
as its excavation and restoration.  In 1948, he helped inaugurate a tourist road that 
climbed from the Urubamba River up to the ruins of Machu Picchu itself.  Under 
his influence, the Comité Nacional lobbied for the establishment of Pachacamac 
National Park in 1950, the first in Peru, and for the protection of forested areas 
along Peruvian highways.  Such advocacy reflects the once widespread belief that 
highway construction and automobile tourism would promote, rather than hurt, 
rural conservation.14  Paracas National Park and Marine Reserve, which today 
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14. See Gregory T. Cushman, “Environmental Therapy for Soil and Social Erosion: 
Landscape Architecture and Depression-Era Highway Construction in Texas,” in Environmentalism 
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protects several of the main guano islands and the Bahía de Independencia, was 
originally founded in the 1960s to preserve remnants of the Paracas culture, an 
ancient fisher people famous for their intricate tapestries.  Meanwhile, Giesecke 
supervised the purchase of indigenous artifacts that today are at the core of Peru’s 
system of state archaeological museums, including the famous collection of sugar 
planter Víctor Larco Herrera, one of the Lords of Guano’s primary beneficiaries.  
The growth of tourism to these sites has turned out to be crucial to recent efforts to 
preserve Peru’s natural heritage through ecotourism.  This is the Comité Nacional’s 
most important legacy to environmental preservation in Peru.15 
But the Comité Nacional’s earliest political victory illustrates the limits of 
the legalist approach to conservation.  Carlos Barreda authored a law that 
completely banned the hunting and export of three Andean fur-bearing mammals: 
the camelids vicuña (Lama vicugna) and guanaco (Lama guanacoe), and the rodent 
chinchilla (Chinchilla laniger).  It was passed by the Peruvian Congress and signed 
into law by President Manuel Prado in June 1940.  With a view toward saving these 
animals from extinction, the Comité Nacional convinced Peru to join the 
Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western 
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Hemisphere, the so-called Washington Convention.  On 12 October 1940, Peru, 
Ecuador, and Venezuela were the first of 11 South American states to sign this 
influential international agreement.  Neither law did much to protect these valuable 
creatures since they established no means for enforcement, much less for dealing 
with the social and economic conditions that motivated their relentless hunting.16 
The fate of these animals sheds light on why CAG was so successful as an 
animal conservation project and why the Comité Nacional’s advocacy rarely 
accomplished much.  The chinchilla almost certainly became extinct in the wild in 
Peru years before these laws were even passed.  It was eventually reintroduced to 
Peru as a semi-domesticated object of commerce thanks to captive breeding in the 
United States.  Today, a few scattered wild populations survive only in the remote 
highlands of Bolivia and Chile.  The vicuña, meanwhile, continued to decline in 
numbers until the late 1960s.  Its eventual recovery had practically nothing to with 
the Comité Nacional, but it had everything to do with technocratic management.  A 
wealthy Peruvian diplomat, Felipe Benavides Barreda (1917-1991), convinced 
upper-class Brits--by far the largest consumers of wool harvested from poached 
vicuña skins--to do something about the vicuña’s plight.  The U.K. government 
funded a two-year field investigation by zoologist Ian Grimwood.  He developed a 
plan whereby armed local peasants would manage a national reserve under the 
supervision of government forestry service officials.  In 1966, Peru established the 
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6,000 hectare Reserva Nacional de Pampa Galeras to protect a wild population of 
6,500 vicuñas in the southern highlands.  Premised on local involvement, it was a 
remarkable success.  Such projects unifying the interests of different social groups 
and nationalities appear to have saved the vicuña and guanaco from extinction.17 
It is safe to say that the Comité Nacional achieved little in most of its 
attempts to protect Peruvian nature.  Its experience with the Santa Lucía forest near 
Ica was typical.  In the mid-1940s, the Beneficiencia de Ica (a local government 
welfare organization) put a 68-hectare plot of extremely rare coastal riparian forest 
up for sale at a time when the local cotton industry was in turmoil, urban prices 
were high, and demand for public welfare benefits was great.  This grove 
represented one of the last old-growth stands of the threatened algarrobo or carob 
tree (Prosopis alba) in central Peru.  The members of the Comité Nacional hoped 
to save this forest from the historical fate of most trees along the arid Peruvian 
coast: sale to a charcoal company.  To this end, they offered to purchase the Santa 
Lucía forest and made a well-publicized visitation to promote its preservation as a 
national park.  But their pocketbooks were too small and their dreams too grand.  
Instead of becoming Peru’s first national park, the Santa Lucía forest was reduced 
to charcoal for urban resale.  The Comité Nacional only delayed its fate.  As 
Enrique Ávila aptly pointed out to his patron Vogt, the Comité Nacional during its 
early years devoted itself almost entirely to “enthusiastic talk” and little action.  
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Years later, Carlos Barreda himself could convey little more than an overwhelming 
sense of loss in his organizational memoir.18 
These proponents of “protection of nature” in Peru, quite simply, could not 
make themselves heard above the din of modernization advocacy in Peru.  They 
were up against powerful forces devoted to the cause of rapid economic growth.  
For example, in a last-ditch effort to protest the destruction of the guano birds, 
Barreda and a remnant of the Comité Nacional tried to organize a conference 
chaired by Robert Cushman Murphy on the “Conservation, Exploitation, and 
Development of the Renewable Natural Resources of the Sea” in 1967.  But this 
scheme came to nought, largely because its organizers wanted to focus on “one 
negative aspect” of marine development when progress-minded políticos were 
fixated on the positive task of creating industrial jobs, infrastructure, and wealth in 
the Peruvian fishing industry. 19   
Not all of the Comité Nacional’s shortcomings can be blamed on their 
opposition.  True to its roots in development-oriented scientific organizations, the 
Comité’s tepid criticism of a few projects stood in stark contrast to its members’ 
overwhelming general support for national development.  As I will note in the 
conclusion, today’s proponents of “sustainable development” face similar 
dilemmas.  But the Comité Nacional’s major problem was institutional.  Its history, 
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CAG’s success notwithstanding, betrays one of the central weaknesses of 
technocracy as a model for political organization: its frequent lack of a political 
base and inability to inspire popular backing.  Although the Comité Nacional’s 
members accurately gauged the nature of politics in Peru when they formed this 
society--particularly the linkage between the personalist exercise of power, 
centralist organization, and social standing--they cut off many possibilities for 
organizational growth, particularly as Peruvian politics evolved a more populist 
style in the years leading up to the military revolution of 1968.   
The Comité Nacional was elitist by definition.  As a “committee,” its 
membership was limited to 25 notables who presumed to represent the interests of 
prominent scientific and governing institutions, all with their headquarters in Lima.  
Other associates were mere “correspondents.”  Its membership, likewise, was 
almost entirely composed of prominent scientists living in Lima who figured their 
expertise, professional and social prestige would gain them political influence 
regarding conservation policy.  Early on, the Comité Nacional formed a mission to 
Iquitos, Peru’s Amazonian metropolis, and convinced local notables to form a 
subordinate Subcommittee for the Protection of Nature in 1943.  Prominent citizens 
in other cities less isolated from Lima’s overweening centralism rejected any 
liaison with the Comité Nacional.  (The Sociedad Geográfica de Lima, from which 
these organizing tactics were derived, had much greater success at attracting 
regional “corresponding” members and forming local societies.)  Even in the 
capital, the leaders of the Comité Nacional hesitated to admit new devotees to their 
ranks who did not fit their social mold.  After returning from his studies with Aldo 
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Leopold, Ávila expressed an interest in joining.  Giesecke rejected his overture 
with the reply that membership was “severely restricted.”  Ávila got the message: it 
was restricted to “certain Peruvian Big-shots” unsullied by his humble origin.  As a 
remedy, Ávila used a tried-and-true political tactic: he appealed to his patron Vogt 
who wrote to Barreda directly with the request that his client be admitted to 
membership.  Ávila’s highland compatriot heeded Vogt’s appeal, and Ávila 
contributed however marginally to the activities of the Comité Nacional over the 
next 25 years.  The Comité Nacional quite literally had difficulty reproducing itself: 
it rarely opened new slots unless an old member died.20 
The leaders of the Comité Nacional had visions of a popular conservation 
movement, led by Peruvian youth, but their project could hardly have been less 
populist.  Barreda loved to blame the failures of the Comité Nacional on the 
failings of common Peruvians.  They lacked his “high civic concept,” much less 
any “popular education that generalizes the love of nature and affectionate repect 
for animal life.”  The popular threat to wild nature, therefore, needed “police 
vigilance and control.”  Barreda’s idealization of proper recreation betrayed a 
disdain for plebian culture that cynically ignored the everyday demands of survival 
for most Peruvians.  In his view, sport hunting, rural tourism, and “contemplation 
of living nature” give “spiritual satisfaction to the modern man who tires of the 
daily burdens of urban life” and allow him to “return to the simple, primitive life 
lived by our ancestors.”  He thought “true national parks” in Peru should be 
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centrally organized playgrounds for the leisure class with “comfortable hotels and 
restaurants for the rest and lodging of tourists . . . who should be guided . . . by 
expert forest guards.”  In his zeal for the greening of rainless Lima, Barreda 
despised the use of open public space for fairs and fútbol and favored their 
conversion to closed forests and contemplative gardens.21 
Perhaps the Comité Nacional deserves some credit for action on this last 
count.  Led by the beautification advocate Francisco Ruiz Alarco, one of the 
Comité Nacional’s few original members without a professional degree, its 
members undoubtedly achieved their most tangible “success” through their 
promotion of zoos, botanical gardens, and municipal parks in Lima.  But most 
green spaces in Lima have been designed to protect their thirsty lawns and tropical 
plants from trampling by the urban horde, not for popular access.  For example, the 
central object of Barreda’s scorn regarding popular land use, the Campo de Marte, 
is no longer a military marching ground, nor is it the site of plebian recreation.  
Instead, it is one of the largest green expanses in central Lima today, fenced off 
from adjacent neighborhoods except for a small, relatively inaccessible gate on the 
Avenida de Peruanidad.  This paved parade ground and park provides a landscape 
for Peru’s modern, mechanized military to brandish its might each July during 
Fiestas Patrias, Peru’s independence celebration.  Many other “accessible” green 
spaces are walled off in a different way: they are located in affluent neighborhoods 
miles away from the dwellings of the majority of Lima’s population or surrounded 
by dangerous urban thoroughfares.  In this way, Lima mirrors the elitism of its first 
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society of conservation advocates.  It is little wonder the Comité Nacional inspired 
no popular following--it was hardly national in its representation.  But this failure 
was not inevitable: limeños have risen up en masse on several occasions to demand 
environmental protection, most notably to protest air and water pollution caused by 
the fishmeal boom of the early 1960s.  The Comité Nacional shows the limits of the 
technocratic model of environmental conservation--the central theme of the 
remaining chapters. 
 
Spreading the Gospel of Guano to Mexico and Chile 
Defenders of the Peruvian guano industry as a model of conservation-based 
development had better luck obtaining a new following outside of Peru.  No one 
was more successful in this endeavor than William Vogt. 
When CAG’s directorate decided to terminate Vogt’s contract in December 
1941, they did not sink Vogt’s career as a scientific consultant in Latin America.  
Earlier that month, Japan had bombed the headquarters of the U.S. Pacific fleet at 
Pearl Harbor.  Suddenly, Vogt’s experience in Peru made him a valuable source of 
intelligence on Pacific South America to the U.S. wartime government.  (Recall 
that immigrants like the Fujimoris and Nikumatsu Okada had built a large Japanese 
community in coastal Peru, which the United States saw as a direct threat to the 
Panama Canal.)  The U.S. Committee for Inter-American Cultural and Artistic 
Relations gave Vogt a small grant ostensibly to investigate the climatology of the 
Chilean coast.  During his brief tour of Chile, Vogt questioned local fishermen, 
Chilean scientists, and U.S. expatriates about the migration of Peru’s guano birds 
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and anchoveta during the 1939-1941 El Niño event--but Vogt was actually working 
as a spy for the G-2 intelligence branch of the U.S. Army.  The U.S. War 
Department debriefed him on his return to the United States later in 1942.  Since he 
was physically unfit for military duty, Vogt migrated to the Office of the 
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs where he worked under Nelson Rockefeeler 
as associate director of its Division of Science and Education.  His foreign service 
and reputation as a conservationist made him an ideal choice in 1943 to head the 
Conservation Section of the Pan-American Union (in 1948, renamed the 
Organization of American States).22 
In this position, Vogt’s career as an international conservation advocate 
went into high gear.  To an amazing extent, Vogt’s affairs during his tenure as Pan-
American conservation chief were concerned with guano.  CAG’s achievements 
were widely known, and officials in other countries looked to replicate Peru’s 
success. 
By this date, Peru was not the only country that operated a guano industry 
based on the conservation of marine birds.  Beginning in the early 1890s, the 
government of Cape Colony in southern Africa initiated annual guano extraction 
under a regime designed to protect island nesting colonies of three species: the 
Cape gannet or málaga (Morus capensis), jackass penguin (Spheniscus demersus), 
and Cape cormorant or Trek duiker (Phalacrocorax capensis), all species 
analogous to Peru’s guano birds.  Until the final collapse of the Benguela Current 
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sardine fishery in the 1970s, these islands consistently produced several thousand 
metric tons of guano a year, making them the leading source of nitrogenous 
fertilizer for South African agriculture during the first half of the twentieth century.  
Beginning in 1931, the South African government initiated the construction of 
large, offshore nesting platforms along the northern coast of Namibia; these 
continue to produce significant quantities of fertilizer.  I know of no direct 
connection between the Peruvian and South African guano industries.  This appears 
to be a case of technological convergence between these distant but ecologically 
similar regions.23 
Mexico also had a guano industry with a long history that extended into the 
realm of manure science.  The first non-European student to study at Justus von 
Liebig’s famous teaching laboratory at the University of Giessen came from 
Mexico, not the United States.  Liebig’s famous 1840 book on agricultural 
chemistry, which contributed so much to the guano rush of the mid-nineteenth 
century, found a ready audience among Mexican scientists.24 
Mexico had rich guano deposits of its own.  Beginning in 1857, private 
concerns extracted substantial quantities of guano from both ancient deposits and 
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living bird colonies in the Baja California region and exported it to the agricultural 
empires of California, even as far away as Hamburg.  In 1938, the Mexican state 
prohibited all private extraction and set up a state corporation of its own, Guanos y 
Fertilizantes de México, to manage this natural resource for national consumption.  
Over the next decade, this Mexican version of CAG collected approximately 1,000 
metric tons of guano rico (averaging nine percent nitrogen by weight) per year 
from five bird species, all close relatives of the guano birds of Peru.  Along the 
Pacific coast of Baja California, this company extracted a rather poor product 
mixed with large quantities of extraneous material from colonies of Brandt’s 
cormorant or sargento guanero (Phalacrocorax penicillatus), the double-crested 
cormorant or cuervo marino (P. auritus), and brown pelican or alcatraz (Pelecanus 
occidentalis californicus).  Guanos y Fertilizantes de México extracted its best 
product inside the Gulf of California from a single, dense colony of the brown 
booby or bobo vientre blanco (Sula leucogaster) and from a mixed colony of 
brown and blue-footed boobies (S. nebouxi).  Mexico’s latter-day guano extractors 
ignored a colony of elegant terns (Sterna elegans) and Heermann’s gulls (Larus 
heermanni) on Isla Rasa that at one time produced large quantities of phosphate 
rich, guano pobre--probably because decades of egg collecting had reduced this 
population to a fraction of its former numbers.25  
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In 1944, the director general of Guanos y Fertilizantes de México, Dr. 
Carlos H. Benítez, began promoting the idea that the Mexican guano industry could 
be improved by transplanting guano birds from Peru to the arid Baja coast.  
Geographers had long contended that the California and Peru Current environments 
are mirror images of one another, and Benítez hoped that the Brandt’s cormorant 
might be replaced with its close relative the guanay.  He figured that the much more 
gregarious and productive guanay would “know better what to do” with offshore 
shoals of the California sardine.  If this did not work, Benítez hoped to replace 
Mexico’s brown and blue boobies with the piquero.  As hare-brained as this 
scheme might seem to us today, it fit with conservation orthodoxy at the time 
which enthusiastically advocated the transplant of alien trees like the eucalyptus, 
ground-cover plants like kudzu, game fish like the brown trout, and other species to 
improve the “natural” productivity of environments around the world.26  
Peru’s network of experts soon got involved.  In 1944, CAG agronomist 
Luis Gamarra traveled to Mexico to examine the situation, although he did not 
bring guanay eggs as the Mexicans had requested, since his boss Francisco Ballén 
was suspicious of the entire project.  Benítez also consulted Vogt and Ávila 
regarding the situation, for he was not foolish enough to think his project would 
succeed without expert direction.  Vogt drew up a plan for ornithological research, 
and Guanos y Fertilizantes de México hired biologist Bibiano H. Osorio Tafall to 
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complete a study of Brandt’s cormorant and its ecology.  One by one, all the 
experts involved with this project came out against the plan to introduce the 
Peruvian guano birds to Baja California.  Ballén came out against it almost 
immediately; he did not want to share even a single bird with Mexico at a time 
when Peruvian guano production was at a two-decade low.  This led Benítez to 
label him “un loco de la casa.”  With the Peruvian option looking doubtful for the 
moment, Vogt offered to approach Chilean authorities to arrange the export of 
guanayes from northern Chile to Mexico.   
Ballén’s retirement in July 1945 gave the plan to transplant Peruvian birds a 
new lease on life.  At the request of Peru’s new Minister of Finance, a contract was 
prepared to provide Mexico with 100,000 guanay eggs, 100,000 piquero eggs, and 
25,000 pairs of both birds each year for 29 years. Vogt and Gamarra returned to 
Mexico late in 1945 to study this new plan, but they together concluded that the 
much-less-productive waters off Baja California could not produce much guano--at 
most 3,000 metric tons per year, and only a few hundred profitably--even if the 
introduction plan succeeded.  Vogt offered to wager Benítez “a hundred to one 
odds that any attempts to establish the guanay on the west coast of Mexico will be a 
failure.”  Osorio confided to Robert Cushman Murphy that he, too, thought the plan 
was impracticable, but he could not say so publicly since his job depended on the 
continuation of this research.  Murphy anonymously transmitted Osorio’s critique 
of the project, citing recent studies of the California sardine indicating that the 
maximum upwelling of the California Current was much more dispersed than the 
Humboldt Current and could never support such great concentrations of bird life.  
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Murphy’s long experience as a student of marine birds led him to raise a more 
troubling question:  Why had the Peruvian birds never colonized this region on 
their own over the eons if the environment was so suitable for them?  But even with 
powerful experts on his side, Ávila was still hesitant to oppose the project publicly 
in his final report because it had “quite a few political strings attached to it.”  As 
Murphy had done for Osorio, Vogt passed on Ávila’s negative opinions to CAG’s 
new managers.  These junior Latin American scientists felt too vulnerable to 
divulge their “unbiased opinions” to their superiors--their jobs and economic 
survival were at stake.  Avila and Osorio’s power as Lords of Guano had tightly 
circumscribed limits.27 
As a consequence, project boosters could dismiss the criticism of “foreign” 
scientists and present these Latin American “nationals” as sharing their optimism.  
Seemingly no amount of expert criticism would snuff the enthusiasm of one 
Mexican booster.  José Carlos Arenas traveled all the way to Peru to promote his 
grandiose plan to purchase US$600,000 worth of boats, tractors, and bulldozers to 
collect the wealth of excrement Peruvian birds would eventually provide to 
Mexico.  Rather than trust the opinion of U.S. scientists, Arenas detected an 
imperialist conspiracy: he boldly dismissed Vogt as “a sentimentalist nature lover 
who wants to confuse Latin American conservationists for the sole pupose of 
saving the industrial interests” of the sagging California sardine industry.  Arenas 
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thought it practicable to airlift thousands of eggs from Peru to Mexico and then 
surreptitiously switch the eggs of P. penicillatus with those of P. bougainvillii, 
thereby tricking the former to raise changlings.  Peruvians eventually decided to err 
on the side of caution: CAG listened to Vogt and rejected the proposal.  Even 
though, ecologically speaking, this looks like the right call to us today, this 
technocratic decision was not necessarily good for the scientific management of 
Mexico’s marine resources.  It put Osorio’s job in severe jeopardy.  But Vogt 
respected the patron-client relationship he had established with Osorio and tried to 
obtain other positions for him, in addition to providing him with scientific books 
and equipment.  In a pattern that was repeated by Peru’s first native-born 
professional ornithologists, Osorio sought to solve this problem by becoming an 
advocate--and scientist--for the development of Mexico’s fishery resources.  But 
his career reached a dead end in Mexico, and he emigrated to work for the nascent 
Chilean fishing industry in the early 1950s.28 
Vogt’s second mission to Chile was also premised on guano’s promise.  
Chile operated a small guano industry in the 1940s.  Every four years, it typically 
extracted a little over 3,000 metric tons from bird colonies off the coast of its far 
northern provinces Arica and Tarapacá (territories it had won from Peru during the 
War of the Pacific).  Late in 1944 while Mexico was negotiating with Peru, the 
Chilean Corporación de Fomento (CORFO)--an extremely important technocratic 
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institution in its own right--sent a request to the Inter-American Development 
Commission to obtain the services of Vogt.29  CORFO engineers wanted Vogt to 
show them how to organize better their own guano industry to increase its output 
for Chilean national agriculture.  But Vogt obtained little local cooperation during 
his guano study:  Chilean officials would not provide him with data regarding past 
guano collection nor even the most basic information on Chilean fisheries.  Vogt 
had to rely on transportation provided by the U.S. Embassy as he did a whirlwind 
environmental survey of Chile’s north coast.  Chilean officials probably suspected, 
with good cause, that Vogt was acting as a spy for U.S. military and fishing 
interests.  Despite these problems obtaining information, Vogt felt confident 
enough to conclude that Chile could establish a guano industry based on the 
conservation techniques developed over the years by CAG that would produce 
around 5,000 metric tons per year.  In response, the Chilean state formed the 
Sociedad Chilena de Fertilizantes to implement Vogt’s recommendations.  By 
1945, there were three technocratic organizations in Latin America devoted to 
sustained-yield production of guano.  In the 1950s, Chile copied CAG’s policy of 
building artificial breeding islands by walling-off coastal points along its far 
northern coast.30 
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Like his experience with CAG and the Comité Nacional de Protección a la 
Naturaleza in Peru, Vogt’s consultation with the guano industries of Mexico and 
Chile opened the door for organizing activity in other realms of conservation.  
During his mission to Mexico in 1944, Vogt met with some “top-notch Mexicans” 
to reorganize and broaden the goals of the Comité Nacional para la Protección de 
Aves Silvestres established in 1931 by Miguel Ángel de Quevedo, Mexico’s 
foremost conservationist of the early twentieth century.  During his mission to 
Chile in 1945, Vogt convened a meeting of scientific notables who reorganized 
their own national committee as the Comisión de Protección a la Naturaleza.  Its 
goals reflected those of Peru’s Comité Nacional, and this meeting led directly to the 
establishment of Cape Horn National Park, a reserve protecting 2,000 square 
kilometers of rugged coast and icy wasteland at the southern tip of the Americas.  
Taking over where Gilbert Pearson left off, Vogt inspired the organization of 
national sections of the International Committee for Bird Preservation in 
Guatemala and Venezuela in the mid-1940s.31 
As he had in Peru, Vogt collaborated most closely in these endeavors with 
local scientists, technocrats, and educators.  In Mexico, Vogt teamed up with 
Enrique Beltrán (b. 1903) on a series of projects.  During the first phase of his 
career, Beltrán had been an advocate for the rational development of Mexico’s 
marine resources.  To this end, he obtained a degree in marine biology from 
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Mexico’s national university.  In the 1920s, he led two government expeditions to 
establish a marine biology research center on the Gulf of Mexico, but post-
revolutionary instability led to their abrupt interruption and forced Beltrán to 
abandon this career path.  With the help of a scholarship from the Guggenheim 
Foundation, Beltrán completed a Ph.D. in protozoan zoology at Columbia 
University in New York in 1933.  President Lázaro Cárdenas then appointed 
Beltrán as the first director of Mexico’s Instituto Biotécnico, a short-lived state 
agency charged with the administration of all investigations related to natural 
resource management.  Beltrán later worked as a developer of state science 
curricula for Cárdenas’s government, a position of some importance in the cultural 
politics of the time, before he joined Mexico’s new institute for the study of 
tropical diseases, an institution near the top of Mexico’s scientific hierarchy.  Vogt 
and Beltrán focused on conservation propaganda during Vogt’s missions to 
Mexico.  Most notably, they collaborated on a series of broadcasts on the 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México’s XEXX radio station in 1944 that 
presented “brief essays on the ecology of conservation.”  These provided the basis 
for Beltrán’s best-known book Los recurosos naturales de México y su 
conservación (1946), a secondary-school conservation manual.  Significantly for 
Vogt’s future influence, about this time, Beltrán adopted the philosophy that 
population is the root cause of environmental problems.  In 1952, he went on to 
found the Instituto Mexicano de Recursos Naturales Renovables (IMERNAR).  It 
quickly evolved into one of Mexico’s premier conservation organizations.  Like 
Peru’s Comité Nacional de Protección a la Naturaleza, IMERNAR’s most visible 
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and influential accomplishment, its long series of annual “round table” meetings of 
experts, was eminently technocratic in orientation.  As much as Quevedo, Beltrán’s 
career makes evident the central role of scientists serving as environmental 
managers in the Mexican conservation movement.32 
Mexico’s attempts to install a conservation technocracy suffered from 
divisions and weaknesses similar to Peru’s experiment.  Technocrats in Mexico 
became embroiled in intense disagreements over the issue of development.  Vogt, 
for example, became involved in a public debate with Adolfo Orive Alba, Mexico’s 
irrigation commissioner, over the value of large dams in the battle against soil 
erosion.  Orive objected vociferously to Vogt’s contention that Mexico was 
geographically ill-suited to industrialization and that dams needlessly drowned rich 
farmland.  Orive won the political side of the debate with his promises of cheap 
electricity and regular water supplies for every Mexican.  In keeping with the 
revolutionary rhetoric of the Mexican state, Orive and Beltrán both expressed 
sensitivity toward the rights of poor Mexicans to use national resources--though 
Beltrán thought their use should be under the firm guidance of ecologists.  Today’s 
Mexican environmentalists have attracted little popular support despite such 
                                                 
32. Enrique Beltrán, Los recursos naturales de México y su conservación, introduction by 
William Vogt (Mexico City: Secretaria de Educación Pública, 1946), esp. viii; idem, “Cuarenta años 
de conservacionismo mexicano,” in El conservacionismo mexicano (Mexico City: Instituto 
Mexicano de Recursos Naturales Renovables, 1966), 21-52; Simonian, Defending the Land of the 
Jaguar, 125-127, 129-130, 133-140; Vogt, Progress Report (n.p.: Pan American Section of the 
International Committee for Bird Preservation, 1 Jan. 1946), Vogt papers, box 3:3.  See also Vogt, 
El hombre y la tierra (Mexico City: Secretaria de Educación Pública, 1944); Beltrán, El hombre y 
su ambiente: Ensayo sobre el Valle de México (Mexico City: Tezontle, 1958), an environmental 
history of the lake basin containing Mexico City from the pre-Hispanic period to the 1950s.  On the 
key political importance of educational projects during the Cárdenas era, see Mary Kay Vaughan, 
Cultural Politics in Revolution: Teachers, Peasants, and Schools in Mexico (Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 1997).   
320 
populist appeals and Beltrán’s dedication to conservation education.33  This 
shortcoming is understandable when one recognizes the technocratic elitism lying 
at the root of both the Mexican and Peruvian environmental movements. 
 
The Environmentalist Manifesto 
While Vogt spread the gospel of guano to Chile and Mexico, he began to 
map out a general solution to the globe’s environmental problems.  His duties as 
Pan-American conservation chief provided him with an ideal opportunity to expand 
his horizons.  During the mid-1940s he completed conservation surveys of Mexico, 
Guatemala, Chile, Venezuela, El Salvador, and Costa Rica.  Vogt had come a long 
way from his days sitting in a blind among Peru’s guano birds, but he remained 
fixated on the relationship between population, subsistence, and environmental 
crisis.  His survey reports all emphasized the threat of overpopulation, the 
progressive deterioration of agricultural land, and the human misery that inevitably 
followed in their wake.34  This turn toward the study of human populations far 
beyond the boundaries of his native land was of epochal significance for the future 
development of the environmental movement in the United States. 
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As witness to the Malthusian decline of Peru’s guano birds during the 1939-
1941 El Niño, Vogt became highly attuned to the importance of food to human 
well-being.  This concern developed into an obsession during his tenure as a 
conservation administrator for the Americas, and his obsession found its public 
expression in Vogt’s 1948 book Road to Survival.35  Vogt’s jeremiad was perhaps 
the most influential environmentalist book published in the United States during the 
years leading up to Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring.  He dropped the “population 
bomb” thesis 20 years before biologist Paul R. Ehrlich and the Club of Rome, the 
experts who tend to get credit for drawing the world’s attention to the ecological 
dangers of population growth.  (Ehrlich, in fact, read Vogt’s book and took its 
conclusions to heart while he was still a young college student; Ehrlich 
appropriated the phrase “population bomb” from a pamphlet first published in 1954 
by Vogt’s disciple Hugh Moore.)  The contents of Vogt’s book, particularly its 
commentary on scientific management of natural resources, reflect the fundamental 
influence of Vogt’s experience in Peru and Latin America.  Through Vogt’s rather 
haughty, ethnocentric conceptualization, events in Latin America had a decisive 
impact on the development of environmental thought at a crucial stage in United 
States history when its long-established conservation movement was in the midst of 
metamorphosing into a full-fledged environmental movement.36   
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Road to Survival was a manifesto “to regain ecological freedom for our 
civilization.”  It was based on a twin premise: “We live in one world in an 
ecological-environmental sense,” Vogt reasoned, expressing the globalist ideology 
that had recently given birth to the United Nations and his own Pan-American 
experience.  “Environmental resistance” or “carrying capacity” put a “practical 
ceiling” on all human endeavors, Vogt argued, applying the principle that had 
guided his study of the guano birds and announcing his opposition to the undiluted 
technological optimism of post-war progressives like Vannevar Bush, the architect 
of the National Science Foundation.  This dual premise was based on Vogt’s 
idealization of a world in “ecological equilibrium” where destructive competition 
was minimized and productivity maximized.  The “Earth’s golden mean” was that 
of a democratic society, which “survives through a system of checks and balances.”  
From this background, Vogt proceeded to paint a grim picture of our probable 
future explicitly designed to vindicate the avatar of “the dismal science,” the 
English political economist Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834).37 
Vogt’s first target was “that sacred cow, free enterprise.”  Echoing many of 
his intellectual colleagues in the United States formed by the experience of the 
Great Depression and the Age of Reform that preceded it, Vogt had little but scorn 
for free-market capitalism, though he hesitated to take clear sides in the emerging 
Cold War.  “The good of the individual, and even of groups, must be sacrificed for 
the general good,” Vogt pleaded.  Western cattlemen typified America’s 
“ecological Fifth Column” and were at the top of Vogt’s blacklist: “The 
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freebooting, rugged individualist . . . we must now recognize, where his activities 
destroy resources, as the Enemy of the People he has become.”  Considering his 
activities in Latin America, it is no surprise that Vogt concluded that government 
intervention, perhaps even government ownership, was needed to increase 
democratic access to natural resources.  But he was no fan of the Soviet “police 
state” (nor Latin American military states, for that matter) which he viewed as 
deceived by the same nineteenth-century progressivism that had given rise to the 
sins of modern capitalism.38 
Vogt was haunted by the specter of the recent world war, and he desperately 
wanted to prevent the seemingly inevitable “atomic or bacterial warfare” of a 
World War III.  Echoing the rhetoric of the eugenicist who founded the 
Washington-based Population Reference Bureau, Guy Burch, he faulted nationalist 
expansionism typified by Hitler’s Lebensraum idea for recent hostilities.  But Vogt 
laid ultimate blame for this great tragedy at the feet of the industrial West which he 
thought had senselessly encouraged population growth and global competition for 
resources through imperial conquest in the decades leading up to the war.  
Countries with limited natural resources such as Japan were not the only villains of 
World War II: 
 
The culpabilty of Japan in seeking this way out of her Malthusian dilemma 
is a culpability shared by most of the nations that have been self-righteously 
preaching democracy.  We grabbed enormous territories from Mexico, and 
under Theodore Roosevelt we unblushingly did to Colombia [by 
establishing the Panama Canal Zone] what Russia would now like to do to 
Turkey [in the Bosporus strait].  The chief justification for our present 
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attitude seems to be that we did our grabbing several decades ago.  We did 
not have the very eminent excuse of such population pressure as confronted 
Japan. 
In its colonial rule of India, the “contented parasite” Great Britain had done even 
more harm than the United States.  Through its industrial and sanitary policies, it 
removed the checks of “disease, famine, and fighting” and allowed Indians, for 
whom “sex play is the national sport,” to go “their accustomed way, breeding with 
the irresponsibility of codfish.”  This then put pressure on the United States to open 
its doors to immigration “to reduce the pressure caused by untrammeled 
copulation.”  As a consequence, the United States stood to see its own living 
standard fall in order “to raise that of the backward billion of Asia.”  Late 
twentieth-century nativism among North American and European 
environmentalists has followed similar reasoning--not to mention some Latin 
American anti-imperialist rhetoric.39 
It is quite remarkable, in fact, how many latter-day environmentalist 
shibboleths Vogt expressed in this 1948 book, many of which eventually found 
their way into environmental historiography: nature as pristine before humans 
became “civilized,” the “goat-god” and ax as destroyers of ancient Mediterranean 
civilization, sheep as the “devourers of men,” erosion as “the cancer of the land,” 
endangered species and predators as integral to the “balance of nature,” the dams of 
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) as “cross-purpose” rather than “multi-
purpose,” “good roads” as the highways to environmental destruction, China as the 
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land of starvation, Africa as a “dying land” condemned by desertification.  Most 
significantly, Vogt, like Leopold and Ávila, foresaw that ecological “revolution” 
would occur only after “a profound change of fundamental ideas” led humans to 
discard “our elementalistic Aristotelean heritage.”  Of course, Vogt was not the first 
nor the most eloquent to enunciate these ideas, but he did bring them to bear on a 
compelling and immensely influential argument.40 
At the core of Vogt’s book was an explicit comparison between the United 
States and Latin America.  This was the supposed empirical foundation of his 
analysis, acquired by experience.  Picking up on a metaphor long used by 
proponents of tropical medicince and eugenics, Vogt contrasted North America’s 
tremendous fortune with Latin America as a tubercular patient.41 
This fortune, however, was built on spoilage.  “Our forefathers . . . were one 
of the most destructive groups of human beings that have ever raped the earth.”  
Citing early environmental historian Avery Craven, Vogt concluded that this 
fortune was built on soil mining for the production of plantation crops, followed by 
parasitic industrial development.  Furthermore, the Americas (as a whole) had 
succored Europe’s vast ecological hunger by exporting American cultivars like the 
potato and then importing vast numbers of Europe’s human castoffs who had been 
brought up on this largesse and then orphaned.  Quoting eugenicist P. K. Whelpton 
in the Journal of Heredity, Vogt concluded, “The United States is now 
overpopulated from the standpoint of per capita economic welfare,” at least in 
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terms of what Vogt called “The American Standard of Living.”  Its immense 
natural inheritance notwithstanding, the United States needed to reduce its 
population to 100 million if it was to survive.  (Vogt scrupulously avoided any 
mention of the true inspiration for this statement: Whelpton’s desire to produce a 
“better population” by cutting off immigration and encouraging the reproduction of 
“native white women” and “the more able, intelligent and farsighted portion of the 
population.”)42 
Latin America was in far worse condition.  “All Latin American countries 
except three or four are overpopulated. . . . Biological bankruptcy hangs over their 
heads like a shaking avalanche.”  (In other words, it was folly to keep following the 
positivist slogan “to govern is to populate” coined by the Argentine Juan Bautista 
Alberdi in 1853.) Vogt diagnosed Latin America’s regional illness as traceable to 
four basic causes:  First, in polar opposition to regional progressives, Vogt 
concluded that the land simply did not have sufficient fertility (“carrying capacity”) 
to produce wealth over the long term without depleting Latin America’s 
“ecological capital.”  (In Vogt’s thinking, like that of the eighteenth-century French 
physiocrats, all value was derived ultimately from the soil.)  Second, Vogt declared 
that a “cultural lag” inherited from sixteenth-century Spain and nineteenth-century 
France held back Latin America’s political development, particularly the region’s 
domination by large landowners and the corruption entailed by the “spoils system” 
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that ruled its centralized governments.  (Significantly for future development of this 
discourse, a negative evaluation of Roman Catholicism did not figure into this 
formulation.)  Third, this region’s “primitive New World folkways” were a barrier 
to progress.  For example, the communal ejido was not a viable solution to 
Mexico’s land reform problem simply because it doled out land in too-small 
quantities to communities of peasant farmers--who also lacked the knowledge to 
produce enough for their own subsistence while conserving the productivity of their 
minuscule holdings.  The “scientific vacuum” that created this situation, however, 
was not due to “lack of intelligence or ability” among even the poorest, as Vogt’s 
more racist peers might have argued; rather, it was due to a fundamental lack of 
economic resources related to causes one and two above.  Fourth, “the ‘American 
standard of living’ . . . has sent all classes [in Latin America] awhoring after 
strange gods.”  In Vogt’s prognosis, industrialization was simply impossible in 
most Latin American countries.  Nearly all lacked exploitable natural resources 
(particularly energy, since Vogt dogmatically rejected hydroelectricity) and had 
small internal markets (impoverished by the basic lack of arable land).  Vogt 
especially criticized the contradictory effect of high protectionist tariffs promoted 
by some economists because they tended to enrich only a few import-substituting 
industrialists while drastically raising the cost of living for the masses.  Only 
Argentina, Brazil, and perhaps the Dominican Republic, which had “protected itself 
against the Haitian hordes,” seemed to be in a position to escape from this vicious 
cycle, Vogt concluded--although if he had actually toured these countries, perhaps 
he would have condemned all of Latin America to destruction.  Vogt largely 
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blamed the United States for this ominous situation: as in Asia’s ongoing conflicts, 
the U.S. policy of “dollar diplomacy” promised to have “violent repercussions” in 
the near future in Latin America.  As in the United States, the fundamental cause 
for all of these problems was ballooning population.43 
Peru, at least, was not so bad off in Vogt’s schema thanks to its guano 
industry.  Like Robert Coker and Robert Cushman Murphy before him, Vogt 
unequivocally praised CAG to his North American audience.  “Were it not for 
guano, Peru would indeed be in a sorry state,” with its coastal agricultural 
productivity soon falling to nothing.  But “with guano they have few equals”--in 
sharp contrast to Chile whose “greatest natural asset is its high death rate.”  As a 
civil service organization, the Compañía Administradora del Guano 
 
set an example not only for the Americas but for the entire world.  Were 
natural resources generally managed as intelligently as the Peruvians have--
in this century--managed their guano, the future of the human race could be 
regarded with considerably more optimism.   
Peru’s guano ecology served as an object lesson for the rest of the world in other 
ways.  Vogt noted with approval that the lagartija lizard Tropidurus peruvianus 
eats its own young to control its population.  It is clear from such comments that 
Vogt’s conception of animal behavior, especially among the guano birds, strongly 
influenced his ideas regarding human conflict.  In Road to Survival, Vogt repeated 
his assertion that increased competition among guano birds for living space on 
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coastal islands, especially when food was scarce, led to the break-up of breeding 
colonies, created millions of “ecological refugees,” and served as a powerful 
natural form of population control.  He described almost an identical scenario for 
humankind during World War II.  This reveals one of Vogt’s fundamental 
presuppositions: human beings are a part of nature; therefore, the ecological 
relationships that govern animal populations must also be the norm for human 
populations.  Unless we experience a fundamental change in outlook, Vogt 
fervently believed, material necessity would bring human civilization to a great 
crash that paled before the economic downturn of the 1930s and the ecological 
depression of the guano birds.  Again following the example of the Peruvian guano 
industry, part of this change would have to involve proper fertilizer use.  Vogt 
praised the use of night soil by South Chinese farmers, noting that nitrogen-rich 
“Anglo-Saxon” feces brought particularly high prices there.  Like the nineteenth-
century proponents of sewage farming mentioned in chapter 1, Vogt believed 
humans needed to “close the circle” and stop throwing away the valuable manure 
produced by modern sanitation systems in misguided fear of epidemic disease.44 
 The Road to Survival did not inevitably lead human society down the toilet.  
Vogt’s intense pessimism about population growth was balanced against an 
abundant technocratic optimism.  He envisioned the establishment of an 
“international WPA” funded by the richer countries to promote “ecological health” 
in the rest of the world--not unlike the “global Marshall Plan” later promoted by 
U.S. politician Albert Gore, Jr.  Vogt’s testament had two commandments, one old 
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and one new:  1) Renewable resources shall be managed to produce as much wealth 
as possible on a sustained-yield basis--the old conservationist “gospel of 
efficiency.”  2) Human societies shall adjust their demand for such resources to this 
sustainable supply, either by lowering their living standard or maintaining fewer 
people.  Vogt thought having few children was the only reasonable choice if 
modern civilized life was to survive.45 
 Scientists would be the judges of Vogt’s new order.  His program of 
research and action was derived from his experience as a scientist in Peru and as a 
conservation administrator for the Americas.  The first task in regions with a 
“scientific vacuum” like Latin America would be to begin “ecological 
bookkeeping” through the gathering of climate data, the conduct of biological 
surveys, and the collection of other “elementary data.”  Vogt did not say directly 
who would be responsible for the interpretation of this data, but the disdain he 
expressed for the “dangerously misleading conclusions” derived from “so-called 
scientific work done in some of the poor countries” suggests that he thought Latin 
Americans could not be trusted to accomplish this by themselves, at least as long as 
their work was limited by poor training, poor pay, and insulation from the 
international scientific community.  (His conflict with scientists in Peru, Mexico, 
and Chile was almost certainly influenced his views on this matter.)  Vogt hoped 
the establishment of international cooperative research programs, as well as 
translation centers and clearinghouses for the diffusion of scientific knowledge 
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would remedy these shortcomings.  The uses of this knowledge would then be 
adjudicated by boards of scientists, “scientific bureaucrats,” in effect, who would 
advise politicians and directly oversee some programs.  Vogt thought the Vannevar 
“Bush plan” for a National Science Foundation in the United States was a step in 
the right direction, as long as funding went to the study of the land and its health, 
and not to military and medical nostrums.46 
 Yet Vogt did not have complete faith in technocracy.  He was ambivalent 
about the utility of purely technical knowledge.  Although he anointed Gifford 
Pinchot of the U.S. Forest Service and Hugh H. Bennett of the U.S. Soil 
Conservation Service as the prophets of his new order, Vogt had a profound 
distrust for engineers who were the products of narrow technical training, 
particularly the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers who had drowned so much fertile 
farmland behind dams in the name of conservation.  Vogt was even more 
distrustful of “a world dotted with TVAs.”  As he knew from personal observation 
in Latin America, big technological projects had great potential for graft and often 
disregarded the immense variation in “technical and social progress” around the 
world.  Scientific research was worthless unless it was accomplished in a holistic 
spirit relating “the whole man to the total environment, recognizing the uniqueness 
of peoples and environments, and the fact that relationships. . . are constantly 
changing” over time.47 
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 Vogt also hoped that room could be found for popular democracy in this 
new order somehow.  He approved of the ongoing process of decolonization for 
countries like Indonesia.  Yet he disapproved of popular desires perverted by free-
market capitalism even more than he distrusted experts.  Like any good liberal, he 
believed proper education provided an escape from this dilemma.  Vogt generalized 
the strategy he and Enrique Beltrán had begun to develop for the Mexican state:  In 
order to survive, states would need to implement a system of scientific and 
humanitarian education for all of society that emphasized the principles of holistic 
ecological health.  Teachers would have to take the lead in this endeavor.  This 
cadre would require proper training, preferably acquired on the land and among the 
people they would manage.  As a result, these teachers would be capable of 
adapting this knowledge to local environmental and cultural variation (much as 
Carlos Llosa had used Vogt’s understanding of the guano birds to come up with his 
artificial islands policy), as they came to understand the relationships that unite all 
of nature.  Vogt envisioned the use of mass media as a tool to sell locally 
appropriate means of land management: “Advertising and publicity techniques that 
have girdled the globe with American tooth paste should sell sound land-use and 
ecological awareness; instead of promoting an American standard of living, they 
should promote a rational, national standard.”  Locally based institutions using 
local languages would orchestrate this education, preferibly modeled after the Inter-
American Institute of Agricultural Sciences at Turrialba, Costa Rica, a Pan-
American teaching center developed under Vogt’s watch.  National and state parks 
were also ideal instruments to instill these principles.  Vogt had great faith in 
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education, even for “so-called backward people.”  After all, he had observed 
Peruvian guano workers “many of them unable to read or write” who learned to 
“faithfully brush their teeth twice daily.”  Nevertheless, Vogt’s advocacy for “a 
rational, national standard” for all peoples betrayed his belief that no system could 
hope to eliminate the gulf between ecologically rich and poor nations, and he made 
no call for any large-scale international redistribution of income.48 
Vogt was neither a total apocalyptist nor an egalitarian--nor did he disdain 
technology.  Having witnessed the sprouting of the Green Revolution at research 
labs in Mexico financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, Vogt had great hopes for 
genetically improved cultivars whose productivity would allow farmers to take 
marginal lands out of cultivation.  Mass media also had a major role to play in his 
plans.  But the linchpin of his system was “outwitting the libido.”  This required “a 
completely new approach to contraception” that went beyond his hero “Charles 
Goodyear’s treatment of rubber” that had led to the mass-marketing of condoms.  
Above all, women needed a contraceptive technology of their own that was cheap 
and dependable: “If the United States had spent two billion dollars developing such 
a contraceptive, instead of the atom bomb, it would have contributed far more to 
our national security, while, at the same time, it promoted a rising living standard 
for the entire world.”  “Freedom of contraception” became Vogt’s most influential 
maxim.49 
                                                 
48. Emphasis added; ibid., 272-277, 282.    
49. Ibid., 265, 277-283.  
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This solution, if it was to have a global impact, hinged on Vogt’s belief that 
humans universally share certain values that do not have to be taught by experts.  
Out of love for our children and our desire to care for their best interests, he 
thought families would freely choose to control their fertility when shown its 
necessity.  Remarkably, at the time Vogt wrote Road to Survival he naively thought 
that conservative institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church would not be 
significant obstacles to this goal (Vogt was not an outspoken anti-Catholic at this 
stage.)  In the final analysis, he still believed that traditional social institutions were 
compatible with his vision.  No matter how radical some of his ideas might sound, 
he was a reformer, not a revolutionary.  Even though “the handwriting on the wall 
of five continents” told him that “the Day of Judgment is at hand,” Vogt believed 
the gate to life was wide and the road to survival broad.  He thought the mass of 
humanity would choose the right path once they were told the truth.50  
    
Vogt’s Legacy 
No doubt many of these pronouncements are familiar to those acquainted 
with the rhetoric of U.S. students of Latin America from this era.  They tend to 
confirm the insight of historian Frederick Pike that new approaches to U.S. 
intervention in Latin America--especially Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor 
Policy--emerged from new conceptions of the relation between humans and nature, 
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particularly a “quest for equilibrium with nature” enunciated by a vanguard of 
professionals during the Great Depression.51 
Vogt was both influenced by this intellectual shift and, in turn, influenced it 
himself.  This is especially apparent where the so-called Berkeley School of 
cultural geography and demographic history is concerned.  Beginning in the 1930s, 
this group of scholars founded by geographer Carl Sauer devoted its attention to the 
relationship between population, the environment, and subsistence in Latin 
America past and present, especially the impact of the European conquest on the 
New World.52  The research of this original generation of ecological historians in 
the United States--all students of Mexico and the U.S. Borderlands--laid the 
foundations for present-day orthodoxy regarding the decline of aboriginal 
populations in the Americas.  They argued that the population circa 1492 in the 
Americas was very high, especially in central Mexico and the central Andes.  The 
indigenous population was so high, in fact, that it was on the verge of collapse in 
many regions--or in a few areas had already collapsed.  The arrival of Old World 
diseases, rather than European brutality and military prowess, caused massive 
subsistence crises that came close to eliminating these populations.  This 
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population decline then left a dearth of exploitable labor that contributed to a long 
economic depression in the mining regions of Spanish America during the 
seventeenth century, the turn toward intensive exploitation of African slaves on 
plantations, and the drive toward extensive raising of livestock on the “Great 
Hacienda.”53 
It became possible to make this sort of argument at mid-century because 
population ecologists had demonstrated the potential for dramatic boom-bust cycles 
among wild animal populations.  These included the famous studies by Charles 
Elton and his students of the predator-prey interactions of lemming, arctic fox, and 
snowy owl populations in northern Canada based on historical records of the 
Hudson Bay Company, Raymond Pearl’s claim to have discovered a mathematical 
“law,” the logistic curve, that described these biological boom-bust cycles, Aldo 
Leopold’s studies of deer “irruptions”--and, of course, Vogt’s studies of the guano 
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birds.54  Vogt and the Berkeley School directly appropriated these findings for their 
studies of human ecology.  As early as 1934, Vogt had already presented the 
argument that the collapse of the ancient Maya had been caused by a great 
subsistence crisis due to systematic destruction of Mesoamerica’s lowland forest.  
This coincidence was no mere manifestation of the Zeitgeist.  Vogt and the 
Berkeley School directly influenced one another through correspondence.  For 
example, Vogt adopted the Mexican historian Lesley Byrd Simpson’s contention 
that maize, rather than men, was the real “Tyrant of Mexico.”  Simpson became 
centrally concerned with the potential “for a Malthusian tragedy” in Mexico thanks 
to Vogt.  By extension, Vogt’s experience as a Lord of the Guanay continues to 
affect the ways we conceive of Latin America, past and present.  This is yet another 
in a long line of examples in which natural science influenced the development of 
social thought (and vice versa).55 
Vogt’s impact on the formation of environmental history as a profession did 
not stop there.  Playing the role of patron, as he had with Enrique Ávila and B. H. 
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Osorio Tafall, Vogt directly inspired Clarence J. Glacken (1909-1989) to make 
environmental studies his profession.  Vogt befriended him in 1942 when 
Glacken’s wife worked for Vogt at the office of the Coordinator of Inter-American 
Affairs in Washington.  Vogt piqued Glacken’s interest in conservation issues, 
particularly soil erosion.  After Glacken returned from a tour of duty in Korea, 
where he was in charge of repatriating Koreans from Japanese-occupied territories 
after World War II, he wrote a personal appeal to Vogt.  Following the path of 
many cerebral veterans enabled by the G.I. Bill, Glacken wanted to get a Ph.D. that 
would allow him to pursue his interests in human ecology as a professional.  From 
El Salvador, Vogt directed his client to travel to Berkeley, meet Carl Sauer, and ask 
him about making an academic career as an East Asia expert.  Sauer, who was an 
outspoken critic of the reductionist triumphalism of social science, convinced 
Glacken to study geography at Johns Hopkins University, and Vogt wrote him an 
enthusiastic recommendation.  There, Glacken completed a dissertation on “The 
Ideas of the Habitable World” in Western thought since the late eighteenth century-
-including a discussion of “Population Growth and Resources,” clear evidence of 
Vogt’s influence.  Continuing in their role as patrons, Vogt tried to arrange a 
publisher for Glacken’s thesis, while Sauer gave Glacken an academic job working 
as part of the Berkeley School. 
Sauer arranged for Glacken to deal with “over-all human time” at the June 
1955 Symposium on Man’s Role in Changing the Face of the Earth.  Under Sauer’s 
guidance this conference became the mythic birthplace of environmental history as 
a problematic, if not as a profession.  (Only two of 75 participants were employed 
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as “historians,” even though “how we got where we are” was an explicit concern of 
the symposium, thanks to Sauer.)  Meanwhile, Sauer protected Glacken from the 
“publish or perish” academic set while he expanded on the ideas of his dissertation.  
Its introduction evolved into one of the masterpieces of environmental history, 
Traces on the Rhodian Shore (1967), a richly detailed interpretation of nature in 
Western thought from Hippocrates to Humboldt.  In later years, Glacken continued 
to acknowledge Vogt’s broad influence in his teaching and writing.  He 
prominently featured Vogt in the unpublished--and unfortunately lost--multi-
volume sequel to this work.  Through Glacken, Vogt contributed to the formation 
of a generation of academic experts on the human encounter with the natural 
environment.56 
Vogt’s influence was not limited to the ivory tower--not by a long shot.  
Road to Survival was the best-selling book on conservation issues in the United 
States before Carson’s Silent Spring.  Excerpts and reviews published in popular 
periodicals broadened Vogt’s audience even further.  An excerpt published in 
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Harper’s Magazine featured CAG as a lone example of hope on a continent sliding 
to ruin.  In this short article, Vogt repeated his stern warning regarding the 
revolutionary potential of Latin America.  Five years before Fidel Castro initiated 
the 26th of July Movement at the Moncada barracks in Cuba, Vogt demanded that 
the United States,  
 
control American vandals abroad.  We have spent millions of dollars trying 
to prove that we mean what we say about the Good Neighbor Policy--and at 
the same time we permit, even encourage, American business men to 
destroy the very means of subsistence of millions of people.  This. . . can 
scarcely fail to have violent repercussions when the people of Latin 
America awake to what is being done to them.  The fact that Latin 
Americans themselves are selling out their countires will be forgotten; the 
dead cats will be heaved at the Colossus of the North.57 
In stark contrast, the condensed version of Road to Survival published in 
Reader’s Digest systematically omitted Vogt’s criticism of the United States and 
European colonial powers.  In this butchered account, “the Japs who came to 
dinner” and other poor “men and women in overpopulated countries who produce 
excessive numbers of children” became the real threat to the “American standard of 
living” and global order.  Vogt’s recommendations that “colonial lands. . . be 
placed under an ecological trusteeship” and that international organizations offer 
people “a sterilization bonus” took on a perverted meaning in this context.  And to 
make sure that the right-wing political implications of this message were clear to 
his 15 million worldwide subscribers (including the many Latin American readers 
of the Spanish-language edition), DeWitt Wallace, the immensely powerful editor 
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of Reader’s Digest, juxtaposed a Panglossian “critique of Road to Survival” that 
told Americans to get ready for unprecedented prosperity during the 1950s.58    
 Unfortunately, the latter, poorly digested version of Vogt’s argument came 
to dominate public discourse when magazines like Newsweek and Business Week 
published features on “Vogt’s ecological Doomsday Book.”  This left Vogt open to 
poorly grounded attacks from technological optimists and cornucopians across the 
political spectrum.  Many took aim at Vogt’s scientific credentials.  From the left, a 
professional geographer writing for The Nation utterly condemned Vogt for his 
“hysterical efforts” against “the spawning millions of backward countries, who 
must now have fewer children and conserve their dwindling resources--so that we 
may maintain our standard of living.”  This writer thought nobody could “foresee 
the end of technological advances.”  For example, “the sea has a virtually limitless 
sustenance capacity which can be developed through scientific research.”  Vogt’s 
failure to ask “the Chinese, Puerto Ricans, Indians, or Africans what they think,” in 
contrast, represented “the extent of science’s bankruptcy in the face of modern 
problems.”  Closer to the political center, a breathless columnist for Time claimed 
that “to the real agricultural scientists, close to the soil and its sciences, such 
pessimism sounds silly or worse.”  Through the use of hybrids, agricultural 
chemicals, and scientific understanding, Time argued, “Man is master not only of 
the soil, but of the plants that grow in it, molding them plastically to suit human 
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purposes.”  For example, the U.S. South was supposedly in the midst of “a real 
agricultural rebirth” where  
 
on thousands of once sterile slopes, the miraculous vine, kudzu, clambers 
like Jack’s beanstalk.  It chokes devouring gullies with entangled soil.  It 
buries fences, leaps into trees.  Its big leaves, which stay green until 
Christmas, are as nourishing to cattle as excellent alfalfa.  When plowed 
under, kudzu enriches the soil.   
Elsewhere, “enormous areas, especially in the tropics, will almost certainly yield, 
sooner or later, to scientific agriculture.”59 
 In hindsight, this boundless faith in the ability of kudzu, the oceans, boreal 
and tropical forests to produce food for humanity sounds to us “silly or worse,” yet 
it reveals the development of a deadly serious philosophical gulf that increasingly 
divided the world’s environmental managers into optimist and pessimist camps, 
into a large majority of cornucopians and small minority of millenarians expecting 
the Apocalypse. 
Further illustrating the crossover between North and Latin American 
discourse on population, Vogt’s most influential left-wing critic did not even come 
from the United States.  In 1952, at the request of the publisher Little, Brown, & 
Co., the Brazilian physician Josué de Castro (1908-1973) published The Geography 
of Hunger, a condensation of a multi-volume study he was planning on the global 
geopolitics of famine and malnutrition.  He directly attacked Vogt, the “standard-
bearer of . . .  those who go in for neo-Malthusian theories while they defend and 
benefit from an imperialist economy,” and he squarely blamed hunger on the 
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maldistribution of food by the world’s capitalist ruling class.  Like Vogt’s other 
cornucopian critics, de Castro had abundant faith that technological progress, the 
conquest of new lands like the Amazon Basin for agriculture, and the conversion of 
the tropical world’s vast cash-crop monocultures to food production would 
continue to produce an abundance of food for all social classes--as long as it was 
justly distributed.  At the height of the Cold War, this runaway best-seller was 
showered with prizes in both the capitalist West and communist East, republished 
several times, and eventually translated into 30 languages.60 
De Castro had more in common with Vogt than he realized (perhaps 
because he, too, gave Vogt’s opus only a superficial reading).  They both despised 
basic features of the world’s “imperalist economy.”  Both believed mass education 
could remedy many of the world’s environmental problems.  Most significantly, de 
Castro numbered among the growing class of international environmental 
technocrats, the key to his influence.  He started his career as a hygienist interested 
in the nutrition and living conditions of the urban working class of Recife, his 
birthplace.  As we saw in chapter 1, the vast hinterland of this northeastern 
Brazilian city, the arid sertão, is disastrously (though irregularly) affected by the El 
Niño-Southern Oscillation cycle.  De Castro’s professional life was profoundly 
influenced by the grandes sêcas of 1931-1932 and 1957-1958 (both associated with 
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Peruvian El Niño events).  He had close official ties to the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), an organization established in the 
aftermath of World War II “to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living, to 
improve agricultural productivity, and to better the condition of rural populations” 
on a global scale.  He was serving a stint as president of its executive council when 
he was first approached to write his famous English-language treatise on the 
“political implications” of the world hunger problem.61    
As Josué de Castro’s case makes clear, Vogt’s legacy was less a function of 
how many people read his work than who read and acted on--or rebelled against--
his words.  Grace Barstow Murphy, Robert Cushman Murphy’s wife, wrote Vogt, 
“Your book is the new Bible.  I’ve already written . . . a clergyman you know to 
found a new religion on it.”  The conservation publicist and historian of the 
American West Bernard DeVoto plugged it whenever he could: “I am more 
steamed up about it than I can remember having been about any book for years.”  
The wealthy founder of the Dixie Cup Corporation Hugh Moore claimed to have 
received a revelation from reading Road to Survival in 1948.  These individuals 
played key roles in three of the biggest environmental controversies of the 1950s in 
the United States: the 1950-1955 battle against the construction of a dam in 
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Dinosaur National Monument (DeVoto), the 1958-1960 lawsuit against the 
spraying of DDT on Long Island (Murphy), and the emerging debate over the need 
for legalized abortion and government-coerced population control (Moore).62 
No reader of Vogt’s work was more important than Aldo Leopold.  As we 
have seen, Vogt and Leopold began to build their friendship in the 1930s when 
Vogt was editor of Bird-Lore and published a precursor of Leopold’s famed land 
ethic.  In the turmoil over his termination as editor, Vogt toyed with the idea of 
going to the University of Wisconsin to study with Leopold before CAG’s offer 
came in.  In his stead, Vogt’s Peruvian disciple Enrique Ávila studied wildlife 
management with Leopold, and Ávila strengthened the relationship of his two 
mentors in the process.  Vogt and Leopold’s friendship grew stronger yet when 
Vogt worked with Leopold’s son Starker to organize a national game survey of 
Mexico.  (Starker, a biologist, had been Carl Sauer’s student at Berkeley in the late 
1930s and helped introduce Sauer’s ideas to Vogt and his father, and he remained 
active in conservationist causes.)  In 1942, Vogt even tried to convince the elder 
Leopold to go on a lecture tour to South America in Gilbert Pearson’s footsteps as a 
boon to “hemispheric science and its relations to strategic problems.”  Even 
personal features of their relationship had implications that extended far beyond the 
United States.63 
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But their intense shared interest in the “irruption sequence” among wild 
populations cemented their intellectual assocation.  In 1940-1941, at the same time 
Vogt was preoccupied with the “irruption” of the guano birds caused by abnormal 
oceanic conditions off Peru, Leopold became obsessed with deer overpopulation 
caused by the extirpation of wolves on the forested Kaibab plateau north of the 
Grand Canyon.  One of Leopold’s biographers argues that the problem of “too 
many deer” became “the one big issue on which Leopold fought in the public 
arena” during his last years; furthermore, it led Leopold to consider the problem of 
resource supply that faces all living things as fundamentally a problem of land 
health.  Like Vogt, he came to think that proper management required the 
restoration of nature’s self-regulating processes.  A personal encounter with a 
massive subsistence crisis among a population of wild animals was the liminal 
event that allowed Leopold to evolve “an ecological attitude toward deer, wolves, 
and forests,” and Vogt toward guanayes, condors, anchoveta, El Niño--and 
people.64 
In 1946, their relationship entered a new phase of intimate collaboration 
that led directly to the publication of their two great works.  Ironically, considering 
the eventual public reception of their books, Leopold was much more pessimistic 
than Vogt about the future, a pessimism strongly flavored by Vogt’s negative 
evaluation of the state of the rest of the world.  After the Third Inter-American 
Agricultural Conference, held in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1945, the Pan-American 
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Union selected the United States to host the next such meeting.  As Pan-American 
conservation chief, Vogt proposed organizing an Inter-American Conservation 
Congress in its stead, and he sent his prospectus to Leopold for comment.  Leopold 
wrote back, “The only thing you have left out is whether the philosophy of 
industrial culture is not, in its ultimate development, irreconcilable with ecological 
conservation.”  Leopold’s answer: “Industrialism might theoretically be 
conservative if there were an ethic limiting its application to what does not impair 
(a) permanence and stability of the land (b) beauty of the land”--a preliminary 
statement of his land ethic.  “But there is no ethic, nor likely to be,” Leopold 
continued.  “Bill, your outline is excellent.  That the situation is hopeless should 
not prevent us from doing our best.”  Vogt was slightly more optimistic: “You are, 
of course, correct in what you say about industrialism.  I don’t know how you 
would define ethic, but I am hopeful that horse sense may someday replace it as a 
limiting factor to preserve the permanence and stability of the land, even though 
there seems to be little hope for saving its beauty.”65 
Vogt already knew, of course, that these ideas about the 
incommensurability between conservation and industrial development were 
unwelcome in Latin America, and his visit to the University of Wisconsin in March 
1946 had confirmed this.  His lectures met with “passionate opposition” from Latin 
American students, their countries’ future technocrats.  But these objections 
seemed to strengthen Vogt’s resolve to fight against developmentalism as his 
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horizons expanded from the Americas to the entire globe.  In consultation with 
Leopold, he hatched the idea during this particular visit to Madison to write a book 
“as soon as possible”--what became Road to Survival--“because the problem of 
population and land use has been given only glancing consideration” in the charter 
of the recently founded United Nations.  His prospectus, meanwhile, evolved into 
the First Inter-American Conference on Conservation of Renewable Resources held 
in September 1948 in Denver, Colorado.  Vogt presided over this meeting attended 
by officials from 21 American republics and “a large proportion” of the 
hemisphere’s conservation officials, including CAG’s general manager Carlos 
Llosa.  Ávila, despite his best attempts, could not attend because he was unable to 
obtain patronage for the trip from the Peruvian state--a situation he blamed 
squarely on discrimination against Puno, his place of birth.  Those who did attend 
traveled over 500 miles around the Great Plains and mountain West to see U.S. 
government conservation projects in action.  They focused on the organization of 
agencies to protect the land and its resources all over the hemisphere--though they 
carefully avoided the controversial birth control question.  Thus, Vogt was the 
force behind yet another important event for the development of environmentalism 
in the Americas.66 
Just before the appearance of Road to Survival, Leopold finished an essay 
collection of his own.  Probably at Vogt’s suggestion, he sent the manuscript to 
Alfred A. Knopf.  This prestigious New York publisher was already known to be 
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friendly toward conservation.  But Knopf’s editors saw no profit in Leopold’s 
defense of wilderness and paean to the natural world surrounding his rural 
Wisconsin “shack.”  Starker Leopold’s brother Luna--a hydraulic engineer who 
became an important U.S. conservationist in his own right--took on the task of 
marketing their father’s “Great Possessions” manuscript to Oxford University 
Press.  Repeating the role he had played in getting Roger Tory Peterson’s bird book 
through the press, Vogt approached his own publisher, Sloane Associates, about 
Aldo Leopold’s manuscript.  Then Leopold died of a heart attack while fighting a 
grass fire at his shack in April 1948, only five months before he was expected to 
attend Vogt’s Denver conference.  Vogt met with Oxford University Press officials 
to assure them that the book they had just accepted for publication could be edited 
adequately by Luna.  Thus, Vogt and Luna played a tried-and-true role in the 
appearance of A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There late in 1949.  
These two environmental technocrats saw the Principia of the U.S. environmental 
movement through the press.67 
A Sand County Almanac shared the same basic message and view of the 
world as Vogt’s Road to Survival.  Nowhere is this clearer than Leopold’s 
presentation of “The Land Ethic.”  In this seminal essay, Leopold criticized “a 
conservation system based wholly on economic motives” since “most members of 
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the land community have no economic value.”  He saw “an ecological 
comprehension of the land” derived from “ecological training” as leading to a 
solution, although he was acutely aware of the political and economic cleavages 
that prevented specialized forest, wildlife, and agricultural professionals from 
arriving at a concept of “land health.”  Leopold parroted Vogt’s opinion that 
“accelerating wastage” due to “exploitative agriculture” had led many parts of the 
world to exceed “their sustained carrying capacity.  Most of South America is 
overpopulated in this sense.”  As Knopf predicted, Leopold’s book attracted little 
attention at first.  But the notoriety surrounding Vogt’s much more negative book--
and the environmental movement it helped inspire--eventually produced a growing 
audience for Leopold’s masterwork.  It emerged as a runaway mass-market 
bestseller in the late 1960s, some two decades after it was published, when Vogt 
and his work had already faded from popular memory.68 
In 1948, another prominent book took up the cause of population control.  
Our Plundered Planet covered almost exactly the same ground as Vogt’s book, 
though it was much more impressionistic and less programatic than Road to 
Survival.  Its author Fairfield Osborn had a long scientific pedigree: he was the 
long-time director of the New York Zoological Society and the son of famed 
paleontologist Henry Fairfield Osborn.  He freely admitted that Leopold and Vogt, 
alone among his vast network of advisors, provided him with “a philosophical 
                                                 
68. Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac, 210, 219, 221-223. The mass marketing of 
U.S. Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall’s book The Quiet Crisis (New York: Holt, Rinehart 
& Winston, 1963) by Avon Books in 1964--which featured Leopold and his ideas--went further to 
prepare the way for Ballantine Books’ republication of A Sand County Almanac in 1966; see Meine, 
Aldo Leopold, 524.    
351 
approach to the problem” the world was facing.  The Latin American section of his 
chapter on “The New World: New No Longer” came straight from Vogt’s Pan-
American Union Conservation Section reports.69   
The similarities between their books are legion.  Osborn, too, was inspired 
by the incredible human destructiveness of World War II to write about another 
“silent war . . . man’s conflict with nature” that promised to destroy our one “world 
society” unless humanity chose to travel down the “slow road to reclamation.”  In 
his view, the predictions of Malthus for industrialized Europe had merely been 
forestalled by the extension of their environmental exploitation to the United States 
and Canada.  The ongoing destruction of the rest of the Americas, Africa, and 
Australia meant that the three great Old World concentrations of global population 
could no longer look to these “New Worlds” for salvation.  Nor could chemical 
fertilizers, pesticides, and other products of the “flattery of science” provide a way 
out.  Like Vogt, Osborn condemned the unending quest of European colonizers for 
“cash returns through export,” their inattention to “basic subsistence” and their use 
of “government taxation” as a “thin veneer to cover forced labor or economic 
slavery” among the colonized--all in the name of “higher civilization.”  These 
wanton acts were responsible, he thought, for the global instability that gave birth 
to two world wars and the growing Soviet threat.  Osborn also had little good to say 
about the “American way of doing business” that destroyed productive land and 
renewable resources for the profit of a few rather than “the benefit of all the 
people.”  But unlike Vogt, he thought well-planned and “ably administered” big 
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development projects like the Tennessee Valley Authority were part of the solution 
for the “oncoming crisis” that faced the world.  In the end, there was only one real 
solution for Osborn:  
 
Man must recognize the necessity of cooperating with nature.  He must 
temper his demands and use and conserve the natural living resources of the 
earth in a manner that alone can provide for the continuation of his 
civilization.  The final answer is to be found only through comprehension of 
the enduring processes of nature.  The time for defiance is at an end.  
This was an archetypal case when two books published simultaneously with 
virtually the same argument on the same subject served to broaden the audience, 
influence--and profitability--of both books.70 
Again, this was no coincidence: Osborn, Leopold, and Vogt were closely 
linked by personal and institutional ties.  They had already known each other for 
years when the New York Zoological Society called together a conference in 
March 1947 to discuss the creation of a conservation organization with a truly 
global scope.  This trio took the lead in its planning and developed its statement of 
purpose: “to advance, for the benefit of mankind throughout the world, knowledge 
and understanding of the earth’s natural and living resources and their essential 
relation to each other and to the sustenance and enrichment of life on earth.”  This 
meeting led directly to the formation of the Conservation Foundation in 1948.  
Here, Vogt’s experience with the creation of groups like the Comité Nacional de 
Protección a la Naturaleza in Peru turned around and influenced the formation of 
this New York-based organization.  Like its Latin American cousins, the 
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Conservation Foundation would focus on the “conservation of soil, water, forests, 
vegetation, and wildlife through research and education.”  It was eminently 
technocratic: its original board of directors included a familiar cast of characters: 
Osborn (its chief), Leopold, Vogt, the English ecologist Charles Elton, and Yale 
zoologist G. Evelyn Hutchinson.  (Hutchinson who was soon to publish an 
exhaustive study of the world’s guano deposits, probably due to Vogt’s influence; 
he, too, was a Lord of Guano.)71   
Unlike the Committees for the Protection of Nature in the rest of the 
Americas, the Conservation Foundation had privileged access to vast technical and 
financial resources in the United States--and pretensions to global influence.  
During its first decade of existence, it gave its support to a variety of scientific 
studies, propaganda films and publications.  The vast majority of these were 
focused on North America, but it also supported studies of population in Jamaica 
and soil erosion in Latin America, research on the exploitation of the sea to feed the 
world’s growing population, and the graduate training of resource experts to serve 
business, industry, and government.  By the 1960s--when Vogt wrapped up his 
career as its director--the Conservation Foundation had acquired quite a reputation 
as both a producer and clearinghouse for environmental knowledge.  But in the 
1970s, a new generation of leaders abandoned the anti-developmental perspective 
of the Conservation Foundation’s founders and began to search for “common 
ground” between “business and environment.”  Environmental historian Samuel 
Hays has interpreted this shift in the Conservation Foundation as representative of a 
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larger tendency for “technical professionals” to neutralize the more radical 
demands of grassroots environmental activists during the 1970s and 1980s in the 
United States.  If Hays is at all correct, this is a cruel betrayal of the environmental 
technocrats who gave the Conservation Foundation its initial impetus.72 
The world’s most powerful technocrats quickly lined-up their forces against 
Vogt and his allies.  In 1949, Fairfield Osborn was invited to present his ideas on 
“the problem of world production” at an international media event, the Mid-
Century Convocation on the Social Implications of Scientific Progress held at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  This was a set-up.  After Osborn had his 
say, a high-powered panel of scientists and engineers including Vannevar Bush, the 
well-known author of Science: The Endless Frontier (1945) and architect of the 
National Science Foundation, and Henry Tizard, the definition of the scientist in 
power as leader of Britain’s war effort, ruthlessly attacked neo-Malthusianism.  
“Science also increases exponentially; in the same way that men lead to more men 
and machines make more machines, so ideas create more ideas,” Bush retorted.  
“The point I think is this, that science gets there first.”73 
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Meanwhile, Vogt got into trouble with his superiors at the newly created 
Organization of American States--exactly the sort of trouble Ávila and Osorio 
thought they would face if they voiced their true opinions during Mexico’s guano 
controversy.  (Even more glaringly, Josué de Castro’s outspoken support for 
redistribution of wealth forced him to live out his life in exile after fleeing the 1964 
right-wing military takeover in Brazil.)  Vogt’s support for contraception on 
demand was controversial, to say the least, and his negative assessment of the 
possibilities for industrialization in Latin America was downright insulting to 
regional developmentalists.  An article published in the Saturday Evening Post 
brought this controversy to a head.  Vogt criticized the “Santa Claus complex” 
behind President Truman’s “bold new” Point IV Program which promised technical 
assistance and economic aid to counter “hunger, misery, and despair” among the 
world’s “undeveloped areas and backward peoples.”  (As a sign of the times, 
technical experts were to be the administrators of this vast aid program to the Third 
World.)  Vogt was afraid that well-meaning Americans ignorant of the needs and 
desires of these “so-called backwards peoples” would saddle them with unpayable 
debts, while ignoring the population problem and other basic causes of 
underdevelopment.  Late in 1949, he chose to resign rather than put down his pen.74 
The same defects that cost him his job at the OAS won Vogt an even more 
visible position in the accelerating U.S. birth control movement.  In May 1951, the 
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Planned Parenthood Federation of America, as activist Margaret Sanger’s Birth 
Control Federation of America had come to be known, named Vogt its national 
director.  Planned Parenthood was the keystone organization of a movement 
dominated by professionals that aggressively promoted the use of scientific 
understanding and contraceptive technologies for family planning.  Vogt’s 
appointment symbolized the convergence of the birth control and population 
control movements during the 1940s and 1950s.  With direct financial assistance 
from the radical Hugh Moore, Vogt helped turn Planned Parenthood into a leading 
voice for global population control. 
But Vogt’s combative tendencies led him into conflict with Sanger and 
heiress Katherine Dexter McCormick, just as they had dogged his relationship with 
colleagues at the Audubon Society and CAG.  Vogt and Sanger had a falling out 
over funds raised by Sanger’s International Planned Parenthood Federation (est. 
1952).  More importantly, Vogt infuriated McCormick (an MIT graduate) when he 
tried to divert her philanthropy away from research into the use of hormones to 
control ovulation and fertilization in mammals.  Vogt was less than enthusiastic 
about supporting this line of research, surely because so few (predominantly male) 
scientists thought it would lead to an oral contraceptive.  Vogt’s inability to divine 
the future has led teleological historians to write him out of histories of the U.S. 
birth control movement.75 
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Meanwhile, McCormick pushed her research team to locate “a ‘cage’ of 
ovulating females” on which to test this hormone therapy.  Beginning in 1954, 
research biologist Gregory Pincus, the Searle pharmaceutical company, and their 
collaborators organized human field trials of a promising oral contraceptive in 
Puerto Rico.  Following Vogt’s logic, they perceived this poor U.S. dependency as 
already overpopulated.  They also expected cooperation from its U.S.-dominated 
scientific establishment.  Twenty-three medical students at the University of Puerto 
Rico served as the first test subjects.  These scientifically trained women found it 
extremely difficult to adhere to the experiment’s invasive regimen, even when their 
grades were threatened.  Prisoners at the Women’s Correctional Institute were less-
willing participants, while poor women involved in a slum-clearing program 
proved more cooperative.  Like the ongoing Tuskegee Study of the advancement of 
syphilis among untreated Southern black males, the organizers of these field trials 
felt no scruples about using women of color in a colonial situation as experimental 
guinea pigs.  It is worth noting that these scientists found plenty of willing 
participants once they gave up part of their “experimental control” and empowered 
Puerto Rican women to simply select themselves for participation.  Thus, this brief 
intellectual history of the “world population problem” again circles back to Latin 
America.  Even the wealth used to fund development of the pill had a southern 
connection: beginning in the 1890s, McCormick-International Harvester had built a 
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significant share of its fortune through its domination over henequen and manila 
fiber production in Yucatán and the Philippines used to make binder twine.76 
In 1960, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved the use of 
Enovid as an oral contraceptive.  Planned Parenthood’s leadership (if not its local 
clinics) immediately endorsed “the Pill” with great enthusiasm.  By the time he 
stepped down as head of Planned Parenthood in 1961, Vogt’s wish for a 
technological fix to the “population explosion” had finally come true.  
Nevertheless, its supposed “revolutionary” consequences were mainly restricted to 
affluent, married, white women in the First World during its first decade of use.  
Intrauterine devices (IUDs), surgical sterilization, and abortion emerged as the 
technologies of choice for crusaders against Third World overpopulation.  In all 
these ways, (predominantly male) physicians extended their expert authority over 
female reproduction, as part of a long process of “professionalization of birth 
control.”  Paradoxically, women also became more active participants in their own 
reproductive health with the advent of the pill.  In a small way, through his 
advocacy of human population control, Vogt helped make the female body part of 
the technocratic domain.77 
                                                 
76. Annette B. Ramírez de Arellano and Conrad Seipp, Colonialism, Catholicism, and 
Contraception: A History of Birth Control in Puerto Rico (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1983), ch. 9 [quote p. 107]. Cf. James H. Howard, Bad Blood: The Tuskegee 
Syphilis Experiment, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1993); Susan M. Reverby, ed., Tuskegee’s 
Truths: Rethinking the Tuskegee Syphilis Study (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2000).  On International Harvester’s southern connection, see Allen Wells, “Henequen,” in The 
Second Conquest of Latin America: Coffee, Henequen, and Oil during the Export Boom, 1850-1930, 
ed. Stephen C. Topik and Wells (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998), 85-124; Gilbert M. 
Joseph, Revolution from Without: Yucatán, Mexico, and the United States, 1880-1924, 2d ed. 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988).  
77.  Watkins, On the Pill, 28-52; Ramírez and Seipp, Colonialism, Catholicism, and 
Contraception, 131-148, 176-179; Reed, From Private Vice to Public Virtue, 294-308; Gordon, 
359 
In his last major work People! Challenge to Survival (1960), Vogt made it 
clear that his Latin American experience was still central to his thinking on 
population.  By this time, after years of close association with the WASP-ish 
leaders of the population control movement in the United States, Vogt had 
developed a virulent dislike for the Roman Catholic Church.  Secular Scandinavia 
became his great success story, while the Catholic Church became his whipping 
boy: “Without birth control, breeding at the leporine rate of the Roman Catholic 
countries, Scandinavia would probably be as badly off as El Salvador.”78  After two 
decades, Vogt still credited his experience as an ornithologist in Peru for his 
zealous interest in population issues.  In fact, he used a long description of the 
sufferings of the guano bird hatchlings during the 1939-1941 El Niño to inspire 
concern among his North American readers.  It is so vivid that it deserves quoting 
in full: 
 
The sheer horror of the rising tidal wave of numbers is still hard to 
comprehend.  It is, perhaps, because I lived with it in a strange and poignant 
way that I sense so strongly the threat of its impact. 
 In 1940, while I was doing research on the guano bird colonies of 
millions of cormorants and pelicans off the coast of Peru, one of the 
recurrent famines hit.  The islands were covered with young birds, each 
nearly as tall as a year-old child, and to the unprofessional eye, resembling 
black-fronted penguins. 
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 As the food supply shrank and the adults had to range farther and 
farther afield in search of fish, the young became thinner and more vocal.  
Like human babies, these cried from hunger and now the complaint went on 
all through the night.  I could roughly gauge the success of the adults’ 
fishing by the cries from the two million young. 
 They were probably suffering also from thirst under the Peruvian 
desert sun, since the freshly caught fish was their only source of liquid.  I 
would go out on the pampa in the morning and be almost knocked down by 
the horde of downy babies.  They would flap their unfledged wings, while 
they gave their hunger call, at the feet of this strange, uncormorant-like 
creature who was, withal, vertical and moving. 
 There was not a thing one could do for them.  Day by day there were 
fewer begging, more staggering about and listlessly drooping.  And then 
more--hundreds of thousands more--of the pitiful, collapsed, downy clumps 
that were the dead. 
 When the rare adult returned with food, he would be literally 
overwhelmed by screeching young.  Whether or not he fed his own 
offspring, or merely those who could best fight their way to him, I could not 
tell.  Finally, perhaps because they were themselves dying, the parent birds 
simply did not return to the island. 
 What had been an animated nursery turned into a wide desolation 
with no sound but the sea and the gulls, and no movement but the 
scavenging gulls and condors. 
Human beings die more stoically.  But here was mass death in 
unforgettable shape and sound.  Somehow, ever since, it has been possible 
to understand more fully the famines of China and India.79 
It would be wrong to give Vogt and the guano birds too much credit for 
inspiring the international population control and environmental movements.  
Certainly other “more oppressive fears” such as “the advent of atomic energy, the 
possibility of World War III, the breakdown of colonialism all over the world, and 
the rising discontent of the colored races” inspired widespread postwar “hysteria,” 
as one of Vogt’s critics sarcastically noted.80 
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Interest in eugenics, the use of hereditarian principles to improve plant, 
animal, and human “racial stocks,” also motivated many prominent population 
control advocates, including Margaret Sanger and Raymond Pearl (the father of the 
logistic curve).  Vogt, for his part, was quite willing to serve on the council of the 
American Genetic Association.  Prominent eugenicists such as Frederick H. 
Osborn, Fairfield Osborn’s cousin, occupied important positions in John D. 
Rockefeller III’s Population Council as well as the Conservation Foundation.81 
As the U.S. environmental movement took off during the 1960s, 
responsibility for population control evolved into a new sort of “white man’s 
burden,” particularly for ecologist Garrett Hardin, author of the “The Tragedy of 
the Commons,” progenitor of the repugnant “lifeboat ethic,” and enthusiastic 
promoter of government reproductive coercion.82  Hardin and the anti-immigrant 
Zero Population Growth movement conveniently ignored the fact that Vogt and 
Osborn originally placed much of the onus for the world’s environmental problems 
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on the competitive greed and overconsumption of the First World.  Birth and 
population control were for everyone, in Vogt’s book, even if he still betrayed a 
profound distrust of peoples from the Third World. 
The horrors of mechanized warfare during the twentieth century proved 
unable to deflate the sense of superiority of elites in the rich countries of the 
Northern Hemisphere.  Racists, environmental determinists, conservatives, liberals, 
and communists shared this perspective, including critics of Western imperialism 
like Vogt.  Meanwhile, as decolonization accelerated after World War II, the 
native-born, but foreign-trained technocrats who took power in so much of the 
postcolonial world also tended to adopt this superiority complex--including the 
belief that the world was overpopulated.  But rather than heed the warnings of men 
like Vogt and think in terms of ecological limits, most looked to economic 
development, modernization theory, or carefully managed Soviet-style social 
revolution as the answer.  The right men with the right knowledge in the right 
positions could engineer the world out of its problems.  This technocratic attitude--
and the elitism inherent to it--was the organizing principle of the Golden Age of 
Development.  It was the fountainhead of the supposed “ecological innocence” 
violated by Rachel Carson and Silent Spring.83 
As we shall see in the next chapters, this attitude drove the rapid 
development of the Peruvian fishing industry.  Many Peruvians saw the prospect of 
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rapid global population growth as an opportunity rather than something to fear.  
They thought Peru had enough marine resources to supply much of the world’s 
needs for vitamins and protein, if only Peruvians possessed the technology to 
exploit them.  This cornucopian belief goes a long way toward explaining why 
pessimists like Vogt and the Comité Nacional de Protección a la Naturaleza had so 
little impact on the course of events in Peru after World War II. 
Yet this chapter has shown that activities on the supposed periphery of 
scientific culture had a profound effect on environmentalism in other parts of the 
Americas, even among its core figures.  Unfortunately, Vogt’s perception of 
profound ecological and cultural inequalities between the United States toward 
Latin America ended up reinforcing prejudices in the North toward the South. 
Meanwhile, the persistence of social inequalities, especially among 
scientists charged with managing Peru’s marine environment, fundamentally 
affected the course of fishery industrialization in Peru.  Counterintuitively, intense 
disagreement between experts helped push forward the development of marine 
science in Peru.  This is testimony to the endurance of a fundamental technocratic 
dogma: that we can find that one right answer--and locate the one Road to 
Survival--as long as we search long and hard enough for it. 
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Chapter 6 
Salomon’s House Divided:  
Marine Science and Peru’s Fisheries 
 
Science only grows through criticism, and the friction of mind on mind ought to 
polish our understanding of these problems until there can be no question as to 
what is the ultimate truth. 
--William Vogt to Francisco Ballén (1941) 
 During the first half of the twentieth century, Peruvians established a 
conservation technocracy that completely revived the fortunes of the guano 
industry.  The Compañía Administradora del Guano succeeded marvelously as a 
development scheme on a number of levels: in terms of the fertilizer it produced for 
Peruvian agriculture, the changes in agricultural practice it promoted, the 
conservation techniques it implemented, and the managerial apparatus it supported.  
Meanwhile, developmentalists searched for other ways to exploit Peru’s rich 
marine resources and replicate CAG’s technocratic achievement.  CAG’s basic 
success enabled it to influence the development of other forms of marine 
production in Peru. 
In many ways, CAG came to represent a real-life example of Francis 
Bacon’s old philosophical ideal of Salomon’s House.  In his utopian description of 
the ideal state, New Atlantis (1627), Bacon described a hierarchically organized  
research institute that applied his inductive method of empirical science.  A small 
group of brilliant savants occupied the highest position of authority in Salomon’s 
House.  It was their job to interpret the knowledge provided by lower echelons of 
fact-gatherers, experimenters, and compilers under them, apply this knowledge to 
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gain power over the natural world, and use this knowledge/power to advise and 
promote the interests of the government of Bensalem, or New Atlantis.  The 
purview of these “Fathers of Salomon’s House” included all of nature, and their 
success as advisers ultimately depended on their accurate interpretation of the 
multitude of facts provided by their underlings.  Even though it was utopian in 
conception, Bacon’s ideal has influenced numerous, real-life technocratic projects.  
In some instances, technicians have “asserted their right to technocratic rule on the 
basis of a mastery that they did not possess.” 1  But in the case of CAG’s savants, 
their dramatic success in the realm of guano production was used to justify their 
ambition to rule other economic realms.  A holistic vision of Peru’s marine 
ecosystem motivated their anthropocentric quest to enlarge “the bounds of human 
empire, to the effecting of all things possible.”2  As the authoritarian political 
experiments in fascist Italy, Spain, Portugal, “corporatist” Brazil and other Latin 
American states make all too clear, “organic” conceptions have often been used to 
justify the subjugation of both humans and nature.3 
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From the very beginning, besides declaring war against the guano birds’ 
predators, parasites, and diseases, CAG’s “fathers” attempted to extend their 
technocratic powers to the organized hunt for sea lions and the policing of artisanal 
fishing in Peru.  As CAG’s managers gained confidence, they presumed the skill 
and authority to develop and manage Peru’s entire marine environment.  They soon 
dreamed of establishing a vast, scientific fishing industry.  These grand aspirations 
brought CAG into conflict with other members of Peruvian society who sought to 
make productive use of Peru’s marine environment.  To increase its scientific 
knowledge and to reinforce its technocratic authority, in 1929, CAG hired a foreign 
expert, the German oceanographer Erwin Schweigger, to study the problem of 
fishery development in Peru.  But CAG simply did not have the coercive power nor 
resources to accomplish these goals.  As a consequence, the industrialization of 
Peru’s rich fisheries languished through the 1930s. 
This situation began to change in the 1940s.  To resolve the fertilizer crisis 
of the late 1930s, CAG set out to build a fishmeal production facility with the hope 
that the Peruvian state would also grant it a permanent monopoly over economic 
use of anchoveta, the largest exploitable living resource from Peru’s marine 
environment other than plankton.  Like so many attempts at technology transfer, 
this project failed, even with the help of a team of North American fishery experts.     
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Though he opposed many of these efforts, William Vogt provided a big 
rhetorical boost to a related project.  If he was right about the complexity of the 
guano birds’ marine community, CAG scientists needed to study the entire 
biological “chain” that connected guano to agricultural production.  By identifying 
and exploiting its “weak points,” they might be able to “open new horizons to 
guano production” and properly explore possibilities for the rational exploitation of 
all species along the Peruvian coast.4   
This is exactly what CAG proceeded to do, as it built an elaborate marine 
science apparatus--a much grander Salomon’s House--on the ruins of its fishmeal 
project.  Even though CAG’s drive to monopolize control over ocean production 
fell short as a technocratic management scheme, it was a tremendous boon to the 
development of marine science in Peru. 
But CAG’s marine scientists hardly worked together in organic harmony.  
On close examination, CAG’s version of Salomon’s House was fraught with 
divisions.  Its experts seldom agreed on the meaning of “facts” regarding Peru’s 
coastal environment, much less how these facts should be applied to its 
management.  Internal enmity based on personality, politics, and ethnic 
discrimination provided the social basis for some of these conflicts.  Remarkably, 
sexism was a rather minor issue, even though women played an important role in 
these debates.  Such social divisions contributed to discord over the capabilities of 
Peru’s scientific establishment.  In the final analysis, different conceptions of the 
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expert’s duty provided the most basic grounds for disagreement:  Was it CAG’s job 
to protect the environment or promote its exploitation?   
If studies of more recent times are any indication, this sort of conflict is 
probably common, even typical of the way science operates all over the world.  
Nevertheless, the clarity and intensity with which these conflicts were enunciated--
as well as the fact that they have been preserved on paper at all--is both rare and 
remarkable, especially since they occurred on the southern “periphery” of the world 
of science.  Yet despite all this conflict at CAG, almost everyone concerned agreed 
on one basic point: improvements in Peru’s scientific capabilities and knowledge of 
its marine environment would ultimately resolve all of these disputes.   
This scientific community’s war against itself had important consequences 
for Peru’s marine environment.  Some startlingly bad science achieved undeserved 
influence and led to some poorly considered decisions.  As we shall see in 
following chapters, the failure of CAG’s experts to agree created a broad opening 
for the unrestricted development of anchoveta extraction in Peru--which led, in 
short order, to the guano industry’s demise. 
 
Managing the Sea Lion Hunt 
The desire to develop production from Peru’s entire marine environment 
was the original inspiration for the studies that led to CAG’s creation.  Other, 
unsuccessful attempts to develop marine production and institutionalize marine 
science in Peru before 1940 make CAG’s initial triumph, as well as later successes 
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and failures, much more striking, since all these projects reflected so many of the 
same concerns. 
In 1906, the Ministerio de Fomento originally hired Robert Coker, the 
eventual reformer of the Peruvian guano industry, as an expert in fish culture.  
Peruvians wanted him to investigate the natural history of all marine “species that 
have or could have commercial value.”  The Ministerio de Fomento hoped these 
studies would provide a scientific basis for Coker to “propose adequate regulations 
for fishing, guano extraction, and the sea lion hunt.”  Coker was specifically 
directed to consider the introduction of new economic varieties of fish from other 
parts of the world to Peru’s marine and inland waters.  This was a major 
preoccupation of fishery science at the time, with even bigger ecological 
consequences:  The eventual introduction of the Great Lakes trout (Salvelinus 
namaycush) to Lake Titicaca in 1937 as part of a government hatchery project led 
within a decade to the extinction of an endemic fish species (Orestias cuvieri).  One 
can cite numerous examples of similar debacles initiated by well-meaning 
scientists: the aforementioned introduction of the neotropical cane toad to Oceania, 
the forestalled transplantation of Peru’s guano birds to Mexico, or worse, the utter 
destruction of one of the world’s greatest centers of freshwater fish diversity after 
the Nile perch was introduced to Lake Victoria in Africa.  Nevertheless, self-
confident conservationists proceeded apace with projects to improve on nature.5 
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Coker carefully surveyed artisanal fish production along the coast and in the 
Sierra.  He concluded that, more than anything, Peru needed a permanent research 
institute that would produce and distribute practical knowledge that even the most 
humble fisherfolk could use to their advantage.  Likewise, the British ornithologist 
Henry Forbes pushed for the establishment of one or two coastal research stations 
that could monitor oceanic conditions, plankton and fish production.  Both of these 
scientists clearly believed that progress in local scientific knowledge had to precede 
technological progress and eventual industrialization in Peru.6  
Coker’s vision of a marine science institute in Peru did not come to fruition 
for almost 50 years, but his declarations regarding Peru’s sea lions or lobos del mar 
(Otaria flavescens) had an immediate impact.  At that time, many Peruvian 
fishermen believed “a working understanding” operated between the lobos and the 
guanayes: sea lions attacked schools of fish from below and herded them to the 
surface where birds could pick them off at will.  This belief led the Peruvian state 
to ban lobos hunting in 1896, with little effect.  Some apologists for the guano 
industry, in contrast, thought lobos hunted young, unwary birds and ate the guano 
birds’ food, and so advocated their destruction.  Coker took a middle position: he 
determined that sea lions were neither particularly beneficial nor harmful to the 
guano birds.  Therefore, following the standard principles of conservation science, 
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a few thousand could be hunted sustainably each year “under important and 
specified restrictions” that took into consideration the sea lions’ breeding behavior.7 
Many parts of the lobos del mar were valuable to humans.  Its two most 
important products were oil and leather.  Sea lion blubber was refined to supply the 
regional market for oil and lubricants (illus. 29).  Hunters used choking lassos or 
clubs to kill the animals in order to protect their hides, which were used to produce 
water-resistant leather products.  Most importantly, young animals were used to 
produce “fantasy articles,” including fur purses, hats, and gloves.  On occasion, 
lobos meat was salted and marketed locally, their ligaments used as sinew, and 
their stomachs as oil cases.  Their testicles sometimes supplied traditional Chinese 
medicine.  But hunters usually left behind everything but their hides and blubber.8 
The response to Coker’s report underscores how sensitive the rulers of 
Peru’s Aristocratic Republic were to conservation issues.  With enthusiastic support 
from CAG, the Peruvian state followed Coker’s suggestion and reopened hunting 
in 1910 by decree.  In 1911, CAG itself officially killed 6,800 lobos during five 
months of hunting for a gain of S/.217,967 (US$45,100).  Later that year, the guano 
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birds abandoned their chicks en masse, causing guano production to plummet.  This 
inspired a boisterous debate.  Some congressional partisans blamed the hunt for this 
disaster.  CAG’s managers put the onus instead on El Niño’s “sinister ocean 
currents.”  In fact, they advocated the culling of an additional quarter of the sea lion 
population to protect the guano birds, figuring this would not do too “much damage 
to the equilibrium pursued by nature.”  With backing from virtually everyone 
concerned, the Peruvian government appointed naval captain A. R. Pimentel to 
decide the issue scientifically.  After a cursory investigation, he concluded that the 
lobos and guano birds ate fish of completely different size and rejected the idea that 
sea lions assisted the guano birds in any way.  It was true that lobos sometimes 
mutilated young birds, but he figured this was an accidental consequence of their 
“blood instinct” to grab anything of the right size that moved underwater.  Pimentel 
came to the same conclusion as Coker: “Experience will tell us the number of lobos 
that can be hunted annually without causing extinction of the species.”9 
Over the next two decades, the Peruvian state handed out the official 
concession to hunt sea lions to many different parties.  CAG’s managers frequently 
complained that hunters violated the sanctuary of the guano islands and “created a 
happy world for birds of prey . . . the worst enemy of the guano birds” with the 
gory remains they left behind.   CAG’s pleading for “technical direction by 
experts” became even more shrill when the Peruvian state opened the hunt to all 
comers.  Finally in 1936, with a view toward resolving the Depression-era shortfall 
in guano production, the Benavides regime gave over the entire lobos hunt to 
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CAG’s “efficient organization and control.”  CAG’s supposedly conservation-
minded managers proved to be efficient agents of death for the sea lions.  Between 
December 1941 and March 1942 alone, hunters contracted by CAG killed at least 
36,500 lobos--88 percent pups.10 
This carnage continued despite the appeals of CAG’s own scientists.  
William Vogt observed that CAG’s hunters focused their deadly activity during the 
breeding season and only targeted females and pups.  “It is obvious this industry 
will not last very long,” he concluded.  Based on Charles Elton’s ecological theory 
of appropriate food size, Vogt speculated that the lobos hunt had allowed the 
population of bonito, a large, predatory, tuna-like fish, to mushroom in size and 
consume much larger quantities of anchoveta.  He feared that this had contributed 
to the crash in the guano bird population during the devastating 1939-1941 El Niño.  
Therefore, he recommended that CAG should leave the lobos alone and focus its 
effort on reducing the number of bonito to restore some semblance of ecological 
balance.  Erwin Schweigger also admitted the potential for “great unfavorable 
changes in the maritime ecology” if the lobos were overhunted.  But he vehemently 
objected to Vogt’s conclusions on empirical grounds: he had never seen sea lions 
feed on bonito except when they had already been caught by fishermen; he thought 
squid, octopus, and lenguado (sole) were much easier for the lobos to catch; most 
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importantly, he noted the biogeographical tendency of bonito to live out to sea and 
the anchoveta and lobos to concentrate near shore--in effect, they occupied 
different environments.11  
The scale of the lobos hunt, meanwhile, began to inspire rabid criticism 
from budding Peruvian conservationists.  In his book Privilegios naturales del 
Perú, the physician Alberto González Zúñiga upbraided these “blind” hunters for 
“sowing terror with garrote in hand,” thereby transforming the sea lions’ “homes” 
into “concentration camps.”  He implored CAG and the Peruvian state to 
implement a management plan based on “scientific precaution.”  If they did not act 
soon, he feared the lobos del mar would suffer the same fate as the southern fur seal 
or lobos de dos pelos (Artocephalus australis) which had been hunted to the brink 
of extinction during the nineteenth century.  The fact that the sea lion population 
still numbered in the hundreds of thousands at this time deafened most people to 
these cries, even if the lobos were in decline near settled areas.  Coastal fishermen, 
for their part, were glad to get rid of a pest that got tangled in their nets and lines 
and stole fish when it could.12 
Eventually, the strong 1957-1958 El Niño caused the falling sea lion 
population to go into a tailspin.  In November 1958, President Prado completely 
banned and enforced stiff fines against lobos hunting.  But by 1961, there were 
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only about 8,000 lobos left on the entire Peruvian coast.  The complete cessation of 
legal hunting--backed by adequate enforcement--allowed the sea lion population to 
recover somewhat to about 35,000 in 1984.  (Under similar protection, the fur seal 
recovered from a low of 4,000 to about 16,000 in 1984.)  Neither species is 
anywhere near its former abundance today, and never will be as long as Peru’s 
giant, diversified fishing industry lasts.13   
Why did scientific, sustained-yield conservation so obviously fail in this 
case, even in the hands of CAG?  This case vividly shows the dangers that exist 
when well-meaning scientists express ambivalence on a policy issue and cautiously 
call for further study.  Neither Coker and Pimentel, nor Schweigger and Vogt, 
could unequivocally determine the lobos’ complicated ecological role and promote 
a strong policy of resource conservation.  This left an opening for those interested 
in maximizing profit from a seemingly inexhaustible resource--including CAG.  
Unlike what happened with guano extraction, hunters had to kill potential parents, 
the source of numerical increase, in order to profit from the lobos.  Note also that 
all scientific studies of the lobos were based on an instrumental premise: to 
determine their ecological impact on other economic species.  This way of thinking 
made the lobos economically expendable as “varmints” when the Peruvian fishing 
industry began its rise after 1941.  Recent scientific studies, as it turns out, have 
shown that Peruvian pinnipeds are opportunistic predators and vary their feeding 
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depending upon availability.  Scientists looking for simple ecological relationships 
were destined to be disappointed where the lobos were concerned.14 
Since the lobos had no lord protectors with a strong developmental interest 
in their conservation, sustained-yield management was never seriously considered 
as an option by anyone who mattered politically.  No one did anything of 
consequence to save the lobos until it was almost too late, for a simple reason: they 
were not worth the bother. 
 
Enforcing Conservation 
The Peruvian state fared little better in its attempts to regulate artisanal 
marine fishing, although its failures on this count did not have the same dire 
ecological consequences as they did for the lobos del mar.  These attempts dated all 
the way back to March 1822 when the newly independent Peruvian Republic first 
required all fishermen to register with the state.  Beginning in 1884, the Peruvian 
state tried unsuccessfully to control the use of dynamite, also known as the 
“American net” (chinchorro americano), by fishermen.  Even though Coker and 
Forbes discounted the threat posed by the illegal use of dynamite and other extant 
fishing practices, Augusto Leguía’s government issued a series of prohibitions 
against coastal fishermen during its drive to reform the guano industry, ostensibly 
to protect the guano birds.  In November 1909, it passed a law that limited all fleets 
to 12 consecutive hours of fishing during guano bird breeding season; it directed 
the port guard to watch for illegal possession of birds, eggs, or dynamite; and it 
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gave CAG and the Peruvian Corporation the right to enforce maritime regulations.  
Following Forbes’s suggestion, in 1916 fishing boats were prohibited from 
approaching within one mile of guano islands.  In the early 1920s, Leguía extended 
this zone to two miles and established criminal fines of up to S/.100 (US$26 in 
1922) for violating these laws.  Owners of violating fishing fleets could have part 
of their catch confiscated and receive an even higher fine (up to S/.1000).  CAG 
officials enthusiastically promoted these fishing regulations.15   
Enforcement of these laws was a major problem from the outset.  Even 
though Peru had a maritime authority (capitanía) under the Ministerio de Marina 
installed in its major ports, local law enforcement in fishing communities--where it 
existed--depended upon sargentos de playa, local deputies linked to the capitanía 
who were appointed by their own communities.  Since this system of enforcement 
was an important vehicle for political patronage, it could not work without local 
cooperation and could not hope to control the traditional activities of entire 
communities merely by decree.  CAG’s general manager Francisco Ballén wrote 
scores of letters and several newspaper articles during the 1920s in a vain attempt 
to get coastal authorities to evict long-established seasonal fishing colonies from 
Islas Lobos de Afuera and Lobos de Tierra, on the basis of reports that they stole 
eggs from local bird colonies (illus. 30).  Even CAG’s guardians refrained from 
denouncing or evicting these colonies, in recognition of the mainland goods these 
fishermen ferried to their lone outposts and the company they provided.  (Today, 
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visits by local fishermen still provide island guardians with their only human 
companionship.)  As a compromise, Leguía’s regime tried during the 1920s to limit 
these colonies to one landing site on each island, but these rules were ignored.  
Elsewhere along the coast, port officials arbitrarily issued licenses to fishermen that 
allowed them to ignore the guano island exclusion laws.  Fishermen organized by 
the Callao and Vicinity Fishermen’s Union successfully lobbied several times 
during the 1920s for the blanket right to approach the guano islands for various 
types of fishing, including special preferences for modern, motorized craft, even 
though Ballén and Peru’s Minister of Public Works both sounded like broken 
records in favor of the exclusion laws.  CAG’s authority as a conservation 
organization had clear limits.16   
CAG responded to these problems by calling for comprehensive reform of 
fishery enforcement.  Since it could not get the Peruvian navy to send gunboats to 
force fishermen off the guano islands, CAG asked the government to follow 
Forbes’s old suggestion and establish a fishing police.  Ballén used the severe 
1925-1926 El Niño to bolster his argument for increased guano bird protection and 
fishery enforcement.  As guano production continued to fall through 1927-1928, 
Leguía’s government responded by establishing a Policía Pesquera under CAG’s 
administration.  With the aid of three speedy patrol boats custom-built in Europe, 
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CAG’s policemen had a decided technological advantage over the sail- and human-
powered vessels that dominated fishing in Peru before World War II (illus. 31-32).  
The fishery police used its authority to detain several law breakers and see that they 
were criminally prosecuted during its brief operation under CAG, including the 
owners of registered craft at Isla Lobos de Tierra.   
Needless to say, this police action was extremely unpopular among Peru’s 
maritime populace.  In an abrupt turnabout, the military government that replaced 
Leguía transferred administration of the Policía Pesquera to the maritime authority 
in November 1931.  It also turned over CAG’s three valuable patrol boats to the 
Peruvian navy for “special needs” of national defense.  Despite entreaties that 
lasted into the 1950s, CAG was never again able to enforce fishery regulations on 
the high seas.17 
This brief experiment in conservation enforcement fell short because CAG 
overreached the limits of its power and influence within the Peruvian state.  CAG 
clearly encroached upon the jurisdiction of the maritime authority and the networks 
of patronage in ways that both benefited and restrained the fishermen who 
frequented coastal ports.  CAG also violated the Peruvian military’s jealously 
guarded monopoly on advanced weaponry.  Without a doubt, only sustained, 
organized repression would have stopped all trespassing around the guano islands.  
CAG (thankfully, from the point of view of Peru’s fishermen) never acquired the 
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apparatus to accomplish this task.  Yet CAG could count one enforcement success.  
The presence of armed guards on the islands who might report the serial numbers 
of registered, law-violating boats did tend to discourage actual landings on most 
islands.  Trespassing remained a serious problem only at coastal points, which 
influenced CAG’s decision to concentrate its guardian force at these coastal 
locations beginning in the late 1940s.  These enforcement failures point out a 
perennial problem with nature sanctuaries throughout the world.  Sanctuaries only 
work well if the people who live with them benefit in some way from their 
protection.  A state cannot simply ban a traditional economic activity and expect it 
to disappear, even with moderate enforcement.  In this case, fishermen had little to 
gain by following Peru’s arbitrary and unenforcable fishing laws, but neither could 
they benefit much from landing on the islands and raising havoc among the bird 
colonies.18  
These enforcement problems with artisanal fishermen also point to a basic 
weakness in CAG’s technocratic organization that foreshadowed its ultimate 
downfall.  CAG technocrats never effectively administered any part of the Peruvian 
marine environment except the bird colonies, despite their grand pretensions.  They 
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had to share Peru’s coastal waters with others.  Even when the stakes were low and 
Peruvian fishermen were not working in ecological opposition to the guano 
industry, the Peruvian state found it impossible to resolve this conflict between 
client parties engaged in production from the marine environment.  Since there was 
no compelling economic or political interest at stake, rather than search for one 
ideal solution in accord with the technocratic ideal, government officials let these 
competing segments of the state and civil society live in conflict with each other.  
CAG’s managers rightly understood that a large fishing industry might 
threaten the guano industry, particularly during the peak summer nesting months 
when the marine upwelling region narrows along the coast and makes it easier for 
both humans and birds to catch fish.  Many Peruvians used dynamite as a labor-
saving fishing technique, even though it wasted fish and unintentionally killed 
other marine life.  CAG managers indoctrinated to the “gospel of efficiency” 
vocally disapproved of this “pernicious practice.”  They even claimed that 
dynamite seriously damaged the reproductive capacity of anchoveta by destroying 
its egg stock.  These claims were dubious:  A two-year-old female anchoveta may 
release up to 20,000 eggs into the ocean.  During the peak breeding month of 
September, Peru’s coastal waters became a sort of egg soup as breeding females 
released quadrillions of eggs (1017).  In fact, the North American Fishery Mission 
to Peru concluded in its 1942 report that the use of dynamite did more to impede 
the “growth and development of fishing methods” in Peru than harm its marine 
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ecology, especially since dynamited fish tended to deteriorate rapidly on their way 
to market.19   
Peruvian fishermen did no major damage to the guano industry before the 
1950s for one major reason--they could not.  Fishing in Peru was quite 
undeveloped before the 1940s, although it was not a “decadent native system 
slightly influenced by Mediterranean methods” as Robert Cushman Murphy and 
later historians have often claimed.  Many fishermen still used “primitive” but “not 
inefficient” small rafts, nets, hooks, and harpoons to catch fish for subsistence and 
a limited coastal market.  They hardly touched the anchoveta, the primary food 
supply of the guano birds (illus. 33).  As late as 1941, there were nearly the same 
number of caballitos de totora as motorized craft in use along the Peruvian coast 
(illus. 34).  But artisanal fishermen, particularly immigrants from the 
Mediterranean whose sailing craft dominated major fishing ports, were not ignorant 
of improvements promised by new fishing technologies.  Around 1908, Peruvians 
rapidly adopted the cotton trammel net (trasmalla), an important European 
innovation.  Traditional communities of fisherfolk were also quite aware of the 
dangers that new technologies posed toward their way of life.  For example, in 
1939 in a significant case of a local revolt against technological modernization with 
nativist overtones, artisanal fishermen from Puerto Chicama torched a group of 
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modern, motorized boats owned by Gildemeister & Co. and operated by Italian 
fishermen.  They wanted to stop these immigrants from taking over local fish 
production and prevent this foreign sugar leviathan from tightening its control over 
the supply of food to its army of proletarians.20 
CAG’s struggle with Peru’s artisanal fishermen had little or no impact on 
either guano or fish production.  But it did have political and ideological 
importance.  It made CAG extremely unpopular with Peruvian fishermen, and they 
became perennial opponents of the guano industry as a consequence.  This became 
a big problem when the fishing industry grew much larger.  Morevover, this case 
reveals the potentially totalitarian implications of technocratic ambition.  In the 
view of CAG’s managers, these traditional fishing communities threatened the 
success of the guano industry through their ignorant, inefficient use of Peru’s 
natural resources.  Like many other Peruvian developmentalists, CAG’s managers 
thought technological progress doomed these traditional fishing communities to 
disappear.  (Ironically, industrial fishermen used this exact argument against the 
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guano industry years later.)  Peru’s fishermen needed uplift through education and 
the rule of law.  If they resisted, they needed the firm hand of discipline, and if they 
completely failed to cooperate, repression.  Who could provide this paternal 
guidance better than an “aristocracy of knowledge,” CAG’s own marine science 
experts? 
 
A House Divided 
CAG’s managers never opposed fishery development in Peru as long as it 
followed what they considered to be rational, scientific principles.  Hence, CAG 
lobbied the state during the 1920s to expand the scope of the navy’s newly created 
School of Fishing and Salting in Callao (est. 1920).  In line with suggestions made 
by both Coker and Forbes--and the desire of industrial firms and populist 
politicians to provide a cheap supply of food for Peruvian workers--CAG called for 
a school run by an “Oceanographic Cabinet” of foreign experts that was dedicated 
to scientific study, the education of local fishermen, and the development of a food 
fish industry to feed “the great proletarian masses” in the cities.21   
CAG itself worked vigorously to institutionalize marine science 
investigation in Peru.  In 1929, President Leguía authorized CAG to hire an expert 
who would study Peru’s volatile marine environment and help establish a fishing 
industry based on “the most rational and scientific form of exploitation.”  This 
time, Peru looked for technical assistance to Germany, the preeminent world leader 
in oceanography and fishery science during the 1920s (with the possible exception 
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of Japan).  It is unclear exactly how CAG first obtained the services of Erwin 
Hirsch-Schweigger (1888-1965), a native of Thorn, from an industrial fishing 
concern in Germany.  It is highly probable that Gildemeister & Co. was involved, 
since it was interested in improving its own fishing capacity and had a long 
tradition of recruiting German technicians from the Hamburg-Bremen region where 
Schweigger worked.  He was a wounded veteran of World War I, a Ph.D. graduate 
from the Institut für Meereskunde at the University of Berlin, and like Robert 
Coker, a specialist in the culture of shellfish (illus. 35).22   
Upon his arrival in Peru, Schweigger pragmatically tried to limit himself to 
basic empirical research on the Pacific environment and a cursory investigation of 
fish production from the ocean and Lake Titicaca.  He thought a comprehensive 
study of the entire fishing sector would absorb too much “time and . . . energy for 
only one man,” and he did not want to leave behind an incomplete and useless body 
of work if conditions forced him to end his investigations and return to Europe.  
This actually happened as he feared: with the onset of the Great Depression and 
political unrest in Peru, CAG was forced to terminate his services after only seven 
months.  Schweigger returned to Germany and took a managerial position in the 
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Hamburg fishing industry.  But before he left, Schweigger encouraged Peru to 
establish a state fishing company similar to CAG that would direct scientific 
research, teach new fishing techniques, market refrigerated fish, and perhaps 
manufacture fishmeal for fertilizer or livestock feed.  The Peruvian state established 
the Compañía Nacional de Pesca in 1936 to produce and market refrigerated fish 
for urban consumers, but this and other similar experiments during the 1920s and 
1930s came to nought because of weak local demand.23 
By 1937, Schweigger was extremely eager to leave Germany.  He expressed 
his desire to return to Peru and resume his marine research to an old friend, 
Johannes Wille, an expatriate German scientist who ran the entomology program at 
the Escuela Nacional de Agricultura.  Besides the timing, circumstantial evidence 
suggests that Schweigger was of Jewish descent:  He had abandoned use of the 
surname Hirsch-Schweigger, and none of his maternal family remained in Germany 
by the 1960s.  None of Schweigger’s surviving scientific colleagues in Peru know 
much about his ethnic background--it was never an issue important enough to be 
spoken about.  Wille passed on news of Schweigger’s plight to Francisco Ballén 
who initiated negotiations to rehire Schweigger and rescue him from the darkening 
shadows of war.24  
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Schweigger had been a minor figure in Germany’s scientific universe, but 
when he returned to Peru he instantly became a big fish in a little sea.  Schweigger 
knew he had come to Peru to stay:  He almost immediately initated proceedings to 
obtain Peruvian citizenship.  He remained CAG’s resident oceanographer for more 
than two decades, and played a central role in the institutionalization of marine 
science in Peru.  Like so many countries eager to bolster their technical capabilities, 
Peru was able to take great advantage of the global diaspora of scientists from 
Germany, Spain, and other European countries under totalitarian control during this 
era.25 
Of course, Schweigger did not accomplish the transformation of Peru’s 
scientific capabilities by himself, but instead depended on the growing community 
of technocrats employed by CAG, especially Luis Gamarra Dulanto (1904-1969?).  
Like CAG’s upper management and so much of Peru’s scientific establishment, 
Gamarra was born into Lima’s white upper class.  Following in the footsteps of 
José Antonio de Lavalle y García, Gamarra graduated from the new campus of the 
Escuela Nacional de Agricultura at La Molina in 1930 with a degree in agronomic 
engineering and expertise in cotton cultivation.  From 1933 until his retirement in 
1967 he worked part-time as a professor at his alma mater (where he acted as the 
contact who passed on news of Schweigger’s situation from Wille to Ballén), 
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authored a variety of scientific studies, attended several international scientific 
conferences, and played a leading role in a number of Peru’s scientific institutions.  
He took over as director of CAG’s Sección Técnica in 1934 and stayed at CAG for 
the rest of his career.  As we saw in chapter 3, from this position he took charge of 
CAG’s work in agronomy, led its hygienic campaigns against chickens and rats on 
the guano islands, and organized its struggle against the “Malthusian crisis” of 
fertilizer supply in Peru during the late 1930s.  He and Schweigger soon became 
allies in CAG’s internal politics and life-long friends of a sort.26 
CAG’s overseers wanted its brain trust to work together to figure out new 
ways Peru could take advantage of its marine resources.  To this end, in February 
1939, Schweigger, Vogt, and Gamarra crowded aboard the Chincha, one of CAG’s 
best ships, for a month-long tour of Peru’s northern coast (illus. 36).27  But instead 
of working in concert, their relationship was riven by discord.   This voyage 
inaugurated a conflict that had a profound influence on the evolution of 
environmental technocracy, not only at CAG but in all of Peru.  It began with a 
controversy regarding the nature of Peru’s marine environment, but it soon 
devolved into a debate over the role of the expert in Peru’s political economy.  An 
analysis of this struggle reveals the underpinnings of one of the most difficult 
barriers to technocratic governance: the failure of experts to agree. 
The heatedness of their disagreement stemmed partly from the seriousness 
of the crisis in guano production at the time.  In 1938, a year of record guano 
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production, CAG’s harvest still fell short of national demand by almost 100,000 
metric tons. 28  Then in February 1939, right before the eyes of CAG’s new 
scientists, the guano birds started to leave their nesting colonies.  As we have seen, 
this marked the beginning of a long “ecological depression” that worsened to the 
point that it threatened CAG’s organizational existence.  Based on 24 years of 
written reports from CAG’s guardian network as well as Eltonian theory, Vogt 
concluded that lack of food caused the birds to leave.  Working-class men of color 
with only a basic education thus provided the empirical basis for Vogt’s scientific 
understanding, a foundation that depended on Vogt’s shaky confidence in their 
ability as observers.29 
But where were the anchoveta?  Vogt, an ornithologist comfortable with the 
idea that some animals migrate thousands of miles each year, postulated that the 
guano birds merely followed the migration of the anchoveta south during years of 
abnormal oceanic conditions.  He used as authoritative support for this argument 
studies of the migration of the California sardine in the supposedly analogous 
environment of the California Current.  Schweigger vigorously disputed this 
contention, noting that he and several other observers had seen anchoveta at the 
surface on occasion and frequently caught them at depth along the Peruvian coast 
during the El Niño crisis.  Peruvian fishermen, he noted, had not seen any schools 
of fish heading south, and birds that returned from this direction later on still had a 
famished appearance.  Schweigger also accused Vogt of falsely twisting the 
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quantitative evidence by using data samples that were too small to be statistically 
significant and by proposing a rigid seven-year cycle for El Niño conditions that 
did not fit with recorded sea-surface temperatures.  Schweigger wondered why 
Vogt refused to consider what he saw as obvious--the anchoveta migrated during El 
Niño years, but vertically, not horizontally.30 
Gamarra was even more strident in his public criticism of Vogt’s use of 
evidence.  He wrote to his superiors accusing Vogt of ignoring contradictory 
reports from locals and CAG’s own guardians regarding the presence of anchoveta 
at the surface when the “northern current” was at its strongest.  Gamarra further 
castigated Vogt for discounting an experiment by CAG’s chief of guardians Felipe 
Sánchez.  In February 1941, Sánchez dropped dynamite charges to three different 
depths off the Islas Pescadores; the deepest explosion at 18 brazas (30 meters) 
brought a large number of stunned and killed anchoveta to the surface.  This 
appearred to prove that anchoveta were present at depths beyond the reach of the 
guano birds.31 
Instead of praising this attempt by a non-scientist to contribute to the 
debate, Vogt attacked this experiment, the views it appeared to bolster, and those 
who held them.  He countered that Schweigger and Gamarra were hardly guiltless 
when it came to ignoring contrary evidence.  He thought their scattered 
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observations lacked the scientific rigor of his systematic observations at Isla 
Chincha Norte: “One occurrence of the anchobeta [sic]. . . is certainly far less 
significant than the statistics that you object to,” Vogt admonished.  Sánchez’s 
experiment regarding the presence of anchoveta at depth, likewise, was “interesting 
but not at all conclusive. . . . One can scarcely establish a biological fact on the 
basis of a single experiment.”  Anyway, the issue was moot where the guano birds 
were concerned, Vogt reasoned: “There would not have to be a complete absence; a 
considerable reduction would be sufficient,” to cause a marked decline in the guano 
bird population.  “The fact is that there was not enough fish available for the birds 
to eat, and when it comes to finding anchobeta, I have more confidence in the birds 
than in human beings.”  As this final statement proves, mere empirical observation 
was not going to resolve the issue: Vogt simply did not believe in the observations 
of his colleagues.  The trust necessary for the idealized function of empirical 
science and a smoothly functioning technocracy did not exist among CAG’s 
scientists.32 
Vogt’s rivals had little trouble detecting his disdain for their scientific 
capabilities.  Schweigger used his modest English skills to express how “bitter” he 
was toward Vogt’s “wrong pride” regarding his observations of the Peru Current 
and ability to identify fish, “which evereybody [sic] understands . . . as a willful 
blow against me.”  Nor could Schweigger and his wife ignore Vogt’s personal 
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slights, particularly his inability to “find time to see us in our new house” or even to 
spend “half an hour . . . for saying farewell to us personally” when he left Peru.  In 
a diatribe against Vogt’s science, Gamarra implied that ethnic or national prejudice 
caused Vogt to disregard “experiments by important and notable Peruvian 
bacteriologists and physicans . . . men of science” whose international “prestige and 
long years of practice regarding bacillus and Aspergillus infections” Gamarra 
thought authoritatively proved that illness was the cause of the guano bird’s 
decline.  Vogt, in reply, contended that he “did not say or in any way intimate, that 
Peru lacks technical men.  As I know well, it has very excellent ones, including Mr. 
Gamarra himself. . . . I have the highest regard for Mr. Gamarra, personally, and for 
his work.”33 
 This was a lie.  Behind his back, Vogt called Gamarra “an active knife 
wielder in the good old Latin tradition” who “really doesn’t know what it is all 
about” to be a scientist.  Other private statements by Vogt and his wife reveal the 
origin and extent of Vogt’s dislike of Gamarra and his distrust for Peruvian science 
in general.  Although he depended on CAG’s workers for some important 
qualitative observations, his experience led Vogt to doubt the value of any 
statistical data they gathered.  He completely lost his faith in their worth when he 
and Schweigger discovered that the tugboat engineers who shuttled goods to the 
                                                 
33. Gamarra, “Memorandum,” pp. 3-4; Schweigger to Vogt, 25 May 1942, Vogt papers, 
box 1:3, p. i. 
393 
guano islands often wrote down sea-surface temperatures in their logs without 
putting thermometers in the water.34   
This deficiency was not the seat of Vogt’s distrust, however.  Vogt’s self-
centered reliance on his own abilities as an observer rested on his experience at one 
of world’s centers for ornithological research, where his work had set the standard 
for the dedicated amateur as scientist.  Likewise, both William Vogt and his wife 
came to Peru with a set of cultural expectations about human behavior formed by 
their bourgeois lifestyle in New York City.  They tended to ascribe differences in 
custom they encountered abroad either to ignorance or to the environment--not to 
race, although their derogatory statements often can hardly be distinguished from 
those of a racist.35  Like so many scientific travelers, both women and men, the 
Vogts felt that their cosmopolitanism and education made them well-suited for the 
role of anthropologist to an entire nation. 
This mindset affected their first sensations of Peru.  The moment she 
arrived, Juana Allraum Vogt remarked in her journal that Peru was “a very dirty 
place” with  “very dirty people”--although she quickly tried to reassure herself 
regarding her fortitude with a disingenuous caveat: “the dirt doesn’t seem to bother 
me.”  She took special note of one of her husband’s assistants who feared “that 
these animals he is maltreating for the purposes of science. . . will cautir him. . . by 
which the animal’s vengeance is visited indirectly on the evil-doer through 
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mysterious illness, etc.”  She added, “Ampuero is not too bright, I fear,” thus 
discounting both the birds’ real trauma and this Peruvian’s humble respect for the 
natural world (illus. 37).36 
William Vogt was equally puzzled by “the emotional state of some of these 
people.”  To him, their “national mournfulness” was “as hard to understand . . . as it 
is to know what is happening to the nervous system of a brooding guanay.”  
Peruvians’ sullen attitude stood in contrast to the “equally persecuted American 
negro who has developed to an almost unique degree the gift of laughter.”  He 
ascribed the Peruvian temperament not to inheritance, but to “the harsh 
environment of these people--the desert coast, the frigid, arid sierra, the dreadful 
selva.”  He blamed Peruvians’ high death rate, alleged inability to concentrate, and 
“lack of vigor” to a poor diet supposedly too high in carbohydrates. 37   
Clearly, the Vogts were environmentalists of the determinist sort before 
they ever set foot on Peruvian shores.  Their understanding of animal behavior 
influenced their perceptions of human behavior, and vice versa.  The fact that 
months of inactivity on the isolated guano islands plunged Juana into depression 
did nothing to improve their regard for the Peruvian environment.  Nor was it good 
for their marriage: the Vogts divorced soon after their sojourn in Peru. 
These views also affected William Vogt’s private evaluation of Peruvian 
scientists and the quality of their work.  After having tea one evening with “one of 
Peru’s outstanding men of science,” Vogt outlined his unnamed host’s capabilities 
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and liabilities in a revealing journal entry, one of the few he made that was not 
directly related to his ornithological research in Peru.  This “loveable, sweet, 
apparently honest” man had “probably been intelligent, though his mind is 
slipping.”  After cursorily glancing at his major work, Vogt determined that this 
“carefully done” book “would not stand up under the kindest North American 
criticism,” despite the fact that it was based on “an enormous amount of labor . . . 
probably with a solid foundation,” for one thing because it was “extremely badly 
documented.”  Nor did Vogt expect much from this man’s future work: “his pleas 
for a second volume sound like 15th Century vaporings.”  In Vogt’s view, the 
quality of this scientist’s work befit his working environment:  “He lives in a house 
that is dismal as only a middle-class Peruvian house can be, with no comfortable 
furniture, not a decent reading light, the chairs falling to pieces.  No college prof 
I've ever known at home has had to endure such uncomfortable living and working 
conditions.”  “Yet,” Vogt wrote in mock amazement, “he is one of Peru’s 
outstanding sabios [scholars].”38 
 The liabilities of this one scientist symbolized for Vogt the failings of the 
entire scientific complex in Peru.  “The really good men are paid less than 600 
soles a month [US$189]” when “almost any U.S. scientific publication cost[s] 25-
30 soles per year.”  This made competition for jobs “so sharp that all sorts of back-
stage knifing goes on. . . . The practicing scientist is almost forced to resort to 
splashy performances in order to make enough of an impression to hold his job”--as 
if the same could not be said for the United States during the Depression, or today, 
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for that matter.  Publication standards in Peru, likewise, “are extremely low; much 
of the published material is an unacknowledged synthesis of work from other 
countries.  And such things as priority, one-time publication, etc., mean nothing to 
most of the scientists here.”  Vogt wondered if behind these poor conditions of pay, 
work, and living, “there is also something in the Peruvian temperament that is anti-
pathetic to the sustained work that is the basis of sound science.”  With the “notable 
exception” of CAG’s general manager Francisco Ballén, Peruvians to Vogt, “seem 
to have grasshopper minds, to a far greater degree than we of the U.S. . . . Many of 
the people I work with seem to have a constitutional difficulty in sticking at 
anything more than a few moments. . . . small wonder that Peruvian science is so 
pathetic.”39   
Obviously, Vogt thought Peru lacked the right conditions and the right men, 
much less the proper knowledge base, for an adequate technocracy.  He verged on a 
racist dismissal of Peruvians’ inherent capabilities for science, though his paternal 
treatment of Enrique Ávila would seem to indicate that he had some hope for 
Peru’s scientific future.  If any part of his evaluation was correct, it did not bode 
well for the rational development of Peru’s other marine resources. 
 But this negative evaluation of Peru’s scientific capabilities cannot explain 
Vogt’s antagonism toward his German colleague who had excellent scientific 
training by almost anyone’s measure.  The available evidence suggests that their 
disagreement is best explained as both an interpersonal and interdisciplinary 
conflict over the standards of professional propriety, expertise, and authority. 
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Part of their misunderstanding can be ascribed to their contrasting 
preference for holist versus specialist study.  Even though he focused on the guano 
birds, Vogt presumed to study the entire complex of interspecies relations that 
affected the birds’ well-being, as one would expect from his scientific upbringing 
among the polymaths of U.S. ornithology and conservation.  He thought only a 
holistic ecological study of Peru’s marine environment would provide an adequate 
knowledge base for the management of guano production.  Schweigger 
acknowledged the value of such a study, but he criticized Vogt for taking on “a 
work which never one man alone can do.”  During his intense, highly specialized 
training in the German university tradition, the idea had been instilled in 
Schweigger that an individual scientist could only become an expert on a single 
group of closely related organisms.  Outside a narrowly defined field of expertise, 
the scientist had to bow to the authority of other experts, which Vogt failed to do, 
in Schweigger’s view.  He particularly frowned on Vogt’s analysis of the food 
chain governing Peru’s marine community, a classic tool of Eltonian ecology (illus. 
38).  Even though Vogt’s diagram provided some idea of the ecological complexity 
of this community, Schweigger noted that it did not even begin to include all of the 
significant relationships that potentially affected the guano birds.  In short, Vogt’s 
work did not meet his own holistic standard.  Schweigger had zeroed in on a major 
reason why many ecologists at this time migrated away from community ecology 
toward the study of population dynamics.  It was difficult to formulate practical, 
quantitative research problems within the holistic rubric of community ecology, 
much less to establish a framework for the technocratic management of entire 
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communities.  Despite the contribution of the “energy-economics” school led by 
Charles Elton, holistic studies only experienced a major renaissance after World 
War II when ecologists encouraged by funding from an immense military-industrial 
complex began to use radioactive isotopes to study the flow of energy and 
chemicals through what then came to be known as “ecosystems.”40 
Vogt and Schweigger also had different approaches toward the use of 
physical data and the study of change in these conditions over time.  Following a 
venerable tradition of German oceanography typified by the work of Schweigger’s 
former colleague Gerhard Schott, Schweigger preferred to gather hard data from as 
many observers as possible in order to interpolate average conditions along the 
entire Peruvian coast.  Vogt, on the other hand, was primarily concerned with the 
changing environmental conditions of a small region surrounding the Islas Chincha, 
especially the effect of environmental extremes on the well-being of the guano 
birds.  Vogt thought Schweigger’s observations were “literally and figuratively 
superficial” because he cared little for their larger ecological context.  To 
Schweigger’s horror, Vogt did not hesitate to derive the physical conditions of 
another site using observations of animal behavior as a proxy, even though he had 
no direct knowledge of these conditions.  Schweigger thought this lack of precision 
led Vogt to embark “on many doubtful ideas” that failed to consider “all the 
particularities of the Humboldt current I have collected during all these years.”  As 
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a hyper-empiricist, Schweigger was uncomfortable following Vogt on what he 
considered flights of theoretical fantasy.41 
More importantly, Schweigger and Vogt had contrasting attitudes toward 
the function of debate in a scientific community.  Schweigger was highly sensitive 
to criticism, while Vogt thought his own abrasive personality was a virtue.  He 
believed that “science only grows through criticism. . . . The friction of mind on 
mind ought to polish our understanding of these problems until there can be no 
question as to what is the ultimate truth.”  Paradoxically, Schweigger was not 
hesitant to publish.  His output of scientific articles was substantial, although much 
of this production was narrowly empirical.  Vogt’s major product, in contrast, was 
a highly speculative report with clear policy recommendations to his superiors at 
CAG; he published practically nothing in English based on his ornithological work 
in Peru.  As a consequence, Schweigger’s observations had a much greater impact 
on broad scientific understanding of Peru’s marine environment, while Vogt’s 
recommendations had a direct effect in the short term on the management of the 
guano birds.42    
Vogt’s profession of faith in the ability of science to “grow through 
criticism” notwithstanding, this three-way debate between a Peruvian agronomist, 
New York ornithologist, and German oceanographer left other Peruvian officials 
with a conundrum.  Should the environmental technocrat rely on the gradual 
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accumulation of local empirical knowledge or have faith in existing theory, even 
though it might not apply to Peru’s situation?  Should the technocrat act cautiously 
or aggressively based on this knowledge?  How could anyone really tell when this 
understanding was fundamentally affected by personal or professional conflicts?  
The accelerating drive to develop Peru’s fisheries made these issues all the more 
pressing. 
 
A False Start 
As the crisis of Peruvian guano production worsened during the El Niño of 
1939-1941, CAG officials considered the possibility that they could circumvent this 
problem by exploiting a different level in the Humboldt Current food chain.  They 
initiated a plan to harvest fertilizer directly from the sea as fishmeal. 
CAG sent Luis Gamarra on a long expedition to study the fishing industry 
in the United States.  There he established contacts with officials from the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service, boat and net manufacturers, and various fish, fish oil, and 
fishmeal companies in New Jersey, Washington State, and California.  Late in 
1940, he submitted an enthusiastic report estimating that CAG could rapidly set up 
a manufacturing complex capable of producing 50,000 metric tons of fishmeal per 
year.  Francisco Ballén was immediately won over by Gamarra’s optimism, and he 
began to envision the implantation of an industry that would “contribute to the 
satisfaction of rising demand for nitrogen fertilizer from the nation’s agriculture,” 
besides producing “a product with excellent market openings” that CAG could sell 
for high prices abroad.  Thus, CAG’s conservation technocrats gave birth to a plan 
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to establish a fishmeal industry in Peru modeled, more or less, after the guano 
industry.43  
They were not the only party interested in the development of Peru’s vast 
marine resources, however.  Nor were these other parties satisfied to let CAG’s 
technical corps attack this problem alone.  But everyone concerned seemed to want 
experts to lead this charge.  Once again, Peruvian state officials consulted foreign 
experts for assistance.  Their endeavors bore fruit, but not in the way CAG’s 
leaders intended. 
In 1940, Manuel Prado’s government issued Law 9140 for the Promotion of 
Industry.  Although this law has sometimes been hailed as a fundamental shift in 
the political economy of the Peruvian state, it had little impact on manufacturing in 
Peru in the short term, except for hesitant steps toward the construction of an 
immense hydroelectric-coal-steel complex near Chimbote, the future center of 
Peru’s fishing industry.  Rapid industrialization was largely a phenomenon of the 
1950s and 1960s in Peru.  Nevertheless, this law did have important consequences 
for the technocratic development of Peru’s marine fisheries.  It included a clause 
that established a Peruvian Fishery Commission composed of national experts who 
were entrusted with mapping out the future of the fishing industry in Peru.  Ballén, 
Schweigger, and Gamarra, all CAG stalwarts, occupied three of its chairs.  This 
sort of top-down organization, in which a bureaucratic commission with broad 
powers is initiated by decree or legislation, became typical of state-led development 
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projects during the mid-twentieth century in Peru and other Latin American states.  
Their popularity, which grew in following years, was testimony to the influence of 
the technocratic ideal and goes a long way toward explaining the epochal growth of 
state bureaucracies during this era.44   
While this “oceanographic cabinet” was getting organized, President Prado 
made a direct request to the United States for aid.  He asked the U.S. to send a 
mission of fishery experts to Peru as representatives of its “Good Neighbor Policy.”  
This action was significant in a number of ways.  It was an important case in which 
a Latin American government took initiative to encourage the administration of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt to back up its international policy of military 
nonintervention and noninterference with direct measures that would improve the 
economies and living standards of its neighbors to the south.  Thus, Peru helped in 
a small way to shape the evolution of the Good Neighbor Policy after 1939.  
Prado’s request also helped to inaugurate Peru’s alliance with the United States 
during World War II, a policy highlighted by Prado’s triumphal visit to Washington 
(where he was feted as “a great scientist and professor” by the Harvard Club), the 
forced internment of much of Peru’s 17,000-plus Japanese population to “protect” 
the Panama Canal, and the signing of a general trade agreement.  This agreement 
promised to provide the United States with agricultural staples and strategic 
materials at controlled wartime prices, placing a ceiling on the profits of Peruvian 
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agro-exporters.  As we have seen, this international relationship had a major impact 
on patterns of guano distribution and the attitudes of agribusinessmen toward Prado 
and his successor.  It also manifests the importance of food production and resource 
conservation to U.S.-Latin American relations during this period, relations which 
provided William Vogt with the opportunity to make a career for himself as an 
international conservationist.  Where the long-term development of Peru’s fishing 
industry was concerned, this alliance did not entwine Peru into strict relations of 
depedence on U.S. economic power and authority.  Prado’s political economy on 
this count was decidedly nationalist, even though it was never designed to 
encourage autonomous economic development.45 
In January 1941, three experts from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in 
Washington, DC, arrived in Peru.  The economist Reginald H. Fiedler (b. 1898) 
had been the chief of the Division of Fishery Industries at the Service since 1929.  
He led the North American Fishery Mission and was to perform an economic and 
statistical analysis of Peru’s fish marketing, distribution, and consumption.  The 
chemist Norman D. Jarvis (b. 1899) had worked at the Service as a fisheries 
technologist since 1930; he came to evaluate the handling and preservation of fish.  
Both Fiedler and Jarvis had degrees in fishery science from the University of 
Washington and had already worked together on a study of the Fisheries of the 
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Virgin Islands (1932).  Jarvis was also an expert on the fisheries of Puerto Rico and 
the Gulf of Mexico, and both were thought to have a special understanding of 
issues related to fishery development in Latin America.  Fishery engineer Milton J. 
Lobell, meanwhile, took charge of the study of fishing techniques and biological 
issues.   
Their studies paralleled the activity of various health, economic, and 
military advisors in Peru, including a U.S. Department of Agriculture mission to 
the Peruvian Amazon designed to expand strategic procurement of rubber, quinine, 
and other jungle products for the war effort.  But these scientific bureaucrats were 
not mere envoys of the Good Neighbor Policy and U.S. interests, they also helped 
to shape them:  Long before he was chosen to lead this mission, Fiedler had been 
an outspoken advocate for a U.S.-funded statistical survey to further “conservation 
of Inter-American fisheries” as a follow-up to his survey of fishery economics in 
the United States and Virgin Islands.46 
These experts came to Peru to reverse a paradoxical situation: Peru was a 
net importer of fish and fish products even though it had one of the richest marine 
ecosystems in the world.  They were rather shocked to discover that even though 
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Peru produced a total catch of 11,863 metric tons worth S/.2,373,000 (US$365,000) 
in 1940, it exported almost no fish or fish products and barely touched its vast 
anchoveta stocks.  Meanwhile, Peru imported over 5,800 metric tons of fish from 
1936-1939, more than two-thirds of which was canned fish for luxury consumption, 
and nearly one-third of which came from Japan.  Peru imported a whopping 
182,184 metric tons of fishmeal from the U.S. and Japan in 1937-1938, probably 
for use as fertilizer.  With the onset of World War II, there was simply no way 
these patterns could continue--and few people in Peru wanted them to.47 
To members of the North American Fishery Mission, the status of the 
Peruvian fishing industry was primarily a technological problem to be solved by 
the introduction of new craft and techniques.  To this end, they sailed to Peru in the 
Pacific Queen, an 80-foot, state-of-the-art trawler newly built in Tacoma, 
Washington (illus. 39).  They used it all along the Peruvian coast to test fishing 
gear, measure environmental conditions, and train a Peruvian fishing and scientific 
crew.  Fiedler, Jarvis, and Lobell intended Peru to use this craft and crew to 
establish an anchoveta fishery for the production of fishmeal, preferably organized 
under an independent administrative and research agency with capabilities similar 
to CAG. 
The North American Fishery Mission to Peru became a model for U.S. 
fishery missions all over the world designed to increase the supply of protein and 
vitamins to Allied forces.  The U.S. State Department almost immediately 
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approached the governments of the Caribbean basin with a similar plan “to further 
economic and social cooperation among the nations of the Western Hemisphere.”  
This led directly to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Caribbean Fishery Mission 
of 1942 headed by Fiedler and assisted by Lobell.  Fiedler continued his flurry of 
wartime organizing activity with missions to the South Pacific islands, Iceland, and 
England in 1943-1944.  In 1944-1945, Lobell led a similar mission to Chile and 
completed a long, unpublished report outlining a ten-year fishery development plan 
for Peru’s neighbor to the south.  President Prado’s appeal helped to set in motion a 
major strategic endeavor by the United States to survey and exploit the world’s 
fishery resources.  Meanwhile, ideologues all over Latin America began to view the 
ocean as the next frontier of modern development.48 
The recommendations of the North American Fishery Mission meshed well 
with CAG’s plan to establish a fishmeal industry in Peru under its control.  After 
the mission returned to the United States late in 1941, CAG received the sole right 
to “anchoveta fishing on a grand scale.”  CAG officials had argued successfully, at 
least for the time being, that they alone could prevent any competition for this 
natural resource that might “disorganize national fertilizer distribution and 
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international marketing.”  With experts like Schweigger at its command, CAG 
looked ready to establish a modern fishmeal industry “compatible with the 
protection of the guano industry.”  CAG negotiated an initial loan with the Banco 
Industrial del Perú for S/.650,000 (US$100,000) to purchase the Pacific Queen, a 
purse-seine net outfit, a complete terrestrial fishmeal plant with lighter fleet, and a 
mechanized storage and transport facility from California.  But the interruption of 
regular shipping during World War II and a sharp, El Niño-induced drop in 
company earnings hampered CAG’s ability to import the equipment necessary to 
complete a fishmeal production complex in Callao for several years.   
After the war, CAG continued to have trouble acquiring sufficient capital 
and staff to get its fishmeal plant operating, despite spending almost three times the 
original loan, a price that included sending two more Peruvians to study the fishing 
industry in the United States.  Critics viciously attacked this project as a 
boondoggle, even though CAG had spent barely half the amount Gamarra 
originally estimated it would take to build an operating fishmeal production 
complex.  CAG’s managers stubbornly stumbled forward with the original plan.  
Finally, in 1955 CAG put the idle plant up for sale at the greatly depreciated price 
of S/.901,474 (US$47,000).  The Italian-Peruvian entrepeneur Marcos Ghio bought 
the plant for an undisclosed amount and proceeded to build a valuable private 
company during the Peruvian fishmeal boom.  CAG never produced a gram of 
fishmeal.49 
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Was this a failure for technocracy?  CAG’s zealous leaders overestimated 
the ability of expertise to solve this new development problem.  But what had gone 
wrong?  When CAG took over and revived the guano industry, it used technical 
knowledge to adapt the existing system of guano production to the ecological 
conditions necessary for the growth of the guano bird population.  With its fishmeal 
plan, in contrast, CAG tried to build an industry using new technology where none 
of its type existed in Peru.  To make matters worse, it first entrusted this endeavor 
to an agronomist who had no experience with fishing.  Boosters of this project had 
been forewarned of its likelihood of failure:  The North American Fishery Mission 
prudently predicted that “the yield of this fishery, at least for several years to come, 
will probably not be as large as prophesied . . . because of the inexperience of the 
operators of the boats and gear and because of unforeseen technical difficulties.”  
The mission also cautioned against Ballén’s dream of mining fertilizer directly 
from the sea: fishmeal was simply too valuable as a high-protein livestock feed for 
it to be wasted as fertilizer.  Schweigger, Vogt, former CAG agronomist Rómulo 
Lanatta, and a series of expert oversight committees appointed by the Peruvian 
state echoed these conclusions.  By preventing CAG from raising enough capital to 
finish its fishmeal complex, expert criticism ensured the failure of a project already 
delayed by wartime and hampered by problems inherent to technology transfer.50 
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A Vexing Experiment 
 Why did CAG proceed with this fishmeal project when its own scientists 
objected to several of its fundamental premises?  The debate over a simple 
experiment by one of the fishmeal plant’s main booster helps us to elucidate some 
reasons why.  The elements of this debate demonstrate that scientific investigation 
cannot resolve some fundamental questions linked to resource development, no 
matter what its protagonists believed science and technocracy could accomplish. 
 Soon after he completed his plan for the development of a fishmeal 
production complex, Luis Gamarra performed a basic experiment in an attempt to 
bolster his claims regarding the desirability of an industrialized anchoveta fishery 
in Peru.  He wanted to determine the amount of guano produced when “the 
machinery of the digestive tube of marine birds” accomplished “the transformation 
of a primary material.”  For this purpose, he captured nine adult guanayes of nearly 
the same weight and placed them in three cages.  He force-fed a carefully weighed 
quantity of fresh machete fish to six of the birds; the other three he allowed to 
starve, ostensibly as an experimental control.  After three days he weighed the 
amount of guano produced by both sets of birds.  The force-fed birds consumed an 
average of 110 grams of fish and produced an average of 28 grams of excrement (a 
3.9:1 ratio).  The so-called controls, meanwhile, produced an average of 18 grams 
of guano each during their fast.  Gamarra then took a crucial (and highly 
problematic) step: he reasoned that he should subtract the latter average from the 
former to obtain the “real” ratio of fish consumed to guano produced by the six 
force-fed birds.  Through a couple more calculations (that do not add up on close 
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examination), he concluded that each guanay consumed 16.5 grams of fish for each 
gram of guano produced.  Gamarra then arbitrarily assumed that one half of this 
guano was lost into the sea, arriving at a final ratio of 32:1 [sic].  This compared 
quite unfavorably to the results of a fishmeal reduction experiment he supposedly 
performed on Isla Don Martín.  He claimed to have produced 2.5 tons of fishmeal 
and 240 liters of oil from ten tons of anchoveta (a 4:1 ratio)--how he did not say.  
But his message was clear: humans could exploit this resource much more 
efficiently than the guano birds.  To make a fishmeal industry seem even more 
lucrative, he calculated that Peru could gain an additional S/.461 (US$71) of profit 
from every ton of fishmeal sold on the international market beyond the S/.70 
earned after cost from each ton of guano sold in Peru.51               
 This shoddy experiment did nothing to improve Vogt’s opinion of Gamarra.  
He publicly attacked the experiment’s elements: the exceedingly small number of 
birds and short study period involved, Gamarra’s simplistic understanding of the 
digestive process, his unwarranted extrapolations.  (No one seemed to question 
Gamarra’s unlikely claim that he manufactured fishmeal at a 4:1 ratio or pointed 
out that his numbers did not add up.)  Vogt thought to repeat the experiment, but he 
could not acquire enough anchoveta from local fishermen at the remote Islas 
Chincha to do so.  Instead, using an analysis of the stomach contents of 23 wild 
birds, some rather fantastic over-estimates of the total population of guano birds, 
and comparisons with other bird species, Vogt guessed that the guanayes consumed 
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a maximum of 5.0 to 7.3 grams of fish for every gram of guano produced.  To 
clinch his argument for the efficiency of the guano industry, he asserted that the 
guano birds had a tendency to drop their pellets at night, and he figured that guano 
“lost” to the sea entered the nitrogen cycle and ultimately produced more 
anchoveta, anyway (see illus. 38).  This meant that the elimination of the guano 
birds to increase the fish catch--a possibility that a few forward-looking fishing 
boosters were already considering as early as 1942 [!]--might actually decrease the 
number of anchoveta by eliminating an important contributor to the nutrient cycle 
in the ocean food chain.  Gamarra countered that his approach to the problem 
simply came closer to scientific exactitude: he thought his experiment, because it 
was quantitative and involved direct measures, was therefore more concrete, more 
objective, and more certain than the “unstable base” Vogt used for his 
extrapolations and speculations.  Their relationship deteriorated further from this 
dispute.52 
 It would seem that this tedious quarrel could simply be dismissed as bad 
science on both sides, but it was hardly trivial.  Despite its basic flaws, Gamarra’s 
study, 32:1 consumption-to-production ratio, and US$71 of “lost” profit per ton of 
guano produced, were cited repeatedly by fishmeal industry boosters as scientific 
evidence for the inefficiency of the guano industry.  The population estimate of 30 
million birds used by Vogt in his calculations, likewise, was often cited by industry 
boosters, even though it was based on an ad hoc assertion by Gamarra that Vogt 
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followed only for the sake of argument.  (Subsequent analysis of aerial photographs 
indicated that the likely breeding population at the time was about 10 million birds 
of three species.) 
In the meantime, Vogt’s conflict with Gamarra over this issue carried over 
to Gamarra’s relationship with Vogt’s disciple.  In 1946, Enrique Ávila proposed to 
repeat Gamarra’s guano productivity experiment; Gamarra bristled at this implied 
criticism and even threatened to have him fired.  Although Gamarra eventually 
relented, Ávila shrewdly waited until the early 1950s to do the study, after he had 
already solidified his position at CAG and when his employer was beginning to 
become worried about competition from other fishmeal producers.  He constructed 
his experiment much more carefully than Gamarra, though he still relied on a small 
sample.  Ávila captured 12 two-month old guanay chicks (instead of adults) from 
Isla Chincha Norte and transported them to Callao; three died on the trip, and only 
six were healthy enough for the study.  These he fed and weighed daily, and he 
carefully measured their excrement at the end of two periods of two months each.  
Ávila used a regression analysis to test the accuracy of his final data and made a 
comparison to known nest deposits in wild conditions on Isla Don Martín.  During 
the first two months, his chicks consumed an average of 6.32 grams of fish for 
every gram of guano produced; during the second two months they produced at a 
4.46:1 ratio.  The accumulated deposits of these captive chicks were comparable to 
the weight of wild nests, which Ávila took to mean that guanayes deposited most of 
their excreta at the colonies (which, again, was not a logical conclusion, since his 
experiment did not involve adults).  Ávila used his results to criticize Gamarra’s 
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sloppy work and to savage the wild claims by other so-called experts that every 
piquero eats seven times its own weight in fish each day.53 
 To confuse matters even more, in his 1950 survey of worldwide guano 
production Yale ecologist G. Evelyn Hutchinson rejected Gamarra’s figures as 
“almost certainly wrong” since his so-called controls were “obviously unwillingly 
converting themselves into guano.”  Hutchinson determined from chemical 
analyses that their consumption-to-production ratio was no better than 9.8:1 and 
probably closer to 15.3:1.  According to this study, Gamarra’s ratio (before he 
arbitrarily doubled it) had been correct--but by accident.  Finally, in the late 1950s, 
one of Ávila’s successors repeated his experiment with much greater care in an 
attempt to prove definitively that chick mortality during El Niño events was due to 
starvation, not disease.  He arrived at a food:guano conversion ratio of 6.88:1.  
These studies were never cited by fishing industry partisans with any regularity, 
however, despite their greater claims to accuracy and relevance for the management 
of Peru’s marine environment.54 
The crux of this matter actually had little to do with the numbers involved.  
However ridiculous their attempts, CAG’s scientists were performing a time-
honored ritual while debating Gamarra’s vexing experiment.  They were 
demonstrating their devotion to the experimental philosophy and the “gospel of 
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efficiency,” basic tenets of the technocratic ideal.  At its deepest level, this debate 
represented a disagreement over the fundamental nature of Peru’s marine 
ecosystem and the proper role of humans in this natural order.  These experiments 
established an arena accessible only to a handful of technocrats where basic, 
philosophical issues could be wrestled over without creating a chaotic, democratic 
free-for-all. 
As many students of technocracy have pointed out, ceremonial display has 
been crucial to the rise of experts to power.  Such rituals include privileging “hard” 
quantifiable data that can be used to calculate efficiency over “hard to decode” 
qualitative trends, and making “economese” and other technical jargon the lingua 
franca of debate.  Respectability--and the legitimacy of power--are at stake in these 
displays.  Though not in this particular case, such displays of respectability often 
come down to tangible, seemingly objective “matters of diploma” (i.e., degrees, 
scholarships, and other credentials that might appear as lines on a résumé) rather 
than abstruse, subjective “matters of science” (i.e., the quality and importance of 
work in a specialized research field, issues requiring evaluation by other experts).  
It is often easier to judge the aesthetics of such ceremonies--and then simply choose 
which side “looks best” based on other political and economic interests--than it is 
to evaluate the applicability of an abstract experiment to a policy debate.55  
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In one sense, this debate was an extension of the dispute over the cause for 
the guano birds’ decline during the 1939-1941 El Niño.  If basic food scarcity was 
the cause, as Vogt believed, then a fishing industry of any size could only hurt the 
guano birds, especially during El Niño years.  But if disease was a major factor, or 
the fish simply had moved deeper out of reach of the birds, as Gamarra and 
Schweigger believed, then a limited fishing industry would not be a problem.  This 
sort of issue could be addressed by further scientific research.  CAG’s scientific trio 
of Gamarra, Schweigger, and Ávila, a Peruvian veterinarian, and another 
agronomist devoted a great deal of attention to this question when a weak El Niño 
in February 1948 negatively affected the bird colonies as far south as Isla Tortugas.  
They unanimously confirmed Vogt’s position that lack of food, not disease, caused 
these upsets.56 
But Gamarra’s experiment was not designed to address this problem.  He 
wanted to determine if humans could make more efficient use of anchoveta as a 
“primary material” than could the digestive “machinery” of the guano birds.  This 
question derived from one of the core principles of conservation, the “gospel of 
efficiency,” by which humans should strive toward the “highest use” for human 
benefit of the various natural resources at their disposal in a particular 
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environment.57  The larger the fish consumption-to-guano production ratio, the 
more humans could profit by extracting fishmeal rather than guano from Peru’s 
marine ecosystem.  According to Elton’s pyramid of numbers (and basic laws of 
thermodynamics), a large population of fish were required to support a small 
number of predatory birds.  Humans would be “eating lower on the food chain,” so 
to speak, by exploiting the anchoveta directly rather than waiting for birds to 
convert them into guano.  In other words, Peruvians could probably generate much 
greater surplus value from natural capital and human labor by establishing a large-
scale fishing industry.  Because this question was framed on the narrow grounds of 
efficiency, and therefore amenable to further scientific investigation, it virtually 
guaranteed that scientists would remain a part of any future debate over the 
institution of a fishmeal industry.   
In this vein, Vogt and Gamarra succeeded in turning this controversy into a 
debate over the ability of experts to manage Peru’s marine environment efficiently.  
Both men assumed that the Peruvian populace could not be trusted to manage an 
industrial anchoveta fishery on their own.  But were Peruvian experts competent 
enough to guide the exploitation of the anchoveta on a large scale without 
destroying Peru’s natural patrimony?  But a philosophical issue lay at the heart of 
this controversy:  Should Peru endeavor to exploit its natural resources to the 
maximum?  Of course, scientists had no more qualifications to answer this moral 
question than anyone else in Peru. 
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Like most developmentalists of his era, Gamarra believed it was the moral 
duty of the scientist--and all patriotic Peruvians--to promote the maximal use of 
Peru’s natural resources:  “It is not right that Peru should lose this enormous 
quantity of money that could have moved the country forward” if it rejected the 
opportunity to exploit the anchoveta directly, Gamarra exhorted.  “As Peruvians 
and employees of this company we are ready to place the entire sum of our strength 
toward preventing our posterity from making accusations against us” for failing to 
maximize the production of wealth in Peru.  Gamarra was a great skeptic regarding 
the ability of nature to regulate itself.  Reflecting his training as an agronomist, he 
thought rational man was quite capable of “exploiting natural resources prudently 
and scientifically.”  The guano birds, on the other hand, did not “conform to these 
norms; they ingest all the fish that come into their reach as do . . . other wild 
animals and insects that attack crops.”  In short, nature could be greatly improved 
upon under human management.58 
Conversely, like many ecologists of his era, Vogt envisioned nature almost 
as an organism in its own right.  He believed natural communities achieved their 
healthiest, most productive “climax” state when left alone by humans.  As a 
foreigner, he had no reason to share Gamarra’s nationalistic biases.  Vogt admitted 
that he did not have sufficient knowledge to predict the future of an industrial 
anchoveta fishery.  “But we do know,” Vogt warned, “from the reactions of 
hundreds of forms of life all over the earth, that exploitation of natural resources by 
man is almost always a dangerous proceeding, unless it is done with care and skill, 
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especially since guano is a resource that will exist in perpetuity.”  Vogt raised the 
specter of the California sardine.  Many experts at this time thought that the sardine 
was being severely overfished (it was still over a decade away from total collapse).  
Vogt pointed out that this dire situation had emerged even though scientific 
understanding of the sardine was vastly superior to knowledge of the anchoveta and 
its ecology.  To make matters more difficult, scientists still knew little about the 
ecology of the sardine, even after years of sustained scientific research.  On these 
grounds, Vogt thought the economic and biological risks of a Peruvian fishmeal 
industry were great, no matter how carefully it was managed--and we already know 
of Vogt’s pessimistic evaluation of the technocratic corps in Peru that presumed to 
develop this new natural resource.59 
Other Peruvian officials tended to agree with Gamarra’s position, but they 
were willing to concede to Vogt their ignorance of Peru’s marine environment.  
Therefore, they consulted yet another foreign expert in search of a technocratic 
solution to this issue. 
In 1941, CAG officials invited the planktonologist Mary Sears (1905-1997) 
to Peru so they might “reach . . . a better understanding of some factors that affect 
the life of the birds and production of guano that until now were beyond human 
control.”  She obtained a grant from the U.S. Committee for Inter-American 
Cultural and Artistic Relations and a faculty fellowship from Wellesley College 
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that gave her the chance to study the plankton and oceanographic conditions of the 
Bahía de Pisco during the 1941-1942 U.S. academic year.60 
Once again, CAG could not have acquired an expert more qualified for the 
job.  Sears had completed a Ph.D. in zoology and oceanography from Radcliffe 
College and was still working at Harvard as a research assistant for Henry Bryant 
Bigelow, founder and director of Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.  She 
specialized on a topic with the most basic implications for economic production 
from the sea: the relation between nutrient cycling and plankton production at the 
rich Georges Bank fishery off the Maine coast.  Like so many of the marine 
scientists who came to work in Peru, her career blossomed after she returned home.  
During what one historian of science has called the “dark age for women in the 
professions,” Sears was one of the architects of U.S. oceanographic research.  She 
served as the main organizer of the Oceanographic Unit of the Navy Hydrographic 
Office, then as founding editor of the journal Deep-Sea Research (1953-1974).  
Sears became a senior scientist at Woods Hole and was one of only four women to 
serve on its board of directors between 1940 and 1970.  Sears was widely 
recognized as the organizing force responsible for the success of the First 
International Oceanographic Congress held at the United Nations in 1959, a role 
her Peruvian experience prepared her to play.61 
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More than any other marine scientist recruited by Peru during this era, Sears 
encountered the inversion of social inequalities that so often happens when 
scientists travel from North to South across the magical barrier that divides the 
“core” from the “periphery” of the world of science.  Even though she made a 
major contribution to the development of marine science by almost any standard, 
the course of her career was always constrained by her gender.  Sears’s social 
subordination in the United States likely shaped the fact that she became a 
planktonologist in the first place, which from an anthropocentric perspective 
involves tedious microscopic study of the ocean’s humblest creatures.  It probably 
played a role in her recruitment to travel to Peru.  But Sears saw this trip as a 
tremendous opportunity, and she always remembered her Peruvian voyage with 
great fondness for a basic reason:  This was the only time during her entire career 
when she was allowed to do science at sea.  In fact, she had an entire ship and team 
of male assistants at her disposal.  By one common measure, this was Sears’s only 
chance to be a “real” oceanographer.  In the United States, as a woman, she was 
always forbidden from participating in offshore expeditions.  (Oceanography is 
often defined as the practice of science on ships at sea.)  In short, Peru was the one 
place Sears was treated with the respect her training, experience, and expertise 
deserved.62 
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Nevertheless, Sears’s nationality and language skills affected whom she 
associated with in Peru.  Rather than teaming up with Schweigger or some 
Peruvian scientist, she worked most closely with her compatriots Vogt, Fiedler, 
Jarvis, and Lobell.  Vogt tried to take advantage of his special relationship with 
Sears to bolster his position regarding CAG’s plans to establish a fishmeal industry.  
Indeed, her plankton studies and preliminary studies of the anchoveta around the 
Islas Chincha seemed to confirm many of Vogt’s assertions.  In Sears’s view, the 
distress of the guano birds had a “more immediate cause” than changing 
environmental conditions:  Poor production of surface phytoplankton appeared to 
have led to the “disappearance” of the adult anchoveta stock in 1941.  Significantly, 
she speculated that lack of phytoplankton had a direct impact on the anchoveta 
population by preventing the “year class” of fry from coming to sexual maturity, 
and thereby depressing the availability of food for the guano birds in an absolute 
sense.  At the very least, Sears vindicated Vogt’s contention that the entire food 
chain of the guano birds needed further investigation.  But her declarations were 
never as clear-cut or authoritative as Vogt tried to pretend they were, and her 
observations and interpretations did not always coincide coincide with his.63  
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In short, Sears’s plankton research did not resolve this debate directly as 
CAG’s managers hoep it would.  However, Sears’s prophetic testimony provided a 
big boost to the technocratic ideal: 
 
Studying plankton in connection to the anchoveta-guano bird problem . . . is 
going to have importance on that day when the fishing industry becomes a 
noted source of income.  In this manner, a comprehension of the various 
conservation problems can be attained before the problems appear, and 
before the overexploitation of these resources determines the ruin or the 
deterioration of the industry--as has occurred in many European and North 
American countires. . . . Here in Peru, we can profit by the errors of others, 
and with a little bit of intelligent foresight avoid similar disasters.64 
With this statement, Sears provided Peruvian economic planners with an out from 
the fishmeal controversy.  Unlike Vogt, she firmly believed Peru could put its faith 
in the ability of conservation technocrats.  Therefore, CAG could proceed 
cautiously with its fishmeal industry plans without putting the guano birds in dire 
jeopardy. 
To an extent, even Vogt shared this faith.  Although he thought poorly of 
Peru’s existing scientific capabilities, he believed Peruvians could be redeemed 
with the proper education.  To this end, building on his experience training Enrique 
Ávila, Vogt drafted an elaborate plan to provide Peru with an educational apparatus 
to train marine scientists.  Vogt’s program called for the hiring of three-to-six U.S., 
Peruvian, or Chilean specialists a year over a 15-year period and the purchase of 
equipment to be used for basic marine research.  In the course of their research, 
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these specialists were to train local apprentices.  Peru actually implemented a 
similar plan two decades later.65 
Vogt believed in the possibilities of a conservation-oriented technocracy, 
but he would never plead allegiance to the developmental orthodoxy that had 
provided the reason for hiring technocrats in the first place.  CAG’s overseers did 
not welcome his heretical attacks on Peru’s national development, and they 
terminated him with the hope that his less costly Peruvian disciple would show 
greater patriotic loyalty to their vision of national progress. 
 
Salomon’s House Transformed 
In the years that followed Vogt and Sears’s return to the United States, 
Erwin Schweigger continued his studies of the ocean environment and fishing 
practices in Peru with a view toward establishing “intensive” fisheries at several 
ports along the coast.  For example, he tested a number of techniques for the 
“scientifically based” exploitation of the bonito; he hoped this research would 
avoid the cost and inefficiency of “empirical fishing.”  As we shall see in the next 
chapter, such empirical studies contributed to the successful industrialization of this 
fishery during the 1940s.66 
Schweigger also gathered data of unprecedented detail and completeness 
regarding oceanic conditions off Peru.  During his tenure at CAG, he published 
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over 40 articles based on these observations in Spanish, English, and German.67  
Schweigger also produced four benchmark books on the oceanography of the 
Peruvian littoral: Pesquería y oceanografía del Perú y proposiciones para su 
desarrollo futuro (1943), El litoral peruano (1947), Atlas de la Corriente 
Costanera Peruana (1951), and Die Westküste Südamerikas im Bereich des Peru-
Stroms (1959).  These publications and the “mapas mensuales” (monthly summary 
maps) of oceanic conditions he compiled provided the empirical basis for 
pioneering papers by foreign scientists on the physical nature of the El Niño 
phenonmeon.68  Like Robert Cushman Murphy, Schweigger deserves a great deal 
of credit for revealing its importance to the larger scientific world; Schweigger also 
used the Pacific Science Congress to spread knowledge of El Niño.69  As we shall 
                                                 
67. Key articles by Schweigger include “Los fenómenos en el mar desde 1925 hasta 1941”; 
idem, “Las irregularidades en la corriente de Humboldt en los años 1939 a 1941: Una tentativa de su 
explicación,” BCAG 18 (1942), 27-42; idem, “La ‘legítima’ Corriente del Niño,” BCAG 21:8-9 
(Aug.-Sept. 1945), 255-336; idem, “Der Peru-Strom nach zwölfjährigen Beobachtungen,” Erdkunde 
3 (1949), 121-132, 229-241; idem, “Estudio comparativo de temperaturas del mar y el régimen de 
vientos entre los años 1954 y 1939/53,” BCCAG 2 (1955), 53-64; idem, “El mar durante el año 
1955.” BCAG, suplemento científico (Lima) 33:7-8 (1957); idem, “Anomalias térmicas en el Oceano 
Pacífico oriental y su pronóstico,” BSGL 78:3-4 (1961), 3-50. 
68. Pivotal articles on El Niño (and “La Niña”) by foreign scientists who relied on 
Schweigger’s work include Martin Rodewald, “Beiträge zur Klimaschwankung im Meere: 10. 
Beitrag: Die Anomalie der Wassertemperatur und der Zirkulation im Nordpazifischen Ozean und an 
der Küste Perus im Jahre 1955,” Deutschen Hydrographischen Zeitschrift 11:2 (1958), 78-82; idem, 
“Beiträge zur Klimaschwankung im Meere: 11. Beitrag: Die ostpazifische ‘Wärmewelle’ von 
1957/1958,” Deutschen Hydrographischen Zeitschrift 12:5 (1959), 204-210; idem, “Beiträge zur 
Klimaschwankung im Meere: 13. Beitrag: Die Asymmetrie im zeilichen Verlauf der 
Wassertemperatur-Anomalien in Puerto Chicama (Peru),” Deutsche Hydrographische Zeitschrift 
17:3 (1964), 105-114; Jacob Bjerknes, “‘El Niño’ Study Based on Analysis of Ocean Surface 
Temperatures, 1935-57,” Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Bulletin 5:3 (1961); Warren S. 
Wooster, “El Niño,” California Cooperative Oceanic Fisheries Investigations Reports 7 (1960), 43-
45; idem, “Yearly Changes in the Peru Current,” Limnology and Oceanography 6:2 (1961), 222-
226.  Cf. César Caviedes, “El Niño 1972: Its Climatic, Ecological, Human, and Economic 
Implications,” The Geographical Review 65:4 (Oct. 1975), 506.  
69. Schweigger “Studies of the Peru Coastal Current with Reference to the Extraordinary 
Summer of 1939,” in Proceedings of the Sixth Pacific Science Congress of the Pacific Science 
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see in chapter 8, all this work helped make later scientists a bit overconfident that 
they understood the vagaries of Peru’s marine environment. 
Unlike Vogt, Schweigger became a Peruvian citizen.  He participated 
actively in local scientific, intellectual, and political life and eventually organized 
Peru’s first university-based teaching program in oceanography and fishery 
engineering in 1960.  He ended up dying in West Germany in 1965 only because he 
had been invited there to give a series of conferences and was struck by a sudden, 
unexpected illness.  With all of these accomplishments, it is little wonder that 
Peruvians now proudly claim this German immigrant as one of their own.70   
Schweigger could not have accomplished all of this without the help of a 
growing marine science organization at CAG.  Beginning in 1946, CAG’s new 
general manager Carlos Llosa began to plan for this expansion.  After a discussion 
with Ávila, he decided to send Schweigger’s former assistant Antonio Landa to the 
United States to study so he could become CAG’s resident anchoveta expert.  Llosa 
hoped to send as many as five “boys” (muchachos) to the U.S. for training, and he 
began to implement plans for a small marine research lab on Pisco Bay.  (Illus. 1 
shows Ávila and his family on the grounds of this facility.)  Note that Llosa’s 
                                                                                                                                        
Association Held at the University of California, Berkeley, Stanford University, and San Francisco, 
July 24th to August 12th, 1939 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1940), 
3:177-195; idem, “Abnormal Summers in the Peruvian Coastal Current,” in Proceedings of the 
Eighth Pacific Science Congress of the Pacific Science Association, Held at the University of the 
Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, 16th to 28th November 1953 (Quezon City: National Research 
Council of the Philippines, 1955), 3:801-816.  
70. Schweigger, “La Facultad de Oceanografía y Pesquería de la Universidad Nacional 
‘Federico Villarreal,’” in Memoria del I Seminario Latinoamericano sobre el Océano Pacífico 
Oriental (Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 1966), 210-212; Gamarra, 
“Fallecimiento del Dr. Erwin Schweigger,” 4; Marcos Cueto, Excelencia científica en la periferia, 
207. 
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language at this stage, despite Mary Sears’s example, excluded the possibility of 
sending “girls” abroad for education.  At least for the moment, Llosa ignored the 
fact that several bright, young Peruvian women such as Aurora Chirinos (de 
Vildoso) and Norma Chirichigno Fonseca were pursuing professional careers in 
marine science through the Ministry of Agriculture’s new Dirección de Pesquería.71 
CAG’s version of Salomon’s House continued to be riven by dissent.  Soon 
after Ávila’s return to Peru, he and Schweigger tried on their own, after a long face-
to-face discussion, to prevent conflict by clearly defining their fields of 
specialization and segregating their responsibilities.  In 1946, Llosa dashed these 
plans by installing Luis Gamarra as “coordinator” of all scientific activities at 
CAG; Schweigger considered quitting rather “than work under the technical 
orientation of a self-styled pouter pigeon.”  Two years later, CAG installed 
Schweigger as the chief of its new Departamento de Oceanografía e Ictiología 
(signficantly, with no mention of “ornitología.”)  This administrative reshuffling 
released CAG’s marine studies from the meddling of Gamarra, but it also formally 
subordinated Ávila to his German colleague, thereby enflaming his jealousy toward 
Schweigger.  As we have seen, Ávila believed racism prevented him from receiving 
equal pay for equal work.  Ávila did not consider Schweigger much of an 
oceanographer, in the holistic sense: “I’m not interested in pure science,” 
Schweigger once admitted to Ávila, “I am first of all a fisherman.”  Schweigger 
also had a tendency to talk down to his young Peruvian associate: “Now, Avila, 
                                                 
71. Ávila to Vogt, 2 July 1946, Vogt papers, box 1:1; interviews with Aurora Chirinos de 
Vildoso and Abelardo Vildoso, Callao, Peru, 11 June 2001. 
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Don’t make the same mistake that Vogt did [b]ecause you see some emaciated 
birds . . . . You surely realize by this time that to talk of food scarcity is sheer 
foolishness.”  To top things off, Ávila thought Schweigger was far too careless with 
empirical data gathering, his supposed strong point, and thus, “a fantastic science 
faker.”  This continuation of the conflict that had divided Schweigger and Vogt 
contributed to the emergence of a permanent rift between bird and fishery scientists 
in Peru with far-reaching consequences.72 
But in the short term, the spectacular success of the guano birds during the 
early 1950s helped smooth-over many of these cracks in CAG’s technocratic 
foundation.  CAG used some of its record profits to establish three well-equipped 
marine biology research stations.73  It staffed them, at first, with young male 
Peruvians who had received advanced foreign educations paid for, in part, by 
company scholarships.  Enrique Ávila, CAG’s University of Wisconsin-trained 
ornithologist, managed the station on Isla Don Martín.  After Antonio Landa 
completed an M.A. in ichthyology at Stanford University’s Hopkins Marine Station 
on Monterey Bay, the center of California’s dying sardine industry, he set up a 
fishery research station for CAG at Chimbote, the focus of Peru’s own emerging 
fishing industry.  CAG appointed Mario Barreda Oyanguren, a holder of an M.S. in 
limnology and biology from the University of Michigan and son of the long-time 
president of the Comité Nacional de Protección a la Naturaleza, as head of its 
station at Pisco Bay.  Thanks to Carlos Barreda and Enrique Ávila’s influence, 
                                                 
72. Ávila to Vogt, 12 Dec. 1945, 24 Jan. 1946, 7 Oct. 1946, 19 Dec. 1946, 23 Mar. 1948,  
26 Apr. 1948, 6 Apr. 1949, Vogt papers, box 1:1.  
73. See app. 4. 
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provincial origin began changing from a liability to a real social advantage, at least 
where becoming a marine scientist was concerned.  All three of these young men 
were natives of Puno on the shores of Lake Titicaca.  Ávila’s successor Rómulo 
Jordán was a native of Cuzco.  Curiously, much of Peru’s first generation of 
professional marine scientists was born in the high Andes. 
Like its foreign advisors, CAG’s scientific staff was not limited to “lords” 
of guano.  At Chimbote, Blanca Rojas (de Mendiola) served as Landa’s assistant.  
When he left CAG to take a better-paying job with the Inter-American Tropical 
Tuna Commission, Rojas replaced him as station chief, while another woman, Obla 
Paliza (de Clark), took over as Rojas’s assistant.  Like Sears, Rojas specialized in 
planktonology.  Rojas and Paliza, along with Chirichigno, Chirinos, and several 
other Peruvian women all eventually had successful scientific careers at the 
Instituto del Mar del Perú (IMARPE), the national oceanographic institute that 
replaced CAG’s marine science endeavors.74 
Even though CAG could never get its fishmeal plant into operation, it did 
get something valuable from the project.  It used the Pacific Queen during the 
1940s as an experimental bonito trawler, a provisioning craft, and even as a 
tugboat.  In 1950, CAG turned over control of the Pacific Queen to its scientists 
who coverted it into the first civilian Peruvian vessel devoted solely to 
oceanographic research.  They equipped it with a “Fishfinder” echosonograph and 
helped introduce this valuable technology to the Peruvian fishing industry.  Finally, 
                                                 
74. BCNPN 10:2 (1953), 53-55; BCCAG 1:1, 1:2, 2 (1953-1955), cover; interviews with 
Aurora Chirinos de Vildoso and Abelardo Vildoso, Callao, Peru, 11 June 2001. 
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CAG in 1953 initiated publication of Peru’s first, independent marine science 
journal, the Boletín científico de la Compañía Administradora del Guano.75   
Thus, the technocratic drive to manage production from Peru’s marine 
environment gained momentum during the late 1940s and early 1950s.  Even 
though CAG’s attempts to manage the sea lion hunt, control artisanal fishing, and 
initiate a fishmeal industry all fell short, CAG’s managers never gave up their 
dreams of comprehensive control of Peru’s marine ecosystem.  Meanwhile, they 
used the growing wealth produced by CAG’s bird management policies to build an 
elaborate marine science apparatus.  The institution of this real-life version of 
Salomon’s House was one of CAG’s greatest accomplishments as an experiment in 
environmental management. 
These Lords of Guano hoped to use science, not only to extend their ability 
to manipulate Peru’s marine environment for human benefit, but to make an 
unassailable case that CAG deserved technocratic authority over Peru’s fishing 
industry.  This ambition set the stage for conflict with the arrival of the Peruvian 
fishmeal boom of the 1950s.  The unprecedented growth--and abrupt collapse--of 
the guano bird population, meanwhile, raised the stakes for this conflict much 
higher.  As we have seen, CAG’s scientific cadre worked for a house divided 
against itself on many levels.  As a consequence, in the end, scientists proved not 
only unable, but unwilling to prevent the collapse of the structure that the Lords of 
Guano had so carefully built.
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Chapter 7 
Engineering the Fishmeal Boom 
 
The National Fishing Industry always has been and always will be disposed to heed 
any fishing regulation that is the fruit of scientific studies. 
--Arturo Madueño (1954) 
The Lords of Guano did not act as diehard opponents of fishery 
development in Peru, as many later observers have come to believe.1  From the 
Compañia Administradora del Guano’s foundation, its managers and scientists 
acted as outspoken advocates for the industrial exploitation of Peru’s marine 
creatures as long as it followed the dictates of marine science.  They even tried to 
establish a fishmeal industry of their own.  In fact, CAG provided a necessary 
jump-start to industrialized fishing in Peru by importing vital expertise, technology, 
and know-how.  The North American Fishery Mission of 1941 and the 
circumstances of World War II provided a crucial missing factor: an opening to a 
foreign market.  This led directly to the institution of a small export fishing industry 
to supply food to Allied Forces.  Conservation technocrats set in motion a process 
of epochal importance for more than just Peruvians and their marine environment.  
They presided over the birth, development, near death (and eventual revival) of the 
largest industrial fishery on earth.  
                                                 
1. Pablo Macera, the twentieth-century guano industry’s only other significant historian,  
argues inexplicably that CAG neglected fishery development before World War II, failed to listen to 
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In many ways, the spectacular growth of the Peruvian fishmeal industry was 
one of the great industrialization success stories of the twentieth century.  It became 
a model for fishery development all over the world.  Yet despite what many 
Peruvian nationalists and entrepreneurs--and not a few economists and historians--
have argued, industrialists should not take sole credit for this creation, nor blame 
Yankee imperialism or state intervention for its shortcomings.  This admirable 
achievement was not the predetermined result of technological progress or a natural 
stage in Peru’s modernization that took place once Peru’s ruling aristocrats had left 
behind the “traditional” mentalities of their “feudal” past so Peru could finally 
exploit its rich “factor endowments.”  Nor was its emergence the unplanned result 
of “muddling through” the rapidly changing circumstances of the post-war world.2  
The Peruvian fishmeal boom happened by design. 
The new captains of the Peruvian fishing industry, several of whom were 
trained technicians, made sure that experts continued to influence this process.  
From the beginning, these entrepreneurs promoted and paid for the organization of 
an elaborate scientific apparatus to regulate their endeavors.  They repeatedly 
promised to follow its dictates--at least as long as they corresponded with their 
interests.  Of course, there lay the rub.  Different parts of the fishing industry had 
different wants and needs.  In accord with the technocratic ideal, Peru’s besieged 
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and rapidly changing ruling class thought experts would be able to come up with 
the “one right answer” that would benefit most everyone with a vested interest--if 
only the right kind of experts studied Peru’s problems long and hard enough.  This 
belief was a tremendous boon to marine science research in the southeastern 
Pacific, and a lasting legacy of the Lords of Guano. 
This is not the place to tell the full story of the rise and fall of Peru’s 
fishmeal industry, nor of the technocrats who managed it.  Instead, this and the 
final chapter will explain how the fates of the guano industry, the anchoveta’s avian 
predators, Big Oceanographic Science, and a vast, new industrial regime were tied 
together politically and ecologically. 
      
Peru’s First Fishing Boom and the Law of the Sea 
After the visit of the North American Fishery Mission in 1941, 
industrialized fishing in Peru finally took off, at first to provide vitamin-rich fish 
livers and protein to a war-torn world.  Hostilities cut off the international supply of 
preserved fish and fish liver oils from two of the world’s largest producers, Japan 
and Norway.  Beginning in 1942, a handful of Peruvian petty capitalists started 
exporting fish livers cut from the bonito (Sarda chilensis).  At first, they discarded 
everything but the fish livers, but they soon acquired an export market in the 
Northern Hemisphere for barrel-salted bonito (see table 7).  Meanwhile, the Banco 
Popular, an institution controlled by President Manuel Prado’s family, lent capital 
to a consortium led by a Peruvian physician to build three plants to can and sell 
bonito as “tuna” to the Allied forces and U.S. consumers.  Prado’s government also 
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played a direct role in these developments:  Following the recommendations of the 
North American Fishery Mission (and rejecting CAG’s desire to monopolize 
control over marine production in Peru), it created the Dirección de Pesquería y 
Caza (Fishing and Hunting Directorate) under the new Ministry of Agriculture in 
July 1943 to provide scientific and technical assistance to this nascent industry.  In 
short order, officials from this new state bureaucracy negotiated a trading 
relationship that removed all duties and tariffs from Peruvian fish exports to the 
United States.  Clearly, the Peruvian state played a crucial role in the success of 
these early endeavors.  The frequently repeated assertion by fishing industry 
partisans that their success was simply “a healthy result of private enterprise . . . 
developed without economic aid” is a fiction.3   
By the end of the war, there were 12 companies operating 23 canneries with 
installed equipment valued at S/.15 million (US$2.3 million) in Peru, despite 
logistical difficulties importing fishing and canning gear.  These obstacles to 
technology transfer forced this nascent industry to depend almost entirely on 
existing artisanal producers for their catch--an indication that lack of a market, 
rather than lack of a progressive mentality among Peru’s fisherfolk, had been the 
real barrier to past expansion.  The entrepreneurs profiting from this burst included 
just one major foreign firm, Wilbur-Ellis Peruana (est. 1944), a subsidiary of the 
San Francisco fishing company.  Wilbur-Ellis was of crucial importance, however, 
because it supplied materials needed for canning and served as the major U.S. 
distributor of Peruvian bonito.  It also sent a series of industrial engineers from the 
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United States to oversee these developments, and they provided vital know-how 
that smoothed the transfer of a series of new technologies from North to South.  
Two of CAG’s biggest beneficiaries, the Gildemeister juggernaut and a Chancay-
valley cotton planter, bought stakes in Peru’s first fishing boom soon after the war, 
as did the brothers of President Prado and his successor José Bustamante.  In 1945, 
these industrialists established a committee under the Sociedad Nacional de 
Industrias, a relic of the Aristocratic Republic, to defend their political interests 
formally before the Peruvian state.4 
 Like agro-exporters during CAG’s early years, fishery industrialists counted 
a scientist-technician among their staunchest, most outspoken allies.  The fishery 
engineer Enrique M. del Solar Cáceda played a leading role in the organization of 
this industry as a technician, ideologue, and investor (illus. 40).  His career in many 
ways paralleled that of agronomists José Antonio de Lavalle y García and Gerardo 
Klinge.  Del Solar’s family owned a hacienda in the Pisco Valley, but its fortunes 
were on the wane.  He started his career as a salesman for Enrique Ferreyros & Co.,  
a family that built an enormous fortune selling agricultural machinery to Peru’s 
agro-exporters.  Del Solar was the son of a minor lord of the Aristocratic Republic. 
During the 1930s, in order to strengthen cultural and economic links 
between the two countries, the Japanese government offered scholarships to young 
Peruvians who wanted to study science and engineering.  Japan was one of the 
                                                 
4. Ibid., 135; Caravedo, Estado, pesca y burguesía, 23, 26-27, 35, 92-93; Thorp and 
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world’s fastest rising scientific and industrial powers, but few sons of Peru’s 
Eurocentric elite showed even the slightest interest in studying in the homeland of a 
reviled minority in Peru.  Nevertheless, two daring young students seized this 
opportunity: Rafael Dávila Cuevas, the Lima-born son of migrants from the 
highland city of Huancayo, to study geophysics, and del Solar to study fishery 
engineering (with hopes of eventually starting a fishing business).  Dávila 
eventually moved on to Southern California where he studied with Jacob Bjerknes 
and Harald Sverdrup, founders of the Bergen school of physics-based meteorology 
and oceanography, in UCLA’s crash wartime meteorology course; he eventually 
founded the modern meteorological profession in Peru.  Enrique del Solar preferred 
to return home where he took positions with the Ministry of Development and 
Peruvian Fishery Commission.  He was Peru’s first native-born fishery scientist.5 
Del Solar worked alongside Schweigger and the North American Fishery 
Mission aboard the Pacific Queen during most of 1941.  They made a curious 
bunch in the tense political climate of the times.  Based on this fieldwork, del Solar 
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wrote an article on the ecology of the anchoveta and other economic fish species 
intended to provide baseline data for their “future industrial exploitation.”  In this 
article, he concluded that the “tropicalization” of coastal waters during the 1941 El 
Niño had caused the anchoveta to change their normal habits, which put them out 
of reach of the guano birds and led to the birds’ “extraordinary” death.  His 
observation that fish life flourished even during this “ecological depression” 
established the basis for his later opinion that the guano industry was moribund as a 
source of new wealth, while the fishing industry could be the fountainhead of 
untold riches.  Like Lavalle, del Solar was an outspoken advocate for technocractic 
industrialization: “In fishing, as in agronomy, to obtain success it is indispensible 
that practical knowledge be subject to technicians.”6  In this spirit, he pushed for 
the establishment of a government Dirección de Pesquería y Caza and a biology 
program to train fishery scientists at the Universidad Nacional de San Marcos.  As 
we saw in chapter 4, this led to the hiring of Hans-Wilhelm Koepcke, the German 
founder of university-based marine science education in Peru. 
Del Solar’s interest in the success of the Peruvian fishing industry was more 
than technical.  He played an important role in the political organization of fishing 
industrialists, and with financial help from some old contacts in Japan, in 1953 he 
established a fish-products factory of his own.   From the very beginning of 
industrialized fishing in Peru, del Solar was its foremost scientific defender.  In line 
with his faith in the technocratic ideal, he steadfastly believed that his expert 
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training and technical understanding prevented his economic and political interests 
from compromising his expert authority.  He continued to publish scientific 
articles--usually based on research voyages he paid for out of his own pocket--to 
aid the development of new fish resources and bolster his reputation as a scientist.7 
The end of World War II freed shipping on the high seas which allowed 
Peruvian entrepreneurs to import ships and capital goods, especially from 
California, for its booming canning industry.  Peruvian fishing exports increased 
markedly in 1946 to serve pent-up worldwide demand.  They dropped just as 
quickly when Japan, Norway, West Germany, and other war-torn countries 
resumed fish production with aid from the United States.  Peru’s market for salted 
fish and fish livers dried up almost overnight.  Fortunately for investors in Peru’s 
new canning industry, their market did not disappear so readily.  Nevertheless, 
rapidly changing commercial conditions after the war threatened a major shakeout 
among these new fishing concerns.8 
Peru’s fishing entrepreneurs had other reasons to feel anxious.  The end of 
the war enabled long-distance fishing fleets to again set their sights on the 
productive waters off the coast of Peru.  As early as 1936, the Van Camp Sea Food 
Co. of California had approached the Peruvian government for permission to enter 
Peru’s three-mile territorial sea so its tuna clippers could catch anchoveta to use as 
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bait.  At that time, Francisco Ballén enunciated what eventually became CAG’s 
party line, first for foreign fishing boats, than for industrialized fishing in general:  
 
In Peru, the exercise of fishing is intimately tied to the guano industry and 
the abundance of certain fish, especially the anchoveta . . . . Every method 
of fishing on a grand scale along the coast would thus be plainly 
inadvisable, all the more so taking into consideration that it will be 
impossible to exercise effective control over the fishing methods put into 
practice.  It is also worth taking into consideration . . . that the fish obtained 
will be exported.  The meager duties this firm offers will not compensate in 
the least for this waste.9 
Peru was not the only country with such fears.  Under intense pressure from 
U.S. oil and fishing companies who wanted to protect their offshore assets, in 1945 
President Harry S. Truman unilaterally issued two proclamations claiming the 
“natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the 
high seas but contiguous to the coasts as appertaining to the United States” and the 
right to establish fishery “conservation zones . . . subject to the regulation and 
control of the United States” beyond the traditional territorial sea.  Mexico and 
Argentina soon made similar proclamations.  But such claims made little sense for 
the extremely narrow continental shelf lining most of the Pacific coast of South 
America.  Therefore, in 1947, first Chile, then Peru declared Exclusive Economic 
Zones (EEZs) extending 200 nautical miles (370.4 kilometers) from their coasts.  In 
1949, several Arab states claimed similar territorial rights to the petroleum and 
other resources located in the “submerged lands” extending from their shorelines.  
In 1952, Ecuador joined its two neighbors to the south by claiming a 200-mile EEZ 
and signing the Santiago Declaration on the Maritime Zone.  It stated that “the 
                                                 
9. MCAG 28 (1937), 183-184.  
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geological and biological factors that condition the existence, conservation, and 
development of . . . maritime flora and fauna” had made “the ancient extention of 
the territorial sea . . . insufficient for the conservation, development, and 
exploitation of these riches to which adjacent coastal countries have a right.”10 
These moves backfired at first for Peru’s fishing industry.  The United 
States responded in a quite unneighborly way toward these declarations.  The U.S. 
Congress passed retaliatory tariffs against Peruvian fish products in 1948, and the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration conveniently banned the sale of bonito as 
“tuna” in 1949 based on the dubious scientific claim that these were entirely 
different classes of fish.  (Peruvian fishery biologists love recounting stories of 
tricking U.S. technicians with taste tests and tissue samples comparing bonito with 
other tunnids.  Their flesh is indistinguishable in practice, even under a 
microscope.)  The Truman administration withdrew its own Fisheries Proclamation 
once its chaotic implications for international law became clear, but the United 
States could not close this Pandora’s box.11   
From the beginning, Peru carefully worded and defended these declarations 
using the rhetoric of conservation science.  CAG’s marine scientists jumped to the 
                                                 
10. Quoted in Eduardo Ferrero Costa, “Evolución del derecho del mar,” Revista del 
Instituto de Estudios Histórico-Marítimos del Perú (Lima) 3 (1980), 79; David C. Loring, “The 
Fisheries Dispute,” in U.S. Foreign Policy and Peru, ed. Daniel A. Sharp (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1972), 62-67, 115-118; S. N. Nandan, “The Exclusive Economic Zone: A Historical 
Perspective,” in The Law and the Sea: Essays in Memory of Jean Carroz (Rome: FAO, 1987), 171-
188; D. P. O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 1:552-
558; McEvoy, The Fisherman’s Problem, 192; see also Bobbie B. Smetherman and Robert M. 
Smetherman, Territorial Seas and Inter-American Relations: With Case Studies of the Peruvian and 
U.S. Fishing Industries (New York: Praeger, 1974).  
11. Loring, 67-69; Caravedo, Estado, pesca y burguesía, 33; Roemer, Fishing for Growth, 
80; interview with Aurora Chirinos de Vildoso, 11 June 2001. 
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defense of the 200-mile EEZ.  Schweigger’s estimate that the productive “green 
zone” of the Peru Current extended a maximum of 200-250 miles offshore 
provided a basic ecological rationale.  At the First Latin American Congress on 
Marine Biology held in Chile in 1949, Enrique Ávila presented a paper on the 
biological and economic importance of South America’s coastal waters.  In direct 
response, this congress of scientists from eight countries voted unanimously to 
recommend the protection of anchoveta stocks from all exploitation (in order to 
protect Peru’s guano birds) and the extension of jurisdictional waters up to 200 
miles by all Latin American states.  In this context, Ávila also introduced the 
neologism bioma (biome) to regional discourse to refer to the unique community of 
organisms typical of Schweigger’s “green zone.”  These debates played into CAG’s 
decision to extend its marine science capabilities during the early 1950s.  CAG’s 
scientific work provided the basis for what became known as the “biome” or 
“ecosystem” defense of the 200-mile EEZ.12 
This battle of words and principles over the EEZ soon degenerated into a 
battle of blows.  In 1947, the Peruvian navy seized its first U.S. tuna clipper for 
violating the EEZ.  Late in 1954, Aristotle Onassis sent a whaling fleet from 
Hamburg explicitly to challenge the Peruvian 200-mile limit.  After a lengthy game 
of cat and mouse, the Peruvian navy triumphantly seized five ships, the remains of 
3,000 whales, and forced Onassis to pay a US$3 million fine.  Buoyed by the defeat 
of this Goliath of international shipping and the nationalist frenzy it provoked, the 
                                                 
12. Schweigger, El litoral peruano, 70-72; Ávila to Vogt, 18 July 1947, 16 Sept. 1949, 25 
Oct. 1949, Vogt papers, box 1:1; Loring, “The Fisheries Dispute,” 72, 86-87.  
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navy began to seize and fine U.S. tuna trawlers for violating the zone in search of 
CAG’s sacred anchoveta with which to bait their hooks.13 
International technocrats scrambled to find a rational solution to this 
conflict through a series of technical conferences.  Peru refused to join the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission, a scientific research body established by the 
U.S. tuna industry and Latin American client states ostensibly to provide a 
technocratic regulatory apparatus for tuna fishing in the eastern tropical Pacific.  
Active hostilities off the coast of Peru came to a halt, for the time being, in 1956 
when the American Tunaboat Association privately negotiated a licensing 
agreement in which Peru promised to use all licensing income for public marine 
science research.  This agreement collapsed in the early 1960s, however, when tuna 
fishermen switched from long-line fishing (which requires bait) to drift nets as part 
of their never-ending quest for new fishing frontiers.  From 1947 until 1974, the 
Pacific Tuna War, as this confrontation is known, resulted in the seizure of more 
than 250 ships belonging to the U.S. tuna industry and the payment of over US$6 
million in fines to Ecuador, Peru, and four other Latin American states.14 
Peru and its allies never backed down from their defense of the 200-mile 
territorial sea, even though this position hurt the export market for Peru’s canning 
industry.  Global opinion gradually turned in their favor, especially during the 
1970s as more and more countries became embroiled in fishing wars of their own.  
                                                 
13. Loring, “The Fisheries Dispute,” 70-72.  
14. MCAG 47 (1956), xviii; Loring, “The Fisheries Dispute,” 72-73; Thomas Wolff, In 
Pursuit of Tuna: The Expansion of a Fishing Industry and its International Ramifications: The End 
of an Era (Tempe: Center for Latin American Studies, Arizona State University, 1980), esp. 53-54, 
118.     
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Finally in 1982, after a decade of intense negotiations involving diplomats and 
technocrats from more than 150 countries, the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea adopted a 320-article convention designed to replace this 
chaotic situtation with the rule of international law.  This convention enabled any 
coastal state to declare an Exclusive Economic Zone out to a maximum distance of 
200 nautical miles.  Thus, Peru and Chile’s declaration became the arbitrary norm 
for divvying up 35 percent of the world’s oceans.  Though this new standard was 
intended to encourage environmental conservation, it was entirely devoid of the 
ecological significance CAG and its scientists had once tried to give it.  It was also 
devoid of real authority: by the end of 1998, the International Year of the Ocean, 
130 states had ratified this UN convention, but still not Peru and Chile’s two main 
rivals for fishing preeminence in the Western Hemisphere: Canada (which declared 
a 200-mile EEZ of its own in 1977) and the Colossus of the North, the United 
States.15 
This agreement demonstrates, yet again, the tremendous influence 
“peripheral” Third World countries have had on global environmental politics 
during the twentieth century.  This controversy over the Exclusive Economic Zone 
had much in common with Peru’s conflict over guano with the Peruvian 
Corporation of London during the 1910s.  In both cases, Peruvian officials used 
universalizing scientific rhetoric and research to defend local, export-oriented 
                                                 
15. United Nations, General Assembly, Final Act of the Third Conference on the Law of 
the Sea (Montego Bay, Jamaica, Dec. 1982); World Commission on Environment and 
Development, Our Common Future (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 272-274, 287 n. 
17; Barry Hart Dubner, Recent Developments in the International Law of the Sea, 33 The 
International Lawyer 627 (Summer 1999), [cited 11 Oct. 2000], available from http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe/. 
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interests in the name of resource conservation.  Nearly all the conflicting parties 
accepted the premise, at least rhetorically, that scientific knowledge should resolve 
these conflicts.  Though marine science failed to resolve either disagreement, both 
controversies acted as a tremendous boon for the technocratic ideal in Peru.  In 
neither case was the Peruvian economy as open to “imperialist penetration” as it 
has often been portrayed.16 
Nevertheless, Peruvians’ nationalistic resolve regarding the Law of the Sea 
had much to do with their perceived economic weakness.  While Peru engaged in 
these diplomatic conflicts, the international competitive environment for Peruvian 
fish exporters deteriorated markedly.  By 1948, when total world fish production 
had almost returned to prewar levels, Japan had reemerged as the world’s largest 
fish-producing nation thanks to extensive economic aid and trading preferences 
granted by the United States after the war.  Even then, Japan’s production still fell 
far short of prewar levels.  But Canadian, British, and Norwegian companies all 
sharply increased their levels of production to make up for Japan’s shortfall.  
Struggling Peruvian entrepreneurs were increasingly locked out of the global 
market for preserved fish by both competition and discriminatory tariffs.  Only an 
aggressive advertising campaign by Wilbur-Ellis that pitted Peruvian bonito against 
Van Camp Seafood’s “Chicken of the Sea” and other tuna brands on the shelves of 
                                                 
16. Peru has often been held up as “the example par excellence in Latin America of that 
dream of orthodox development economists,” a free and open economy ruled by a laissez-faire 
political economy: see Thorp and Bertram, Peru, 1890-1977, pt. 4, esp. 205-206; Cotler, Clases, 
estado, y nación, ch. 6. 
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the United States’ new suburban supermarkets kept the Peruvian canning industry 
from going belly up in the early 1950s.17 
By the end of 1953, because of intense international pressure to install new 
machinery to produce a higher quality product and declining market share, 
Peruvian fish canners began suffering from many of the same problems of 
overcapitalization that later beset the fishmeal industry.  Almost all of Peru’s 50 
coastal canneries and 630 motorized fishing craft (mostly purse seine vessels 
[bolicheras] imported from the United States like the Pacific Queen) operated far 
below capacity, and many were completely inactive.  Meanwhile, hundreds of 
small craft were forced out of fishing altogether by this boom-bust cycle, leading 
thousands of male artisanal fishermen to become wage workers--and now face 
unemployment.  The expected rise in domestic fish consumption long predicted by 
the ideologues of fishery industrialization had not materialized:  Peruvians only 
purchased a paltry nine percent of domestic canned-fish production, although this 
did substitute for what Peruvians had imported before the war.  In an attempt to 
diversify their holdings, fishing entrepreneurs in Peru built several large-capacity 
refrigeration plants to freeze and pack whole tuna, swordfish, and shrimp.  The 
Peruvian state, meanwhile, did its part to encourage production and domestic 
consumption by building modern market terminals in Callao and Lima and by 
vigorously defending Peru’s Exclusive Economic Zone.  Exports of whole frozen 
fish briefly surpassed canned fish, but then rapidly tailed off.  This sector was also 
                                                 
17. See table 7; Tarnawiecki, “A Survey of the Development of Oceanic Fisheries in Peru,” 
130; Edmonds, “Reasons Underlying Development of the Peruvian Fishing Industry,” 12.  
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unevenly capitalized:  The 19 refrigerated boats registered in Peru had a capacity 
40 percent larger than the freezing capacity of local plants, not to mention the 
problem of finding refrigerated transport abroad.  These woes--underutilization of 
equipment capacity, dependence on imported technology, flacid local markets--
typified those facing industrialists in the so-called developing world.  Economic 
barriers, not lack of entrepreneurialism, expertise, or state support, led to the failure 
of Peru’s original food fish industry.18 
Profit-hungry industrialists did have one thing in their favor: an 
unorganized, low-paid, predominantly female pool of factory labor.  (As in the 
California industry, on which it was modeled, Peruvian canneries employed men 
only as technicians and managers.)  But workers are only cheap if they produce 
something with a signficiant added value that their bosses can sell at a profit.  
Peru’s first fishing boom had gone bust.19 
 
Chicken from the Sea 
Peru’s fishery industrialists were always on the lookout for a new export 
opportunity.  In the late 1940s they found it--fishmeal.  Even though CAG held a 
monopoly over the production of fishmeal from anchoveta to protect the guano 
birds, nothing prohibited the production of fishmeal in Peru from other sources.  In 
                                                 
18. Tarnawiecki, “A Survey of the Development of Oceanic Fisheries in Peru,” 129-131; 
Fiedler, Jarvis, and Lobell, The Fisheries and the Fishery Industries of Peru, 53-55; Caravedo, 
Estado, pesca y burguesía, 39-41.  Cf. Stephen Haber, Industry and Underdevelopment: The 
Industrialization of Mexico, 1890-1940 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), passim; 
Warren Dean,  The Industrialization of São Paulo, 1880-1945 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1969), ch. 7.  
19. Caravedo, Estado, pesca y burguesía, 39-41, 55.  
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1945, Peruvian fish canners began manufacturing fishmeal on a significant scale 
from spoiled bonito and canning waste; two years later, they started exporting it.  
Meanwhile, an “unnatural disaster” in the Northern Hemisphere created an 
uncommon opportunity for Peruvian entrepreneurs.  Overfishing and climate 
change caused the California sardine industry, one of the world’s largest fishmeal 
producers, to collapse.  Despite elaborate attempts to manage the catch 
scientifically, total production of sardines crashed from 503,299 metric tons in 
1944-1945 to 4,074 metric tons in 1953-1954 and never recovered.  U.S. firms like 
Wilbur-Ellis suddenly had a mountain of surplus industrial machinery that they 
offered to enterprising Peruvians at bargain prices.20 
But this supply-side market opening cannot explain how the Peruvian 
fishmeal industry grew to be ten times larger than the California industry it 
replaced.  The growth of a global meat industry is one of the hallmarks of the 
ecological history of the late twentieth century (table 8).21  On the demand side, the 
size and prosperity of human populations in the First World who wanted to indulge 
their taste for inexpensive meat grew rapidly after the lean years of World War II.  
This put the United States and future European Union way ahead of the rest of the 
world in terms of meat production and consumption in 1961 (except for a few 
countries with large herding economies such as Argentina, Australia, Mongolia, 
                                                 
20. Tarnawiecki, “A Survey of the Development of Oceanic Fisheries in Peru,” 129-131; 
Roemer, Fishing for Growth, 61.  On the rise and fall of the California sardine industry and the role 
of scientists and bureaucrats in this process, see McEvoy, The Fisherman’s Problem, ch. 6, 7, esp. 
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and Somalia).  Since then, global meat production has more than tripled, per capita 
consumption nearly doubled, and the global meat trade has grown by almost seven 
times. 
Contrary to the predictions of catastrophists like William Vogt, in recent 
years some “developing” countries have helped drive this trend in meat 
consumption.  Aided by its status as a major soybean producer, Brazil has rapidly 
emerged since the 1970s as one of the world’s largest meat producers and 
exporters.  Per capita, Brazilians today eat three times as much meat as they did in 
the early 1960s.  But the Chinese have changed their eating habits the most of all.  
Since the “Three Bad Years” of 1959-1961 killed 30 million people, the worst 
famine in history, meat consumption by the denizens of the world’s most populous 
nation has increased by over 25 times.  The Chinese now eat almost as much meat 
per capita as the European Union and United States, and they consume significantly 
more animal fat, practically all of which is produced within China’s own borders.  
Thanks to such dense sources of food energy, the average citizen in these countries 
now consumes more than 2,900 calories per day making these the fattest human 
societies in the history of the earth.22 
                                                 
22. American Association for the Advancement of Science, AAAS Atlas of Population and 
Environment, by Paul Harrison and Fred Pearce (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
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Of course, as Josué de Castro would be sure to point out if he were alive, 
national accounts tell us nothing of the enormous internal social inequality and 
shameful malnutrition that continue to beset rich countries like Brazil and the 
United States.  But they do reveal some striking regional inequalities:  Peruvians 
and Sub-Saharan Africans consume nearly the same amount of meat per capita that 
they did decades ago--and not by choice.  In the meantime, peoples of the African 
Sahel have replaced Indians and Chinese as mass-media symbols of hunger and 
misery.23 
Advocates of the “hamburger thesis” blame this worsening inequity, in part, 
on the systematic elimination of the world’s tropical rainforests to create pasture 
for cattle and provide cheap beef to the global fast-food industry.  Though there is a 
connection between cattle raising and tropical deforestation (tied mainly to land 
claims, at least in Amazonia and Central America), this has almost nothing to do 
with the vast global trade in “modern meat.”24  Unlike the days when beef cattle, 
                                                 
23. On hunger and social inequality in northeastern Brazil and the United States, see Nancy 
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fed on the grand expanses of the Argentine pampas, U.S. Great Plains, and 
Australian Outback, were the lifeblood of the global meat trade, the post-World 
War II expansion in the global meat supply has been driven primarily by industrial 
production of pigs and fowl (table 9).25  While world cattle production remained 
relatively stagnant, the number of chickens slaughtered each year has increased by 
over six times and the global trade in live chickens by over 15 times.  Chickens 
alone account for 41.3 billion of the 47.7 billion animals killed for human and pet 
consumption each year, though they are still surpassed in terms of total weight by 
the annual global slaughter of over one billion pigs. 
Rather than simply raising more hogs and chickens or focusing on the 
efficient use of land and labor, agro-industrialists in search of greater profits have 
looked to increase the intensity of animal production by directly manipulating the 
biology of livestock.  To accomplish this, they engaged the world’s increasingly 
vast technoscience complex to research and develop the “Chicken of Tomorrow” 
and other super-animals.  Advances in nutrition, breeding, disease management, 
and other forms of environmental control--such as burning off the beaks of 
chickens so they cannot peck at themselves or each other in crowded enclosures--
has allowed meat producers to increase dramatically the efficiency of their 
operations.  (At least so far, genetic engineering of animals has had little to do with 
                                                                                                                                        
Rise and Fall of the Cattle Culture (New York: Dutton, 1992); Eric Schlosser, Fast Food Nation: 
The Dark Side of the All-American Meal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001). 
25. The beef trade had a formative impact on early twentieth-century Argentine history, see 
Peter H. Smith’s classic study, Politics and Beef in Argentina: Patterns of Conflict and Change 
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these trends.)  Because they are biologically predisposed to convert nutrient-dense 
foods to body mass with great efficiency, chickens and pigs have responded best to 
this manipulation.  From 1945 to 1975 to 1995, in the clearest example of success, 
the average market weight of “young meat-type” broiler chickens in the United 
States increased from 1,360 to 1,720 to 2,130 grams (3.0 to 3.8 to 4.7 pounds), 
feed-to-meat conversion efficiency rose from 26 to 48 to a whopping 53 percent, 
and time-to-market maturity dropped from 95 to 56 to 47 days.  Chicken, not beef, 
is the modern meat.26 
As with input-intensive plant agriculture, these new forms of livestock 
raising have eliminated old systems of waste recycling associated with animal 
husbandry and replaced them with industrial throughput.  These trends have turned 
a former benefit of livestock raising into an environmental scourge.  The giant 
“animal factories” that produce all this meat simply cannot get rid of their animal 
waste fast enough.  Rather than providing vital nitrogen fertilizer to plant 
agriculture as it did for millennia, today’s animal manure has become one of the 
world’s worst waterway pollutants and caused major changes in the nutrient supply 
and biodiversity of aquatic ecosystems all over the world.  This epochal increase in 
human food production thus confirms a modern German saying: 
 
Life is like the ladder in a chicken coop, 
A person just can’t get ahead because of all the poop. 
And when he finally reaches to the top of it, 
                                                 
26. William Boyd, “Making Meat: Science, Technology, and the Industrialization of 
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Then he’ll find he’s stuck in the deepest shit.27 
On a few farms where the “gospel of efficiency” is taken to an extreme, excrement 
is fed back to livestock, both to get rid of it and to put more meat on the table.  In 
fact, the nutritional conditions of factory chickens are such that consuming their 
own excrement actually makes them healthier.28 
The use of carefully balanced, high-protein feeds has been fundamental to 
the development of faster-growing, heavier livestock.  This brings us back to the 
problem of producing enough nitrogen fertilizer for agriculture--the same problem 
that sent British and German farmers lusting after Peruvian guano and nitrates in 
the nineteenth century so they could grow enough root crops to feed livestock so 
Europe’s ascendant bourgeoisie could eat a chop of meat at dinner each day.  Circa 
1950, with more and more new chemical plants using the Haber-Bosch nitrogen 
synthesis process coming into production, engineers were rapidly knocking down a 
fundamental barrier to human meat consumption (see table 2).  But it took a while 
for industrial economies of scale linking agrichemicals, soybean growers, and meat 
producers to develop, especially in Europe.  It took many years for China to install 
any of its vast network of small-scale “backyard” fertilizer plants.  At least in the 
short term, it was simpler and more economical to extract high-protein feed directly 
from the sea as fishmeal, to rely on an unexploited realm of nature instead of 
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human artifice to do the work.  (Fishmeal also had more nutrients and was known 
to accelerate livestock growth rates more than soybean meal.)  Our capacity to eat 
so much meat was premised on our ability to master the nitrogen cycle.29  
From 1948 to 1958, the crucial period when Peru’s fishmeal industry took 
off, the total global market for imported fishmeal multiplied by over six times, from 
111,000 metric tons worth US$15.3 million to 693,000 metric tons worth US$103.4 
million.  West German swine farmers and U.S. chicken raisers drove this early 
trend, followed by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.  Japan’s consumption 
grew at the fastest rate, as affluent Japanese slowly adopted the meat-heavy diets of 
many Westerners.  Rather than eating hamburger from Latin American rainforests, 
at least during these early years, U.S. and European consumers were eating chicken 
and sausage from the sea.30 
A supply had to be found to meet this demand, of course.  By the end of 
1953, at least nine Peruvian canners had installed fishmeal reduction equipment, 
led by firms with ties to Wilbur-Ellis.  But their ability to make fishmeal from 
factory waste was dependent on their production of canned fish, which had limited 
prospects.  Peruvian fishermen had long coveted CAG’s monopoly right to produce 
fishmeal from anchoveta.  Not only were anchoveta much more abundant than 
bonito or any other fish off the Peruvian coast, they were also easier to catch and 
more economical to reduce to fishmeal because of their schooling tendencies and 
small individual size.  With CAG’s plant under political attack and still inoperable, 
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Manuel Elguera, a Peruvian fishing entrepreneur with both family and professional 
ties to the United States, began construction of a plant at Chimbote using 
equipment and engineers imported from California by Wilbur-Ellis.  In 1950, the 
first Peruvian factory devoted solely to the reduction of anchoveta into fishmeal 
went into operation.  This opened the door to the exploitation of anchoveta by 
others, but only a crack.  By 1953, the Dirección de Pesquería y Caza recognized 
10 fishmeal reduction plants devoted solely to anchoveta exploitation.  Estimates of 
fishmeal exports from Peru vary widely for this early period.  This statistical 
uncertainty is a reflection of both the tenuous legality and lack of state supervision 
over anchoveta production in Peru at the time.31 
Partly with this in mind, Peru’s fishing entrepreneurs reorganized 
themselves politically to protect their economic interests.  They distanced 
themselves from the Aristocratic Republic’s stodgy Sociedad Nacional de 
Industrias when it fell out of political favor after the 1948 military overthrow of 
populist José Bustamante.  In 1952, they decided to establish a new, independent 
political association, the Sociedad Nacional de Pesquería (SNP).  In recognition of 
Manuel Elguera’s leadership in both the canning and fishmeal industries and his 
close ties to the powerful U.S. firm Wilbur-Ellis, its members named him as SNP 
president.  Enrique del Solar, meanwhile, became its primary technical advisor.32 
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Through the SNP, Peru’s fishing interest began to take sides against the 
guano industry, especially when CAG’s managers again became vocal about their 
desire to regulate development of the fishmeal industry.  To fishery industrialists, 
fishmeal production from anchoveta looked to be their salvation, so it had to be 
defended at all costs.  And what better way to defend it than with the principles and 
findings of marine science? 
  
Deciding the Fate of the Anchoveta 
The 1953-1954 debate over the fishmeal industry in Peru soon became quite 
heated, the centrality of technocratic rhetoric to the arguments of both sides 
notwithstanding.  In this sense, this contest was a preview of the rancorous disputes 
between pro- and anti-DDT scientists in the United States before and after the 
publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962.  Remarkably, one scientist--
Robert Cushman Murphy--played a starring role in both debates.33 
As we have seen, CAG’s managers had long recognized the danger 
“massive anchoveta fishing” posed toward the guano birds.  In 1953, led by its 
general manager, agronomist Carlos Llosa Belaúnde, CAG began to lobby 
Peruvian officals to set a 100,000 metric ton annual ceiling on anchoveta 
production, since the state refused to ban it altogether.  The SNP rejected these 
arbitrary limits on principle, noting that they lacked any explicit scientific 
justification.  In response, CAG requested permission to use its own scientific 
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apparatus to develop fishing regulations.  If this was too much to ask, CAG at least 
wanted the state to set up an independent board of experts to develop “rational” 
fishing standards that would not threaten the “unstable equilibrium” of the marine 
ecosystem.  The latter suggestion was acceptable to both sides, and the 
government’s Dirección de Pesquería y Caza organized an adjudication board for 
this purpose in April 1953.  CAG’s delegation of experts, which included its 
scientific protégés Enrique Ávila, Mario Barreda, and Antonio Landa, explicitly 
pointed to the failure of the California sardine fishery in support of CAG’s position 
regarding strict fishing quotas.  Scientists from the Dirección de Pesqueria y Caza, 
led by Enrique del Solar, argued that the guano and anchoveta industries could 
develop safely in parallel.  As a compromise, high-level state officials elected to 
limit the number of construction permits granted to fishmeal plants but refused to 
set any production limits.  This pleased neither side.  In an attempt to break this 
impasse, CAG invited two of the foremost conservation scientists in the world to 
study Peruvian marine production with “disinterest” and “affection for pure 
science.”34 
Frances Naomi Clark (1894-1987) was one of the world’s preeminent 
experts on the California sardine (Sardina caerulea) and was at the peak of a 
remarkable scientific career that had been dogged by gender discrimination.  When 
she was young, her prosperous father retired from farming in Nebraska and moved 
to California.  There, both Frances and her older sister Laura attended Stanford 
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University.  Frances converted her interest in marine science into entry-level 
government jobs tied to the California fishing industry.  Both daughters moved to 
the University of Michigan in the early 1920s: Frances to pursue a Ph.D. in 
ichthyology, Laura to support the doctoral work of her husband, Carl Hubbs, in the 
same field.  After completing her Ph.D. in 1925 (illus. 41), Frances moved back to 
California where she passed a year as a junior-high school teacher looking for 
someone who would hire a woman scientist.  The California Department of Fish 
and Game took her on as a fisheries researcher, but would not give her a 
supervisory post, even though for years none of the men she worked with had 
anything comparable to her formal scientific training.  Finally, she was promoted to 
director of the California State Fisheries Laboratory at Terminal Island in 1941.  
Even then, she was given a bogus job title at first, and often gave her directives 
through a male assistant to avoid harming the masculine sensibilities of her 
underlings.  She stayed in this position until her retirement in 1957.  This made her 
the only U.S. woman scientist of any kind with an important policy-making post 
during the entire 1940-1972 period. 
Such an exceptional achievement required sacrifices.  Like Mary Sears, 
Frances Clark elected to forgo both the benefits and obligations of marriage and 
family traditionally imposed on women by society.  Her mathematically adept 
sister Laura, in contrast, was banned by nepotism rules from receiving pay for her 
vital work as a scientific assistant to her husband at the Scripps Institution of 
Oceanography.  But these sacrifices allowed Frances to be a productive researcher:  
From 1925-1962, she published 62 papers, most focused on the life history, 
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population dynamics, and conservation of the all-important California sardine.  She 
was also one of the few people with any knowledge of the California anchovy 
(Engraulis mordax), the Peruvian anchoveta’s closest relative.35 
CAG officials could not have chosen a more qualified nor a more outspoken 
critic of the unregulated development of a fishmeal industry if William Vogt had 
picked her himself.  (In fact, Vogt may have had a hand in Frances Clark’s 
selection.  He introduced CAG officials to Clark’s work in his 1942 report on the 
guano birds.  He also knew her personally, and they corresponded regarding the 
Peruvian guano industry.)36   
In 1939, Clark publicly predicted the collapse of the California sardine 
stocks and recommended strict limits on their harvest.  All of her observations on 
these counts had important implications for the Peruvian fishmeal industry.  She 
noted that the reduction of sardines to oil and meal had been the most lucrative 
phase of the California fishing industry from the moment that canners first started 
processing their canning waste.  The California Department of Fish and Game had 
tried to limit the use of whole fish for direct reduction, but their regulations were 
circumvented during the 1930s by the introduction of floating reduction factories 
that did their work beyond California’s three-mile territorial sea.  (As we saw in 
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chapter 1, this was the same strategy mid-nineteenth-century fish-fertilizer 
producers had used to avoid local pollution regulations along the U.S. Atlantic 
seaboard.  For good reason, the defenders of Peru’s 200-mile EEZ feared this sort 
of invasion by foreign factory ships.)  The response of regulators, however, was to 
relax restrictions against sardine reduction onshore, which led to a boom in the 
construction of shore plants.  This was “a matter of grave consideration,” Clark 
admonished, since it threatened the long-term survival of the entire industry from 
British Columbia to Mexico.  She aggressively advocated government restrictions 
on the total yearly catch.  A closed season was not adequate, in her view, because 
fishermen would simply raise the intensity of their effort during the open season.  
Closed reserves would not work, either, because the sardine is migratory and 
fishing grounds vary from year to year.  A size limit was unfeasible because 
different-sized fish constituted the sardine schools; fishermen could not use nets 
with larger mesh to allow immature fish to escape because they would become 
clogged with gilled fish and quickly become inoperable.  In Clark’s opinion, the 
supply of sardines could not be maintained in California waters unless the state 
enforced a yearly quota not greater than 250,000 metric tons--half the catch at the 
time.  Clark’s warning went unheeded and, tragically, her prophecy came to pass.  
In the years that followed, she took on leadership of the faction of scientists who 
pointed to human harvesting as the primary cause for the dramatic decline of the 
sardine against those who blamed environmental changes.37 
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The defenders of the guano industry clearly expected Clark to decide in 
their favor.  The technocratic ideal, however, requires the scientist to do some 
empirical research before making any authoritative statements, and the Peruvian 
fishing industry would have settled for nothing less.  Clark arrived in Peru in 
October 1953 and had the good fortune to hook up with two Danish survey vessels.  
CAG’s scientific team, especially Mario Barreda, worked closely with her during 
three survey cruises lasting until May 1954.  As in the case of Mary Sears, crossing 
the North-South divide allowed Clark to have a level of access to shipboard 
research she was totally unused to in the United States.  It also created an 
opportunity for Peruvian women scientists.  With the aid of her closest Peruvian 
assistant, Luz Sarmiento, Clark produced substantial basic data on the anchoveta’s 
biology.  Most significantly, they confirmed that anchoveta schools concentrated in 
the surface layers, especially between five and nine meters, and only rarely 
descended below 18 meters--at least during the cool “La Niña” conditions of early 
1954. 
Clark also drafted a plan for systematic anchoveta research in Peru.  Clark’s 
experience with CAG’s capable scientists and extensive facilities impressed her 
greatly.  Her plan made CAG responsible for instituting systematic anchoveta 
research, although she recommended hiring a much larger scientific staff to do this 
adequately without slighting CAG’s vital ornithological work.  This was exactly 
what CAG’s managers hoped to hear, but to their chagrin, she cautiously offered no 
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explicit recommendations for the regulation of the fishmeal industry.  Even worse, 
a Paita newspaper reported that she made the offhand comment that unregulated 
exploitation of anchoveta would have no detrimental impact in the short term in 
view of their “simple abundance.”38 
This could have been fatal to CAG’s position, if not for the adamant support 
for strict regulation of the fishmeal industry provided by the other senior U.S. 
scientist CAG invited to Peru.  As we have seen, Robert Cushman Murphy was 
already well known in Peruvian scientific circles, and he knew Peru’s coastal 
environment as well as anyone--especially the Peruvian guano birds and the natural 
hazard posed by the El Niño phenomenon (illus. 42).  For decades he had been an 
outspoken advocate of the reformed Peruvian guano industry, which he viewed as 
“an example to the world.”  By the early 1950s, Murphy had a nearly unparalleled 
international reputation as a scientist and conservationist to back up his opinions.  
Moreover, Murphy had already made public his negative opinions regarding “the 
beginnings of an ‘artificial guano’ industry . . . with the anchovy.”  In a review of 
Schweigger’s Pesquería y oceanografía del Perú (1943), Murphy warned, 
 
many such undertakings have ended, sooner or later, in the exhaustion of 
the supply.  There are strong indications that the Peruvians . . . would do 
well to concentrate on the betterment of their free, organic producers of 
irreplaceable wealth rather than sigh after short cuts.39  
                                                 
38. Clark, “Biology of the Anchoveta,” 25 June 1954, SIO Subject Files 17/25, translated 
as “Biología de la anchoveta,” BCCAG 1:2 (1954), 98-132; idem, “Program for Anchoveta 
Investigations,” 26 Apr. 1954, SIO Subject Files 17/25; “Panorama provinciano: La Anchoveta y las 
aves guaneras,” La Nación (Lima) 26 Jan. 1954, clipping from American Tunaboat Association 
Records, SIO Library, box 103/folder “Peru”; Rodewald, “Die Anomalie der Wassertemperatur und 
der Zirkulation im Nordpazifischen Ozean und an der Küste Perus im Jahre 1955,” 82. 
39. Who Was Who in American History--Science and Technology, 1976 ed., s.v. “Murphy, 
Robert Cushman”; Graham, The Audubon Ark, 110, 117, 143, 155; Murphy, Oceanic Birds, 1:27-
461 
CAG officials confidently expected Murphy to come down hard on the fishmeal 
industry. 
He delivered.  After a two-month, whirlwind survey of the Peruvian and 
Chilean coasts, Murphy made his report to the science faculty of the Universidad 
de San Marcos in January 1954, a major cultural event widely covered by the Lima 
press.  In it, he utterly condemned the unlimited development of an industrial 
anchoveta fishery in Peru.  Because of El Niño, he thought guano and fish 
production were both “equally subject to ecological depressions of irregular 
incidence.”  He reasoned that “stable production or populations probably do not 
exist” in the Peru Current.  To build political support for his position, Murphy 
made a direct appeal to the agro-exporters who had long supported CAG and who 
dominated the current government that had been imposed by General Manuel Odría 
in 1948.  He noted what should have been obvious to everyone from the beginning:  
Since fishmeal was so valuable as an exportable livestock feed, it would hardly 
benefit Peruvian farmers who grew plant crops.  In short, they risked losing the 
“hen that lays the golden egg” by allowing a large industrialized fishery to threaten 
the guano birds.40 
Murphy aggressively criticized the kind of science used to promote the 
interests of the Peruvian fishmeal industry.  For example, he had nothing good to 
say about the crude 1941 guano production experiment by Luis Gamarra often cited 
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by fishmeal advocates.  Murphy also questioned the management value of the 
fishing industry’s technical studies.  He thought they put the anchoveta at greater 
risk, in fact, since they were designed to maximize productive efficiency within the 
industry, not to ensure the adequate reproduction of wild stocks.  Nevertheless, 
Murphy was still a big believer in the technocratic management of natural 
resources.  In accord with Baconian natural philosophy, Murphy deemed that 
proper science first involved observation, then understanding, then prediction, and 
finally control over nature.  In his view, CAG had achieved the third stage and was 
on the verge of the fourth, but the Peruvian fishing industry had barely entered the 
first stage, and thus should bow to the interests of Peru’s mature guano industry.  
Murphy took a tack quite different from Clark in the name of caution.  He thought 
“wisdom” mandated that Peru strictly limit industrial fishing at least until “much 
more has been learned about the life cycle of anchoveta.”   Otherwise, “a new 
‘Saturnalia’” akin to Peru’s Guano Age might result and lead the Peruvian fishing 
industry to the “calamitous” fate of the California sardine--or even the extinct 
passenger pigeon.41 
Fishing industry representatives bristled at this challenge, and the SNP 
quickly rounded up its own “scientific circle,” led by Enrique del Solar, to refute 
Murphy’s assertions.  These propagandists turned Murphy’s position on its head.  
They made the guano birds into a threat to Peruvian national development.  In an 
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illustrated article prominently featured on the front page of the arch-conservative 
Lima daily La Prensa, one SNP spokesman made the outrageous claim that the 
guano birds “eat more than they produce.”  This article claimed that “prestigious 
scientists affirm” that the guano birds were draining the seas of 18 million metric 
tons of anchoveta each year worth US$1.34 billion to Peru if converted to fishmeal, 
though without ever revealing who these unnamed experts were, much less the 
basis for these doubtful assertations.  To try to win over the farming interest, this 
article kept pretending that fishmeal had “the same properties as guano” as a 
fertilizer, was available “at a lower cost” if produced on an industrial scale, and 
thus would finally save “the farmers of our coast and the indigenous paupers of our 
Andes from the sorrow of parched lands,” despite over a decade of expert opinion 
to the contrary.42 
A follow-up article by the same SNP spokesman claimed that the Peruvian 
guano industry was an anachronism instead of a model of progressive conservation 
science.  “The exploitation of guano birds,” he argued, “is a blunder on a grand 
scale that is putting the country at risk and is an index of the industrial backwardess 
of the nation.”  In other words, not only did the guano industry threaten the 
development of Peru’s fishing industry, but it also prevented entrepreneurs from 
initiating a local petrochemical industry to produce fertilizer using the Haber-Bosch 
process.  Modern Peruvians needed “neither guano birds, nor fishmeal as fertilizer 
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[!], only the extended and planned protection of the national fishing industry as a 
productive source of excellent cheap food.”43 
In another publication, the SNP’s experts crudely attacked Murphy’s 
scientific credentials and his intellectual honesty.  They accused CAG of violating 
the objective norms of scientific discourse by bringing a biased observer to Peru 
who lacked proper expertise.  Since Murphy was an ornithologist, he “cannot be 
considered capable to carry out studies and arrive at solutions for problems related 
to marine fauna and biology.”  Furthermore, “no serious investigator” would dare 
present such “vague” pronouncements and “incongruous ecological examples.”44 
Fishing industry advocates also cynically comandeered some of Vogt’s 
ecological rhetoric to use against Murphy’s position.  In their opinion, the record 
levels of guano production CAG attained in the early 1950s were a matter for 
criticism, instead of praise.  This “indiscriminate multiplication” of the guano birds 
violated the ecological “equilibrium” of the ocean ecosystem and potentially led to 
their “overpopulation.”  In addition, by snatching away anchoveta from the bonito 
and fishmeal industries, the birds were supposedly stealing needed protein from the 
mouths of the world’s exploding population.  At any rate, CAG’s unprecedented 
success self-evidently indicated that fears of overfishing were “alarmist and without 
scientific foundation,” at least for the time being.45   
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It is remarkably difficult to gauge whether the guano birds really did 
“consume more than they produced” in terms of Peruvian national wealth, as the 
fishing industry claimed.  By 1954, the fishmeal industry was producing more than 
US$10 million in foreign exchange value a year from a product that went straight 
overseas to feed livestock and put meat, milk, and eggs on the tables of First World 
consumers.  The majority of guano went to food plants grown and consumed by 
Peruvians, rather than to cotton and cane sugar production for export, as it once 
had.46  Of course, the fact that CAG’s guano production substituted for fertilizer 
imports partly made up for this difference.  Since guano was sold at below-market 
prices to benefit Peruvian agriculture, it is unfair to compare its sale value to 
fishmeal.  It is also difficult to compare the “conversion efficiency” of these two 
industries.  As we saw in the last chapter, these estimates varied wildly.  The best 
scientific estimate for the guano industry, 6.9 tons of anchoveta consumed for 
every ton of guano produced, came into play far too late to influence this 
controversy.  The Peruvian fishmeal industry converted anchoveta to fishmeal at 
approximately a 5.5:1 efficiency, though this is not evident in official statistics 
because of the prevalence of cannery waste.  Of course, fishmeal production also 
required significant investments in technology and energy which had to be 
recouped, while guano had long been harvested by brute, unskilled labor at a 
significant profit--something the fishing industry could not always claim.  Since 
guano and fishmeal were put to such different uses, there is little point in making 
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gross ecological comparisons between the food energy produced by guano versus 
fishmeal.47 
Clearly there was a decision to be made: “to fish or not to fish.”48  It was 
obvious to both sides that the Peru Current could not support maximum production 
of both guano and anchoveta.  If Murphy’s caution carried the day, marine resource 
development in Peru would stagnate permanently where anchoveta were concerned.  
As with Vogt’s declarations a decade earlier, few development-minded Peruvians, 
even CAG’s own scientists, wanted to see this come to pass.  Yet there were no 
clear grounds on which to make a rational choice whether guano or fishmeal was a 
more “efficient” use of nature, much less to decide how much anchoveta could be 
harvested without harming the guano industry.  Out of respect for the technocratic 
ideal, all parties concerned decided to put the question to a new set of experts. CAG 
went in search of a foreign scientific consultant acceptable to the fishing industry to 
head this investigation. 
 
The Triumph of Big Oceanographic Science 
Through a complicated series of personal contacts orchestrated by the 
Scripps Insitution of Oceanography in California, CAG officials soon zeroed in on 
the perfect technocrat for the job: Milner Bailey Schaefer (1912-1970, illus. 43).  
This Wyoming native turned marine biologist had years of practical experience 
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with state-run fishery management organizations in Washington State, British 
Columbia, California, and Hawaii.  He also had relevant political skills.  After 
completing a Ph.D. in fishery science at the University of Washington in 1950, 
Schaefer left government service to become director of investigations at the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission, a scientific research organization that was 
the U.S. tuna industry’s answer to Chile and Peru’s technocratic posturing over the 
EEZ.  This position gave him immense responsibility for the study and 
management of the yellowfin and skipjack tuna fisheries in the eastern tropical 
Pacific Ocean.  It also forced him to nurture collegial relationships with scientists 
and tuna producers in California, as well as scientists and officials in the Latin 
America states that bordered this region.49   
Meanwhile, Schaefer had almost finished work on a vital tool for wildlife 
management.  During the 1940s, he had been involved in the development of 
mathematical models to predict the population dynamics of the California sardine.  
The sardine industry collapsed before these could be put to practical use.  While 
working for the Tuna Commission, Schaefer continued analyzing the California 
sardine data while turning his attention to the population dynamics of Pacific 
tunnids and the small bait fishes used to catch them.  He soon developed an 
effective means to indirectly quantify the reproductive dynamics of an exploited 
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fish population using catch statistics.  This “Schaefer model,” as it became known, 
allowed him to quantify the “maximum sustainable yield” of a fishery and come to 
an objective, quantifiable definition of “overfishing.”  This was clear evidence of 
the progress of population ecology as a scientific discipline beyond Raymond 
Pearl’s “law of population,” the logistic curve.  Once again, Peru could not have 
consulted a foreign scientist more qualified for the problem at hand.50 
Schaefer carefully studied Frances Clark’s typescript report before setting 
off for Lima in August 1954.  Through his preliminary contacts, he was able to 
gauge quite accurately the contrary interests that divided scientists over the 
Peruvian fishmeal versus guano question.  He identified lack of scientific 
organization, rather than lack of scientific knowledge, as the primary barrier to its 
resolution.  Upon his arrival, he immediately convened a roundtable meeting that 
brought together representatives from the various sides.  During their discussions, 
he identified a scientific problem shared by everyone that could form the basis for a 
compromise solution based on scientific research:  What was the extent of oceanic 
fluctuations (i.e., the El Niño phenomenon) and their impact on biotic populations 
off the Peruvian coast?  He suggested the formation of a scientific advisory 
committee to attack this problem with representatives from CAG, the SNP, the 
Hydrographic Office of the Peruvian Navy, and the Dirección de Pesquería y Caza.  
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Schaefer also formulated an ambitious collaborative research plan to be executed 
mainly by CAG’s scientific apparatus.  This research was designed to determine the 
amount of anchoveta predation by the guano birds, the amount of anchoveta 
predation by the fishmeal industry, basic characteristics of the anchoveta 
population, and the effects of environmental variability on these characteristics.  
Under Schaefer’s plan, all major groups with an interest in Peru’s marine 
environment had a stake in both the creation and use of this scientific knowledge.51 
Implicitly, his plan vindicated Clark’s opinion that all regulations should be 
based on precise scientific knowledge and rejected Murphy’s conservative, “better 
safe than sorry” approach.  In fact, Schaefer turned exploitation of anchoveta by the 
fishmeal industry into a scientific virtue: as long as it was carefully documented in 
terms of fishing effort and yield, anchoveta fishing became the conservation 
technocrat’s best source of knowledge for calculating the anchoveta’s population 
dynamics. 
Schaefer’s recommendations led directly to the institutionalization of 
Peruvian marine science research under a single organization.  In November 1954, 
President Odría established the Consejo de Investigaciones Hidrobiológicos 
(Council on Hydrobiological Investigations) under the Ministerio de Marina to 
“coordinate and support marine biological studies with a view to the greater 
utilization and control of natural resources.”  For some time, the Consejo continued 
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to exist in name only as CAG, the Navy, and the Dirección de Pesquería pursued 
their investigations independently.  Then in 1956, with aggressive support from the 
Peruvian fishing industry, the American Tunaboat Association negotiated an 
agreement to buy licenses so that U.S. tuna ships could work within Peru’s 
Exclusive Economic Zone--with the condition that payments would go straight to 
fund the Consejo. 
This agreement led directly to the contracting of another North American 
expert, SIO oceanographer Warren S. Wooster (1921-), to provide the Consejo with 
some direction.  Wooster already had experience working with Peruvian scientists 
thanks to SIO’s 1952 “Shellback” expedition to the eastern equatorial Pacific and a 
scholarship program that brought Enrique Ávila and other budding Peruvian 
scientists to study at Scripps.  As Director of Investigations, Wooster proceeded to 
implement, as best he could, a scientific program in accord with Clark and 
Schaefer’s old research plans.  He and his successor, the Romanian-Argentine 
oceanographer Zacarías Popovici Carpanu (d. 1991), organized important 
investigations of the 1957-1958 El Niño and made occasional policy 
recommendations.  Most importantly, the Consejo began to gather reasonably good 
statistics from the fishing industry for the first time.  Despite Wooster and 
Popovici’s best efforts, the low-intensity, poorly funded scientific work organized 
by the Consejo was completely inadequate for the management task envisioned by 
Clark, Schaefer, and their Peruvian associates.52 
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Little by little, Peruvian marine science was becoming more dependent on 
outside funding and expertise as it become divorced from the guano industry.  The 
strong El Niño of 1957-1958 accelerated this process dramatically.  It caused guano 
production to fall by over two-thirds and CAG’s real net earnings to fall by almost 
one half from their peak in 1955-1956.53  This crisis forced CAG to dismantle its 
scientific apparatus:  In 1959, it sold its Chimbote fisheries lab; in 1960, it 
mothballed the lab and much of the equipment on the Pacific Queen; and in 1961, 
it turned over the instruments from its ornithology station to the Peruvian state.  
Most of its biological staff took jobs elsewhere: Antonio Landa with the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission, Schweigger as the director of a new fishery 
science program at the Universidad Nacional Federico Villarreal.54 
Some had trouble finding new work.  In 1955, Enrique Ávila left CAG to 
take a research scholarship at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography.  By the time 
he was ready to return, CAG did not have the money to rehire him.  Ávila had to 
fall back on his family for support and ended up for a while back on his father’s 
small ranch (now the site of a cement plant) near the bleak highland city of Juliaca.  
In the early 1960s, he acquired a position at the Puerto Rico Nuclear Center at 
Mayagüez where he pursued studies of ocean nutrient cycling using water samples 
sent from Peru.  Ávila eventually returned as professor of oceanography to his alma 
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mater, the Universidad Nacional de San Agustín in Arequipa.  By the mid-1960s, 
only one marine scientist, Demosthenes Cabrera Quiroz, remained on CAG’s 
payroll.55 
Almost needless to say, acolytes of technocracy such as Ávila were 
becoming extremely frustrated with this “absurd” situation and the “unnecessary 
tension” it produced between advocates of the guano and fishmeal industries.  In 
Ávila’s view, both industries played 
 
a vital function in our country’s economy.  It is absurd because the first 
axiom of the Conservation of Renewable Natural Resources is not “to 
preserve without exploiting” but . . . “to exploit rationally for the benefit of 
man.” . . . “Rational exploitation” implicitly mandates that . . . the object of 
exploitation should be studied exhaustively, . . . not only [to serve] the 
interests of present society, but also those of generations to come. . . . A 
healthy guano industry and a growing fishing industry . . . both must  
finance to their completion all such studies . . . that might be needed to 
determine at what level and strength each of the industries can operate.56      
Rather than ask the Peruvian fishing industry to pay the bill, in 1959, with 
the vocal support of almost everyone else concerned, the second government of 
President Manuel Prado looked abroad for help.  Peru asked the United Nations 
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Special Fund to finance an independent institute that would fully centralize marine 
science activity.  Its goal: “the study and control of oceanographic, biological, 
economic, and technical factors” that determined “the degree of exploitation 
possible [for] the marine resources of the Peruvian coast, especially [the] 
anchoveta, without endangering the[ir] natural richness.”  In April 1960, the UN 
Special Fund provided US$756,300 matched by US$1,105,300 from the Peruvian 
state budget to found the Instituto de Investigación de Recursos Marinos 
(IREMAR).57  This was the first grant of its kind ever given by the UN Special 
Fund, and it became a model for UN relations with fishing industries all over the 
Third World. 
This new organization truly represented the arrival of Big Science in Peru.  
Key features of this model for organizing large-scale investigation of the marine 
environment include elaborate ocean-going vessels, instruments, and marine 
laboratories, all with substantial research staffs and funding under the management 
of a hierarchical bureaucracy.  Thus, Peru joined in a trend that was revolutionizing 
science--especially marine science--on a global scale after World War II.58 
Embracing Big Science meant that local scientists had to give up most of 
their control over marine science research to foreign scientists and UN-FAO 
bureaucrats.  IREMAR’s “trust de cerebros” was placed under the direction of 
Trygve Sparre (b. 1899), a Norwegian expert in fishing economics who had 
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operated his own food industry lab and consulting business in Argentina for 22 
years before returning home to spend a decade as director of the Norwegian 
Institute of Fishmeal Research.59  With the aid of Popovici, a managerial team of 
foreign experts, and several former CAG employees, Sparre instituted a broad-
based research programs in physical oceanography, marine biology, and in fishing 
technology, economics, and administration--including guano bird research.  To 
appease Peruvian fishing industry interests, IREMAR named Enrique del Solar as 
its principal scientific and technical advisor.  By 1962, it employed 65 people, 
including 9 foreign FAO scientists, 22 Peruvian scientists, 10 advanced Peruvian 
students, and 19 administrators; it also operated three research labs and a research 
vessel donated by the Peruvian navy, the Bondy.  This was a grand scientific 
institution by Latin American standards. 
Peru’s fishing industrialists eventually lived up to their rhetoric regarding 
the value of marine science, but for a price.  IREMAR’s programs were put at risk 
in 1964 when the original UN Special Fund grant ran out.  Deft behind-the-scenes 
lobbying by del Solar, Manuel Elguera, and foreign scientists connected to the 
California tuna industry finally convinced fishing industrialists to pay for the 
expansion of IREMAR’s work.  (As we shall soon see, Peru’s fishmeal 
entrepreneurs had acquired enormous wealth by this date.)  As part of the deal, this 
scientific institution became a quasi-independent appendage of the Peruvian navy 
and everyday management passed into the hands of locals.  By 1966, the renamed 
Instituto del Mar del Perú (IMARPE) employed 50 professional scientists (14 with 
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advanced degrees from foreign schools), and 23 technicians as part of a cadre 
totaling 126 employees.  It also operated two brand-new research vessels, the 
Explorador and Unánue, and soon moved into a new, specially built headquarters 
in Callao (illus. 44).  It was clear whose interests IMARPE was intended to serve: 
its scientists worked almost entirely on problems related to the anchoveta, 
particularly the definition of fishing quotas based on a theoretical maximum 
sustainable yield.  Although the El Niño phenomenon remained an important 
research concern, guano bird research fell by the wayside.  Finally, Peru had a 
marine science apparatus appropriate to its vast marine resources.  A dream of 
CAG’s founders finally came true.  By all appearances, this triumph of Big 
Oceanographic Science was also a victory for the technocratic ideal.60 
 
The Technology of Fishmeal 
By supporting more scientific study and building bigger scientific 
institutions, Peruvian state officials, just like the managers of Peru’s guano and 
fishing industries, hoped to find the “one right answer” that would prevent them 
from imposing arbitrary regulations and thus ensure the “rational exploitation” of 
Peru’s marine environment “for the benefit of man.” This is the essence of the 
technocratic ideal.  In case after case all over the world, this quest for scientific 
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principles of environmental management has provided an enormous boost to 
science, from yesterday’s regulation of California’s fisheries to today’s interest in 
global climate change.  At the same time, this cautious (some would say cowardly 
and blame-deflecting) strategy has paralyzed regulatory action too many times to 
count.61 
The quest for the biggest possible profit from environmental exploitation is 
tied up with this search for the “one right answer.”  A fundamental tenet of the 
technocratic ideal is that improvements in scientific knowledge will inspire new 
technological applications that will have big economic payoffs.  As we saw in 
chapter 5, perhaps the best-known proponent of this belief, Vannevar Bush, thought 
scientific progress would enable humanity to conquer an endless series of frontiers.  
To conclude his bachiller thesis, Enrique Ávila quoted U.S. President John F. 
Kennedy on the conquest of one such frontier, the ocean: 
 
Knowledge of the oceans is more than a matter of curiosity.  Our very 
survival may hinge upon it.  The seas offer a wealth of nutritional resources.  
They can provide many times the current food supply if we but learn how to 
garner and husband this self-renewing larder.  To meet the vast needs of an 
expanding population, the bounty of the sea must be made more available. . 
. . Basic research is the cornerstone on which the successful use of the seas 
must rest.62 
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It was hoped marine science would diffuse William Vogt’s population bomb. 
Both President Kennedy and Ávila had reason to be optimistic.  During the 
decade that elapsed between the founding of the Consejo de Investigaciones 
Hidrobiológicos in 1954 and IMARPE in 1964, the Peruvian fishing industry 
changed beyond recognition.  Anchoveta exploitation and fishmeal production 
experienced a boom without precedent thanks, in large part, to a series of 
technological advancements, some of which depended on basic scientific research 
produced elsewhere in the world. 
This enormous expansion occurred before the institution of Big 
Oceanographic Science in Peru.  Nevertheless, the Peruvian fishmeal boom 
depended on the local engagement of experts, both foreign- and Peruvian-trained.  
It required the design, organization, construction, and administration of a 
complicated technological system capable of converting live anchoveta into an 
easily transportable and lasting product.  When CAG’s managers built the first 
fishmeal reduction plant in Peru, they merely intended to supplement the biological 
conversion of fish into nitrogen fertilizer by the “living machinery” of the guano 
birds.  But fishmeal production involved an entirely new set of ecological, 
economic, and technological relationships.  These could not be instituted overnight, 
as CAG’s managers found out.  As a consequence of their false start during the 
1940s, they lost control of the fishmeal industry to a new set of managers, a group 
that envisioned the fishmeal industry as a replacement for the guano birds as the 
main consumers of anchoveta.  As the owners of the fishmeal industry ruthlessly 
competed with each other to maximize their share and control of the industry, the 
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fishmeal manufacturing process itself changed over time in the direction of greater 
productive efficiency, greater ecological impact--and lower profitability. 
Industrial anchoveta fishing began with the purse seine trawler, a 
technology that was transferred directly from the salmon and sardine fisheries of 
the western United States to Peru by the North American Fishery Mission in 1941.  
At first, Peruvian anchoveta fishermen simply motored along the coast and 
searched for surface schools by sight or by making an educated guess where they 
could be caught beneath the surface.  They depended heavily on watching guano 
birds to locate schools of fish.  They wasted little time and fuel in this effort, as 
long as fish were abundant near port, which they almost always were, at least 
during the austral summer.  Once fishermen located a school, the vessel circled it 
while the crew unloaded by hand a heavy net made from locally produced cotton 
(illus. 45).  When the school was surrounded on the surface, the crew used a winch 
to reel in the purse line attached to the weighted bottom of the net; this caused the 
bottom of the net to gather up and prevent fish from escaping.  The fishermen then 
used hand nets to transfer the anchoveta from this watery “purse” into the ship’s 
hold--a slow, back-breaking process.  They then chugged back to port to unload 
their catch before it degraded too much.   
In this new system, the guano birds brought fishermen to the anchoveta, 
rather than bringing the anchoveta to a handful of guano islands where they and 
their chicks converted it to excrement.  Even in the best conditions, this required 
about as much manual labor and much more skill, ship time, and fuel than CAG 
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needed to extract guano--all factors that Luis Gamarra failed to include in his 
efficiency calculations. 
The introduction of a series of technological innovations to Peru, many 
linked to military research in the Northern Hemisphere, made it much more cost 
effective to mine the seas for anchoveta on a large scale.  In 1954, directional echo-
locaters (SONAR) originally invented to pinpoint submarines below the surface at 
some distance away from a ship went on sale in Peru.  When used to locate 
subsurface schools of fish, these high-tech instruments eliminated much of the trial-
and-error nature of fishing.  But few in Peru could afford these expensive, imported 
instruments without going into major debt.  Moreover, they required a lot of skill to 
operate.  IREMAR and IMARPE, led by Norwegian expert Gunnar Saetersdal, 
offered classes to enterprising fishermen who wanted to learn the art and science of 
echo-location.63  The widespread adoption of SONAR during the 1960s 
substantially increased the efficiency as well as the geographical and seasonal 
range of Peru’s fishing fleet.  But this technological change helped drive poorer 
boat owners out of the industry.  Echolocaters also made the guano birds entirely 
superfluous to the process of finding fish; in fact, they turned the guano birds into a 
pest. 
In 1955, nets produced from nylon fibers first became available in Peru.  
The development of nylon fishing nets involved one of those remarkable 
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“Connections” cherished by pop historians of technology that ultimately tied South 
American nitrate extraction and industrial nitrogen synthesis to Big Science and the 
eventual success of the Peruvian fishing industry.  After World War I, the U.S. 
chemical company Du Pont, a long-time producer of nitrate-based explosives, 
sought to adapt its new-found success with high-pressure catalytic ammonia 
synthesis (the Haber-Bosch process) to consumer uses other than explosives and 
fertilizer.  From 1927-1940, Du Pont’s R&D complex developed a new, nitrogen-
based polyamide polymer.  Du Pont first mass marketed this new fiber in the form 
of women’s fashion hosiery.  Later, it adapted nylon for use in fishing nets (and the 
nylon model for organizing large-scale research to the development of other 
synthetic fibers and plutonium manufacture).64  The mass production of nylon nets 
was entirely premised on the ability to synthesize nitrogen compounds on a large 
scale and the manipulation of these chemicals by Big Science in the Northern 
Hemisphere. 
These imported synthetic nets were superior to Peruvian-produced cotton 
nets in almost every way: they were lighter, stronger, more durable, and also 
relatively inexpensive.  They were also amenable for use with diesel-powered 
cranks.  This new combination made it possible to manipulate enormous purse-
seine nets, many of which reached deeper than the guano birds could dive and fish 
effectively.  Their introduction eliminated a major factor that limited the size of 
purse-seine vessels and created economies of scale for owners of the largest boats.  
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By 1959, the use of cotton nets in Peru had almost disappeared.  Because of their 
sheer size, besides sweeping the sea of the guano birds’ food, these nets caught and 
drowned thousands of birds. 
As with SONAR and nylon nets, the fishmeal industry imported most of its 
capital goods from the Northern Hemisphere in the beginning, especially from the 
defunct California sardine industry.  But by the late 1950s, the Peruvian fishing 
industry had far surpassed the maximum size of its “parent,” and the Peruvian 
economy rapidly developed its own manufacturing industries to supply large 
wooden- and steel-hulled ships, reduction equipment, plant buildings, and other 
capital goods to the fishmeal boom.  By the early 1960s, for example, the Peruvian 
firm Textil Marítima (est. 1950) had given up manufacture of cotton nets--to the 
detriment of Peruvian cotton growers--and begun to produce a range of nylon nets 
using Du Pont filament on British- and French-built looms, many for export. 
The fishmeal boom also inspired lucrative local innovations.  Hidrostal was 
a firm founded by a Swiss hydraulic engineer who had immigrated to Peru years 
before the fishmeal boom.  Martin Stähle got his start designing irrigation pumps 
for coastal agriculture.  At the behest of a Peruvian fishmeal plant manager, in 1957 
he designed a helical-impeller pump that could remove fish from pursed nets 
without mutilating them.  This delayed their deterioration and extended the range of 
fishing fleets.  More importantly, the use of these pumps greatly increased the 
efficiency of loading and unloading fish.  Hidrostal’s founders obtained an 
international patent for this superior pump and manufactured it and exported it to 
the world.  This created an immense demand, in turn, for reinforced rubber hose to 
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carry fish from net to ship to factory, most of which had to be imported from the 
United States or Great Britain. 
Many economic factors drove entrepreneurial competition for anchoveta 
and the adoption of new fishing technologies to catch them.  One of these, surely, 
was the well-known “tragedy of the commons,” the drive to maximize individual 
profit from an ownerless and unregulated natural resource.65  These new 
technologies also reduced much of the drudgery and dramatically increased the 
speed of the fishing process.  On the other hand, they eliminated the need for many 
manual workers--who, unlike machines, required managerial discipline, could 
demand pay raises, or even go on strike.  These were not major issues, however, as 
long as the industry kept growing. 
Finding and catching anchoveta was only half the story.  The conversion of 
wet, perishable fish into dry, inert fishmeal also required the direct transfer of 
reduction plant technology from the California sardine industry.  This process took 
a couple of attempts and several years to complete.  But the basic process of 
fishmeal manufacture in Peru was already set in the original plan for CAG’s 
fishmeal reduction plant drafted by Luis Gamarra.  Later plants incorporated some 
technological innovations, but not to the revolutionary extent that anchoveta fishing 
vessels did.   
When purse-seine trawlers returned to port, they first unloaded their catch 
into lighter vessels or directly at the dock of a fishmeal plant (illus. 46, a, b).  
Initially this was done by hand; the later adoption of Hidrostal’s helical impellers 
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greatly speeded up this process and reduced the need for manual workers on shore, 
as well.  The fresh fish were then weighed and placed in large storage tanks (c), 
usually made of concrete.  These measurements provided the basis for official catch 
statistics and did not account for fish already discarded by the trawlers.  
Mechanized conveyors and elevators (d, e) lifted the fish into a cooker (f) where 
they were steam-heated at 80 to 100 degrees Celsius.  The cooked fish passed 
automatically to a press (g) that removed liquid which was then transferred to oil 
separators (h) and to a boiler (i) for further processing.  The pressed solid cake 
passed to a disintegrator (j) where it was broken up and then lifted into a rotating, 
cylindrical hot-air dryer (k).  A mill (l) broke up the resulting dried solid, while a 
centrifuge (m) removed insoluble solids from the remaining liquid and returned 
them to the dryer.  Like guano, the fully processed meal was then packaged in jute 
sacks imported from South Asia (n, o) and lowered to a warehouse (p) for curing.  
Subsequent plants eliminated the warehouse which was necessary on the rainy U.S. 
West Coast but superfluous in extremely arid coastal Peru.  In the late 1960s, one 
Peruvian company developed a chemical stabilizer that skipped the curing process 
altogether, while W. R. Grace & Co.’s Paramonga sugar complex established a 
local industry for producing paper sacks.  By the mid-1960s, Peruvian plants as a 
whole produced approximately 1 ton of fishmeal from every 5.41 tons of anchoveta 
unloaded at the plant, quite a bit short of the 1:4 efficiency Gamarra originally 
claimed would replace millions of avian beaks, crops, gullets, stomachs, intestines, 
and cloacas. 
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These plants were not environmentally benign.  They required immense 
quantities of energy from either Peru’s stressed electrical network or on-site diesel 
generators--another element “externalized” from Gamarra’s conversion efficiency 
calculations.  Chimbote emerged as the fishmeal capital of the world in the 1950s 
for several reasons that had nothing to do with the biologically productive 
upwelling region close offshore.  One of the few achievements of the industrial 
policy of Manuel Prado’s first government during the early 1940s, other than the 
establishment of a fish-canning industry, was the development of a hydro-electric 
complex and steel mill in the Chimbote region.  As part of this project, an 
international team of male engineers and hygienists drained over 225,000 square 
kilometers of wetlands surrounding Chimbote and installed potable water and 
sewage facilities, while female social workers kept a close watch over the local 
population to eliminate the threat of disease and encourage “healthy” urban 
growth.66 
Peru’s first fishmeal plants simply dumped their waste water into the ocean.  
This created an enormous marine pollution problem.67  Effluent from these plants 
literally killed off artisanal fishing around the ports of Chimbote and Callao.  Later 
plants (four-fifths by 1968) added cleaners that removed most solids from waste 
water in order to produce more fishmeal.  A few advanced plants incorporated 
expensive, stainless-steel stickwater processers that obtained even more product, 
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reducing the amount of water pollution in the process.  Plant managers adopted 
these innovations, however, not to reduce water pollution, but to increase the 
efficiency of their operations. Unfortunately, there was no purely economic reason 
to put a stop to the most notorious pollution problem caused by fishmeal plants: the 
production of noxious fumes.  Immense public outcry in Lima against the horrible, 
fishy stench and smoke that pervaded even the richest neighborhoods of this 
rapidly growing metropolis led the Peruvian government to issue a series of decrees 
in the early 1960s regulating air pollution by fishmeal plants.  Despite the strongest 
possible protests from industry executives, one such decree closed down all 
fishmeal factories in the Lima-Callao metropolitan area until they installed air-
filtering equipment.  Even though the government offered emergency low-interest 
loans to make this regulation easier to bear, many simply moved elsewhere or 
closed down altogether.  This act farmed out Lima and Callao’s pollution problem 
to provincial cities with less political influence in Peru, where the “smell of 
money” and fishing industry jobs was sweet enough to overcome the stench of 
pollution steaming from their smokestacks.68 
All of these technological installations and improvements required money, 
of course--lots of it.  Local capital markets played a crucial role in the fishmeal 
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alimento ingerido por las aves guaneras y el guano aprovechable que producen,” in Lanatta, 
Informe, 65-74.  
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boom.  With international demand and prices for fishmeal so high, Peruvian petty 
capitalists discovered that they could rapidly recoup their investments in nets, 
motorized craft, and plant facilities, so they were willing to pay extraordinarily 
high rates of interest to local lending institutions.  Peruvian banks, encouraged by 
the loose fiscal policy established by the second Prado administration in 1956, 
pumped vast amounts of capital into the industry with short-term, renewable loans.  
This rapidly created an immense vested interest in the industry’s short-term 
financial success that pushed long-term considerations of industry welfare--and the 
health of Peru’s marine environment--to the sidelines of political debate.69 
New technology, easy credit, and profit margins as high as 90 percent per 
year helped to create enormous fortunes for a few lucky investors.  Luis Banchero 
Rossi (1929-1972) was the golden boy of the fishmeal boom.  He began his 
working life at the small liquor store of his Italian-Peruvian parents in the southern 
city of Tacna.  His mother envisioned better things for her son but feared sending 
him to the predatory metropolis Lima, and so arranged for him to live with her 
family in Trujillo where he matriculated at the local university.  While he studied 
chemical engineering in order to raise his social standing by becoming a technician, 
Banchero worked as a salesman with ties to the local cane sugar industry.  In 1951, 
after finishing his classwork, he put his technical career on hold to devote himself 
full-time to the sale of petroleum lubricants.  In 1955, Banchero traded this interest 
in this business for a small bonito cannery in Chimbote.  He quickly converted it to 
fishmeal production and bought his first motorized vessel and nylon purse-seine 
                                                 
69. Thorp and Bertram, Peru, 1890-1977, 245. 
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outfit.  Like Manuel Elguera, Banchero got expert assistance along the way.  In 
1957, he and Wilbur-Ellis entered a partnership to build the gigantic Pesquera 
Humboldt fishmeal plant in Chimbote.  Banchero rode the wave of the fishmeal 
boom to the top.  By 1960, he was the second biggest fishmeal producer in the 
world (after the U.S. Gulf Coast’s “king of menhaden” and chicken feed Harvey 
Smith) and said to be the richest man in South America.  He was widely considered 
to be one of the oligarchs who ruled Peru, and his company as the definition of “a 
technified industry, with plans, with trained men.”  His rags-to-riches story 
heightened the mystique of entrepreneurship and managerialism and became a 
rallying point for proponents of developmentalism in Peru.70 
Contrast Banchero’s success as the definitive “self-made man” to the fate of 
the Graña brothers, well-born sons of the Aristocratic Republic.  A member of their 
family had been present at the very first meeting of CAG shareholders in 1909 and 
unsuccessfully stood election to its board of directors.  The Graña’s Huando estate 
had been one of CAG’s biggest guano customers.  In 1961, these agribusinessmen 
took a big risk and sold out their interest in cotton cultivation to buy into the 
fishmeal boom.  Within two years, they owned the third largest fishmeal company 
in Peru--only to go bankrupt a year later as Chancay, the fishing city they helped 
build overnight, became the first coastal boomtown to suffer the downside of 
overly rapid expansion.71 
                                                 
70. “El magnate de la pesca peruana,” Pesca Oct. 1960, 22-26; Edmonds, “Reasons 
Underlying Development of the Peruvian Fishing Industry,” 62; Gilbert, The Oligarchy and the Old 
Regime in Peru, 342; Diccionario histórico y biográfico del Perú, s.v. “Banchero Rossi, Luis.”  
71. See table 5; “Otro agricultor de la pesca,” Pesca Sept. 1961, 39; “Los 15 grandes,” 
Pesca Apr. 1963, 51; “Quiebran empresas de Graña,” Pesca Sept. 1964, 32; “Chancay tuvo su 
bonanza,” Pesca Feb. 1966, 12-16; “Información comercial: Banco Alemán Transatlántico [sic, see 
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In sum, experts played a pivotal role in the initiation of the Peruvian fishing 
industry, both during its initial, food-fish producing phase (1942-1953), and the 
fishmeal boom that succeeded it.  In Luis Banchero’s case, a chemical engineer 
became Peru’s biggest fishing tycoon.  During the decade that followed the 1954 
guano-versus-fishmeal controversy, Peruvians industrialists maintained a 
semblance of control over the production and use of new, more efficient fishing 
technologies.  Though they required the help of a variety of technicians, their 
success did not depend on marine science.  In the process, Peru’s coastal 
environment became integrated into a new transnational economy involved, not 
only in feeding chickens and hogs in the Northern Hemisphere, but also in 
supplying capital goods to the world’s other burgeoning industrial fisheries.  In 
many aspects, the Peruvian economy appeared to have “taken off” on a 
developmental trajectory of its own, just as historian and presidential advisor Walt 
Rostow’s “non-communist manifesto” predicted would happen when 
underdeveloped economies reached the right “stage of growth.”72 
But the fishmeal boom always had its downside.  Peru never came close to 
self-sufficiency in supplying the fishmeal industry, as proponents of import-
substituting industrialization during this era would have liked.  More troublingly, 
the fishmeal boom was fueled almost entirely by enormous debt.  It was never as 
efficient as its boosters claimed it would be, especially taking into account the vast 
                                                                                                                                        
correction “Información comercial: Compañía Administradora del Guano,” 12 Apr. 1909 (morning 
ed.) p. 1, col. 6],” La Prensa 11 Apr. 1909 (morning ed.), p. 2, col. 1.  
72. See W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1960), esp. ch. 4. 
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amounts of energy it consumed and pollution it produced.  Meanwhile, a new 
vested interest came into being.  It grew larger with every sol lent, every fish 
caught, every dollar garnered for processed meal, every dollar paid to a worker or 
capital-goods manufacturer.  Most importantly, technology transformed the very 
nature of fishing in Peru’s coastal waters: from a labor-intensive to a capital-
intensive endeavor, from a relatively innocuous industry that depended on the 
guano birds to catch anchoveta, to a potent ecological force that could outcompete 
the guano birds for fish--and potentially destroy the fishery itself. 
In the midst of all this, high-level government planners consciously decided 
to put the guano industry at risk in the name of national economic development 
while they waited for science to rule on the “highest use” of Peru’s marine 
environment.  CAG could not produce hard evidence that a large-scale fishing 
industry threatened the well-being of the guano birds--which, until the 1957-1958 
El Niño, were flourishing better than they had in human memory.  The guano birds 
paid the price for this delay, just as Robert Cushman Murphy had warned. 
 
490 
 
Chapter 8 
Replacing the Guano Birds 
 
As a result of the intervention of man, . . . it would not be surprising if the 
extinction of the guano birds were closely followed  
by the extinction of the anchoveta.  
--El Comercio editorial (1966) 
Technocrats were never able to reconcile all the conflicts associated with 
exploitation of Peru’s marine environment, yet Peru’s rulers never gave up their 
faith in the technocratic ideal. 
In the late 1950s, during yet another moment of economic and 
environmental crisis, Peruvian state officials decided to place their trust in a 
different kind of technocrat, an economist, who thought the free market should be 
allowed to resolve the guano versus fishmeal controversy.  This allowed the 
fishmeal industry to grow unabated at a criticial juncture. 
Others put their trust in state-managed import-substituting industrialization.   
By the late 1950s, the guanay and piquero had clearly lost their position as “the 
most valuable birds in the world” to the industrial North’s new super chickens.  
Most of Peru’s agro-exporters had long since lost interest in the guano industry and 
were looking for new cheap sources of fertilizer.  Though they supported free-
market economics in some realms, they campaigned for the development of an 
import-substituting chemical industry that could produce nitrogen fertilizer via the 
Haber-Bosch process.   
The Peruvian guano industry could have produced fertilizer in perpetuity 
for Peru, but its future prospects for growth were limited.  It was also sensitive to 
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environmental change.  The El Niño phenomenon initiated two big crashes in the 
guano bird population in 1957-1958 and 1965.  The guano birds failed to recover 
from the second crash--a clear indication that the Peruvian fishmeal industry, as 
long feared, had grown so large that it was stealing the birds’ food.  This inspired 
immense public outrage against an industry already responsible for polluting a 
number of Peru’s coastal cities with noxious-smelling effluent and fumes.  
Peruvians were also well-aware that this industry existed solely to provide First 
World consumers with as much cheap pork and chicken as they wanted, while 
Peru’s poorest children starved. 
Any grounds for coexistence that had once existed between the guano and 
fishmeal industries had long since eroded away.  Too many vested interests liked 
“the smell of money” emanating from the fishing industry’s smokestacks to put 
controls on the industry merely to save Peru’s poor marine birds.  So Peru’s rulers--
with the support of key experts--consciously allowed the guano industry to pass 
into oblivion.  They hoped Peru’s nascent chemical industry would soon be able to 
replace the guano birds as fertilizer manufacturers. 
By the mid-1960s, all this industrial “progress” had begun to threaten public 
order.  Peru’s lower classes, especially rural peasants pouring into Lima, Chimbote, 
and other industrial cities looking for work, became increasingly restive about the 
paltry benefits they were receiving from economic growth.  In a few regions, 
guerrilla focos sprang up that sought to overthrow the “oligarchy” that continued to 
monopolize wealth and power in Peru.  These popular movements, as they had so 
often done, served to reinforce Peru’s technocratic tendencies.  In fact, they paved 
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the way for reformist military officers to seize control of the Peruvian state in order 
to establish a redistributive “bureaucratic-authoritarian” government premised on 
the technocratic ideal.1 
By the time the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces took 
power in 1968 to put a lid on social unrest, the internal momentum of the fishmeal 
industry was so great that not even the military could control it.  Nevertheless, they 
thought they could.  By the 1960s, experts had repeatedly proven their ability to 
manage production from Peru’s marine environment, and there was good reason to 
believe that this success would continue.  But Peru’s marine environment turned 
out to be much more variable and unpredictable than even experts on the El Niño 
phenomenon imagined.  In 1972-1973, a strong El Niño event came along that put 
the anchoveta population to its first severe test since the fishmeal industry had 
reached truly gargantuan size.  The anchoveta fishery collapsed.   
But this was hardly a natural disaster.  Well-informed officials advised by 
the world’s best marine scientists made conscious, deliberate decisions that carried 
Peru to the brink of ecological cataclysm.  Peru’s economic planners carried their 
country over the brink, as they tried to manage a series of simultaneous economic 
crises.  Misplaced faith in technocracy, not technology run amok, ultimately 
doomed the fishmeal industry.  It took two decades for Peru’s marine industries to 
recover.  Peru’s guano birds never did. 
 
                                                 
1. See Cotler, Clases, estado y nación, esp. ch. 7, esp. pp. 347, 353, 365; Stepan, The State 
and Society, pt. 2.   
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Steps toward an Ecological Disaster 
The fortunes of fishmeal entrepreneurs like Luis Banchero notwithstanding, 
a few powerful men never forgot the dire warnings of William Vogt and Robert 
Cushman Murphy.  Even though state credit policies were driving the fishmeal 
industry’s growth, President Manuel Prado attempted to rein in its uncontrolled 
expansion by other means.  In December 1956, he suspended licensing plant 
expansions and construction of new plants, claiming that the fishmeal industry 
potentially threatened “the equilibrium of the biological chain” of the Peru Current 
ecosystem.  In other words, Peru’s guano birds, bonito, and lobos del mar needed 
state protection.  This decree was issued, however, only as a precautionary measure 
while scientific studies continued.  Like so many regulations of this type, it 
included a grandfathering clause for plants under construction and allowed the 
licensing of new construction as long as the builder promised to refrain from using 
anchoveta--a requirement that was obviously difficult to enforce.  It was also 
motivated as much by the “not in my backyard” advocacy of influential coastal 
citizens who did not want to live with the putrid fumes and effluent of fishmeal 
plants as it was by any desire to regulate the factories’ productive capacity.  
Government corruption and the speculative sale and transfer of licenses further 
undermined the Prado administration’s attempts to regulate the fishmeal industry in 
this manner, much less protect the guano birds.2 
                                                 
2. MCAG 48 (1957), 25-26; Belaúnde, La legislación pesquera en el Perú, 141; Caravedo, 
Estado, pesca, y burguesía, 47-48, 142-143; Thorp and Bertram, Peru, 1890-1977, 246. 
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Then came the “ecological depression” CAG had long dreaded.  In 1957-
1958, a strong El Niño event struck Peru after years of cooler than normal oceanic 
temperatures and a decade of CAG’s policy of creating artificial guano “islands” at 
several coastal points.  This event devastated the guano bird population (fig. 9).  
Under the careful watch of CAG’s marine scientists, the estimated nesting adult 
guanay population, which had peaked at 33.5 million in August 1955, plunged to a 
low of 3.1 million in January 1958 (normally prime nesting season).  The nesting 
adult piquero population in Peru, meanwhile, fell even more precipitously from a 
high of 4.2 million in December 1956 to only 160,000 in July 1957.  The nesting 
alcatraz population suffered most of all, declining from as many as 1.3 million in 
March 1955 to as few as 20,000 in August 1957.  A substantial part of these abrupt 
downswings can be ascribed to migration, but many of these birds never returned--
having died of starvation, disease, or predation somewhere along the South 
American coast.  Where they went mattered little, of course, to the millions of 
chicks they left behind to die and the humans who stood to profit from their 
excrement.  Production of guano rico plummeted accordingly from an all-time high 
of 332,223 metric tons in 1956 to 108,919 metric tons in 1959.  Both CAG and 
Peruvian farmers sought to make up for this short-fall by increasing their imports of 
Chilean nitrates and manufactured fertilizers from abroad.3 
CAG officials desperately tried to make sense of this catastrophe.  In 1957, 
they sent six of CAG’s scientific cadre on a series of oceanographic cruises and 
                                                 
3. See app. 2; Tovar, Guillén, and Nakama, “Monthly Population Size of Three Guano Bird 
Species off Peru,” 208-218; MCAG 50 (1959), x, anexos; Robertson, The Peruvian Fertilizer 
Industry.  
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tours of the guano islands.  After hundreds of bird autopsies and a brilliantly 
conceived experiment that revived several moribund birds, they definitively proved 
that lack of food was the root cause of this disaster.  But to cover all its bases, CAG 
directed its workers in 1958 to intensify their “prophylaxis” of the islands, 
eliminating bird cadavers and destroying the areas favored by bird ectoparasites in 
the futile hope that disease prevention might stem this holocaust.  CAG’s scientists 
even tried using Aldrin, benzene hexachloride (BHC), and other persistent 
pesticides to try to get rid of these parasites.  Luckily, these wrong-headed 
experiments failed, as these chemicals are now known to cause egg-thinning, 
breeding failure, and direct poisoning in the very birds CAG was trying to protect. 
On the regulatory side, CAG called for “more energetic methods” against the 
“frenetic” fishmeal industry, including size limits, a closed season, even a ban 
against use of the purse seine.  “The dynamic equilibrium between the guano bird 
and anchoveta can be broken by man, leading to the extinction of both species,” 
CAG’s managers pleaded.  “Man is capable of exhausting any natural resource, and 
we [must] remember that . . . sea lions, conches, and oysters were nearly 
exterminated from our coast” by human mismanagement.  To pacify CAG, the 
Ministry of Agriculture held a roundtable meeting of experts in September 1957, 
but little came of it.4 
                                                 
4. MCAG 49 (1958), vi-vii, 7, 10, 12-14, 18, 21; MCAG 50 (1959), v; Barreda, 
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This El Niño event had little effect on Peruvian fishermen, who besides 
following the guano birds to schools of fish could use two-way radio, echolocation, 
deep-reaching nets, and airplanes in their search for anchoveta.  By most 
appearances, it looked like El Niño benefited them: anchoveta production and 
fishmeal exports increased by over 600 percent from 1956 to 1958.  In fact, 
Peruvian fishermen caught more fish than was good for them: their export income 
only increased by 20 percent during these boom years as Peru glutted the world 
protein market.  This uncontrolled expansion for so little financial gain, as much as 
the sufferings of the guano industry, inspired President Prado to issue strict 
regulations against the fishmeal industry in December 1958.  Prado restricted the 
time, season, location, and net size of anchoveta fishing, particularly around the 
guano islands, and prohibited the transfer of production licenses from old to new 
reduction plants (although not to floating plants, the scourge of the California 
sardine).  Lawbreaking fishermen and plant owners were threatened with fines and 
confiscation, albeit small ones: for plant owners S/.1,000 (US$36) on the first 
offense, S/.10,000 (US$360) on the second, temporary closure on the third, and 
permanent confiscation on the fourth.  These laws would remain in place while 
“biological studies . . . determine the maximum yield possible that will protect the 
national economy.”5  
Meanwhile, larger forces worked in tandem to undo this attempt at a state 
fishery conservation policy.  The El Niño-Southern Oscillation cycle did not hurt 
                                                 
5. See app. 9; MCAG 50 (1959), 14-17; Belaúnde, La legislación pesquera en el Perú, 372-
375; Caravedo, Estado, pesca y burguesía, 47-48. 
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just the guano industry.  The one-two punch of a severe “La Niña” event in 1955-
1956 followed by a strong El Niño warm event in 1957-1958 depressed crop 
production all over Peru.  Generalized drought conditions in much of the Sierra 
were topped off by massive food-crop failures and near famine on the altiplano 
around Lake Titicaca in 1957.  Export crops were also affected.  Sugar cane yields 
per hectare harvested in 1957 were their worst, by far, since 1938.6 
Peruvian agribusinessmen could not simply blame the weather for these 
problems.  As we have seen, as part of the drive to maximize Tangüis cotton 
production, most of the central Peruvian coast had been converted to an almost 
continuous, year-round monoculture.  This created ideal conditions for an insect 
plague.  Problems started in the late 1930s, but widespread use of arsenical dust, 
crop rotation, reduced wartime planting, and a resurgence of the pests’ natural 
enemies caused the problem to die down in the early 1940s.  After the war, high 
crop prices led cotton planters to choose a new strategy to maximize crop 
production: beginning in 1946, they applied vast quantities of two brand-new 
insecticides, DDT and BHC, both products of the Northern Hemisphere’s vast 
military-chemical complex.7  Cañete Valley cotton planters were among the first in 
Latin America, or anywhere in the world, for that matter, to use chlorinated organic 
pesticides on a large scale.  They enthusiastically served as experimental guinea 
pigs for this powerful, but flawed new technology. 
                                                 
6. Thorp and Bertram, Peru, 1890-1977, 278-279; Portocarrero, Beltrán, and Romero, 
Compendio estadístico del Perú, 40, 42.  
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Not everyone was a convert to these new insecticides.  The cotton bollworm 
(Heliothis virescens) soon developed resistance to these poisons.  The German-
Peruvian entomologist Johannes Wille, a long-time friend of Erwin Schweigger and 
student of the guano birds’ parasites, became increasingly concerned with these 
chemicals’ adverse impact on the natural insect predators of crop pests.  Cotton 
productivity actually fell during the late 1940s.  But by steadily increasing their 
applications of chemicals, cotton growers were able to boost productivity in the 
early fifties, only to see it fall precipitously in 1956 and 1957 due to insecticide 
resistance and a sudden plague of secondary crop pests encouraged by abnormal 
weather conditions and the extermination of their natural enemies.  Export income 
fell precipitously.  Wille’s philosophy of “integrated pest management” eventually 
won over Peruvian cotton farmers, as a consequence.8 
In short, the economic crisis of the late 1950s was partly an ecological crisis 
affecting input-intensive agriculture.  But to high-level economic planners, these 
problems paled in comparison to those created by the sharp recession that hit the 
international economy in 1957.  As a consequence, the Peruvian economy suffered 
its worst balance-of-payments shortfall of the 1950s and its worst trade deficit since 
before the turn of the century, partly because the loose credit policies that had been 
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driving the expansion of the fishmeal industry had allowed purchases of imported 
consumer goods to rise.9   
Late in 1957, Prado called out for help.  Foreign economists from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the world’s “money doctors” of the late 
twentieth century, gave Peru’s central bank a substantial line of credit to defend the 
sol on foreign currency markets with the understanding that Prado would impose 
austerity measures on the Peruvian economy and wait for export income to recover.  
Prado balked at their suggestions:  On the one hand, if he put the squeeze on wages 
and salaries, he risked losing the support of APRA and stirring up massive labor 
unrest.  On the other hand, if he imposed direct currency exchange controls, he 
would take away the ability of rich men like himself to protect their wealth by 
converting it to foreign currency and removing it from the country.  Prado’s 
government instead tried to compensate with increased deficit spending, but this 
only worsened the balance-of-payments situation and plunged Peru into an even 
deeper recession and political crisis.  In 1959, the Peruvian Congress gave a vote of 
no-confidence and Prado’s democratically elected coalition government nearly fell 
to pieces.10 
In July 1959, Prado appointed a well-known technocrat to clean up this 
mess.  This decision had dire long-term consequences for Peru’s entire marine 
ecosystem.  Pedro G. Beltrán Espantoso (1894-1979, illus. 47) was an outspoken 
representative of the far right in Peru.  He was fiercely dedicated both to the free-
                                                 
9. Bertram, “Peru, 1930-60,” 8:443, 446; Portocarrero, Beltrán, and Romero, Compendio 
estadístico del Perú, 168, 170. 
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market principles of classical economics and the protection of wealthy interests, 
and he felt no compunction against using authoritarian means to ensure a laissez-
faire climate for business in Peru.  His basic remedy for every social problem was 
increased per capita production, based on his emphatic belief that increased wealth 
would somehow trickle down to Peru’s poorest.  He was a true forerunner of the 
Chicago Boys and other neoliberal technocrats of the late-twentieth century, and 
his life personified the convergence of many strands of Peruvian history since 
CAG’s foundation. 
Beltrán was born into one of Peru’s most powerful agro-exporting families 
and went to school with the sons of key members of the Aristocratic Republic.  He 
earned an economics degree at the London School of Economics in 1918, but 
opportunities were few for an economist in Peru, even one with such prestigious 
training, so he took up cotton farming in the Cañete Valley south of Lima upon his 
return.  During the 1920s, Beltrán totally transformed the management of his 490-
hectare Montalván estate.  He personally established a regional experimental 
agronomy station for this center of Tangüis cotton cultivation, hired agronomists 
and plant breeders to manage his plantation, mechanized its cultivation, and was 
reputedly the first Peruvian to employ a crop duster to apply arsenical insecticide to 
his crops.  Beltrán benefited as much as anyone from CAG’s services:  Under his 
tenure, Montalván quickly rose to the ranks of CAG’s top 25 guano customers of 
all time.11  Beltrán was a model scientific farmer. 
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While he engaged in these endeavors, Beltrán began his rise as one of the 
supreme spokesmen of the agro-exporting class in Peru: first as the founder of a 
local farming association for the Cañete Valley, then as president of the Sociedad 
Nacional Agraria, then as a founder of the ultra-conservative Partido Nacional 
Agrario with agronomist Gerardo Klinge.  But Beltrán never gave up his identity as 
a British-trained economist.  By the time he took control of Peru’s political 
economy in 1959, Beltrán had a long record when it came to the technocratic 
management of Peru’s monetary system under authoritarian governments, first as 
director of the Banco Central under Luis Sánchez Cerro’s Depression-era military 
government, then as a big supporter of General Manuel Odría’s 1948 military 
takeover.  As director of the Banco Central de Reserva under Odría, with the 
encouragement of a team of U.S. economists known as the Klein mission, Beltrán 
oversaw the shift to a laissez faire economic policy--with the obvious exception of 
vast government spending in irrigation works.  An unprecedented agro-exporting 
boom ensued that went a long way toward reconstituting Peru’s old oligarchy.12 
Beltrán turned into a vocal critic of Odría’s regime, however, when his 
superior (with the IMF’s support, in this case) stopped supporting his monetarist 
prescriptions.  Beltrán countered by inviting Austrian economics professor Ludwig 
von Mises, one of the founders of neoliberalism, to stand by his side when he 
stepped down as Peru’s central banker in 1950.  Latter-day technocrats routinely 
used this tactic to recruit support for their economic prescriptions.  Beltrán had 
other propaganda tools at his disposal.  Since 1934, he had owned a large share of 
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the Lima daily La Prensa and frequently used it to broadcast his political and 
economic doctrines.  He ended up in prison in 1956 for his negative press 
campaigns.  Thus, this agent of authoritarian governments unjustly became an 
international icon of freedom of the press in Latin America. 
In stark contrast to Odría, Manuel Prado in 1959 gave his prime minister 
free reign over state economic policy.  Beltrán immediately hatched a plan 
designed to please the IMF and to make his idol von Mises proud.  Among his 
many stabilization procedures in 1959, Beltrán devalued the sol markedly, raised 
fuel prices, and established special tax exemptions for business.  But his most 
significant act for the subject at hand was his decision to revoke all laws limiting 
the growth of the fishmeal industry in order to “stimulate the commercial 
development of the country on the basis of free enterprise.”  To serve the ideology 
of this new breed of technocrat--the neoliberal macroeconomist--the Peruvian 
government jettisoned policies designed to protect the guano industry, thus setting 
the stage for the rapid growth of the fishmeal industry.  The international economy 
cooperated with Beltrán’s designs: the recession passed.  Anchoveta production and 
income from fishmeal exports mushroomed.  The planting and production of cotton 
and sugar cane also went up sharply, pest and fertilizer supply problems 
notwithstanding.13  This export boom turned into a general economic boom.  
Beltrán looked like an economics genius, though his policies benefited the rich far 
more than the poor who were in the process of creating vast, unplanned 
shantytowns (barriadas) on the outskirts of Lima, Chimbote, and other cities.   
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In 1962, Beltrán tried to use his technocratic achievements to springboard to 
the presidency, but he had an entirely misplaced sense of his own popularity.  He 
failed to recognize that the general populace, most of whom benefited little from 
his economic reforms, hated him more than any other figure on the Peruvian 
political scene, particularly for his unending attacks on “wage inflation.”  Beltrán 
often accused Peru’s “overpaid” workers, like the guano birds, of “consum[ing] 
more than they produce.”  This producer of export cotton also shamelessly 
appropriated the overpopulation rhetoric of William Vogt to oppose any sort of 
government land reform--since it might threaten agricultural productivity, lead to 
“mistreated land,” and threaten the world’s food supply.  Many in Peru’s political 
elite disliked just as much Beltrán’s haughty belief that he held a monopoly on 
economic truth.  He quickly dropped out of the race and government, but left 
behind a legacy that contributed significantly to later social unrest and political 
instability in Peru.  Years before the triumph of Friedrich von Hayek and Milton 
Friedman’s Chicago Boys under Augusto Pinochet, much less the rise of Jeffrey 
Sachs and other neoliberal economists at the end of the Cold War, this free-market 
technocrat fundamentally changed the course of his country’s ecological history by 
“liberating” Peru’s marine environment from state intervention.14 
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Of course, the Peruvian fishmeal boom was not all one man’s 
accomplishment, even if some of Beltrán’s worshippers liked to think otherwise.  
In fact, it was as much a product of the formation of an international cartel--the 
antithesis of the free-market economy--as it was of the liberalization of the political 
economy of the Peruvian state.  In 1959, a serious slump in the global price of 
fishmeal stimulated by the rapid rise in fishmeal supply and speculation in fishmeal 
contracts threatened to end Peru’s fishmeal boom.  Several fishmeal exporting 
countries got together to form a cartel.  Peruvian fishmeal entrepreneurs held out at 
first, in the belief that they could run their international competitors into the ground 
by underselling them.  But the slump continued, and in October 1960, led by 
Elguera and Banchero, Peru joined most of the world’s other major fishmeal 
producers in a Fishmeal Exporters Organization.  To ensure their participation, 
Peruvian producers obtained a generous quota, a guaranteed 60 percent of world 
production.  Conservation rhetoric played into Peru’s strategy: Banchero, Peru’s 
biggest producer, claimed he would only accept limitations “that come from a 
biological-technical study. . . for conservation purposes, . . . not for the 
convenience of international markets,” but he eventually gave into the cartel.  With 
the notable exception of Gildemeister & Co., which marketed its fishmeal exports 
through its vast agribusiness headquartered in Bremen, Germany, practically all of 
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Peru’s major producers joined the Consorcio Pesquero del Perú, S.A., a national 
cartel with the sole power to market Peru’s export quota.15 
In a remarkable convergence between the guano and fishmeal industries, 
Roque Romero Cárdenas (b. 1912) was recruited to head the Peruvian Fishing 
Consortium.  He was a lawyer by training who spent many years working his way 
up through the ranks of CAG’s management hierarchy.  He left CAG to become the 
bureaucratic head of the Odría regime’s new health and social security program.  In 
October 1954, he returned to replace Carlos Llosa Belaúnde as CAG’s general 
manager in the midst of the guano vs. fishmeal controversy, and he took over 
CAG’s campaign against the unregulated growth of the fishmeal industry.  Romero 
left CAG in 1957 when offered the number-one post in Coca Cola’s Peruvian 
operations.  As head of Peru’s new cartel, arguably the most powerful fishmeal 
trader in the world in the early 1960s was a former Lord of Guano.16 
With the institution of this cartel, the international fishmeal price recovered 
rapidly, and the Peruvian fishmeal boom barely wavered, at least in terms of brute 
production.  By 1964, the vested interest in the Peruvian fishmeal industry was 
immense.  In that year, Peru caught what was then a record 8.863 million metric 
tons of anchoveta and exported 1.566 million metric tons of fishmeal (99 percent 
                                                 
15. “El magnate de la pesca peruana,” 26; “Paris: Conferencia de productores,” Pesca Oct. 
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derived from anchoveta) worth US$165.7 million.  Peru had already passed Japan 
in 1962 as the number-one producer by tonnage of live fish in the world.  By 1964, 
Peru’s catch represented one-fifth of total world production, and its fishmeal 
supplied two-thirds of global trade in this commodity.  In 1965, Peru’s fishmeal 
export income surpassed the value of all its agricultural exports combined, even 
though the recent kings of Peru’s coastal economy, cotton and sugar cane, were 
bigger than they had ever been.  Fishmeal provided more than 28 percent of Peru’s 
foreign exchange, second to mineral exports.  The fishing industry as a whole 
composed more than four percent of Peru’s gross national product.  To the 
satisfaction of Peruvian economic nationalists, foreign companies only had dibs on 
one-quarter of the industry’s investments.  Peru’s industrial working class also had 
a major interest in the fishmeal industry; it directly employed around 38,000 well-
organized, politically active workers whose demands and strikes fundamentally 
influenced fishery management in following years once the fishing sector stopped 
growing so rapidly.  Ancillary industries employed tens of thousands more.  Many 
ideologues of Third World development came to perceive the Peruvian fishing 
industry as one of the great industrialization success stories of the age.  Some 
foreign experts--most notably Benny Schaefer--began to promote it as a model for 
other underdeveloped nations to follow so they could experience their own 
economic “take-off” and feed the Third World’s exploding population.17 
                                                 
17. Key proponents of the idea that ocean products could feed the world include Milner 
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But all was not well with the fishing industry.  By 1963, total industry debt 
was estimated to be as high as S/.3 billion (US$112 million), although no one knew 
exactly how large it really was.  By this time, the fishmeal industry, like the 
canning industry it replaced, was on the verge of overcapitalization.  Its fleet of 
1,848 motorized fishing craft and 150 or so fishmeal plants had an estimated 
capacity to catch and process 13 million metric tons of anchoveta per year, roughly 
four million tons beyond what it needed.  From the time of the price slump of 1959 
until the Peruvian state expropriated the industry in 1973, smaller, less efficient 
producers were constantly on the verge of bankruptcy, especially since larger 
producers kept upping the ante by upgrading their fishing fleets and refining 
equipment to get an edge over their rivals.  It is testimony to the growing power of 
the industry--and its continuing state of crisis--that the new civilian government of 
Fernando Belaúnde Terry lowered taxes on fishmeal to the minuscule level of other 
export industries when he took office in 1964.  Belaúnde’s government also created 
a special subsidiary of the Banco Industrial del Perú to provide credit to keep the 
boom going, though fishery industrialists were compelled to buy shares in the 
Banco Industrial as part of the bargain.18 
This contradiction between incredible prosperity, productivity, and power, 
on the one hand, and the constant threat that this behemoth would collapse under its 
own weight and take down Peru’s entire social order, on the other, made it all but 
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impossible to bring the fishmeal industry under control.  It had far too much 
momentum.  This did not stop Peru’s rulers from looking for a technocratic 
solution to these problems.  But it was already too late to save the guano birds from 
the wrath of Mother Nature and to prevent the guano industry’s sacrifice to the God 
of National Development. 
 
“Perhaps We Should ‘Lose’ Guano?” 
While the Peruvian fishmeal industry was approaching its high-water mark, 
the Peruvian guano industry withered away under its onslaught.  The guano bird 
population recovered after the 1957-1958 El Niño, a clear indication that its initial 
decline was mainly related to environmental conditions and that CAG’s bird 
management policies were still performing their intended function.  But their 
numbers leveled off far short of their recent glory (see fig. 9).  Direct competition 
with anchoveta fishermen was cutting into the carrying capacity of the marine 
environment for the birds.   
Guano production also recovered somewhat, but with the booming agro-
export economy of the early 1960s, CAG never could fulfill more than a quarter of 
national demand.  Because of this shortfall, Peruvian farmers came to rely more 
and more on expensive imported fertilizers (fig. 10).  They bought the lion’s share 
from West Germany, partly because Peru still had a special relationship with the 
German chemical industry thanks to Gildemeister & Co.’s long influence, partly 
because German companies packaged their fertilizer in sacks made from South 
Asian jute, just as CAG had been packaging guano for over five decades.  (U.S. 
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manufacturers shipped fertilizer either in unfamiliar paper bags or in bulk.)  Of 
course, these imports cut into the profits of Peruvian agribusiness and hurt Peru’s 
balance of trade.  Many farmers could not afford them at all.  CAG’s managers 
realized the guano industry’s days might be numbered, so they directed their 
agricultural chemists to investigate ways to commercially derive uric acid and other 
marketable chemicals from guano.  CAG completed a uric acid production plant in 
1959, but to keep its balance sheet from going into the red, CAG had to export 
substantial quantities of guano.  Since it could no longer supply Peru’s fertilizing 
needs, the Peruvian guano industry was losing its reason for existence as a state 
development project, especially from the point of view of Peru’s agro-exporters.19 
For the time being, few Peruvians with political clout showed much concern 
for the guano industry’s plight, though CAG’s management kept up its incessant 
criticism of the fishmeal industry, and that old symbol of Peru’s decaying 
oligarchy, the Sociedad Nacional Agraria, kept voicing its lukewarm support.  In 
1960, the law granting CAG its formal existence was allowed to expire once the 
foreign loan that Leguía’s government had contracted back in the 1920s on the 
basis of future guano receipts had finally been paid off.20 
As time passed, more and more people began to agree with the fishmeal 
industry’s position that the time was right to replace the guano industry with a 
modern domestic industry that would eliminate the need to import manufactured 
                                                 
19. See app. 2-6; MCAG 46 (1955), xix; MCAG 50 (1959), xii; Robertson, The Peruvian 
Fertilizer Industry, passim. 
20. “La futura estructuración de la Compañía Administradora del Guano o de la entidad 
que la suceda, de acuerdo con las necesidades actuales del país,” BCAG 38:11 (Nov. 1962), 3-5.  
510 
chemical fertilizers.  A handful of local entrepreneurs attracted by the easy credit 
and tax advantages offered under the Prado administration elected to start a 
synthetic fertilizer industry in Peru.  In 1957, the first calcium superphosphate 
manufacturer opened.  Three years later, FERTISA started producing ammonium 
nitrates and ammonium sulfates using the Haber-Bosch process at an expansive 
chemical manufacturing complex at the mouth of the Rímac River in Callao.  But 
these private companies barely made a dent in fertilizer imports.21 
Political change accelerated this switch toward import-substituting fertilizer 
manufacture.  After three years of Pedro Beltrán’s controversial policies, the 
presidential election of 1962 ended in a virtual three-way tie--clear evidence of the 
deep political and social fissures that were threatening to plunge Peru into civil 
disorder.  Presaging the revolutionary events of 1968, a reformist group of military 
officers took control of the Peruvian state rather than allow a devil’s bargain 
between the populist APRA party and a reactionary right-wing decide who would 
be Peru’s next executive.  These officers tentatively embraced state-led 
developmentalism, a philosophy of government diametrically opposed to Beltrán’s 
laissez faire.  As we have seen, this approach had deep roots in Peruvian history, 
whether under Manuel Prado’s first administration, Augusto Leguía’s “Nueva 
Patria,” or Manuel Pardo’s “Practical Republic.”  In 1962-1963, this military junta 
cautiously instituted a series of technocratic commissions, including an Instituto de 
                                                 
21. Robertson, The Peruvian Fertilizer Industry, passim. 
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Planificación (Planning Institute), to consider how the Peruvian state organism 
could lay out a reformist course for the rest of Peruvian society.22 
This sort of intervention should be immediately recognizable to those 
familiar with the “bureaucratic-authoritarian” approach to rule in Latin America.  
Two years after Peru’s reformist military coup, a right-wing junta of military 
officers seized control of the Brazilian state.  They brutally repressed dissent and 
proceeded to install an elaborate science and technology sector to guide Brazil’s 
national development.  Its pharaonic projects helped engineer Brazil’s “miracle” of 
the 1970s.  International institutions and programs such as the IMF, World Bank, 
Inter-American Development Bank, U.S. Alliance for Progress, FAO, even the 
Economic Council on Latin America (ECLA), legitimated this authoritarian 
approach to development.  It promised to eliminate many barriers to foreign aid 
programs, while offering a powerful bulwark against the spread of communism.23  
It should be noted, however, that technocratic planning was also a feature of 
communist Cuba and Latin American governments that did not fall under military 
rule, particularly Peru’s neighbor Colombia where Canadian-born economist 
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Lauchlin Currie (1902-1993) and his brainchild Planeación Nacional de Colombia 
(est. 1968) did so much to determine the course of national development.24 
One thing these approaches to state-led development shared was a 
dedication to import-substituting industrialization.  This was the overarching intent 
behind the National Fertilizer Plan promulgated early during Peru’s new military 
regime.  In 1963, it reorganized CAG as the Corporación Nacional de Fertilizantes 
(CONAFER) and directed its management to work with a series of foreign 
technical consultants and a tripartite government commission to build a fertilizer 
plant close to the oil fields along Peru’s northern coast.  The Lords of Guano were 
thus given the charge to develop a new agroecological system for Peru based on 
domestic production of synthetic fertilizers powered by Peru’s natural gas 
resources and using imported expertise.  As is so often the case with technology-
transfer projects, the technology of fertilizer manufacture was changing so fast that 
this unwieldy planning apparatus could not keep up.  CONAFER’s managers were 
caught in a classic bind of “underdevelopment”:  New plans became obsolete 
almost as soon as they were written, but the cost and complexity of these projects--
as well as the influence of foreign funding organizations--was so great that this 
planning procedure could not be skipped.  CONAFER was not allowed to think 
small.  Even the cheapest project under consideration would have built a plant with 
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a daily output capacity of 200 tons of ammonia and 340 tons of agriculturally stable 
urea for US$20.9 million.  Peru’s National Fertilizing Plan called for the 
construction of facilities that were capable of manufacturing, year after year, twice 
as much nitrogen as the mercurial guano birds did during their most successful 
season under CAG’s management.25 
Meanwhile, Peru’s military government gave another state-owned company 
the go-ahead to build a fertilizer synthesis plant at Cachimayo in the highlands near 
Cuzco.  This regional company took over CAG’s old duty to promote input-
intensive agriculture among farmers in Peru’s southern Sierra.  Its struggles to 
make a profit illustrate the sort of dilemmas that face these projects once they reach 
the implementation stagem, and it underscores the tragedy of discarding a proven 
project such as CAG.   
The Development and Reconstruction Corporation of Cuzco wanted to 
expand a hydroelectric plant on the Urubamba River within sight of the famed 
archaeological ruin Machu Picchu, but it needed a big electricity consumer in the 
area to justify the “need” for this power plant.  An energy-intensive nitrogen 
manufacturer fit the bill nicely.  But why choose Cuzco over Puno, Ayacucho, 
Cajamarca, or any other highland department without an industrial sector or input-
intensive agriculture?  La Convención province on Cuzco’s Amazon slope 
(montaña) happened to be the focus of one of several left-wing guerrilla focos that 
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sprang up in rural Peru in the wake of the Cuban Revolution.  This one had a 
significant rural following in a region clamoring for agrarian reform.  In accord 
with the United States’ Alliance for Progress in Latin America, Peru’s reformist 
military felt compelled to meet this threat, not with military force, but with a land 
redistribution and development program.26  This fertilizer plant became central to 
its plans for agrarian reform in the Cuzco region.  The military junta’s civilian 
successors made sure these projects went forward. 
The result was a fiasco.  A German contractor completed the Cachimayo 
plant for the enormous sum of S/.647.5 million (US$24.1 million).  When it opened 
in 1965, it had a production capacity ten times greater than the total demand for 
nitrogen fertilizer in all of southern Peru at the time.  Of course, state planners 
hoped that area farmers would scramble over each other for this new product and 
pull the Peruvian highlands into the modern world of input-intensive agriculture 
and high-technology industry in the process.  Things did not work out that way.  
The Cachimayo plant almost immediately filled its warehouse with unsellable 
fertilizer.  It soon ran out of capital and shut down in May 1967.  Plant managers 
made a deal to distribute their wares on the far-away coast, but when they reopened 
they could not meet their production goals.  Even if they had, the plant still would 
have barely covered the interest on its loans.  Nevertheless, the state kept this big 
money loser going. 
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Today, travelers to Machu Picchu can still see this monument to state 
developmentalism.  It is the only industrial complex of any significance on the rail 
line from Cuzco.  It is surrounded by fields still cultivated by the ancient Andean 
digging stick (taki chaclla).  Unfortunately, tourists can no longer continue down 
the line past the Machu Picchu hydroelectric plant to Quillabamba, the capital of La 
Convención province.  A huge landslide (huaico) caused by torrential rains during 
the 1997-1998 El Niño buried the plant under 28 million cubic meters of rock, 
water, and mud.  It destroyed, probably forever, the only railroad ever built in Peru 
that connected the Pacific coast to the Amazon Basin.  Thus, El Niño interred a 
dream of generations of Peruvian progressives under tons of mud.  Against the 
advice of financial and technical experts, the Peruvian state dug out and rebuilt the 
90-megawatt Machu Picchu hydroelectric plant at a cost of US$53 million.  It 
reopened to great fanfare in 2001, proving that Peru could recover from natural 
disaster, even if it could never recoup the millions of dollars lost on these projects 
intended to replace the guano birds as engines of progress.27 
These failures were not due to lack of training and expertise.  CONAFER’s 
new state-appointed board of directors, now representing corporatist interests like 
the National Federation of Chemical Engineers rather than share-holding agro-
exporters and state creditors, included five engineers and two licensed economists 
out of nine members.  Four of CONAFER’s top managers, including its general 
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manager, were also engineers.  This reflected the “technocratic consensus” that 
swept President Fernando Belaúnde Terry, a University of Texas-trained architect 
and long-time professor at Peru’s national engineering school, to power when Peru 
returned to civilian rule in 1964.  CONAFER consulted a series of experienced 
U.S. and Japanese experts to help it implement its manufacturing plans.  Such 
projects were not doomed to failure: Indonesia, India, and many other post-colonial 
countries built successful ammonia-urea plants with the aid of foreign engineers 
during this period.  The transfer of five complete plants from Great Britain and the 
Netherlands to China in the aftermath of the 1959-1961 famine set the world’s most 
populous country on the road to becoming the globe’s largest nitrogen fertilizer 
consumer and producer--and a big meat consumer.  Moreover, Peru’s newest Lords 
of Guano were still following the technocratic model that had brought so much 
success to the guano, bonito canning, and fishmeal industries.28 
By this time CONAFER had already dismantled its version of Salomon’s 
House.  In 1963, as a sign of this brain drain, the military government excluded 
CONAFER from the advisory board it formed to develop new fishing regulations 
after IREMAR’s scientists sternly warned that anchoveta production was nearing 
its natural limits.  But this did not mean that CONAFER’s managers gave up their 
technocratic pretensions to manage Peru’s entire marine environment.  In fact, Luis 
Gamarra, still CONAFER’s gerente técnico after all these years, belatedly 
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converted to Vogt and Murphy’s cause.  He upbraided Peru’s fishmeal magnates 
for destroying the “equilibrium” and “climax state” of the guano birds.  Unless they 
adopted strict conservation policies such as a 20-mile “safe zone” around the guano 
islands, Gamarra warned, their wanton acts “could lead to the practical extinction 
of the species.”29 
His prediction nearly came true.  In 1965, yet another El Niño event--
although only a moderate one--hit the Peruvian coast, this time under 
unprecedented supervision by marine scientists.  Once again, this event had a 
devastating effect on the guano birds.  Ávila’s former assistant Rómulo Jordán 
(now at IMARPE) closely followed their decline.  Using monthly charts provided 
by CONAFER’s island guardians, he estimated that starvation caused the total 
guano bird population to fall from 17.3 million in February 1965 to three or four 
million the next year.  (More exact studies have concluded that the total breeding 
bird population on the guano islands recovered briefly to a post-1957 high of 28.2 
million in May 1964, slid to 12.3 million in March 1965, and then plunged to a low 
of 610,000 in September 1965.)  Although Jordán and his collaborators made no 
explicit policy recommendations, they faulted the fishing industry for this situation 
and made a general plea for conserving the guano birds as “a necessary and 
valuable resource,” at least until Peru’s nascent synthetic fertilizer industry had 
fulfilled its promise.30 
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Diehard defenders of the Peruvian fishing industry were not necessarily 
predisposed to accept these hard facts of the guano industry’s crisis.  In 1964, the 
engineering journal Pesca published a snide article that dismissed the entire 
foundation for scientific understanding of the guano bird population.  “As the 
source for its ‘statistics,’” Pesca’s publisher chided, CONAFER “has indicated that 
its figures have been procured by the guardians of its guano islands and points, 
which gives one an idea of how much ‘science’ said work contains.”  Pesca used 
the kind of image CAG once used to promote its accomplishments to make sure its 
point was clear (illus. 48).  Its caption read: “Any one of these workers, the 
majority illiterate, can become a guardian, and [CONAFER] considers the figures 
they gather on bird numbers to be data of great scientific and technical value.”  
Peruvian fishery engineers were just as adept at deploying ethnic and class 
animosity to belittle the science of others as William Vogt had been.31 
But people living in Lima and Callao did not need scientists to tell them 
something terrible was going on.  The guano birds’ plight was so severe that 
thousands of starving birds descended on these cities’ open markets in search of 
food.  This created an enormous public uproar.  News of this “disaster” even 
provoked the United Kingdom’s Prince Philip, a friend of Peruvian conservation 
activist Felipe Benavides and a prominent conservationist in his own right, “to call 
                                                                                                                                        
Stevenson, Oscar Guillén G., and José Santoro de Ycaza, Marine Atlas of the Pacific Coastal 
Waters of South America/Atlas de las aguas costaneras del Océano Pacífico en la América del Sur 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970). 
31. “Nunca hubo 40 millones de aves,” Pesca Mar. 1964, 39-43.  Pesca was edited and 
published for most of its run by the Peruvian-born, University of Washington-trained fishery 
engineer Alejandro Bermejo; see “El profeta de la escasez,” Pesca Nov. 1960, 32-33.   
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for emergency action. . . to safeguard this unique Peruvian asset.”32  Peru’s world-
famous guano industry quite literally died on the streets of its capital. 
The guano birds’ very public demise breathed new life into the 
conservationist cause in Peru.  In fact, the disastrous events of 1965 led directly to 
regulation of the fishmeal industry.  In September 1965, Belaúnde’s government 
reinstated the three- to five-mile reserves around Peru’s guano islands that 
Beltrán’s policies had abolished.  It even gave CONAFER the right to issue fines to 
trespassing fishing boats, though CONAFER still lacked a Policía Pesquera to do 
this effectively.  In November, after IMARPE’s scientists and the fishing industry 
had their say, the Peruvian state issued even more stringent regulations and formed 
a Guano Bird Study Commission to decide what to do next.33 
Like the first two rounds of debate between scientists during the early 1940s 
and mid-1950s regarding the fate of the guano birds, this expert commission failed 
to come to an agreement.  Representatives from CONAFER, the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s Servicio de Pesquería, and the government’s new Instituto de 
Planificación all agreed that the guano birds needed greater protection.  Luis 
Gamarra testified that the 95 percent decline in the guanay population since 1956 
was “symptomatic of a species on its way to extinction.”  Countering the fishing 
industry’s cost-benefit rhetoric, he claimed that guano was (once) responsible for 
S/.1 billion (US$37 million) in Peruvian agricultural production every year.   The 
                                                 
32. Philip to Benavides, 5 Apr. 1966, Biblioteca Municipal, Pueblo Libre, Lima, Peru, 
special exhibition [27 Apr. 2001].  
33. “Disposiciones legales y documentos relacionados con estos,” BCONAFER 4:1-4 (Jan.-
Apr. 1966), 77-82.  
520 
Lima daily El Comercio, an outspoken advocate for environmental protection 
during this controversy, gave Gamarra a platform to speak to the Peruvian public 
directly.  CONAFER’s directors saw to it that Carlos Llosa Belaúnde was 
appointed as company president to speak out on the guano birds and save the guano 
industry, as he had done as CAG’s general manager from 1945-1954.34 
The Sociedad Nacional de Pesquería’s representatives Manuel Elguera and 
Enrique del Solar issued an independent report--with IMARPE’s tacit support--
thrashing the “emotional” arguments of the defenders of the guano birds.  Elguera 
and del Solar tried to take the scientific high ground.  They criticized the guano 
industry’s “inexact scientific appreciation for the oceanic cause of the avian crisis.”  
Echoing Erwin Schweigger’s old contention, they argued that the El Niño 
phenomenon established “a natural factor limiting the bird colonies” (which could 
only fish some ten meters below the surface), but not for the anchoveta fishery.  
Why should Peru’s fishermen (who could reach down to 50 meters) be stopped 
from targeting fish flourishing at depths out of reach of the guano birds?  Elguera 
and del Solar countered the contention that the fishmeal industry was violating a 
“virgin stock” with a laughable cornucopian definition of ecological balance:  
Based on the anchoveta population’s well-known ability to reproduce itself every 
two years or so, they claimed: “Self-renewable resources, like anchoveta, have to 
                                                 
34. “Medidas recomendadas al Supremo Gobierno en relacion con las aves guaneras: 
Informe presentado por la Sub-Comisión 1: Decreto Supremo No. 67 de 12 de noviembre de 1965,” 
BCONAFER 4:1-4 (Jan.-Apr. 1966), 94-108; Gamarra, “Texto de la exposición del Ingo. Luis 
Gamarra Dulanto ante la comisión creada para contemplar las medidas por adoptarse para la 
protección de las aves guaneras, Febrero 11 de 1966,” BCONAFER 4:1-4 (Jan.-Apr. 1966), 57-60; 
idem, “Comentarios sobre ‘la acción con respecto al ave guanera como depredadora,’” BCONAFER 
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maintain a certain dynamic balance.  If for some reason the population decreases, 
the rate of renewal increases, so that the population recovers its balance.”  They 
also pointed out the arbitrariness and inefficacy of the state’s fishing restrictions:  
The size of the “safe zones” around the guano islands not only had “no scientific 
basis,” but such zones were nearly impossible to patrol and enforce (as CAG had 
discovered years before).  Such restrictions, moreover, threatened the closure of 
fishmeal factories and the loss of thousands of jobs and billions of soles in lost 
wages, tax income, and invested capital.  Finally, Elguera and del Solar renewed 
their criticism of the “inconsistent, obsolete, anti-economic guano industry.”  In its 
stead, modern Peru needed a “chemical fertilizer industry,” preferably one that took 
advantage of large, undeveloped natural gas and phosphate deposits in the 
Amazon--an industry that could expand “at a rate compatible with population 
increase and just expectations of the elevation of food needs.”35 
Meanwhile, the defenders of the Peruvian fishing industry had made a habit 
of using both the neo-Malthusian arguments of William Vogt and anti-hunger 
rhetoric of Josué de Castro against the guano industry.  Of course, they were 
extremely vulnerable to the criticism that practically every fish taken from Peru’s 
marine environment ended up in the belly of a chicken or hog in the rich countries 
of the North, rather than feeding the world’s poor.  The Sociedad Nacional de 
Pesquería had given its support to a couple of projects to head off this criticism.  
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With several countries involved in a race to develop technologies to refine fishmeal 
for direct human consumption, in 1960 the SNP, U.S. National Institute of Health, 
and Clínica Anglo-Norteamericana in Lima initiated a program to test the 
nutritional attributes of fishmeal.  Medical outposts in Lima’s impoverished 
shantytowns provided a couple hundred malnourished children as guinea pigs.  
They were fed soup, bread, and pasta fortified with fishmeal provided by an 
experimental South African refinery.  One dangerously underweight infant, 
“Isabelita,” was fattened up on fishmeal and turned into the poster child for the 
Peruvian fishing industry’s food from the sea campaign (illus. 49).  Pedro Beltrán 
even served a slice of fishmeal bread to visiting U.S. dignitary Adlai Stevenson.  
But in 1962, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determined fishmeal to 
be unfit for human consumption because it could not meet its high standards for 
purity in animal products.  Peruvian fishmeal producers dropped this project once 
this huge potential market was lost--thus revealing their real intention, to enter the 
U.S. processed-food industry.36        
In the midst of the controversy over the demise of the guano birds, the 
Belaúnde administration’s Minister of Agriculture, agronomic engineer Rafael 
Cubas Vinatea, lambasted the Peruvian fishing industry for its utter failure to 
provide food to Peruvians.  Fishing industry representatives responded cynically 
that it was the government’s duty to make sure Peruvians consumed enough 
                                                 
36. “La tragedia de la abundancia,” Pesca Oct. 1960, 5-8; “Una realidad: Harina para 
consumo humano,” Pesca Aug. 1961, 13-17, 19-21; “¿Y la ética periodística?” Pesca Sept. 1961, 
16-17; “Harina Vio Bin, rechazada,” Pesca Mar.-Apr. 1962, 43; “La polémica de la harina 
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protein.  To deflect such criticism, the SNP had already established a small food-
fish company to supply Peruvian coastal consumers; meanwhile, Enrique del Solar 
briefly returned to the life of a field scientist when he personally funded and 
supervised research into the industrialization of a merluza fishery.37 
Some of these projects were well-intentioned, and they did draw public 
attention to the Peruvian hunger problem, “the taboo of our time.”  But as the 
industry’s reaction to the FDA’s decision to ban fishmeal for human consumption 
in the United States makes clear, most of this was pure propaganda designed to 
forestall government intervention in the fishing industry, not to furnish 
malnourished children like Isabelita with unlimited food from the sea.38 
 
Fortune Strikes 
The intervention of fishery population biologist Milner Schaefer brought a 
final end to the fishmeal vs. guano controversy.  Under his influence, Peruvian 
officials made a consicious decision to trade away the continued existence of the 
guano industry for a chance to place the fishmeal industry under meaningful 
regulative control.  Despite the best efforts of Peru’s marine scientists, these plans 
failed miserably.  During the next strong El Niño event, the world’s largest 
industrial fishery collapsed.  The story of the role of experts in this second 
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ecological disaster is too rich to recount here in full.  But it is worth outlining some 
of its features in order to demonstrate how CAG’s legacy as a successful 
conservation organization--and faith in the technocratic ideal--affected the tragic 
fate of the anchoveta. 
Anchoveta producers in Peru had begun to experience some difficulties 
finding fish in 1962 and 1963, leading to the decline of Chancay as a major fishing 
port.  This directly influenced the fishing industry’s decision to fund IMARPE.  But 
not until the moderate El Niño of 1965 did the industry experience a noticeable 
drop in brute anchoveta production, although a major strike by fishermen in 
February 1965 and the ease with which some boats continued to locate stocks 
masked the ill effects of this environmental hazard on the fish population.  Popular 
reaction to the collapse of the guano bird population forced Peruvian state officials 
to take a stand:  During the 1965-1966 fishing season, they issued several limits to 
the fishmeal industry reminiscent of the conservation policies that originally 
protected the guano industry.  Based on recommendations by IMARPE scientists 
(acting independently of the fishing industry, for the moment), the Peruvian state 
stopped issuing licenses to expand fishmeal plant capacity, established a minimum-
size limit for individual fish caught (calculated as an average per catch), prohibited 
fishing during the peak months of anchoveta spawning (June-August, when fishing 
activity was at a minimum, anyway), and most importantly, mandated a seven 
million metric ton anchoveta production quota based on theoretical calculations of 
the fishery’s maximum sustainable yield (MSY).  It even expanded the closed 
oceanic reserves around the three most important guano island groups to ten miles.  
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For the 1966-1967 season, IMARPE recommended slightly more stringent 
regulations, including an additional six-week closed season (veda) early in the year 
to protect the new year-class of anchoveta fry (peladilla) and a five-day work week 
for the entire industry.  Of course, most of these regulations were crafted to 
minimize their economic impact rather than to conserve anchoveta stocks.  By 
preserving the peladilla, the industry maximized the standing crop of adult 
anchoveta that could be converted to fishmeal, leading to greater yields.  By 
adopting a restricted work week, the industry spread out the work year and 
provided time off for fishermen, thus providing a concession to labor syndicates 
that were agressively opposing a long veda--and work stoppage--of several months.  
Of course, these regulations meant that factory and boat owners could not operate 
their machinery at anything close to full capacity, and it meant smaller incomes for 
industry workers.39 
The fishing industry lobby did not take these “drastic measures” lying 
down.  As CAG had done 12 years earlier,  the Sociedad Nacional de Pesquería 
recruited Milner Schaefer to check IMARPE’s math, so to speak.  As we saw in the 
chapter 7, Schaefer was widely respected as the world’s “experto número uno” 
when it came to fish population dynamics because of the mathematical model he 
had developed to track variations in the Pacific yellowfin tuna.  Fishing industry 
executives, both North and South, liked Schaefer because he was a major 
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proponent of increasing the production of “food from the sea” and sensitive to their 
economic complaints, even if he was acutely aware of the stakes of these measures, 
and the need to prevent what happened to the California sardine.40  Nor did he carry 
the haughty pretense that many northern experts--William Vogt, for example--
brought south as part of their cultural baggage. 
  In April 1966, Schaefer traveled to South America and did a reanalysis of 
Peru’s 1964-1965 fishing data.  His calculations were slightly more optimistic than 
IMARPE’s.  Rather than surpassing the maximum sustainable yield of the 
anchoveta fishery in 1965, Schaefer concluded that the Peruvian fishing industry 
had almost exactly equaled the “long-term” MSY (7.5 million metric tons) of the 
fishery.  In short, the fishing industry was not engaged in “overfishing” where its 
own interests were concerned, even if it was killing off the guano birds.  
Nevetheless, Schaefer thought Peru needed to curtail fishing effort since the fishery 
was so close to its maximum sustainable yield.  He thought a closed season (veda), 
one of the main policies used to protect the guano birds, was the best way to 
accomplish this.  It was easy to enforce, and he thought it would encourage fishing 
entrepreneurs to redirect their unused equipment to other underutilized species from 
Peru’s coastal waters.  Perhaps this would finally lead to industry diversification 
and produce food for Peruvian consumers.  Schaefer had high hopes for these 
measures.  Based on his frustrating experience trying to manage tropical tuna 
fishermen, he believed “the leaders of the [Peruvian] industry are much more 
                                                 
40. See Bermejo, “El profeta de la escasez,” Pesca Nov. 1960, 32-33; “Estimación del 
potencial del mar,” Pesca Oct.-Nov. 1964, 23-29.  
527 
enlightened and rational than in most parts of the world” and “quite willing to 
accept regulation of the fishery if it is really required.”  Moreover, Peru’s biggest 
fishmeal producers, in accord with the gospel of efficiency, were quite enthusiastic 
about fishery conservation. 
Meanwhile, Schaefer started to include estimates of the guano birds’ 
consumption in his anchoveta population estimates.  This changed everything.  It 
allowed him to raise his tentative estimate of the combined maximum sustainable 
yield of the anchoveta fishery involving both human and avian predation to around 
ten million metric tons.  His interpretation: the massive decline in the guano bird 
population during the 1965 El Niño had created a windfall for the fishmeal 
industry.  A much smaller guano bird population meant that the “long-term” MSY 
available to humans was around 9.5 million metric tons per year in perpetuity.  
Unlike the fishing industry’s shrill critics, he did not think the total extinction of the 
guanay, piquero, or alcatraz was at stake if Peruvian fishermen upped their 
exploitation to these levels. 
Peruvians had a clear choice to make, in his view.  They could decide to 
maximize either guano or fishmeal production.  “Such a choice cannot be avoided, 
the only question is whether it will be made on the basis of objective analysis or 
through . . . emotional arguments,” Schaefer told CONAFER officials.  Yet 
Schaefer would not recommend a specific course of action.  In his view, this was a 
decision for the Peruvian people, not a foreign technocrat, to make.  But privately, 
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Schaefer did not think it would be much of a tragedy if “perhaps we should ‘lose’ 
guano.”41 
Schaefer’s new quantitative approach to overfishing could not have come at 
a better time for the Peruvian fishing industry.  When Schaefer arrived in Peru in 
April 1966, the impasse between the members of the the Guano Bird Study 
Commission was nowhere close to being resolved, and the SNP had become 
embroiled in a vicious polemic with Minister of Agriculture Rafael Cubas over its 
patriotic duty to supply Peruvians with sufficient food.  Most importantly, the 
anchoveta catch was rapidly approaching the 7 million metric ton quota that 
IMARPE had set, and government officials had already agreed to workers’ 
demands to limit the length of the closed season to June to September.  Practically 
everyone breathed a sigh of relief when Schaefer announced at a press conference 
that the anchoveta fishery’s true MSY for 1965-1966 was 10 million metric tons, 
only half a million tons of which was going to be eaten by the depleted guano birds, 
so the true MSY for anchoveta fishermen was around 9.5 million metric tons.  Even 
though anchoveta fishermen reached their original quota three weeks early, 
regulators were able to keep a clear conscience while allowing fishing to continue 
for a total season of 222 days worked.  Schaefer’s innovation made the decision to 
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implement the first closed season in the history of the Peruvian fishing industry 
much easier to accomplish, and it went a long way toward increasing his influence 
with industry executives. 
In following years, Schaefer helped IMARPE develop a procedure to 
estimate the maximum sustainable yield for the year in the middle of an ongoing 
fishing season.  These calculations were based on early returns and fish recruitment 
estimates.  This was supposed to allow regulators to act on the best possible 
information when they set a cut-off date for the year’s fishing.  Most importantly, it 
allowed them to adjust the MSY for the year upward if the year’s peladilla crop 
was abundant.  What it meant, in practice, was progressively shorter fishing 
seasons: from 166 days in 1966-1967 down to 116 days in 1971-1972, with 
increasing yields in most years.  These actions were extremely unpopular, 
especially among wage workers and small, indebted, inefficient producers.  Every 
day state officials shortened the fishing season, they risked forcing another plant 
into bankruptcy, further reducing orders for new fishing craft and equipment, 
throwing a few hundred more proletarians out of work, and depleting Peru’s 
precious export income and foreign exchange.  In one sense, the Peruvian fishmeal 
industry’s association with another kind of expert, the industrial engineer, had 
become self-defeating.  The ease with which companies incorporated new 
technologies to increase their efficiency was pushing this perilously overcapitalized 
industry toward a shakeout.42 
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The decision to establish the veda system as the fishing industry’s main 
control therefore sealed the fate of the guano birds.  No regulator could bring 
himself to shorten the fishing season in order to reserve additional fish for the 
guano birds and take food away from the families of fishery workers or close down 
another small businessman.  Moreover, open fishing corresponded with the guano 
birds’ prime breeding season when the anchoveta was easiest to catch.  One 
overwhelming fact, basic lack of food, made all other bird protection policies 
irrelevant, just as William Vogt, Robert Cushman Murphy, and now Luis Gamarra 
predicted. 
With this intense ecological competition, the guano birds failed to recover 
from the 1965 El Niño.  From 1966 to 1970, the annual mean breeding population 
hovered around 3.8 million adults--an undeniable indication that fishing pressure, 
not environmental conditions, was the ultimate cause for their decline.  Guano 
production fell to its lowest levels since the formation of CAG.  Significantly, the 
average alcatraz population remained fairly stable during this period.  It only 
declined slightly from 270,000 breeding adults during the period 1957-1964 to 
240,000 during the period 1965-1971.  This was a clear indication that the alcatraz 
occupied a distinct ecological niche from the guanay and piquero and did not 
require anchoveta for subsistence.  Moreover, this stability contradicts the notion 
promoted by some defenders of the fishing industry that persistent pesticides were 
the main cause for the guano birds’ decrease.  In marked contrast, DDT exposure 
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depleted the North American population of the brown pelican (Pelecanus 
occidentalis), the Peruvian pelican’s closest relative, so severely during this period 
that it came to be classified as an endangered species.  Its population recovered 
rapidly after the U.S. government banned the use of DDT and similar chemicals in 
1972.43 
Meanwhile, the Peruvian state struggled to replace the guano birds with a 
fertilizer manufacturing industry.  In the short term, fertilizer imports skyrocketed 
with the decline in guano production.  Even though the Cachimayo plant near 
Cuzco was barely surviving, CONAFER became involved in an even grander 
project, a Gran Complejo Industrial Petro-químico del Norte combining the 
interests of a half-dozen state and private companies.  Of course, it took several 
more years to plan and build this huge industrial complex--and CONAFER had 
ceased to exist by the time it went into operation.  This project turned out to be a 
success.  For a brief period from the mid-1970s to late-1980s, Peru had its own 
import-substituting fertilizer industry.  Of course, this chemical industry had a 
number of environmental drawbacks that the guano industry did not, especially its 
great thirst for energy produced from fossil fuels.  To keep things in perspective, 
Peru’s fertilizer factories produced almost exactly the same amount of nitrogen 
over a 16-year period (918,225 metric tons from 1975-1991) as Peru’s guano birds 
provided during the entire 57-year period from CAG’s foundation until the final 
crash of the guano industry in 1966 (917,517 metric tons).  Peruvian agriculture 
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finally escaped from the limits inherent to extracting nutrients from Peru’s marine 
environment.  But a decade of economic crisis, renewed foreign competition during 
the late 1980s, followed by President Fujimori and economist Carlos Boloña’s 
neoliberal “shock therapy,” all led this once-protected industry to the same demise 
as the guano birds.  Both were discarded as obsolete by a new generation of 
developmentalists.  In 2000, Peru’s chemical industry produced zero metric tons of 
nitrogenous fertilizer.  Except for organic farmers who use guano and other animal 
manures, Peruvian agriculture now, for the first time in its entire history, depends 
entirely on nitrogen imports.44 
It took much less time than this for the fishmeal industry to meet with 
misfortune.  The owners of the largest, most profitable companies such as Luis 
Banchero stood behind the Peruvian government’s technocratic regulations, as 
promised.  From their point of view, there were several benefits to the shorter 
fishing seasons of the late 1960s.  IMARPE’s standards reduced labor costs and 
mainly hurt less-efficient competitors in the short term.  In the long term, these 
conservation regulations promised to protect their immense, underutilized 
investments in technology and provide them with the opportunity either to gobble 
up their smaller competitors or force out them out of business.  In short, these 
technocratic standards helped lead to concentration of ownership in the fishing 
industry, not unlike the concentration in coastal agricultural holdings 
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unintentionally promoted by the technocratic administration of irrigation water and 
guano.  By 1968, Luis Banchero had come to own nine subsidiary companies, 
including the giant Pesquera Humboldt factory in Chimbote, and control 15 percent 
of the fishmeal industry’s producing capacity.  This made him the number one 
fishmeal producer in the world.  Manuel Elguera and his partner Arturo Madueño, 
the founding fathers of the SNP and Peruvian fishmeal industry, owned five 
subsidiaries and another six percent of the industry’s producing capacity, making 
them the third-largest producers in Peru.  By 1968, two U.S. corporations, 
International Proteins of New Jersey (owning factories recently bought from 
Ralston-Purina) and Star Kist Foods of California (an H. J. Heinz subsidiary), 
owned between them eight fishmeal companies and over 11 percent of the 
industry’s producing capacity, making them the second- and fourth-largest 
producers in Peru, respectively.  Major beneficiaries of the Aristocratic Republic all 
owned significant shares of the industry--Gildemeister & Co. (no. 10), W.R. Grace 
& Co. (no. 13), the Graña, Pardo, and Lavalle families--as did Enrique del Solar 
and Mariano Prado.  Three other U.S. companies, the Minneapolis-based giant 
Cargill (no. 9), Gold Kist (no. 22, a Georgia cotton-marketing cooperative, now the 
United States’ second-largest chicken processor), and General Mills (no. 24) 
represented the gradual infiltration of transnational agribusiness into Peruvian 
fishing.  But economic nationalists and enemies of Peru’s old oligarchy alike could 
take solace in the fact that a new class of fishmeal capitalists dominated by 
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Banchero, Elguera, and Madueño owned as much of the fishing industry as foreign 
companies and Peru’s “traditional elite” put together.45 
During the late 1960s, most IMARPE scientists felt no need to clamor for 
stricter production limits because its conservation policies seemed to be working.  
The Peruvian anchoveta kept producing good year-classes of new fish.  The 
population models Schaefer IMARPE implement said it was okay for production to 
surpass the long-term average annual MSY during a good season.  Schaefer’s new 
calculations kept telling him that this long-term average for the total anchoveta 
fishery (humans + birds) was between 9.9 and 10.3 million metric tons.  Moreover, 
it was thought an industry shakeout would eventually remove pressure on the 
fishing stocks.46 
A handful of fishery scientists, both Peruvian and foreign, were not as 
confident as the fishing industry’s “experto número uno,” especially in view of 
what had happened to the guano birds.  They worried that the Peruvian anchoveta 
fishery was headed for a similar collapse.  But Schaefer was unimpressed by such 
“predictions of doom.”  For one, the guano birds’ loss meant the fisherman’s gain.  
He had great confidence in Peru’s fishery management system.  He felt IMARPE 
kept good statistics on catch and fishing effort.  Even though he was concerned 
about the progressive improvement in fishing vessel efficiency--which meant 
Peru’s fishing fleet posed a greater threat toward the anchoveta every year--he 
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thought it would be possible “to detect any marked overfishing” well ahead of time.  
He firmly believed, from repeated conversations, promises, and actions by Peruvian 
government and fishing industry officials, that the right people were “in a position 
to do something about” marked overfishing “when and if it occurs.”  Unlike 
William Vogt, Schaefer had immense faith in Peru’s conservation technocracy. 
But IMARPE’s vaunted statistics had a major flaw: they did not go back 
very far.  They did not even include the 1957-1958 El Niño year.  This did not 
concern Schaefer much.  From his work at the Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission and close association with the world’s foremost Pacific 
oceanographers and meteorologists, he had as good an understanding of the El 
Niño phenomenon as any other scientist in the world at the time.  He helped 
organize the international “El Niño Project” of the mid-1960s.  In fact, Schaefer 
was personally responsible for turning meteorologist Jacob Bjernkes to the study of 
the El Niño phenomenon:  During the 1960s, as the last major act of a phenomenal 
career, Bjerknes developed a physical model connecting sea-surface and 
atmospheric changes in the equatorial Pacific.  It remains the basis of our present-
day understanding of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation.  Schaefer played a role as 
important as anyone in the “discovery” of ENSO.  Based on these observations, he 
firmly believed that El Niño’s effect on Peruvian fish “stocks is small--and perhaps 
even favorable,” especially since it put a virtual stop to predation by the guano 
birds.47 
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As it turned out, this was the perfect recipe for disaster.  In 1968, the 
Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces overthrew President Belaúnde’s 
financially beleagured, gridlocked, and scandal-ridden government.  Taking over 
where Peru’s previous military regime had left off, it established a reformist 
bureaucratic-authoritarian state run by technical experts--many with training at 
Peru’s Centro de Altos Estudios Militares--in order to forestall an even more 
radical revolution à la communist Cuba.  Under General Juan Velasco Alvarado’s 
leadership, this center-left government gradually took control of the means of 
production in Peru, starting with foreign-owned companies such as the Peruvian 
Corporation of London and its railroads.  In many cases it created worker 
cooperatives to run these institutions, only to replace them with trained technicians 
when it became obvious that worker control usually led to sharp decreases in 
economic output.  Beginning in 1969, the Revolutionary Government launched a 
radical agrarian reform that sought to reverse a situation in which less than one 
percent of landowners owned a whopping four-fifths of all agricultural land in 
Peru.  Most importantly, it instituted a political economy in line with the latest 
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“dependency theory” enunciated by ECLA technocrats that was designed to reduce 
Peru’s economic “enslavement” to the Northern Hemisphere.48 
The military rulers of the Peruvian state possessed great power and 
expertise.  But Peru’s fishing industry possessed even greater inertia as a 
technological system.  Meanwhile, the military was the avowed defender of Peru’s 
small entrepreneurs and workers against big, foreign companies, and it was 
embroiled in a series of major economic reforms.  This created a situation in which 
it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to balance conflicting interests within 
the fishing industry and the reformist goals of the military government with the 
well-being of the anchoveta. 
The technocratic ambitions of Peru’s military rulers notwithstanding, they 
failed to enforce IMARPE’s fishing quotas consistently, even after a special panel 
of foreign scientists reviewed Peru’s system of fishery management in January 
1970 and legitimated IMARPE’s regulatory regime.  This panel set an MSY of 9.5 
million metric tons for the 1969-1970 season.  The productive power of the 
Peruvian fishing industry’s 20,000 fishermen and 1,400-plus purse seiners was so 
vast by this time that they reached this quota on 28 April 1970 after less than five 
months of work.  Over the next ten days, they landed an additional million metric 
tons.  The military government shut down the bigger companies, but caved in to a 
petition by smaller producers for an extension, and they hauled in another 300,000 
metric tons.  All told, the industry officially landed more than 11 million metric 
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tons of anchoveta before the government decreed the end of the fishing season for 
good after 151 days of work.  Because of systematic under-reporting of the 
peladilla catch, due in part to the fact that official production statistics were only 
taken at the point that anchoveta entered the plant, Peru may have caught more than 
14 million metric tons of anchoveta.  This required the deaths of around ten trillion 
(1013) individual fish in order for Peru’s 125 operating fishmeal plants to 
manufacture less than two million metric tons of chicken and hog feed for 
consumption in the First World. 
In macroeconomic terms, Peru’s technocrats had little room for maneuver.  
Fishmeal exports brought in a little over US$300 million to the captains of a vastly 
overcapitalized industry.  This represented more than a third of Peru’s total export 
income, and the fishing industry as a whole produced about two percent of Peru’s 
entire gross domestic product (GDP).  Peru’s military leaders were desparate to 
maintain this income.  They could not afford to return to the huge balance-of-
payments and balance-of-trade deficits accrued by the government they had 
overthrown, and they had to make up somehow for the loss of export income in 
other areas.  For example, real export income from agricultural products like sugar 
and cotton had fallen by almost half from the levels of the early 1960s, as the 
Revolutionary Government pushed forward agrarian reform in the countryside.  
Fishing industry workers, meanwhile, were desparate to work as many days 
as possible during the year (and pressured the government to make this possible) 
because so little of this income reached their pockets.  An unskilled, full-time 
fisherman made less than US$1,300 on average for the entire season.  Although 
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“good” for a country where per capita GDP was US$548, this meant that 60 percent 
of the fishing industry workforce shared in less than eight percent of the industry’s 
gross earnings, even though their labor produced a whopping 5,500 metric tons of 
fish per man.  The situation was not much different in the fishmeal plants, where 
unskilled wage laborers made an average of US$1,200 per year, while managers 
and skilled workers on salary got by on US$2,900; this third of the workforce 
shared in less than six percent of gross earnings, even though their labor produced 
more than 180 metric tons of fishmeal per person.  The owners of the fishmeal 
industry pleaded that they were too financially stretched to afford to pay their 
workers anything more, though they consistently refused to open their books to the 
gaze of government technocrats to prove this, probably because they feared 
expropriation if their true financial mismanagement was discovered.49 
Inevitably, a strong El Niño event put this overextended system to a test.  
The events of 1972-1973 proved that the anchoveta population was vulnerable to 
disruptions in deep-water upwelling and plankton production caused by this 
phenomenon--much more vulnerable, in fact, than even pessimistic scientists 
expected.  Catch levels went into a freefall.  Increasing numbers of ships came back 
to port without encountering any fish at all.  Things happened faster than Peru’s 
                                                 
49. See app. 5, 9; IMARPE, Panel de Expertos, “Informe sobre los efectos económicos de 
diferentes medidas regulatorias de la pesquería de la anchoveta peruana,” Inf.Inst.Mar Perú 34 
(1970); Paulik, “Anchovies, Birds and Fishermen in the Peru Current,” 156-158, 172-176, 181-182; 
PESCA-PERU, Qué ha hecho y adonde va, 26; Edmonds, “Reasons Underlying Development of the 
Peruvian Fishing Industry,” 17-18; Abramovich, La industria pesquera en el Perú, 86; Portocarrero, 
Beltrán, and Romero, Compendio estadístico del Perú, 168-170; Peru, Instituto Nacional de 
Estadísticas e Informática, Peru: Series estadísticas, 1970-91 (Lima: Dirección Técnica de 
Indicadores Económicas, 1992), 168; idem, Peru: Series estadísticas, 1970-94 (Lima: Dirección 
Técnica de Indicadores Económicas, 1995), 77-78, 85-86. 
540 
technocrats could react.  Peruvian state officials finally tried to stop the carnage by 
imposing strict catch quotas, but the damage had already been done.  Catch-per-
unit-of-fishing-effort statistics clearly show that the Peruvian bolichera fleet was so 
efficient in its destructiveness that it removed nearly all available anchoveta from 
the sea during these two years.  Dozens of fishmeal companies failed, throwing 
thousands out of work, as anchoveta production plunged from over 10 million 
metric tons in 1971 to 1.5 million in 1973--far less, in fact, than the quota allotted 
by IMARPE.  That year, fishmeal export income bottomed out at US$138 million, 
the lowest in real terms since the formation of the fishmeal cartel in 1960.  This 
was a devastating blow to Peru, both economically and socially.50 
Fishing executives could no longer look to either Schaefer or Banchero for 
help in finding a solution--both were deceased.  The military government used 
undeniable evidence of industry mismanagment to nationalize the 84 surviving 
Peruvian fishmeal companies on 7 May 1973.  But it paid a large indemnity for the 
expropriated companies under the circumstances (equal to US$102 million).  It also 
took on the industry’s huge debt (equal to US$273 million), plus its nearly 
worthless “excess of factories and craft, as well as personnel.”  The state--and 
ultimately, Peruvian taxpayers--bailed out the failing fishmeal entrepreneurs.  
When it established PESCA-PERU in 1973 and took over the barren remains of the 
guano industry in 1975, the Peruvian government briefly made real the state 
monopoly and comprehensive management of marine production envisioned by 
CAG technocrats decades before.  Envisioning an even greater future for these 
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industries, the Peruvian state financed a concrete skyscraper on Lima’s eastern 
periphery to house its fishery technocrats.51 
But to what end?  PESCA-PERU, in consultation with IMARPE scientists, 
continued trying to maximize the anchoveta catch over the next few years in order 
to pay for this expropriation and to produce scarce export income during an 
accelerating balance of payments crisis.  In fact, the worst “overfishing” of 
anchoveta stocks probably happened during the mid-1970s when the fishmeal 
industry was under total state management.  As a consequence, the anchoveta 
population failed to recover from the El Niño of 1972-1973.  By the beginning of 
1982, when an El Niño super-event forced the anchoveta fishery to shut down 
entirely, PESCA-PERU only operated 37 fishmeal plants and still owed a US$245 
million debt.  The entire fishing sector only employed 7,000.52 
In fact, Peru’s “anchovy crisis” was just one aspect of a global disaster 
during 1972-1973.  This powerful ENSO event influenced similar climate 
anomalies in many parts of the world.  Of course, none of Peru’s fish made it to the 
African Sahel where thousands, primarily pastoral peoples, were starving due to an 
intense drought.  In the USSR, a huge grain production shortfall forced Soviet 
planners to import massive quantities of food.  These combined disasters once 
again drew the world’s attention to the El Niño phenomenon and the world’s 
population problem.  This is the context that made people so receptive to the Club 
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of Rome’s famous report on The Limits to Growth that were facing humankind.  
Cornucopians stopped talking in ecstatic tones about an untapped wealth of food 
from sea.  Thus, events affecting Peru’s marine environment again influenced 
environmental consciousness in the rest of the world.  The oil price shock of 1973 
only made these problems much worse.  It took longer for observers to realize that 
decades of ill-conceived development projects were responsible for some of the 
worst examples of ecological destruction and human suffering caused by this 
climate disaster.  Unfortunately, some of these patterns were repeated during the 
more powerful ENSO event of 1982-1983.53 
In ecological history, every major change produces winners as well as 
losers.  Some organisms benefited from the decline of the anchoveta.  It reduced 
grazing pressure on many plankton species, all of which recovered after upwelling 
resumed.  A local sardine species (Sardinops sagax) increased markedly in 
abundance once it no longer had to compete with the anchoveta for plankton.  After 
General Velasco’s death in 1975, Peruvian government planners allowed private 
companies to gradually build a new fishmeal industry based on the sardine.  This 
sardine fishery never came close to approaching the size of the anchoveta fishery, 
however.  More encouragingly, the failure of the anchoveta finally inspired 
Peruvian fishermen to turn their attention toward exploiting other species for local, 
human consumption.54  Of course, these endeavors put other marine species at risk 
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of overexploitation.  But fishery economics and careful supervision by IMARPE 
have prevented this, at least so far. 
Peru’s misfortune also created an enormous opportunity and windfall for its 
neighbor Brazil.  The collapse of Peru’s fishmeal industry brought a permanent end 
to the wild growth of world fishmeal production and caused the price for high-
protein feeds to skyrocket.  This led to a fundamental shift in the agroecological 
system that supplied the world’s meat industry with protein feed (fig. 11).  
Worldwide, farmers increased the area planted in soybeans by a quarter from 1971 
to 1974.  Almost half of this increase was in Brazil, where the military government 
provided major incentives to turn the vast tropical savannas of Mato Grosso into 
mechanized, input-intensive soybean plantations.  By 1977, Brazil was producing 
12.5 million metric tons of soybeans on 7.1 million hectares of land and exporting 
7.9 million metric tons of soybeans and soycake worth US$1.86 billion.  In real 
dollars, this was five times more than Peruvian fishmeal exports brought in during 
their best year, 1969.  Ever since, Brazilian agribusiness has controlled one quarter 
of the global soybean export market, and it has emerged as the world’s third-largest 
meat producer.  Of course, this agricultural expansion required vast quantities of 
nitrogen fertilizer and land.  By the year 2000, a total of 75 million hectares 
(268,000 square miles) was planted in soybeans worldwide, an area roughly 
equivalent to Peru’s vast Amazon basin, or the United Kingdom and Spain, but 
much smaller than Peru’s 114 million hectare territorial sea.55 
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Meanwhile, Peru’s guano bird population reached a new low.  In July 1972 
the total breeding population in Peru bottomed out at around 560,000 adults, and 
the average total breeding population for all of 1973 only amounted to 1.63 million 
adults, a 90-plus percent decline from the mid-1950s.  As always, the guanay 
population was hit the hardest.  In fact, this catastrophe hit them so hard that the 
piquero population in Peru outnumbered the guanay almost continuously from 
April 1972 until March 1979.  The 1982-1983 El Niño event caused Peru’s guano 
bird population to decline even further.  None of these bird species has since 
returned to anything like its former abundance.  The fishmeal boom engineered a 
profound and persistent change in the Peruvian marine environment.56 
The anchoveta fishery eventually recovered from human mishandling after 
a hiatus lasting two decades.  But the guano birds joined the California sardine, 
great whales, fur seal, sea otter, sea turtles, North Atlantic cod, herring, and 
oysters--and nearly joined the extinct great auk and Steller’s sea cow--on a long, 
long list of valuable marine species ruined by human ecological greed.57  Peruvian 
planners consciously sacrificed the guano industry to the god of national 
development, although not without some hand-wringing.  Whether in the guise of 
service to the free market or state-managed economic nationalism, they did so 
believing that alternative plans could better engineer social and political stability 
and rapid economic growth in Peru.  These plans proved to be far more difficult to 
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accomplish than expected, even under technocratic-authoritarian rule.  
Environmental management had its limits.
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Conclusion 
 
Who has made the decision that sets in motion . . . this ever-widening wave of 
death? . . . Who has decided--who has the right to decide--for the countless legions 
of people who were not consulted that the supreme value is . . . a sterile world 
ungraced by the curving wing of a bird in flight?  The decision is that of the 
authoritarian temporarily entrusted with power; he has made it during a moment of 
inattention by millions to whom beauty and the ordered world of nature still have a 
meaning that is deep and imperative. 
--Rachel Carson (1962) 
It is convenient (and probably appropriate) to blame the military technocrats 
who managed PESCA-PERU for the failure of the anchoveta fishery.  Years later, 
economists such as Jeffrey Sachs certainly found it expedient to fault statist 
economic management for the intense economic problems that beset most of Latin 
America during the 1980s: they wanted to ensure the triumph of neoliberal regimes 
all over the region during the 1990s.  At least superficially, the recovery of the 
anchoveta fishery and Peruvian fishmeal industry under private ownership in recent 
years would seem to support this conclusion: in 1992, the year after Carlos Boloña 
took over as finance minister, the fishing industry processed over four million tons 
of anchoveta for the first time since the El Niño of 1972.  In 1997, fishmeal exports 
brought in over US$1 billion, and by 1998, the entire industry had passed back into 
private hands. 
Meanwhile, Peru’s newest generation of technocrats have learned from past 
mistakes:  In 1997-1998 during the most powerful El Niño event of the twentieth 
century, scientists at IMARPE set conservative quotas for the anchoveta fishery.  
These were strictly enforced by Alberto Fujimori’s authoritarian government, 
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neoliberalism’s laissez-faire rhetoric and opposition from the fishing industry, 
notwithstanding.  Many fishmeal producers targeted sardines and other fish species 
in order to hold their heads above water during this crisis.  As a consequence, the 
anchoveta population recovered rapidly, and in 2000 Peru’s fishing industry caught 
9.372 million metric tons of anchoveta and exported 2.344 million metric tons of 
fishmeal, the fifth- and second-largest yearly totals in Peruvian history, 
respectively.1 
Peru’s newest fishmeal plants also emit relatively few pollutants, thanks to 
new technologies that maximize processing efficiency.  However, anyone who has 
suffered the agony of breathing the caustic exhaust produced by Lima’s chaotic, 
privatized public transportation system or the mineral concentrating plants situated 
along the Central Andean Railway--all tangible products of neoliberal reforms 
during the 1990s--knows that Peru’s new-fangled technocrats have done little to 
provide their compatriots with a clean, healthy environment in other realms.  
Whether this second fishmeal boom will continue remains to be seen. 
Many environmental activists now fault science, technology, and expertise 
for enabling the unprecedented destructiveness of humanity during the past two 
centuries.  Some even see science as “the civics of [a] Hobbesian world.”2  Others 
continue to seek the earth’s salvation in science, particularly ecological science.  
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Meanwhile, no amount of scientific knowledge can decide whether it is the 
technocrat’s primary moral duty to promote economic development for human 
benefit or to protect other species.      
This concluding chapter takes a moderate position on these questions.  It 
highlights several ways in which science enabled the successful management of 
Peru’s marine environment for human benefit--albeit, for a privileged few--and a 
few ways in which science contributed to the failure of these endeavors.  It should 
be clear by now that economic development and wildlife conservation can coexist.  
If the idea of “sustainable development” guided by scientists is ever to have any 
practical meaning between these dystopian and utopian extremes, historians must 
provide examples of relatively stable and lasting human ecosystems in the past that 
can serve as models for emulation.3  The lifecycles of the Peruvian guano and 
fishing industries indicate that such schemes are possible, but quite fragile. 
 
The Frontiers of Environmental Management 
The revived Peruvian guano industry, for most of its history, was an 
extraoridinarily successful case of environmental management that served as a 
model to the world, its tragic fate notwithstanding.  The Compañía Administradora 
del Guano’s triumph as a scientific development program was crucial to its 
longevity.  This success was premised on the remarkable quality of scientific talent 
--on the Lords of Guano--Peru has been able to recruit over the years: Rehr, 
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Unanue, Humboldt, Haenke, Rivero, Piérola, Raimondi, Malinowski, Carrillo, 
Vanderghem, Klinge, Coker, Forbes, Lavalle, Murphy, Gamarra, Schweigger, 
Vogt, Ávila, Sears, Llosa, Clark, Jordán, Rojas, Schaefer, Bjerknes.  Their 
involvement in the management of Peru’s marine environment is testimony to the 
importance of science in Peruvian history.  The centrality of science and 
technology to the Peruvian fishmeal industry may have contributed to its demise, 
however, because it created the false appearance of a robust environmental 
management program. 
The management of Peru’s marine environment for human benefit had 
obvious ecological limitations.  Peruvians discovered the hard way that the 
anchoveta were much less amenable to technocratic control than the easily 
“domesticable” guano birds.  This was largely due to the different ecological roles 
humans played in exploiting these creatures.  When extracting guano, humans 
played the role of scavenger.  CAG took advantage of an unoccupied niche in 
Peru’s marine ecosystem as consumers of excrement, although not without 
adversely affecting several other species in the process of shepherding the guano 
birds.  In stark contrast, when catching schools of anchoveta to convert into 
fishmeal, humans acted as predators.  Not only did the fishmeal industry compete 
ruthlessly against the guano birds for this limited resource, it negatively affected 
the inherent capacity of the anchoveta population to reproduce itself, even under 
the best conditions. 
Today’s marine experts have come to a consensus that environmental 
unpredictability makes marine fish “notoriously resistant to traditional resource 
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management approaches.”4  Organisms, humans included, tend to experience life in 
terms of extremes.  True environmental extremes happen at irregular intervals, 
sometimes beyond the living memory of an organism.  This is especially true off 
the coast of Peru where the El Niño phenomenon makes the reproduction of marine 
organisms extremely variable from year to year, and where each El Niño event is 
quite different from the last. 
In order to make sense of this uncertainty, investigation of this climate 
phenomenon has been a centerpiece of scientific research in Peru since the 1890s.  
Contrary to expectations, even after decades of study, experts still found it difficult 
to come to an agreement on the meaning of ecological change.  On the one hand, 
William Vogt and Robert Cushman Murphy believed that uncertainty compelled 
caution, lest humans upset the “balance of nature” and destroy Peru’s marine 
resources.  On the other hand, the belief that Peru’s marine ecosystem tended 
toward some “balanced” albeit oscillating state, encouraged scientists to try to 
manipulate and predict this variability.  This had tragic consequences once Milner 
Schaefer legitimated the Peruvian fishing industry’s attempts to manage the 
anchoveta fishery to produce a maximum sustainable yield for human benefit.  
Unfortunately, the rise of the Peruvian fishmeal industry happened between two 
severe El Niño events, and so was never put to an early test, and the anchoveta 
population proved to be more variable than even pessimists expected. 
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Social relations of production from Peru’s marine environment also 
impinged on this management regime.  CAG’s conservation experiment worked 
well initially because it stayed within preexisting traditions of property tenure.  
After the Peruvian state dealt with the Peruvian Corporation, CAG effectively 
owned and controlled the land and usufruct of the guano islands.  The guano birds 
were wild and ownerless and their primary product easy to control.  CAG’s 
managers routinely used both conservation science and the technocratic ideal to 
defend their domain.  They soon extended their technocratic realm to include the 
workers who harvested guano and the coastal farmers who used it, though not 
without resistance.  From this solid base, the Lords of Guano were able to exercise 
autonomy of action in several realms.   
In contrast, fish are highly mobile and not amenable to traditional forms of 
property administration developed on land.  Fishermen are just as mobile and 
difficult to control, as CAG’s managers found out in their futile attempts to police 
Peru’s artisanal fishermen.  Nevertheless, CAG’s success dramatically strengthened 
the political authority of marine science in Peru, so much so that Peru’s fishing 
industrialists continually pledged allegiance to the technocratic ideal, even to the 
point of funding IMARPE and submitting to its regulatory regime.   
This authority had its limits, however, when marine experts failed to meet 
their superiors’ lofty expectations.  Modern industrial systems and state budgets are 
not designed for booms and busts; they are premised on constant growth.  CAG 
eventually lost its reason for being when it failed to keep up with the expansion of 
input-intensive agriculture in Peru.  The guano birds were sacrificed by Peruvian 
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developmentalists in the belief that engineers could build a profitable chemical 
fertilizer industry based on the Haber-Bosch process that was not subject these 
limits.  In a similar vein, the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces 
thought technocrats could do a far more efficient job managing the Peruvian 
economy for the benefit of all social classes once Peru’s mining, agro-export, 
petroleum, railroad, and fishing sectors were placed under state ownership (after 
paying indemnities to their owners).  This proved to be far more difficult than 
expected, especially when the vagaries of the anchoveta population and the 
international economy conflicted with the military’s developmental vision. 
As this last point indicates, the ecological history of Peru’s marine 
environment cannot be understood merely in local terms.  Besides that fact that 
foreign scientists were so often engaged in its management, production along the 
Peruvian coast has been subject to our changing role in the global ecology of the 
planet over the last two centuries, particularly our conquest of the nitrogen cycle.  
The “discovery” of Peruvian guano and nitrates by Humboldtian scientists during 
the early nineteenth century, followed by the invention of the Haber-Bosch process 
for synthesizing nitrogen compounds during the early twentieth century, not only 
affected the birth and demise of CAG and Peru’s Guano Age, but also enabled 
input-intensive agriculture to become the conventional way most of the world’s 
food is produced.  Today, these practices make it possible for just less than half of 
the world’s population (76 percent in the Americas) to live in cities far removed 
from the farming way of life.  Meanwhile, nitrogen compounds are accessories in 
the annual deaths of trillions of fish (caught by nylon nests), billions of birds and 
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mammals (fed on protein-rich feed and killed for meat), and millions of humans 
(by gunfire, conventional bombs, and cardiovascular disease from 
overconsumption of food and lack of exercise).  Our manipulation of nitrogen has 
been as important as fossil fuels, and much more important than our ability to split 
the atom, in driving the ecological and social changes of the last two centuries.  It 
will also shape the twenty-first century.  Flatulence from all the meat- and milk-
producing animals fed on these nitrogen compounds contributes to global 
warming.5 
It is important to recognize that scientific innovation often took shape on 
the periphery, rather than at the core, of the global economic system built on this 
conquest of nitrogen.  The cultural boundaries of science are vital to creativity, for 
at its margins, social conventions are brought into tension, even turned upside 
down.  Preexisting mental categories turn out not to work, no matter how hard we 
try to force reality to fit our prejudices and classificatory schemes, so new 
paradigms have to be created.  Locale is fundamental to this creative process.  This 
was true among nineteenth-century Humboldtian scientists in the tropics, not only 
for Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace, who independently formulated the 
theory of evolution by natural selection based on their travels, but also for Jean 
Baptiste Boussingault, who devoted his life to researching the fertilizing 
importance of nitrogen after his encounter with guano in Peru.  During the 
twentieth century, modern, physics-based meteorology was born, not in the 
                                                 
5. On these points see Smil, Enriching the Earth, passim; idem, “Nitrogen and 
Phosphorus”; McNeil, Something New under the Sun, esp. ch. 7; AAAS Atlas of Population and 
Environment, 47-50, 55-62, 91-102.     
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scientific capitals of Europe, but in Bergen, a Norwegian fishing port.  Likewise, 
the science of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation was born in Peru, Indonesia, India, 
and California (a one-time scientific backwater).6 
Fundamental changes in environmental consciousness have also taken place 
on these cultural frontiers.  The encounter with degradation in the “Edenic” tropics 
starting in the sixteenth century was vital to the development of modern 
environmental thought, as was the closing of the North American frontier at the end 
of the nineteenth century.  During Peru’s “ecological depression” of the early 
1940s, William Vogt’s encounter with the guano birds sparked his interest in the 
linkage between subsistence and human population growth, with far-reaching 
consequences for environmentalism in the Americas.7 
It is wrong to conclude that the vast ecological transformations of the last 
two centuries were primarily “the unintended consequence of social, political, 
economic, and intellectual preferences and patterns.”8  Some of the worst travesties, 
such as the collapse of Peru’s anchoveta fishery, indeed were “accidental.”   Even 
the best-laid plans sometimes created problems bigger than the ones they were 
trying to resolve.  But many environmental changes, as with the final demise of 
                                                 
6. Thomas F. Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999), esp. ch. 5, “Hybridizing Credibilities: Albert and Gabrielle 
Howard Compost Organic Waste, Science, and the Rest of Society,” a study of the construction of 
the agricultural science of compost within the British empire; idem, “A Space for Place in 
Sociology”; Stepan, Picturing Tropical Nature, esp. ch. 1-2; Friedman, Appropriating the Weather; 
Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts, pt. 3. 
7. Besides Grove, Green Imperialism, and other studies listed in ch. 5, see Patricia Jasen, 
Wild Things: Nature, Culture, and Tourism in Ontario, 1790-1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1995); Lee Clark Mitchell, Witness to a Vanishing America: The Nineteenth-Century 
Response (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981).  
8. McNeil, Something New under the Sun, xxii; cf. Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: 
Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
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Peru’s guano birds, were accomplished by experts who knew exactly what they 
doing and accomplished much of what they set out to do.   
This fact is clearest when we examine whom these projects were intended 
to serve.  The Lords of Guano enriched and empowered a new ruling class for Peru.  
The fat became fatter as a consequence of their actions on both sides of the North-
South divide.  Even if experts often presumed to use their “objective” knowledge to 
reconcile conflicting interests in order to serve the common good, in case after 
case, experts accomplished these changes explicitly to benefit those who already 
possessed power and capital.  For this exact reason, some critics of the “dangerous 
liaison” that has developed between environmentalism and developmentalism 
consider “sustainable development” to be nothing more than the ancient worship of 
growing GDP under a new brandname and logo.  Meanwhile, thanks to the 
catastrophist rhetoric of Vogt and his intellectual descendants, the “eco-
technocratic elite” who manages the natural world for the rest of us are portrayed as 
the managers of our survival, when often times, they are really servants of the old 
regime.  Experts have gained so much importance over the last two centuries for 
one major reason:  They have been called on to manage uncertainty (if not to 
conquer it) for those who have the most to lose.9 
                                                 
9. On the historical origin and meaning of the phrase “sustainable development,” see 
Wolfgang Sachs, “Environment and Development: The Story of a Dangerous Liaison,” The 
Ecologist 21:6 (1991), 252-257; idem, “The Archaeology of the Development Idea,” Interculture 
23:4 (1990), 1-37; idem, ed., The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Power as Knowledge 
(London: Zed Books, 1993); Worster, “The Shaky Ground of Sustainable Development,” in The 
Wealth of Nature: Environmental History and the Ecological Imagination (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 142-155.  Experts have most clearly served vested interests in the case of 
freshwater management: see Reisner, Cadillac Desert; Worster, Rivers of Empire; Perlo, El 
paradigma porfiriano. 
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Epilogue: Silent Spring on Isla Don Martín 
Many environmental scientists envisioned something very different for 
ecology, “the subversive science.”  In Europe, “ecology” even became a codeword 
for Green politics.  In 1962, at the exact moment when a movement of bird 
enthusiasts metamorphosed into an international environmental crusade, two 
former Lords of Guano brandished ecological science as a weapon to protect “the 
ordered world of nature” and humanity from the “ever-widening wave of death” 
reserved for them by the short-sighted “authoritarian.”10 
During the late 1950s, economic entomologists working for the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture oversaw the spraying of the insecticides DDT and 
dieldrin over vast areas of the eastern United States.  Such sprayings were intended 
to control mosquitos, an old foe, as well as some new biological invaders: the 
gypsy moth, Dutch elm disease (by killing bark beetles), and the fire ant.  These 
authoritarian actions unintentionally killed countless untargeted animals.  As we 
now know, they also began to interfere, via a process known as bioaccumulation, 
with the ability of many fish-eating birds to produce viable eggs.  In May 1957, 
Robert Cushman Murphy and a group of prominent Long Island residents filed suit 
seeking an injunction against spraying over private property.  In 1959, Murphy 
brought his continued interest in the Peruvian guano industry to bear on this 
                                                 
10. See epigraph, Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), 127.  On 
ecology as the “subversive science,” see Paul B. Sears, “Ecology--A Subversive Subject,” 
BioScience July 1964, 11-13; Worster, Nature’s Economy, esp. pt 6; Bramwell, Ecology in the 20th 
Century; Thomas Søderqvist, The Ecologists, From Merry Naturalists to Saviours of the Nation: A 
Sociologically Informed Narrative Survey of the Ecologization of Sweden, 1895-1975 (Stockholm: 
Almqvist and Wiksell, 1986). 
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controversy.  He wrote yet another article about CAG for National Geographic 
Magazine implicitly chastising North Americans for lacking the respect for marine 
birds that Peruvians had regained “out of the wreckage of the past, out of lessons 
bitterly earned.”11  Murphy lost the case, however, and the Supreme Court declined 
to review the decision in 1960. 
But this ruling set the stage for the most important moment of the budding 
U.S. environmental movement.  Murphy’s wife, Grace E. Barstow Murphy, 
organized a grassroots movement, the Citizens Against Mass Poisoning, in protest.  
Meanwhile, one of Murphy’s friends, a government scientist turned popular writer, 
Rachel Carson (1907-1964), developed an avid interest in the ecological impact of 
these chemicals.  She had a long-standing relationship with Murphy, Vogt, and 
Mary Sears as both a bird enthusiast and a professional marine biologist with 
graduate training from Johns Hopkins (M.A., 1932) and Woods Hole.  On 24 
September 1962, when prominent limeños were marching to protest the pollution 
caused by Callao’s fishmeal plants, both Murphy and Vogt were invited by 
Houghton Mifflin to attend a party at Carleton House in New York City to 
celebrate the official publication of Carson’s newest book, Silent Spring.  It quickly 
surpassed Road to Survival as a best-seller and now ranks as the most important 
environmental book ever written in any language.  Carson argued forcefully with 
multiple examples and crystalline prose that North Americans would soon face a 
“silent spring” devoid of bird life and all that is beautiful if they did not curtail their 
use of poisonous synthetic “biocides.”  When Carson died of breast cancer only 
                                                 
11. Murphy, “Peru Profits from Sea Fowl,” 413.  
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two years later, Murphy helped carry her bronze casket up the aisle of Washington 
Cathedral as a pallbearer.  By this time, Peruvian state officials were actively 
considering ways to replace what Murphy still proclaimed as “the most impressive 
bird sanctuaries of their kind in the world.”12 
Like Murphy and Vogt, Carson challenged orthodox faith in technological 
progress and expert planning during this Golden Age of developmentalism.  Like 
these Lords of Guano, Carson turned the ideology of progressive industrialism on 
its head.  Her standard of value became our ability to adapt to the limitations of 
nature rather than to conquer them.  Much like Vogt’s Road to Survival and 
Murphy’s 1954 report on El guano y la pesca de anchoveta, Carson’s book was 
ruthlessly attacked by chemists, agronomists, entomologists, physicians, and other 
technical experts because she lacked the proper scientific training to speak 
authoritatively on the impact of pesticides on animal and human health.  Many 
others condemned her as anti-progressive.  Social inequalities were also involved in 
this treatment.  Unlike in Peru, where female marine scientists were welcomed, 
Carson was treated with great condescension for her gender in the United States.13 
Vogt, a self-proclaimed “admirer of Miss Carson and her writings,” joined 
some of this critique.  In a prominent review of Silent Spring and Murray 
Bookchin’s first book Our Synthetic Environment (1962), Vogt gently admonished 
Carson for “a tendency to exaggerate and an occasional, uncritical acceptance of 
                                                 
12. Ibid. 
13. Dunlap, DDT, ch. 4-5; Linda Lear, Rachel Carson: Witness for Nature (New York: 
Henry Holt, 1997), esp. 74, 120-121, 154-155, 180-182, 276, 305-307, 319, 422, 481, 516 n. 6, 555 
n. 65  
559 
data,” for her neglect of the scientific literature on population ecology, and her 
failure to use scientific names.  In contrast to Carson’s other critics, Vogt did not 
think Carson had gone far enough to provide “an ecological approach” to “these 
problems . . . in which our economy is embedded.”  Carson’s more cynical 
opponents could have used such statements to claim that “prominent 
conservationists” dismissed the scientific basis of her argument. 
Of course, Vogt agreed with Carson’s basic claims.  He knew exactly where 
the main battle for the world’s environmental future was being fought: on the 
almost lifeless fields that modern, input-intensive agriculture was creating to 
maximize global food production.  In this quest:  
 
Man . . . has fouled not his own nest but his entire environment--the air he 
breathes, the water he drinks, the soil that produces his food, the very food 
itself.  He has reduced almost infinitely varied nature to the uniformity of 
pure stands of food and fiber that are even more ideally suited to his insect 
enemies than to himself. 
These agricultural fields “destroyed more beauty than will ever be accumulated in 
all [our] galleries.  Perhaps [our] major stupidity has been . . . to give the pernicious 
laws of the market place precedence over the most compelling laws of biology.” 
Like his old friend Aldo Leopold, and any good technocrat, Vogt was 
interested in acting on this knowledge, in developing viable solutions to humanity’s 
problems based on a holistic view of the biosphere.  But Vogt also realized how 
dependent humanity had become on synthetic pesticides and other technologies of 
input-intensive agriculture: 
 
What part do such substances play in trying to feed three billion world-
wide, adding about another billion each decade?  What would the control or 
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abolition of such materials on our . . . farms do to their social structure, and 
to the cost and availability of food? . . .  
If Miss Carson and Mr. [Bookchin] are substantially correct in their 
facts and interpretations, and I believe that on the whole they are, a return to 
health and sanity will probably be roughly as complex and difficult as 
would have been the establishment of control over numbers and use of 
automobiles forty years ago.  It might conceivably have been possible, 
before our society had become so thoroughly motor-dependent, to prevent 
the future hypertrophy and constipation of our metropolitan areas, the 
poisoning of their air, the repeated decimation of our wildlife, and the 
killing and maiming of far more Americans than have yet felt the icy hand 
of cumulative poisons.  Will we move fast enough, now, to escape possible 
immolation in the metabolic by-products of a technology gone wild? 
Here, Vogt summarized the key dilemma of environmental technocrats in a 
nutshell:  Was it their primary duty to protect the environment, or to promote 
economic development for human benefit?  Scientific understanding by itself, no 
matter how rigorous, simply could not change the political and economic 
imperatives imposed by society.  Moreover, these imperatives were getting so far 
out of control that they seemed to require “man’s mismanagement of his 
environment” just to survive in the short term.14 
Who would decide?  Even some critics of modern, technological society 
thought an authoritarian response was necessary.  In direct response to Vogt and 
Josué de Castro’s earlier polemic, Jacques Ellul concluded:  
 
All experts on agricultural questions are in fact in fundamental agreement . . 
. . Only strict planning on a world scale can solve the problems of 
agriculture [and population;] . . . only human relocation and collective 
distribution of wealth can solve the problem of famine.  This can only mean 
                                                 
14. Vogt, “Reviews on Man the Destroyer,” Natural History Jan. 1963, 3-5; cf. Murray 
Bookchin [Lewis Herber, pseud.], Our Synthetic Environment (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962). 
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that man . . . will be obliged to apply extremely rigorous administrative and 
police techniques.15 
As China’s “Three Bad Years” of 1959-1961 make clear, collective redistribution 
of wealth and “rigorous administrative and police techniques” had a checkered 
record when it came to solving the problem of famine.16 
Rachel Carson, in contrast, believed that people would rise up and 
democratically demand a solution that favored the environment once they 
understood the threats ecological degradation posed to their well-being.  To a 
certain extent, that is exactly what happened among the world’s relatively 
privileged youth.  A “counterculture” sprang up that rejected “The Quest for Truth, 
The Conquest of Nature, The Abundant Society,” and other values of the 
“technocratic society” that had given it birth.17  These challenges were met by a 
dual response, symbolized by the career of Robert S. McNamara, “the can-do man 
in the can-do society, in the can-do era.”  First, as U.S. Secretary of Defense, he 
used overwhelming military force in a (failed) attempt to stop the triumph of 
revolutionary forces in Vietnam.  Later, as head of the World Bank, he orchestrated 
a liaison between environmental and development interests that used technocratic 
                                                 
15. Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson (1954; New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), 104-111, quote p. 108, originally published as La technique ou l’enjeu du 
siècle (Paris: Armand Colin, 1954). 
16. Smil, China’s Environmental Crisis, ch. 6.  
17. Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic 
Society and Its Youthful Opposition (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969), xiv.  See also Eric Zolov, 
Refried Elvis: The Rise of the Mexican Counterculture (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1999); José Agustín, La contracultura en México: La historia y el significado de 
los rebeldes sin causa, los jibitecas, los punks y las bandas (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1996); Robert 
V. Daniels, Year of the Heroic Guerrilla: World Revolution and Counterrevolution in 1968 (New 
York: Basic Books, 1989); Ronald Fraser, ed., 1968: A Student Generation in Revolt: An 
International Oral History (New York: Pantheon, 1988); George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of 
the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968 (Boston: South End Books, 1987). 
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projects to counter radicalism.18  In the United States, popular pressure led to the 
passage of a series of environmental protection laws in the wake of Silent Spring.  
These laws gave birth to an elaborate bureaucracy dedicated to the “management of 
environmental restraint.”19  In short, as was so often the case in Peru, rumblings for 
popular democracy tended to reinforce the power and autonomy of technocrats.  
The upshot of all this forced one of the main former beneficiaries of Peru’s 
guano birds to suffer the consequences of its environmental sins.  In 2001, 134 
years after Bryce, Grace, & Co. was founded to supply guano ships stopping at the 
Islas Chincha, 92 years after James W. Grace sat on CAG’s first board of directors, 
and almost 30 years after the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces 
divested its share in Peru’s sugar and fishmeal industries (with full compensation), 
W. R. Grace & Co. filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy to protect itself from enormous 
liability due to massive asbestos contamination in Libby, Montana, and other sites.  
Over 100 people have died and hundreds more suffer from chronic respiratory 
illness as a direct result of exposure to the by-products of Grace’s former 
vermiculite mine, and there is good evidence that experts informed its managers of 
the problem years before.  Grace had already been subject to a lawsuit involving 
cancer-causing chemical pollution around Woburn, Massachusetts, as portrayed in 
the book and Hollywood feature film “A Civil Action,” starring John Travolta.  
Grace might have faced regulatory discipline much sooner if the Environmental 
                                                 
18. See David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972), 
215; Sachs, “Environment and Development,” 253-254; cf. Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: 
The Life and Times of Robert McNamara (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993). 
19. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence esp. ch. 12 “The Middle Ground: Management 
of Environmental Restraint”; cf. Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch. 
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Protection Agency had not ignored a 1982 report that clearly linked high cancer 
risks to Grace’s vermiculite processing facility, a decision that suspiciously 
coincided with the final report of the Private Sector Survey on Cost Control chaired 
by J. Peter Grace, a centerpiece of the Ronald Reagan administration’s campaign to 
dismantle the U.S. federal government’s regulatory apparatus.  The Grace 
Commission, as it was known, issued over 2,000 recommendations, many targeting 
the EPA for cuts.  Thus, the “democratic” route to environmental protection had its 
shortcomings, particularly its torpid rate of action.20 
In Peru, the heirs to the Lords of Guano have not given up on the idea of 
environmental management by technocrats.  In 2003, the Peruvian guano industry 
was again plugging along under the independent management of PROABONOS 
(est. 1997), a quasi-state company modeled after CAG and run by conservation-
minded agronomists.  During its first three years of existence, PROABONOS 
produced 52,483 metric tons of guano rico, 8,000 of which were exported to 
organic farmers in the Northern Hemisphere.  The green in that expensive organic 
asparagus flown in from Peru on your dinner table just might contain some nitrogen 
that passed through the gut of a guano bird.  The Peruvian guano industry is back 
almost exactly where it started in 1909.21 
                                                 
20. Bishel, “Business Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy,” esp. 19; “Información comercial: 
Banco Alemán Transatlántico,” La Prensa 11 Apr. 1909 (morning ed.), p. 2, col. 1 [see correction 
“Información comercial: Compañía Administradora del Guano,” La Prensa 12 Apr. 1909 (morning 
ed.), p. 1, col. 6]; Living on Earth, “Libby's Asbestos Legacy,” radio broadcast week of 29 June 
2001, [cited 5 July 2001]; idem, “EPA Investigates Itself,” radio broadcast week of 28 July 2000, 
[cited 25 Oct. 2002], both available from http://www.loe.org/archives/archives.htm.  
21. Peru, Ministerio de Agricultura, PROABONOS, Memoria anual 1999 (Callao, May 
2000), 10-12; PROABONOS, Memoria annual 1998, 14-16, 19; PROABONOS, Memoria annual 
1997, 5, 7; Armando Rivera Calle, personal communication, June 2001.  
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Peruvians have found new uses for relics of the old guano and fishmeal 
industries.  The concrete tower that once housed the Ministry of Fisheries is now 
home to Peru’s Museo de la Nación and some of the ancient indigenous artifacts 
originally purchased by conservationist Albert Giesecke.  It is a popular destination 
for foreign tourists.  The hollowed-out shell of the palace built for CAG’s managers 
in the 1920s is also still in use, as a sweatshop producing clothing for the cut-rate 
stores that serve Lima’s seven million-plus working class.  From its roof, one can 
get a good look at decaying symbols of Lima’s former splendor: the seventeenth-
century baroque Convento de San Francisco, Juan Rehr’s post-1746 cathedral 
towers, the ornate courtyards and skylights of downtown Lima’s departed elite, and 
the abandoned Art Deco headquarters of Gildemeister & Co.  Peru’s present and 
future are also visible:  Dozens of small retail shops and street merchants hawk 
their wares, most imported from the other side of the Pacific.  An unending stream 
of exhaust-spewing buses travels up and down Avenida Abancay, for which many 
blocks of old colonial Lima were razed by Augusto Leguía to make way for the 
automobile age.  Private cars and taxis dart in and out of adjacent streets, trying to 
avoid this permanently clogged artery.  All of this is overlooked by the 
meticulously clean, carefully guarded Congreso, Peru’s living palace to democracy. 
On Isla Don Martín, the old marine biology station that Enrique Ávila built 
still stands.  Inside, its museum, archive, and living quarters are still intact, almost 
how he left them more than four decades ago.  But outside things could not be more 
different.  From the top of the island, one sees nothing but bare soil and rock, a 
handful of guano birds, CAG’s old wooden buildings, and a few vultures perched 
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on an old crane ready to take advantage of another animal’s demise.  In its glory 
days under CAG, this island was a continuous squawking colony, one of the great 
spectacles of nature.  Isla Don Martín was once home to more guanayes at one time 
than the 1.4 million birds populating the entire Peruvian littoral during the 1998 El 
Niño.22  Looking east toward the coast, one sees giant bolicheras chugging in and 
out of port and the unmistakable smoke plumes of several fishmeal plants.  
Looking west, one sees nothing but the vast Pacific Ocean, Peru’s “fourth natural 
region.” 
We did not eat any meat out on the guano island, though we did eat a fresh 
cheese.  Meat is too expensive, too perishable for the lone island guardians, and we 
did not think to bring any with us.  We mainly ate lentils and rice, the staples of the 
guano worker.  When we got back to Huacho, the nearest port, we were in too big a 
hurry to search out a decent cevichería (fish stand), so we stopped at fast and 
efficient Norky’s, a Peruvian-owned chain, and pigged out on pollo a la brasa and 
papas fritas.  A couple hundred thousand tons of fishmeal per year now makes it to 
the stomachs of Peruvians, via the concrete chicken ranches that line the Pan-
American highway and ubiquitous roast-chicken joints that serve Peru’s major 
towns and cities.  For those who can afford it, “chicken from the sea” is among 
Peruvians’ favorite foods.  Nevertheless, Peruvians per capita still consume half the 
meat as the earth’s average human.23  Perhaps they are healthier for it. 
                                                 
22. PROABONOS, Memoria annual 1999, 21-23; PROABONOS, Memoria annual 1998, 
26.  
23. See table 8.    
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Breathe in.  That pungent “smell of money” on Isla Don Martín comes from 
fishmeal, not from guano as it used to.  Listen.  The island is silent, except for the 
sea.  Every spring will be silent on the guano islands as long as the new generation 
of technocrats who manage Peru have their way and keep extracting the maximum 
sustainable yield from the anchoveta fishery, and as long as affluent Peruvians and 
North Americans keep eating chicken at places like Norky’s.
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Table 1: Fertilizer Use by Peruvian Coastal Agriculture, circa 1914-1915 
 
 
Fertilizers used  
(in rough order  
of importance) 
 
 
Crop/Land Use 
 
Percent of Total 
Cultivated Area 
 
Percent Share of 
Fertilizer 
Purchases 
 
    
guano rico sugar cane 36.5 62.7 
salitre (NaNO3) cotton 25.8 31.5 
guano pobre pasture/feed lots (incl. alfalfa) 13.4 -- 
potassium sulfate fields in preparation 6.6 -- 
 sharecropped (yanaconizada) 5.8 -- 
animal dung fallow 4.9 -- 
cane juice froth maize 2.6 3.8 
ammonium sulfate rice 0.9 1.3 
nitrolim (CaCN2) legumes 0.9 -- 
 root crops (camote, yuca, potato) 0.5 -- 
kainite (KCl)a other crops 2.4 -- 
    
Source: CAG, Sección Técnica, Las necesidades de guano de la agricultura nacional, 117-205, 
209-240, graph following p. 294. 
a Used by cotton growers only. 
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Table 2: Global Nitrogen Fertilizer Production, 1900-2000 (metric kilotons of nitrogen)  
 
       
 Peruvian 
guano 
Chilean 
nitrates 
NaNO3 
Coke-oven 
gas recovery  
(NH4)2SO4 
Cyanamide 
synthesis 
CaCN2 
Haber-Bosch 
process 
NH3 
Total nitrogen 
productiona 
       
       
1900 <1.0 220 120 0 0 340 
1910 7.1 360 230 10 0 610 
1920 9.0 410 290 70 150 950b 
1929 16.4 510 425 255 930 2,160b 
1950 29.2 270 500 310 3,700 4,810 
1970 6.1 120 950 300 30,230 31,620 
2000 4.0c 120 370 80 85,130 85,700 
       
Source: Smil, Enriching the Earth, app. F, L; “Anexos: Guano explotado: Cantidades de guano 
solicitadas por la agricultura nacional y ventas realizadas a esta industria, guano exportado, ley 
media azoada y fosfatada del guano vendido a la agricultura nacional, y utilidad fiscal durante los 
años 1909-1962,” MCAG 54 (1963); Humberto Tovar S., “Las poblaciónes de aves guaneras en los 
ciclos reproductivos de 1969/70 a 1973/74,” Inf.Inst.Mar Perú 45 (1978), 12; Peru, Ministerio de 
Agricultura, PROABONOS, Memoria anual 1999 (Callao, May 2000). 
a Rounded to ten kilotons. 
b Includes 20 kilotons of nitrogen produced by the electric-arc process. 
c 1999 production figures. 
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Table 3: Pay Received by Guano Island Workers, North Zone, 1919-1969 
 
         
 daily wage basic daily ration 
   
         
 laborer overseer laborer overseer 
 S/. 1979US$ S/. 1979US$ S/. 1979US$ S/. 1979US$ 
         
         
1919a 1.20 0.91 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
1945 2.44 1.11 3.60 1.64 2.01 0.92 2.52 1.15 
1949 5.47 2.48 7.73 3.50 3.92 1.78 5.23 2.37 
1956 13.07 1.71 17.94 2.34 b b b b 
1960 17.77 1.70 27.67 2.65 10.22 0.98 11.20 1.07 
1965 33.97 2.12 54.72 3.42 16.33 1.02 17.25 1.08 
1969 39.47 1.63 58.09 2.40 25.40 1.05 26.44 1.09 
         
Source: “Resumen de los gastos y promedios de las islas de la zona norte--Campaña 37a.--año 
1945,” Dec. 1945; Manuel E. Razetto, “Resumen de los gastos y promedios de las islas de la 
campaña 41a.--año 1949,” Feb. 1950; J. Pablo Miñan, “Resumen de los costos y promedios de las 
islas de la zona norte--campaña 48a.--año 1956,” Dec. 1956; Fernando Angobaldo C., “Resumen de 
los costos y promedios de la zona norte campaña 52a.--año 1960,” 31 Dec. 1960; Guido A. Razetto 
T., “Diversos promedios de islas zona norte 1965,” Dec. 1965; idem, “Trabajos de explotación de 
guano rico, baja ley, pobre y mezclas.  Rendimiento y costos de las tareas--Zona Norte, año 1969,” 
22 Sept. 1969; all from ACAG-Zona Norte.  Portocarrero, Beltrán, and Romero,  Compendio 
estadístico del Perú, 88-89. 
a Average pay for entire coast. 
b Together, laborers and overseers received an average daily ration of S/.8.25 = 1979US$1.08. 
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Table 4: Guano Rico Distribution in Peru, 1909-1935 
 
 
Year 
 
Total Large 
Purchasesa 
(metric tons) 
 
Total Small 
Purchasesb 
(metric tons) 
 
 
Ratio 
 
Number of Large 
Purchasers 
     
1911-12 12,843  2,323  5.5 : 1 130 
1915-16     39,482       3,585  11.0 : 1 93 
1920-21 51,208  6,190 8.3 : 1 231 
1925-26 87,172 10,239 8.5 : 1 302 
1930-31 82,853 8,891 9.3 : 1 228 
1934-35 113,918      17,483  6.5 : 1 384 
     
     
Total (1909-35): 1,562,841 170,884 9.1 : 1 567c 
     
Source: “Anexos: Detalle de la distribución y venta del guano en los puertos,” MCAG 3-26 (1912-
1935). 
a Large purchases (ventas mayores) refer to orders by single plantations/latifundia amounting to 
greater than one metric ton during CAG’s fiscal year. 
b Small purchases (ventas menores) refer to purchases amounting to less than one metric ton by 
undifferentiated minifundia and gardeners. 
c In 1935, CAG listed a total of 567 different farming entities that had purchased at least one metric 
ton of guano during some fiscal year of its first 26 years of operation.   
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Table 5: Principal Guano Consumers in Peru, 1909-1935 
 
 
Plantation (Owner circa 1914, Regiona) 
 
Consumption 
1909-1925 
(rank/metric tons/ 
percentage) 
 
Consumption 
1909-1935 
(rank/metric tons/ 
percentage) 
   
   
Casa Grande (Gildemeister & Co., Chicama) 1.   51,571 6.1 1. 130,124 7.7 
Cartavio (W. R. Grace & Co., Chicama) 2.   34,660 4.1 2. 72,490 4.3 
Paramonga (Sociedad Agrícola Paramonga, Supe)b 9.   18,558 2.2 3. 48,413 2.9 
Pomalca y Collud (Gutiérrez brothers, Lambayeque) 11.   17,266 2.0 4. 44,466 2.6 
Tumán y Calupe (Pardo family, Lambayeque) 6.   19,823 2.3 5. 43,148 2.6 
Chiclín (Larco Herrera brothers, Chicama) 3.   23,803 2.8 6. 41,687 2.5 
Cayaltí (Aspíllaga brothers, Lambayeque) 7.   19,746 2.3 7. 39,546 2.4 
Laredo (José Ignacio Chopitea, Moche)c 8.   18,947 2.2 8. 38,067 2.3 
San Nicolás (Barreda y Laos family, Supe) 5.   21,652 2.5 9. 37,525 2.2 
Infantas (Sociedad Agrícola Infantas, Lima) 13.   14,397 1.7 10. 28,186 1.7 
Humaya (Sociedad Agrícola Humaya, Huaura) 16.   10,771 1.3 11. 26,920 1.6 
San Benito (Nosiglia brothers, Cañete) 22.     7,952 0.9 12. 26,387 1.6 
Santa Bárbara (British Sugar Co., Cañete) 4.   23,636 2.8 13. 25,968 1.5 
San Jacinto (British Sugar Co., Chimbote) 12. 15,833 1.9 14. 25,923 1.5 
Tambo Real (Peruvian Sugar Est., Chimbote) 14.   13,547 1.6 15. 24,086 1.4 
Chiquitoy (Larco Herrera brothers, Chicama) 24. 7,233 0.8 16. 23,938 1.4 
Esquivel y Retes (del Solar brothers, Chancay) 18.     9,836  1.2 17. 22,504 1.3 
Hualcará (Felipe Espantoso, Cañete) 17.   10,402 1.2 18. 20,508 1.2 
Unánue (Luis Larraburre, Cañete) 21.     8,440 1.0 19. 20,090 1.2 
Roma (Víctor Larco Herrera, Chicama)c 10.   18,233  2.1 20. 19,058 1.1 
Palpa (Empresa Agrícola Palpa, Chancay) 20.     8,575 1.0 21. 16,820 1.0 
Pátapo y Tulipe (Cía. Agr. Chiclayo, Lambayeque) 19. 9,805 1.2 22. 16,312 1.0 
Herbay Alto (Sociedad Agrícola Herbay Alto, Cañete) 26. 6,027 0.7 23. 14,801 0.9 
Huando (Antonio Graña, Chancay) 25. 6,124 0.7 24. 12,763 0.8 
Montalván (Reynaldo Luza, Cañete) -- 1,612 0.2 25. 12,654 0.8 
El Naranjal (Testamentaria F. Tallieri, Lima ) 23.     7,524 0.8 29. 11,451 0.7 
Sausal (Gildemeister & Co., Chicama)c 15. 11,228 1.3 30. 11,228 0.7 
La Huaca (de las Casas family, Chancay) -- 2,216 0.3 -- 4,595 0.3 
Urrutia (Luis Albizuri, Pisco) -- 600 0.1 -- 1,446 0.1 
       
       
Total guano rico consumption:  852,418 49.3  1,686,009 51.3 
       
Source: “Anexos: Detalle de la distribución y venta del guano en los puertos,” MCAG 5, 17, 26 
(1914, 1926, 1935); Gonzales, Plantation Agriculture and Social Control in Northern Peru, 26-33, 
45-51; Thorp and Bertram, Peru, 1899-1977, 360 n. 10 
a See app. 7.               b Established by the Canaval family, later purchased by W. R. Grace & Co. 
c Incorporated into Casa Grande or purchased by Gildemeister & Co. 
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Table 6: Guano Rico Distribution in Peru, 1934-1960 
 
 
Year 
 
Total Large 
Purchasesa 
(metric tons) 
 
Total Small 
Purchasesb 
(metric tons) 
 
 
Ratio 
 
Destination Crop 
 
Amount  
Purchased  
(metric tons/  
percent share) 
      
      
1934-35 113,918      17,483  6.5 : 1 cotton: 
sugar cane: 
grain/rice: 
78,937 
37,417 
15,048 
60.1 
28.5 
11.5 
1941 90,648 23,499 3.9 : 1 cotton: 
sugar cane: 
other food crops: 
grain/rice: 
flax: 
54,896 
25,847 
16,458 
16,345 
601 
48.1 
22.6 
14.4 
14.3 
0.5 
1945 51,808  32,124  1.6 : 1 grain/rice: 
cotton/cane/flax: 
other food crops: 
 forage: 
coffee/fruit: 
46,042 
20,151 
12,758 
4,605 
376 
54.9 
24.0 
15.2 
5.5 
0.4 
1950 184,398  35,630  5.2 : 1 grain: 
cotton: 
sugar cane: 
rice: 
other food crops: 
forage: 
flax: 
82,485 
56,853 
26,246 
23,542 
19,272 
11,566 
65 
37.5 
25.8 
11.9 
10.7 
8.8 
5.3 
<0.1 
1956 243,402 59,727  4.1 : 1 cotton: 
unclassifiedc: 
grain: 
other crops: 
rice: 
sugar cane: 
forage: 
potatoes: 
63,853 
59,727 
57,486 
50,911 
35,014 
22,603 
11,722 
1,814 
24.9 
19.7 
22.4 
16.8 
13.6 
8.8 
3.9 
0.6 
      
      
Continued on next page      
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Table 6--Continued      
      
 
Year 
 
Total Large 
Purchasesa 
(metric tons) 
 
Total Small 
Purchasesb 
(metric tons) 
 
 
Ratio 
 
Destination Crop 
 
Amount  
Purchased  
(metric tons/  
percent share) 
      
      
1960 66,351 29,636 2.2 : 1 unclassifiedc: 
grain: 
cotton: 
rice: 
sugar cane: 
potatoes: 
other crops: 
forage: 
29,636 
17,720 
14,848 
14,763 
6,957 
5,974 
3,643 
2,523 
30.9 
18.5 
14.8 
15.4 
7.2 
6.2 
3.8 
2.6 
      
      
Total (1935-62): 3,679,156 992,050 3.7 : 1   
Total (1909-62): 5,241,997 1,162,934 4.5 : 1   
       
Source: “Anexos: Clasificación de las ventas de guano a la agricultura nacional y su contenido en 
unidades de nitrógeno,” MCAG 26, 33 (1935, 1942); “Anexos: Guano rico--ventas mayores: 
Clasificación por cultivos de las ventas a la agricultura nacional con su contenido de unidades de 
nitrógeno y valores correspondentes,” MCAG 37, 42, 48, 52 (1946, 1951, 1957, 1961); “Anexos: 
Guano rico--ventas menores: Clasificación por cultivos de las ventas a la agricultura nacional con su 
contenido de unidades de nitrógeno y valores correspondentes,” MCAG 37, 42, 48, 52 (1946, 1951, 
1957, 1961); “Anexos: Guano explotado: Cantidades de guano solicitadas por la agricultura 
nacional y ventas realizadas a esta industria, guano exportado, ley media azoada y fosfatada del 
guano vendido a la agricultura nacional, y utilidad fiscal durante los años 1909-1962,” MCAG 54 
(1963). 
a Large purchases (ventas mayores) refer to purchases by a single plantation/latifundia amounting to 
greater than one metric ton during CAG’s fiscal year.  
b Small purchases (ventas menores) refer to purchases less than one metric ton by minifundia or 
gardeners. 
c The destination crop for small purchases was left unclassified by CAG; most small purchases went 
to grain and other food crops. 
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Table 8: Global Meat Production, Consumption, and Trade, 1961-2000 
 
      
 1961 1971 1981 1991 2000 
      
      
Meat production (1000s of metric tons) 
      
World 71,177 104,575 139,055 183,836 232,965 
   U.S.A. 16,513 22,071 24,833 29,553 37,661 
   European Union 15,993 22,761 29,517 33,284 35,966 
   China 2,550 8,712 15,443 33,362 63,227 
   Japan 687 1,816 3,014 3,422 3,005 
   Latin America & Caribbean 8,111 10,433 16,644 21,120 31,169 
      Brazil 2,120 3,086 5,586 8,465 14,683 
      Peru 217 277 397 535 910 
   Sub-Saharan Africa 2,663 3,445 4,444 5,474 6,580 
      
      
Net trade, all meat and meat products (1000s of metric tons) 
      
World (total imports) 3,391 5,962 9,831 14,204 22,836 
   U.S.A. -207 -562 7 420 3,399 
   European Union -1,085 -967 527 1,297 2,153 
   China 27 208 246 632 -593 
   Japan -35 -277 -659 -1,402 -2,399 
   Latin America & Caribbean 471 669 690 177 311 
      Brazil 33 151 419 397 1,375 
      Peru -8 -16 -18 -22 -26 
   Sub-Saharan Africa 17 75 -96 -239 -198 
      
                  
Per-capita meat consumption (calories/day) 
      
World 110 136 155 181 210 
   U.S.A. 335 378 389 411 445 
   European Union 265 345 397 417 428 
   China 29 87 132 240 402 
   Japan 26 75 116 149 165 
   Latin America & Caribbean 178 168 213 214 268 
      Brazil 112 126 168 234 330 
      Peru 78 78 71 75 99 
   Sub-Saharan Africa 61 60 61 57 56 
      
 
Source: FAO Statistical Databases, [cited 8-13 Oct. 2002], available from <http://apps.fao.org/>. 
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Table 9: Global Live Animal Production, Slaughter, and Trade, 1961-2000 
 
      
 1961 1971 1981 1991 2000 
      
      
World live animal stocks (millions of head) 
      
Beef cattle 942 1,097 1,228 1,297 1,346 
Chickens 3,899 5,389 7,526 11,113 14,461 
Pigs 406 618 780 866 908 
Sheep 994 1,064 1,110 1,184 1,058 
Andean camelids 5 6 6 5 6 
Total (all typesa) 7,282 9,396 12,221 16,713 20,656 
      
World live animal imports (millions of head) 
      
Beef cattle 4.9 6.9 7.0 8.2 8.2 
Chickens 47.2 122.6 287.3 449.4 732.0 
Pigs 2.6 5.4 9.7 13.4 16.6 
Sheep 6.8 8.6 17.4 21.4 14.4 
Total (all typesa) 63.6 149.3 342.3 540.1 825.7 
      
World slaughtered animals (millions of head) 
      
Beef cattle 173 204 237 258 278 
Chickens 6,585 11,405 19,334 28,080 41,377 
Pigs 376 595 749 936 1,151 
Sheep 331 372 401 473 487 
Andean camelids 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 
Total (all typesb) 8,365 13,808 22,426 32,350 47,691 
      
World slaughtered animal production (1000s of metric tons) 
      
Beef cattle 27,685 38,074 45,940 53,896 56,517 
Chickens 7,553 13,643 24,321 37,269 58,187 
Pigs 24,743 39,414 52,986 70,908 89,584 
Sheep 4,930 5,626 5,860 7,121 7,624 
Andean camelids 27 18 15 14 14 
Total (all typesb) 71,177 104,575 139,055 183,836 232,965 
      
 
Source: FAO Statistical Databases, [cited 8-13 Oct. 2002], available from <http://apps.fao.org/>. 
 
a Does not include beehives. 
 
b Includes asses, beef cattle, buffalo, camels, other camelids (alpaca, llama, guanaco, vicuña), 
chickens, ducks, goats, geese, horses, mules, pigeons and other birds, pigs, rabbits and other rodents, 
sheep, turkeys.  Production by weight also includes game meat, snails, and other misc.        
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Appendix 1: Guano and Nitrate Exports from Peru, 1840-1995 
 
     
Year 
 
Nitrate Exports 
(metric tons) 
Index 
(73,444 metric 
tons = 100)a 
Total Guano 
Exports 
(metric tons) 
Index 
(134,185 metric 
tons = 100)b 
     
     
1840         10,459                14               0   0 
1841         12,810                17           8,085                  6  
1842         16,418                22          23,441                17  
1843         16,989                23           2,617                  2  
1844         17,489                24          27,189                20  
1845         17,307                24          24,701                18  
1846         18,361                25          36,914                28  
1847         17,622                24          96,724                72  
1848         22,314                30        107,356                80  
1849         19,785                27        151,621              113  
1850         23,545                32        185,724              138  
1851         31,713                43        262,739              196  
1852         27,277                37        145,968              109  
1853         40,767                56        316,116              236  
1854         33,141                45        533,280              397  
1855         43,097                59        514,957              384  
1856         37,334                51        280,928              209  
1857         50,408                69        626,584              467  
1858         56,131                76        343,055              256  
1859         72,413                99        190,586              142  
1860         63,518                86        460,862              343  
1861         62,331                85        246,893              184  
1862         77,833              106        365,973              273  
1863         70,870                96        419,789              313  
1864         50,167                68        373,157              278  
1865       112,353              153        439,049              327  
1866       100,634              137        463,383              345  
1867       117,315              160        493,335              368  
1868         87,699              119        441,754              329  
1869         69,324                94        526,726              393  
1870       135,397              184        728,703              543  
1871       165,872              226        614,668              458  
1872       220,198              300        326,960              244  
1873       288,133              392        233,021              174  
1874       257,384              350        701,820              523  
1875       332,557              453        245,693              183 
     
     
Continued on next page      
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Appendix 1--Continued      
     
     
Year 
 
Nitrate Exports 
(metric tons) 
Index 
(73,444 metric 
tons = 100)a 
Total Guano 
Exports 
(metric tons) 
Index 
(134,185 metric 
tons = 100)b 
     
     
1876       326,000             444        575,476              429 
1877       216,507              295        541,222              403 
1878       270,249              368        504,134              376 
1879         72,558                99          87,987c                66 
1880-1882 0 0               0c                 0  
1883 -- --         167,534c               114 
1884 -- --         47,864c                36 
1885 -- --         38,150c                28 
1886 -- --        139,716c                104 
1887 -- --         24,316c                  18 
1888 -- --         83,942c                62 
1889 -- --         78,200c                58 
1890 -- --               0   0 
1891 -- --           12,650                  9  
1892 -- --           30,780                23 
1893 -- --           68,681                51 
1894 -- --           39,788                30  
1895 -- --           17,649                13  
1896 -- --           16,723                12  
1897  -- --           20,626                15  
1898 -- --           31,772                24  
1899  -- --           44,212                33  
1900  -- --           11,460                  9  
1901 -- --           49,888                37  
1902  -- --           69,578                52  
1903             89,211                66  
1904             83,877                63  
1905 Guano Rico Guano Pobre           69,315                52  
1906 Exportsd Exportse           96,463                72  
1907  (metric tons) (metric tons)           98,583                73  
1908             77,326                58  
1909f   24,902               19  
1909/10           25,469            20,701            46,170                34  
1910/11            43,660            14,820            58,480                44  
1911/12            34,582            30,684            65,266                49  
1912/13           16,205            20,220            36,425                27  
1913/14           19,865            14,612            34,477                26  
     
     
Continued on next page      
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Appendix 1--Continued      
     
     
Year 
 
Guano Rico 
Exportsc 
(metric tons) 
Guano Pobre 
Exportsd 
(metric tons) 
Total Guano 
Exports 
(metric tons) 
Index 
(134,185 metric 
tons = 100)b 
     
     
1914/15            28,498            15,419            43,917                33  
1915/16           18,706      0             18,706                14  
1916/17-1919/20 0 0 0               0   
1920/21             4,064     0               4,064                  3  
1921/22             6,045  0             6,045                  5  
1922/23            24,028                   0           24,028                18  
1923/24           23,142                   0           23,142                17  
1924/25           22,332  0             22,332                17  
1925/26            21,128      0             21,128                16  
1926/27           10,983  0           10,983                  8  
1927/28           12,657      0             12,657                  9  
1928/29           16,208  0           16,208                12  
1929/30           23,814              5,950            29,764                22  
1930/31            25,375              7,112            32,487                24  
1931/32           16,500      0             16,500                12  
1932/33            47,657      0             47,657                36  
1933/34           44,042              4,761            48,803                36  
1934/35             3,983            10,480            14,463                11  
1935/36     0                  254                 254                  <1  
1936/37     0                  375                 375                  <1  
1937/38     0               5,420              5,420                  4  
1938g
 
          16,911                 510            17,421                13  
1939            14,927      0             14,927                11  
1940      0       0       0                 0   
1941      0               8,474              8,474                  6  
1942-1944     0       0       0                 0   
1945                  81      0                    81                  0  
1946-1948     0       0       0                 0   
1949                  33      0                    33                  <1  
1950             2,350      0               2,350                  2  
1951                  39      0                    39                  <1  
1952                  95      0                    95                  <1  
1953              1,072      0               1,072                  1  
1954                905      0                  905                  1  
1955           12,397      0             12,397                  9  
1956           10,224                 445            10,669                  8  
1957            27,645      0             27,645                21  
     
     
Continued on next page      
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Appendix 1--Continued      
     
     
Year 
 
Guano Rico 
Exportsc 
(metric tons) 
Guano Pobre 
Exportsd 
(metric tons) 
Total Guano 
Exports 
(metric tons) 
Index 
(134,185 metric 
tons = 100)b 
     
     
1958            13,789      0             13,789                10  
1959           12,376      0             12,376                  9  
1960           12,974      0             12,974                10  
1961           16,866      0             16,866                13  
1962           13,335      0             13,335                10  
1963           13,806  0           13,806                10  
1964             6,550  0             6,550                  5  
1965 -- -- 0 0 
1966 -- -- 0 0 
1967-1975  -- -- n.d.                 n.d.  
1976-1977 -- -- 0               0   
1978 -- --             2,000                  1  
1979 -- --                500                  <1  
1980 -- --             3,500                  3  
1981 -- --             3,600                  3  
1982  -- --                800                  1  
1983  -- --             2,300                  2  
1984 -- --             4,600                  3  
1985-1993 -- --                  0               0   
1994 -- --                300                  <1  
1995 -- --                400                  <1  
     
     
1840-1890h -- -- 12,959,051  
1891-1909h -- -- 953,484  
1909/10-1928/29h 327,572 116,456 444,028  
1929/30-1963h 331,196 43,781 374,977  
1891-1995h,i -- -- 1,772,137  
     
Sources: Shane J. Hunt, “Price and Quantum Estimates of Peruvian Exports, 1830-1862” 
(Discussion paper no. 33, Research Program in Economic Development, Woodrow Wilson School 
of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1973), table 21; Robert G. Greenhill and 
Rory M. Miller, “The Peruvian Government and the Nitrate Trade, 1873-1879,” JLAS 5:1 (May 
1973), 108, table 1; José Antonio de Lavalle y García, El guano y la agricultura nacional (Lima: La 
Opinión Nacional, 1914), 41; “Anexos: Extracción de guanos verificada por The Peruvian 
Corporation Ltd.,” MCAG 12 (1921); “Anexos: Guano explotado: Cantidades de guano solicitadas 
por la agricultura nacional y ventas realizadas a esta industria, guano exportado, ley media azoada y 
fosfatada del guano vendido a la agricultura nacional, y utilidad fiscal durante los años 1909-1962,” 
MCAG 54 (1963); MCONAFER 1 (1967), 49; S. Zuta and L. A. Flores, “Oceanography 
Development in Peru,” in Oceanography: The Past, ed. M. Sears and D. Merriman (New York: 
Springer-Verlag, 1980), 645; PESCA-PERU, Qué ha hecho y adonde va PESCA-PERU (Lima, 
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1982), 12; Richard Webb and Graciela Fernández Baca, eds., Almanaque estadístico: Perú en 
números 1990 (Lima: Cuánto, 1990), 388; idem, Anuario estadístico: Perú en números 1999 (Lima: 
Cuánto, 1999), 767-768; Peru, Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, Perú: Series 
estadísticas, 1970-94 (Lima: Dirección Técnica de Indicadores Económicas, 1995), 144. 
a From 1830-1879, average annual nitrate exports amounted to 73,444 metric tons. 
b From 1909-1963, average annual guano rico production amounted to 134,185 metric tons, i.e. the 
average amount of annual replacement under managed conditions. 
c Chile occupied Peru’s guano islands from late 1879 until 1883 during the War of the Pacific.  By 
agreement, Chile received one-half of Peru’s guano exports from 1883-1889; totals for these years 
include Chile’s share. 
d Guano rico or guano azoado contains greater than four percent nitrogen by weight.  
e Guano pobre or guano fosfatado contains less than four percent nitrogen by weight. 
f A two-month period before the establishment of the Compañía Administradora del Guano. 
g A nine-month period that included the entire guano harvest during 1938.  
h Exports by Quirós/Allier/Myers & Co./other private contractors (1840-1849), Antony Gibbs & 
Sons/other private contractors (1849-1861), various private contractors (1861-1869), Dreyfus Bros. 
& Co./Peruvian Guano Co./other private contractors (1870-1878), private contractors (1879-1890), 
Peruvian Corporation of London (1891-1928/29), Compañía Administradora del Guano (1929/30-
1963), CONAFER (1964-1972), PESCA-PERU (1975-1995). 
i Excludes 1965-1975; no data available.   
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Appendix 2: Guano Production in Peru, 1891-1995 
 
     
Year 
(El Niño Event 
Strength)a 
Guano Rico 
Productionb 
(metric tons) 
Index 
(1916/17 = 100) 
Total Guano 
Productionc 
(metric tons) 
Index 
(1916/17 = 100) 
     
     
1891 (VS) -- --                12,650                   23  
1892 -- --                30,780                   57  
1893 -- --                68,681                 126  
1894 -- --                39,788                   73  
1895 -- --                17,649                   32  
1896 -- --                17,962                   33  
1897 (M+) -- --                25,314                   46  
1898 -- --                34,267                   63  
1899 (S) -- --                47,441                   87  
1900 (S) -- --                17,757                   33  
1901 -- --                62,844                 115  
1902 (M+) -- --                81,378                 149  
1903 -- --              104,522                 192  
1904 -- --              113,115                 208  
1905 -- --              108,949                 200  
1906 -- --              142,091                 261  
1907 (M) -- --              141,729                 260  
1908 -- --              106,325                 195  
1909d -- --              26,306  -- 
1909/10                48,809                   90                 70,292                 129  
1910/11 (M+)                66,587                 122                 90,417                 166  
1911/12 (S)                51,746                   95               101,566                 186  
1912/13                38,607                   71                 70,172                 129  
1913/14                48,832                   90                 70,169                 129  
1914/15 (M+)                50,988                   94                 76,200                 140  
1915/16                58,929                 108                 58,929                 108  
1916/17                54,472                 100                 54,472                 100  
1917/18 (S)                80,866                 148                 80,866                 148  
1918/19                74,076                 136                 74,076                 136  
1919/20                50,628                   93                 50,628                   93  
1920/21                68,174                 125                 68,174                 125  
1921/22                62,757                 115                 62,757                 115  
1922/23 (M)                84,332                 155                 84,332                 155  
1923/24              110,508                 203               110,508                 203  
1924/25              148,046                 272               148,046                 272  
1925/26 (VS)              136,333                 250               136,333                 250  
1926/27                80,404                 148                 80,404                 148  
     
     
Continued on next page     
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Appendix 2--Continued     
     
     
Year 
(El Niño Event 
Strength)a 
Guano Rico 
Productionb 
(metric tons) 
Index 
(1916/17 = 100) 
Total Guano 
Productionc 
(metric tons) 
Index 
(1916/17 = 100) 
     
     
1927/28                78,493                 144                 78,493                 144  
1928/29              125,471                 230               125,471                 230  
1929/30              136,263                 250               151,461                 278  
1930/31 (M)              123,317                 226               132,974                 244  
1931/32                94,700                 174                 94,700                 174  
1932/33 (S)              133,741                 246               133,741                 246  
1933/34              157,634                 289               162,358                 298  
1934/35              137,203                 252               148,256                 272  
1935/36              126,635                 232               127,722                 234  
1936/37              134,442                 247               136,056                 250  
1937/38              152,532                 280               159,138                 292  
1938e
 
             168,619                 310               169,786                 312  
1939 (M+)              152,198                 279               152,778                 280  
1940 (S)              125,637                 231               126,545                 232  
1941 (S)              119,399                 219               119,642                 220  
1942                67,643                 124                 79,201                 145  
1943 (M+)                69,697                 128                 91,820                 169  
1944                75,939                 139                 78,842                 145  
1945                86,418                 159                 93,359                 171  
1946              110,608                 203               113,536                 208  
1947              157,970                 290               160,433                 295  
1948              162,230                 298               163,262                 300  
1949              191,773                 352               193,874                 356  
1950              218,146                 400               218,456                 401  
1951              237,071                 435               237,077                 435  
1952              251,687                 462               253,425                 465  
1953 (M+)              255,772                 470               260,797                 479  
1954              288,173                 529               293,977                 540  
1955              286,773                 526               289,876                 532  
1956              332,223                 610               336,438                 618  
1957 (S)              283,284                 520               285,407                 524  
1958 (S)              143,857                 264               167,009                 307  
1959              108,919                 200               127,307                 234  
1960              127,540                 234               157,915                 290  
1961              142,937                 262               159,198                 292  
1962              184,332                 338               206,097                 378  
1963 181,672            334           203,437             373  
1964 187,087            343           205,092             377  
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Appendix 2--Continued     
     
     
Year 
(El Niño Event 
Strength)a 
Guano Rico 
Productionb 
(metric tons) 
Index 
(1916/17 = 100) 
Total Guano 
Productionc 
(metric tons) 
Index 
(1916/17 = 100) 
     
     
1965 (M+) 161,020            296           169,790             312  
1966 41,693             77             55,505             102  
1967 41,322             76             64,891             119  
1968 27,810             51             35,111              64  
1969 14,901             27             20,112              37  
1970 43,397             80             50,225              92  
1971 16,416             30             22,328              41  
1972 (S) 37,676             69             47,112              86  
1973 (S) 28,406             52             33,088              61  
1974 0             0                    0                0   
1975                13,333                   24                 31,516                   58  
1976 (M)                        0                          0                          0                          0   
1977                27,295                   50                 36,645                   67  
1978                26,826                   49                 29,576                   54  
1979                28,194                   52                 29,299                   54  
1980                29,983                   55                 42,014                   77  
1981                24,900                   46                 28,900                   53  
1982 (VS)                        0                          0                          0                          0   
1983 (VS)                        0                          0                          0                          0   
1984                26,700                   49                 26,700                   49  
1985                14,100                   26                 26,600                   49  
1986                20,434                   38                 22,575                   41  
1987 (M)                21,820                   40                 21,820                   40  
1988                12,720                   23                 15,887                   29  
1989                11,707                   21                 18,694                   34  
1990                14,997                   28                 14,997                   28  
1991                18,236                   33                 20,070                   37  
1992 (M)                  1,346                     2                   1,346                     2  
1993                14,350                   26                 20,078                   37  
1994                21,643                   40                 31,106                   57  
1995                25,795                   47                 29,017                   53  
     
     
Guano Rico Production Total Guano Production  
(metric tons) (metric tons/yr) (metric tons) (metric tons/yr) 
     
     
1891-1908f -- --           1,173,242  69,014 
1909-1963f           7,246,042  134,185           7,678,205  142,189 
1891-1995f -- --         10,001,541  96,169 
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Sources: José Antonio de Lavalle y García, El guano y la agricultura nacional (Lima: La Opinión 
Nacional, 1914), 41; “Anexos: Extracción de guanos verificada por The Peruvian Corporation Ltd.,” 
MCAG 12 (1921); “Anexos: Guano explotado: Cantidades de guano solicitadas por la agricultura 
nacional y ventas realizadas a esta industria, guano exportado, ley media azoada y fosfatada del 
guano vendido a la agricultura nacional, y utilidad fiscal durante los años 1909-1962,” MCAG 54 
(1963); MCONAFER 1 (1965), 3, 6; Humberto Tovar S., “Las poblaciónes de aves guaneras en los 
ciclos reproductivos de 1969/70 a 1973/74,” Inf.Inst.Mar Perú 45 (1978), 12; S. Zuta and L. A. 
Flores, “Oceanography Development in Peru,” in Oceanography: The Past, ed. M. Sears and D. 
Merriman (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1980), 645; PESCA-PERU, Qué ha hecho y adonde va 
PESCA-PERU (Lima, 1982), 12; Richard Webb and Graciela Fernández Baca, eds., Almanaque 
estadístico: Perú en números 1990 (Lima: Cuánto, 1990), 388; idem, Anuario estadístico: Perú en 
números 1999 (Lima: Cuánto, 1999), 767-768; Peru, Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, 
Perú: Series estadísticas, 1970-94 (Lima: Dirección Técnica de Indicadores Económicas, 1995), 
144. 
a El Niño event strength as determined by W. H. Quinn and V. T. Neal, “The Historical Record of El 
Niño Events,” in Climate Since A.D. 1500, rev. ed., ed. Raymond S. Bradley and Philip D. Jones 
(London: Routledge, 1995), 623-648; M = moderate, M+ = moderately strong, S = strong, VS = 
very strong. 
b Guano rico or guano azoado contains greater than four percent nitrogen by weight. 
c Includes both guano rico and guano pobre or guano fosfatado production containing less than four 
percent nitrogen by weight. 
d A two-month period before the establishment of the Compañía Administradora del Guano. 
e A nine-month period that included the entire guano harvest during 1938. 
f Sales by private contractors (1896-1909), Compañía Administradora del Guano (1909/10-1963), 
CONAFER (1964-1972), FERTIPERU (1973-1974), PESCA-PERU (1975-1995).
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Appendix 6: Cotton and Sugar Cane Production in Peru, 1915-1980 
 
Year 
 
Total Guano 
Sales 
(metric tons) 
 
Sugar Cane  
Area 
Cultivated 
(hectares) 
 
 
Sugar Cane 
Production 
(metric tons) 
 
Cotton Area 
Cultivated 
(hectares) 
 
Cotton 
Production 
(metric tons) 
      
1915             43,678           42,804      2,548,189  -- -- 
1916             51,211           40,732      2,268,866           55,635          24,603  
1917             79,408           45,328      2,200,516           64,060          27,125  
1918             72,892           49,804      2,603,263           77,872          30,687  
1919             50,926           48,754      2,679,537           88,863          33,558  
1920             57,351           49,077      2,884,986         104,287          38,386  
1921             54,683           50,847      2,372,175         108,356          40,352  
1922             63,743           50,813      2,768,912         111,428          43,120  
1923             85,935           53,086      2,830,999         113,560          46,000  
1924           109,146           55,736      2,707,204         116,218          46,582  
1925             97,411           53,466      2,644,798         118,518          45,467  
1926             68,301           53,194      3,231,717         127,863          53,374  
1927             72,485           57,039      3,305,167         127,852          53,254  
1928           106,271           53,283      3,182,666         114,630          48,682  
1929           116,694           77,987      4,648,201         126,883          65,591  
1930             92,453           53,050      3,418,112         133,688          58,695  
1931             73,531           50,311      3,517,192         126,890          50,700  
1932             88,686           50,064      3,317,484        123,065          52,573  
1933           115,402           60,308      3,729,389        130,481          60,228  
1934           131,840           51,453      3,380,204        148,517          74,144  
1935           127,051           52,841      3,271,048        162,088          85,175  
1936           133,595           53,262      3,320,727        165,530          83,617  
1937           143,903           52,610      3,102,768        157,021          81,498  
1938           148,514           52,880      2,974,123         190,792          85,885  
1939           137,105           53,803      3,448,874         177,483          81,872  
1940           121,152           54,933      3,953,682         180,135          82,871  
1941           114,422           51,279      3,887,758         169,911          71,354  
1942             83,220           51,700      3,965,091         156,284          69,847  
1943             89,445           47,746      3,517,977         124,866          56,781  
1944             78,284           49,193      3,496,477         132,112          67,153  
1945             90,853           50,830      3,491,390         136,862          70,488  
1946           102,126           50,576      3,292,010         138,104          71,262  
1947           148,301           50,346      3,476,978         120,005          65,069  
1948           168,473           48,750      4,102,423         124,635          61,361  
1949           161,550           50,228      4,050,991         147,055          67,194  
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Appendix 6--Continued 
 
   
Year 
 
Guano Sales 
(metric tons) 
 
Cane Area 
Cultivated 
(hectares) 
 
 
Cane 
Production 
(metric tons) 
 
Cotton Area 
Cultivated 
(hectares) 
 
Cotton 
Production 
(metric tons) 
      
1950           221,342           53,226      3,697,087         134,396          73,468  
1951           243,708           54,566      3,961,421         160,207          83,231  
1952           236,492           52,208      4,169,758         189,869          96,305  
1953           241,937           55,041      5,403,665         204,992          96,042  
1954           270,056           55,890      5,813,000         209,169        111,876  
1955           309,563           56,923      6,097,566         217,473        104,939  
1956           312,620           61,546      5,876,384         226,995        115,083  
1957           272,534           62,082      6,077,792         239,235        105,399  
1958           149,379           61,751      6,840,208         237,627        114,571  
1959           108,879           66,749      6,543,824         235,928        115,831  
1960           114,620           69,204      6,837,832         252,355        130,499  
1961           126,201           69,204      6,837,832         255,000        131,110  
1962           130,429           73,892      7,247,077         275,000        145,642  
1963 190,350          75,130      7,697,310         260,000        146,775  
1964 195,293           76,440      7,390,920         260,000        141,331  
1965 --          83,190      7,498,940         227,800        130,918  
1966 --          83,460      8,463,380         203,976        121,308  
1967 --          82,890      7,942,800         180,425          88,649  
1968 --          79,150      7,272,300         166,235        100,825  
1969 --          76,533      6,411,900         188,610          88,631  
1970             40,516           78,864      7,531,318         143,825          91,480  
1971             41,277           86,575      8,309,447         136,325          81,747  
1972             51,564           83,595      8,611,668         127,580          75,655  
1973             57,687           85,736      8,772,386         134,660          81,543  
1974             17,047           89,831      9,183,620         148,190          90,013  
1975               3,310           91,475      8,927,700         133,670          72,357  
1976                  353           92,885      8,791,542           98,290          56,786  
1977             32,286           93,096      8,825,477         110,782          57,726  
1978             36,747           92,871      7,970,198         118,044          76,194  
1979             33,344           91,551      7,034,212         134,719          92,912  
1980             25,826           89,023      5,598,088         149,017          97,947  
      
Sources: Felipe Portocarrero S., Arlette Beltrán B., and María Elena Romero P., Compendio 
estadístico del Perú, 1900-1990 (Lima: Universidad del Pacífico, Centro de Investigación, 1992), 
40, 42; “Anexos: Guano explotado: Cantidades de guano solicitadas por la agricultura nacional y 
ventas realizadas a esta industria, guano exportado, ley media azoada y fosfatada del guano vendido 
a la agricultura nacional, y utilidad fiscal durante los años 1909-1962,” MCAG 54 (1963); 
MCONAFER1 (1965), 3, 6; S. Zuta and L. A. Flores, “Oceanography Development in Peru,” in 
Oceanography: The Past, ed. M. Sears and D. Merriman (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1980), 645; 
PESCA-PERU, Qué ha hecho y adonde va PESCA-PERU (Lima: n.p., 1982), 12.
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Appendix 8: Ranking of Coastal Bird Colonies by Guano Rico Production, 1909-1966 
 
 
Rank 
 
 
Guano Bird Colonies 
 
Guano Production 
(metric tons) 
 
   
1. Grupo de Islas Chincha (Norte, Central, Sur) 1,182,722 
2. Isla La Viejaa 793,842 
3. Grupo de Guañape 733,184 
4. Grupo de Santa Rosa 654,419 
5. Isla Don Martín 384,442 
6. Grupo de Asia 351,573 
7. Grupo de Pescadores 345,136 
8. Isla Macabí 343,714 
9. Grupo de Ballestas 338,570 
10. Grupo de Santa 312,758 
11. Grupo Huaura/Mazorca 250,306 
12. Grupo Pachacámac 214,668 
13. Puntas San Juana,b, San Nicolása, y Tres Hermanasa,b 197,655 
14. Grupo San Lorenzo 188,333 
15. Isla Lobos de Tierra 142,773 
16. Punta Culebrasa,b 144,011 
17. Punta Colesa,b 94,177 
18. Isla Tortuga 91,626 
19. Punta Salinasa,b 89,325 
20. Islotes y Puntas del Norte (Anconcillo)a 77,652 
21. Punta Lomasa 60,974 
22. Islotes y Puntas Chala, Aticob, Ocoña, Islay, 
Hornillos, Playa, Pescadores, y Saltadero 
 
59,461 
23. Isla Lobos de Afuera 49,730 
24. Morro de Sama 41,169 
25. Islotes y Puntas Jesús y Cocotea 36,534 
26. Puntas Chancay y Grita Lobos 30,560 
27. Isla Blanca del Norte 28,093 
28. Puntas Lomitasa,b y Olleroa 23,903 
29. Punta La Chiraa,b 23,861 
30. Islotes y Puntas del Sura 18,039 
31. Islotes y Puntas de Cerro Azul 13,344 
32. Punta Literaa,b 13,343 
33. Islotes Sombrerillos 12,076 
34. Isla Blanca Sur u Ovillos 10,405 
35. Islas Hormigas de Afuera 9,912 
36. Isla Palominos 8,612 
37. Punta Malabrigoa,b 6,566 
   
  
Continued on next page    
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Appendix 8--Continued    
 
 
Rank 
 
 
Guano Bird Colonies 
 
Guano Production 
(metric tons) 
 
   
38. Punta Cerro Negroa 6,135 
39. Punta e Islote Tartacay 3,165 
40. Isla El Frontóna 1,872 
   
  
Total (all islands and points): 
 
7,394,434 
   
Source: MCONAFER 5 (1967), 47. 
a Ninety percent or greater of total guano rico on this particular territory was produced after 1946. 
b Protected by isolation walls built by CAG after 1946.
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Appendix 9: Fish and Fishmeal Production and Exports in Peru, 1953-1997 
 
 
Year 
(El Niño Event 
Strength)a 
 
Anchoveta 
Production 
(metric tons) 
 
All Other 
Fish Species 
Production 
(metric tons) 
 
 
Fishmeal 
Exports  
(metric tons) 
 
Fishmeal Export 
Income 
(million US$) 
 
     
1953 (M+)        37,112         50,360b        27,700  7.0 
1954        43,028         65,640b        40,600  11.2 
1955        58,707         71,030b         47,300  11.8 
1956      118,726         83,590b         61,000  14.9 
1957 (S)      325,624         98,270        97,700  18.4 
1958 (S)      737,019       109,670       137,200  17.9 
1959   1,908,698       138,480      338,500  42.5 
1960  2,943,602       143,770      575,400  50.0 
1961  4,579,708      158,910       849,900  69.7 
1962  6,274,624       152,620   1,219,500  119.8 
1963  6,423,244       148,680   1,199,700  120.2 
1964   8,863,367       127,870    1,565,500  165.7 
1965 (M+)   7,242,390       126,930    1,581,400  185.7 
1966   8,529,821       143,440    1,421,700  205.4 
1967   9,824,624                  --     1,812,400  203.4 
1968 10,262,661       177,000   2,404,100  232.0 
1969 (M-)  8,960,460       182,000    1,886,700  320.4 
1970 12,276,977       204,000    1,873,000  303.0 
1971 10,276,600       227,300    1,750,000  267.0 
1972 (S)   4,447,200       356,000   1,524,000  219.0 
1973 (S)   1,512,800       776,300       348,000  138.0 
1974   3,583,400       535,700       629,000  202.0 
1975   3,078,800       318,900      781,000  168.0 
1976 (M)  3,863,100       473,800       592,000  168.0 
1977      792,100    1,699,200       436,000  184.0 
1978   1,187,000    2,243,300       483,000  196.0 
1979   1,362,700    2,276,700       657,000  256.0 
1980      720,100    1,977,000       417,000  195.0 
1981  1,225,200    1,475,900      315,000  141.0 
1982 (VS)   1,720,400    1,776,500       616,000  202.0 
1983 (VS)     118,400    1,418,600      205,000  80.0 
1984        23,000    3,265,400      401,000  137.0 
1985 844,260 3,365,900 508,000 118.0 
1986 3,481,870 2,047,700 716,000 206.0 
1987 (M) 1,764,640 2,783,700 732,000 223.0 
1988 2,701,100 3,897,300 812,000 357.0 
     
     
Continued on next page    
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Appendix 9--Continued 
 
   
 
Year 
 
Anchoveta 
Production 
(metric tons) 
 
All Other 
Fish Species 
Production 
(metric tons) 
 
 
Fishmeal 
Exports 
(metric tons) 
 
Fishmeal Export 
Income 
(million US$) 
 
     
1989 3,718,700 3,041,491 1,095,000 410.0 
1990 2,926,408 3,850,375 1,093,000 339.0 
1991 3,080,992 3,724,121 1,123,000 441.0 
1992 (M) 4,869,966 2,544,171 993,000 427.0 
1993 7,009,534 1,917,784 1,568,000 545.0 
1994 9,800,223 2,097,066 2,221,000 713.0 
1995 6,558,108 2,258,869 1,816,000 712.0 
1996 7,463,147 1,977,440 1,610,000 836.7 
1997 (VS) 5,923,000 1,947,800 1,924,500 1,027.0 
1998 (VS) 1,205,600 4,347,700 669,600 394.4 
1999 6,732,000 1,698,900 1,481,300 532.9 
2000 9,372,200 1,094,100 2,343,800 860.5 
     
Sources: Felipe Portocarrero S., Arlette Beltrán B., and María Elena Romero P.,  Compendio 
estadístico del Perú, 1900-1990 (Lima: Universidad del Pacífico, Centro de Investigación, 1992), 
46, 138-141; Richard Webb and Graciela Fernández Baca, eds., Anuario estadístico: Perú en 
números 1999 (Lima: Cuánto, 1999), 756, 1226; Peru, Superintendencia Nacional de Aduanas, 
“Aduanas: Información estadística--exportaciones, Peru: Segun sectores económicos 1997-2001,” 
[cited 6 Mar. 2001], available from http://www.aduanet.gob.pe/aduanas/informae/supme1.htm; 
Peru, Ministerio de Pesquería, “Resúmen general del desenvolvimiento de la actividad pesquera, 
1997-98,” [cited 6 Mar. 2001], available from http://www.minpes.gob.pe/cuad_anua98.htm; idem, 
“Resúmen general del desenvolvimiento de la actividad pesquera, 1999-2000,” [cited 6 Mar. 2001], 
available from  http://www.minpes.gob.pe/boletme2.htm. 
a El Niño event strength as determined by W. H. Quinn and V. T. Neal, “The Historical Record of El 
Niño Events,” in Climate Since A.D. 1500, rev. ed., ed. Raymond S. Bradley and Philip D. Jones 
(London: Routledge, 1995), 623-648; M- = weak, M = moderate, M+ = moderately strong, S = 
strong, VS = very strong. 
b Excludes dried and salted fish production; no data available. 
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